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
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Several Hundred RECREATION HUTS, Tents and Clubs, at home and in France, Flanders, Malta, Egypt, Salonica, East Africa, Mesopotamia and India (over 60 under shell-fire on Western Front; 42 in Egypt) for Sailors and Soldiers; many more needed; Huts cost £300, Tents £150, Week's working £5 abroad, £2 at home.

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
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
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
ANNIESLAND,

GLASGOW.



THE SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR BY THE SPANIARDS, 1704-5.

From an old print in the possession of Colonel C. Field, R.M.L.I. Published at Augsburg.



#### SECRETARY'S NOTES.

#### I.—Entrance Fee Temporarily Suspended.

At the Annual General Meeting held on March 7th last it was unanimously resolved that for the present, and as a temporary measure, the payment of any entrance fee on joining the Institution should be dispensed with.

#### II.-Life Membership: Reduced Terms.

It was at the same time decided that the amount payable for Life Membership should be temporarily reduced from £15 to £10.

#### III.-New Members.

The following officers joined the Institution during the months of August, September, and October, viz.:-

The Reverend D. M. Kay, Army Chaplain. Lieutenant J. H. Dixson, The Royal Scots.

Lieutenant W. Scott, 20th (Reserve) Bn. Highland Light Infantry.

Fleet-Surgeon A. S. G. Bell, late R.N.

Major G. W. West, 8th (Service) Bn. K.O. Royal Lancaster Regiment.

Assistant-Paymaster E. M. Tetley, R.N.

Captain A. R. Rainy, R.F.A.
Sub-Lieutenant R. H. Poppleton, R.N.R.
Lieutenant H. H. Tarver, R.E. (T.F.).
Lieutenant F. G. Firmin, R.N.R.

Major J. H. Leslie, late R.A.

Assistant-Paymaster F. N. L. Oliver, R.N. Second-Lieutenant G. R. M. Coldwell, Coldstream Guards.

Second-Lieutenant P. J. W. McClenaghan, I.A.

Lieutenant C. J. Charlewood, R.N.R.

Captain C. S. Peach, Reserve of Officers (T.F.).

Major E. M. Little, R.G.A.

Captain J. H. Woods, Royal Berkshire Regiment.

Lieutenant-Commander D. MacD. Ross, R.N.R.

Captain O. D. Bennett, I.A.

Lieutenant G. L. Harvest, 5th Bn. London Regiment (T.F.).

Major-General F. W. Ward, C.B., late R.A.

Colonel W. Verner, late Rifle Brigade.

Lieutenant A. H. S. Casswell, R.N. Major E. Wighton, D.S.O., R.G.A.

Major-General S. B. Steele, C.B., M.V.O., Canadian Fortes Lieutenant H. T. Thornhill, late K.R.R.C.

Second-Lieutenant W. I. Leetham, 11th Hussars.

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#### IV.-Library Subscription Reduced.

The Council have pleasure in announcing that for the present, and as a temporary measure, it is decided to reduce the subscription to the Lending Library from 10s. per annum to 5s. per annum. The Library is rich in works of reference, military and naval, historical, scientific, etc.; a subscriber can take out as many as four volumes at one time.

#### V.-The R.U.S.I. Journal.

#### PAYMENTS FOR CONTRIBUTIONS.

Naval and military officers, whether members of the Institution or not, are invited to send papers, essays, experiences, narratives, etc., which may appear to be of general interest, for the consideration of the Editor, with a view to publication in the quarterly JOURNAL of the Institution.

#### VI.—The late Field-Marshal Earl Kitchener's Medal Ribbons.

Several inquiries having been made as to the medal ribbons worn by Lord Kitchener at the time of his death, the following is a complete list in the order in which he was wearing them with the colours of the ribbons:—

G.C.B. Crimson.
G.C.S.I. Pale blue, white edging.
G.C.M.G. Blue, red, blue.
G.C.I.E. Blue.
Queen's Jubilee Pale blue, dark blue, pale blue.

Coronation, 1902 Blue, red, blue.

Durbar, 1902 Dark blue and light blue stripes (5).

Coronation, 1911 Pale blue, red, pale blue.
Egypt Blue and white stripes (5).
Khartoum Yellow, pink, black.

Queen's South Africa Red, blue, orange, blue, red.
King's South Africa Green, white, orange.

Mediidieh Green, red, green

Medjidieh Green, red, green
Osmanieh Red, green, red.
Leopold of Belgium Claret.
Savoy Order Blue, red, blue.

Legion of Honour

French Military Cross
French War Medal (1870)

Bright crimson.

Green and Red Stripes (11).

Black and green stripes (7).

Khedive's Star

Khedive's Khartoum

Khedive's Khartoum

Blue.

Yellow, blue, yellow.

The Field-Marshal had also been awarded the following orders, the ribbons of which he was not wearing:—K.G., K.P., O.M., St. John of Jerusalem, and the Grand Cross of Serbia (red with blue and white edging).

#### VII.-The late Captain H. J. G. Garbett, R.N.

The Council have learnt with great regret the announcement of the death of Captain Hubert J. G. Garbett, R.N., which took place at Herne Hill suddenly

on September 7th. The deceased was the second son of the Venerable James Garbett, Archdeacon of Chichester, and, entering the Royal Navy, was for three years, from 1882 to 1885, Flag-Lieutenant to Admiral Rider, while later he commanded H.M.S. "Humber," "Castor," and "Coastguard." He was appointed Editor and Librarian to the Royal United Service Institution in January, 1896, in succession to Colonel (then Captain) F. N. Maude, C.B., subsequently, on a change being made in the distribution of these duties, retaining the office of Editor only until early in 1911, when, on attaining the age of 65, he retired. He was thus connected with the work of the Library and Journal of this Institution for some seventeen years, and during that time the Library received very many additions to its already large number of books, maps, charts and manuscripts, while the high standard of the Journal was more than maintained during the long period of time that Captain Garbett controlled it. The Council feel sure that all members of the Institution will join with them in this expression of regret at the sudden death of one who, in his time, did such admirable work for the Royal United Service Institution.

#### VIII. - Distribution of the Journal-Members' Addresses.

Owing to the War, members' addresses have become so uncertain, and are so constantly changing, that punctual distribution of the JOURNAL is quite impracticable, and many members must fail to receive their copies. As a matter of fact, a great many copies of the last number have been returned to the Institution, through the Post Office, "Addressee not found." It is notified, therefore, that any member who does not receive a copy of the present issue can be supplied by applying to the Secretary and giving an address.

#### IX.-Marine Society-"Hawkins" Widows' Fund.

The Marine Society, having in trust certain funds which are distributed in annual grants to widows of Captains, Commanders, Lieutenant-Commanders, and Lieutenants of the Royal Navy of the Engineering and Executive branches, are prepared to receive applications for the same.

Full particulars may be obtained from the Secretary, Marine Society, Clark's Place, Bishopsgate, E.C.

X .- The amount taken for admission to the Museum during the past quarter was :-

£,66 17 6 in August.

£95 19 o in September.

£52 9 9 in October.

#### ADDITIONS.

- (3426) Spanish Order of Charles III. of Spain presented to Major-General Sir W. Parker Carrol, K.H., C.B., who served with great distinction through the Napoleonic Wars and held a command in the Spanish Army during the Peninsular War.—Deposited by Miss Alice Carrol.
- (3427) Model of the Attack on Mametz, July 1st, 1916.—Deposited by Brigadier-General C. J. Deverell.

This model was made by the late Captain D. L. Martin, the Devonshire Regiment. It was made previous to the attack and was

used for instructional purposes by all taking part. After the completion of the attack the model was found to be very accurate,

Up to July 1st the British line ran approximately east and west in front of Mametz, at an average distance of 200 yards from the German front line. It ran continuously across the road and railway, ascending the hill which rises steeply from the railway valley to the small wood known as Mansel Copse. At this point the opposing lines were about 120 yards apart. Our line then continued its course up the hill to the mine craters on top of the hill. Both forces had here been engaged in mining operations for many months past until practically the space between the lines on top of the hill consisted of craters 40-60 feet deep. The edges of these craters were held by the two opposing forces—the intervening space being reduced in places to about 50 yards.

Each of the German trench lines was very strongly protected by thick continuous rows of barbed wire entanglements. The communication trenches connecting the hostile trenches with covered

approaches were similarly wired on both sides.

A steep bank covered with shrubs and undergrowth ran in front of the German front line between the railway and the craters. From their front line to the top of this bank the Germans had dug three

saps as shown on the model.

The fortified village of Mametz—the numerous trench lines, and the whole of the wire entanglements—works which had been in preparation for nearly two years, were completely demolished by our artillery previous to the attack. So complete was the preparation that on the morning of the attack the trenches were practically unrecognizable—the whole area being converted into a mass of deep shell holes.

Amidst, and in many cases under these shell holes, still existed the deep German dug-outs—25 to 30 feet under the ground. Well timbered and built they were for the most part immune from the fire of our heaviest artillery, but their occupants who had existed during our bombardment unable to stir out, were no match for our infantry when on the morning of July 1st they charged across "No man's land," delighted to deal a strong blow to an enemy with whom they had been in ceaseless contact for many long months.

Side by side Gordon Highlanders, men of Devon and from the border county of Cumberland, rushed through the German line. The fight was fierce and hard, but on the afternoon of July 1st the ruins of Mametz were in our hands, and our line ran from the craters along Apple and Orchard Valleys around the northern face

of Mametz into Bunny Alley.

Every inch of the ground allotted to the troops as their task for the day had been gained, and the number of German dead and wounded, together with numerous prisoners who had fallen into our hands, showed the blow which had been struck on an enemy who deemed themselves secure in their semi-permanent fortifications supported by powerful artillery and very many machine guns. The roads are shown by white thread, the railways by red.

(6810) Badge of the Militia Eight of the Militia Rifle Association, now amalgamated with the Army Rifle Association.—Given by Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Williams. (6811) Sleeve link which was worn by Roger Casement and taken from him when he landed in Ireland in April, 1916. It is made of two Kruger threepenny pieces dated 1896 and 1897.

Casement was executed at Pentonville for high treason on

August 3rd, 1916.-Given by the Army Council.

(6812) Silver Medal to commemorate the glorious memory of those who fell on May 31st, 1916, in the naval battle off the coast of Jutland. It was designed by Admiral H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenberg, G.C.B., etc.

On the obverse: The Union Jack and the White Ensign, the staffs crossed in front of a trident and tied to it by a riband, from which depends a small shield inscribed May 31st, 1916. The legend around is: "To the glorious memory of those who fell that day."

On the reverse: "May 31st, 1916. The German Fleet attacked off the coast of Jutland and driven back into port with heavy loss. Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty Commanding Battle-cruiser Fleet." This inscription, which is in ten lines, is placed within a heavy wreath of oak.— Given by Messrs. Spink & Sons, Ltd.

- (6813 to Dress Coatee, Overalls, Crimson Silk Sash and Lines, Sword Belt 6819) and Sabretache, Cross-belt and Plate of a Lieutenant of the Royal Horse Artillery of about 1815. They were worn by Lieutenant Edward Green, who served through the Peninsular War.—Given by his niece, Mrs. Ewen.
- (6820) Field Officer's Shako of the Royal Artillery, 1828, with an additional pair of chin-strap scales of a later period, which belonged to Lieutenant Edward Green, who served through the Peninsular War.— Given by his niece, Mrs. Ewen.

(6821) Waistcoat taken from a German seaman who was rescued from the wreck of a German submarine which was sunk by H.M. Destroyer "Attack."

The Waistcoat has a curious arrangement with a bag at the back, which it is supposed was used as a gas-holder to enable the wearer to get clear of a sunken submarine.—Given by the ship's company of H.M.S. "Attack."

- (6822 & Two Incendiary Bombs dropped in England from a German Zeppelin 6823) on the morning of September 3rd, 1916, which failed to explode.—
  Given by the Army Council.
- (6824) A burnt-out Incendiary Bomb dropped from a German Zeppelin on the morning of September 3rd, 1916, which was picked up near Sedgeford, in England.—Given by the Army Council.
- (6825) Piece of the head of an exploded Bomb dropped from a German Zeppelin on the morning of September 3rd, 1916, which was picked up at Wixoe, in England.—Given by the Army Council.
- (6826) Naval Cap of a German officer which was dropped from a German Zeppelin on the morning of September 3rd, 1916, and picked up by a Superintendent of Police at Loddon, in Norfolk.—Given by the Army Council.
- (6827 & Two portions of a Bomb dropped from a German Zeppelin on the 6828) morning of September 3rd, 1916, which were picked up in the neighbourhood of London.—Given by the Army Council.

- (6829) A German Steel Trench Helmet captured in France.—Given by the Army Council.
- (6830) Set of Medal Ribbons worn by the late Field-Marshal The Right Hon. Earl Kitchener of Khartoum which were taken from one of his undress coats at the time of his death, consisting of the following, viz., G.C.B.; G.C.S.I.; G.C.M.G.; G.C.I.E.; Queen's Jubilee; Coronation, 1902; Durbar, 1902; Coronation, 1911; Egypt; Khartoum; South Africa, Queen's; South Africa, King's; Medjidieh; Osmanieh; Leopold of Belgium; Savoy; Legion of Honour; French Military Cross; French 1870 War; Khedive's Star; Khedive's Khartoum.

Lord Kitchener's other orders were as follows: K.G., K.P., O.M., St. John of Jerusalem, and Servian Order.—Given by Captain Sir George Arthur, Bart., M.V.O.

The attention of members is drawn to the Museum Purchase Fund.

# THE JOURNAL

OF THE

# Royal United Service Institution.

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No. 444.

[Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective Papers. All communications (except those for perusal by the Editor only) should be addressed to the Secretary, Royal United Service Institution.]

#### THE TRAINING OF THE NEW ARMY, 1803-1805.

By Major J. F. C. FULLER.

IN 1781 the capitulation of York Town, to all intents and purposes, closed the War of the American Independence. In 1782 the British Army was withdrawn from America, and a year later its disbandment was all but complete, leaving Great Britain, at a very critical period in European history, without an army to support her politics or to defend her shores.

In the following year, 1784, the finishing touch to this disastrous task was accomplished, General Conway retiring from the post of Commander-in-Chief, for political reasons, no other officer was appointed in his place. From this time on decadence was rapid, and by 1794, two years after the revolutionary wars had begun, the condition of the British Army was deplorable beyond words.

Men had been disbanded without registration; now that they were wanted they could not be found. There was no system of recruiting or of training once the men had been impressed. Endless regiments were raised from the riff-raff of the nation. There was no discipline, and the chief qualification of an officer and a gentleman was that of being, as nearly as possible, perpetually drunk.

In 1794 Pitt introduced the rascally system of raising men for rank, in other words, officers could buy their promotion by buying men as recruits.

This led to endless abuses, and it was not unusual for infants in the cradle to obtain commissions and to draw pay regularly for sixteen years before joining their corps. Mere children were exalted in the course of a few weeks to the dignity of field officers. One proud parent, indeed, requested leave of absence for one of these infant Lieutenant-Colonels, on the ground that he was not yet fit to be taken from school.

The following well-known story illustrates the limit to which this system was carried:—

A certain gentleman, on visiting a house in Scotland, heard a loud noise proceeding from the nursery. On enquiring what was wrong, the maid answered: "Oh, it's only the Major roaring for his parritch."

In 1792 the British Army was only 32,000 strong; by 1796, after every means of fraud and violence had been employed, it was raised to 206,000.

"A child might sell himself, or, rather, be sold by his parents for life," writes one author, "and the difference between the price of enlistment for limited and unlimited service was only one guinea." The reward for life enlistment being two.

The first light shed upon this darkness emanated from a dour, canny, level-headed old Scotsman, General Sir David Dundas, later on Commander-in-Chief of the British Army. In 1785 he attended the last manœuvres of Frederick the Great, and was so impressed by the training of the Prussian Army and its mechanical drill that, in 1791, he produced a monumental work entitled: "The Principles of Military Movement." This book was very well received by King George III., and, at the suggestion of the Duke of York, the King's brother, Dundas was ordered to compile a drill book for the army, there being no official one in use at the time. This he did, and on June 1st, 1792, appeared the first true drill book the British Army ever had. It was called "The Rules and Regulations for the Formation Field Exercise and Movement of His Majesty's Forces."

It was a colossal work, a work pedantic and already out of date, for the revolutionary wars in France had given birth to a system of fighting vastly superior to that of Frederick, and, tactically, diametrically opposed to it. Yet the "Rules and Regulations" saved the British Army, for they gave it a doctrine and a system to work by.

Nine years later, in 1801, the second step was taken towards the reconstruction of the Army—the Duke of York was made Commander-in-Chief.

Little successful as a General, his royal position, his will and his determination, at once made themselves felt, and out of a criminal mob of men began to appear an army which, a few years later, proved itself invincible in Spain.

Meanwhile, on the Continent, during these nine years, things had been moving apace. Bonaparte, with a brilliance unparalleled in war, had destroyed the Austrian armies trained under the system of Frederick the Great. This set thinking several of the few true soldiers left in England, who, seeing that it was useless to hope to vanquish the

French by means of Prussian drill, opened a campaign against the rigid formality of the Dundas system. Chief amongst these were Lord Howe, Major-General John Money and Colonel George Hanger, all veterans of the American War.

As late as 1805 we find Hanger writing:

"I hold in detestation and abhorrence all Button and Buckle Officers, I never yet have seen a real martinet a tip-top Adjutant (excuse, my Lord, I entreat you, the vulgarity of the latter expression) ever turn out a good officer on service; their minds, my Lord, are confined to the drill and parade, and extend no further; their whole thoughts are absorbed in the minutiæ of discipline; their ideas soar no higher than pipe clay, buttons, lacquering of caps, the precise length of the pig-tail, even to a quarter of an inch . . . ."

His final remarks are still too pointed to be left unquoted:

"Let not the opinion of either lawyer or priest be asked on military affairs; let the lawyer stick to his brief and the priest to his sermon; for the lawyer, when asked his opinion on military topics, may reply, that he approves of the plan, 'nevertheless, notwithstanding, if so be, provided anything should be to the contrary notwithstanding'.... And the priest may give as curious an answer ...."

"Let women trifle, toy, caress and change, as often as the wind, but let Englishmen be firm and irrevocably fixed in the prosecution of

some one plan for the safety of their country."

The agitation for military reform brought about by hostility to Dundas's "Rules and Regulations" first bore fruit in 1797, when Baron Francis de Rottenburg, an Austrian soldier of fortune, was appointed by the Duke of York to raise and command the 5th Battalion of the Royal Americans, now the King's Royal Rifle Corps. This he did, and, for the benefit of his men, he translated his book, "Regulations for the Exercise of Riflemen and Light Infantry," which had first appeared in German in 1797. This book, under the guidance of Sir John Moore, was about to reform the whole tactical training of the Army.

These Regulations, a slight volume of some eighty pages, contained a complete treatise on the art of war, much of which has survived to this day; further, it contained the germs of a new discipline, which a few years later Sir John Moore was destined to perfect at

Shorncliffe.

The following quotations will clearly show its character:-

"The true Rifleman will never fire without being sure of his mark."

"Interest and humanity both require the maintenance of a strict discipline."

"It is the duty of every officer carefully to provide for the wants

of his men."

"The officers should endeavour to learn the capacities and characters of their men, so that they may employ them to the best advantage; this may be easily done by conversing with them, and hearing their opinions and statements on different subjects."

Skill, discipline, humanity and comradeship were the foundations of Baron de Rottenburg's training, which may virtually be looked upon as the commencement of that system of training which, under Sir John Moore at Shorncliffe, produced a body of troops unsurpassed in the history of war.

The influence of the Duke of York, of Sir John Moore, who was his chief military adviser, and of such men as Money, Hanger and de Rottenburg, was beginning to make itself felt, in spite of the opposition offered by most of the officers of the old school, such men as William Napier so graphically depicts in a letter to his mother dated December, 1803:—

"Under a long feather and cocked hat, trembling though supported by stiff Hessian boots, gold-headed cane and long sword, I see the wizened face of a General, grinning over the parapet of a fine frill, and telling extraordinary lies, while his claret, if he can afford claret, is going down the throats of his wondering or quizzing aides-de-camp."

In 1800 the Experimental Rifle Corps was formed under the able command of Colonel Coote Manningham and Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable William Stewart. This Corps, under its old number, the 95th, became famous during the Peninsular War; to-day it is known as the Rifle Brigade.

Stewart was an exceptionally able man, though petulant and quick of temper. At the age of twenty-one he had been made Lieutenant-Colonel of the 67th, at the age of twenty-six Lieutenant-Colonel of the Experimental Rifle Corps, for which he wrote the "Regulations of the Rifle Corps," probably the finest and most thorough Regimental Standing Orders which have ever been compiled.

In 1802, on the advice of Sir John Moore, Colonel Coote Manningham received a route to move the Rifle Corps to Shorncliffe. In 1803, Sir John Moore, with his own regiment, the 52nd Light Infantry, moved there as well. In 1804 the 43rd Light Infantry joined them; the camp was now complete.

Other regiments joined the camp at various times, but it was these three regiments which in particular Moore trained and which later on fought together under Craufurd, Seaton and Wellington in Portugal, Spain and France.

I will now turn to the founder of this camp, for the character of Sir John Moore played so important a part in the moulding of the character of the troops under him.

Born in 1761, from the time he first saw active service in America, in 1781, his life was spent amongst his troops in many parts of the world. In 1794 he was in Corsica and took an important part in the reduction of that island; in 1796 he sailed for St. Lucia, and it was almost entirely due to his energy that the rebels there were defeated. In 1798 he was sent to Ireland, then in a state of rebellion, and soon overcame all resistance; he forbade all retaliation and earned the respect and even the affection of the rebels. In 1799 he saw active service in Holland, and in 1800 in Egypt.

Whilst at St. Lucia a small incident occurred which shows the extraordinary nobility of his character.

Finding he could not superintend the work alone, he asked Sir Ralph Abercromby, the Commander-in-Chief, to appoint General Knox, who was senior to him, to take part in the duties. General Abercromby was much surprised, and pointed out to Moore, that, if General Knox were appointed, Moore would have to work under his orders.

Moore answered as follows:-

"I have asked for another General because another is requisite for the numerous duties. I ventured to propose General Knox because he is a man of good sense and an excellent officer: for it is of the utmost importance that the service should be well conducted, but of none, which of us commands."

Such an action as this was typical of Moore. Throughout his life it was his country first, his friends second, himself last. It is natures such as his which forge epochs.

Moore was not only a hard worker, but a very cheerful worker, and exceedingly human. Sir Charles Napier relates how once, whilst in Portugal, he was looking at a very pretty woman at a window, when someone gently laid hold of both his ears saying in a joking tone: "Ah, Caitiff! have I caught you? What right have you to look at such an ugly woman as that? I will put you under arrest." Looking round, Sir Charles, then quite a young officer, saw that it was the Commander-in-Chief who had caught him. "I will thank you for the punishment, Sir," he answered, "if you will place the ugly old woman over me as sentry."

At times Sir John Moore could be dryly sarcastic. Once, inspecting a worthy old Colonel with a soul not above buttons, he remarked: "Your men are clean—very clean," and then, after a pause, "So are the Gosport Volunteers."

Sir John Moore's system of instruction was derived from many sources, it was nothing entirely new, but he surrounded his instruction with an atmosphere of his own, which made it quite irresistible. He not only worked hard, but made others work hard, and like working hard for him. And if we look for any landmark in his training we shall find that it was discipline more than drill that he aimed at. Discipline of a mental, and, consequently, of a moral order, rather than that discipline which has for its goal implicit and blind obedience.

We may look in vain for a written account of the discipline which made the Light Division so famous, for no true system of discipline can be set forth between the covers of a book.

The greatest gift a teacher can possess is a magnetic personality, which attracts to him those he comes in contact with; such a personality Moore possessed beyond all others.

Sir Henry Bunbury writes: "Every quality in Moore was real, solid and unbending." He was a man to whom every officer looked up to with an "entire confidence." Here we have the key to his success as a trainer of soldiers, for without confidence there can be no true discipline.

He insisted that his officers should be trained with their men, and in this he was ably seconded by his Commanding Officers. Sir Kenneth McKenzie, who commanded the 52nd, once said: "If the officers do not fully understand their duty, it is quite impossible to expect that the men can or will perform theirs as they ought."

On joining, the young officer was at once treated like an ordinary recruit. He would drill with the men, and the natural result of this was, that he and the men he would one day command got to know each other, and to realize that they were of one flesh and blood; and that they, as soldiers, were both of the same caste, of the same family or brotherhood, and that, therefore, for such years as they worked together, they must work, not for themselves alone, but for each other, in order to accomplish a common task which had always to be well done, for the honour of the regiment to which they both belonged.

The first requirement in the formation of a good battalion is a good Commanding Officer, this has always been so in theory, but at Shorncliffe Moore insisted that it should be so in practice. With him it was not a matter of age but of ability—without a good Commanding Officer there can be no good battalion, especially a good light infantry battalion, for initiative is essential in such.

One of the books used at Shorncliffe was Ewald's "Treatise upon the Duties of Light Troops." Ewald was a Hessian Jäger, who had fought on the British side during the War of the American Independence. His remarks on the selection of Commanding Officers must have pleased Moore. He writes:—

"The roster, according to seniority in a Light Corps in war time, when the unskilfulness or irresolution of an officer has so frequently occasioned the loss of the honour, liberty and lives of so many men, has always appeared to me like the electing of a Burgo-master in a free and imperial city, when the municipality assembled round a table, and laid down their honourable heads and grey beards upon it; in the middle of the table was placed a louse, which louse, on marching into the beard of one of them, decided the election of the dignity of Burgomaster."

As regards the officers, the Regulations of the Rifle Corps have many excellent remarks to make. I will, however, only quote one, which practically sums up all the rest:—

"From the Officers of the Regiment the Colonel expects every example of what is good and great in a Soldier's and a Gentleman's character."

When a soldier enlisted into one of the regiments at Shorncliffe he was first treated with lenity and attention, and not until these had proved useless was he punished.

The system of punishment at Shorncliffe was far removed from the barbarous methods of the day; in the 95th it was divided under two main headings, Private Punishment and Public Punishment. Under the first, the offender was tried by a company court-martial convened by the Captain. If a private soldier had to be tried, the court consisted of a corporal as president and three or four private soldiers as members; if a corporal, then the court was composed of three sergeants and two corporals. Public Punishment was generally carried out by an officer's court-martial or by the Commanding Officer.

Officers were urged that good discipline was attained by preventing crime rather than by punishing it; and that the best preventative was occupation. If the men were not working they were to be encouraged to play games, their officers taking part in them. We read that Sir William Napier, then a subaltern, "joined in competing with the soldiers in all their sports." His brother Charles tells a story how Moore himself raced his officers up the Sandgate Shorncliffe Hill, and was only just beaten by Neil Campbell, of the 95th.

"Games," the Regulations of the Rifle Corps inform us, "can never be too much encouraged." The following were played at Shorncliffe: cricket, hand and foot ball, leap-frog, quoits, vaulting, and racing. Dancing was encouraged and considered a good exercise, and every man was taught to swim.

Besides bodily exercise, mental ones were provided for, and we

find instituted regimental schools and libraries.

The comfort and well-being of the men were insisted upon, and not only their well-being, but the welfare of their wives and children. There was a regimental Charity Fund, there were regimental needlework classes and laundries. The regiments were, in fact, self-supporting.

I now come to the principle which differentiated the Shorncliffe training from all other training of the day—this principle was discipline, not the mechanical discipline of Frederick and Dundas, but the intelligent discipline which embues an army with confidence and

I will not enlarge on this subject, all I will do is to quote from the various regulations in force in Sir John Moore's camp, I will let them speak for themselves:—

"The first principle of discipline," we read, "is a full acquaintance of the soldier's character by their officers, a strong example of good conduct on their part, and a steady unchangeable mode of authority towards those who are under their orders."

"Real discipline implies obedience and respect wherever it is due on one hand, and on the other just but energetic use of command and responsibility."

A good soldier was defined as follows: "He who possesses the most peaceable conduct in his quarters, and the most generous courage in the field."

Another maxim was: "The good order and discipline of a regiment requires that fixed rules and directions should be laid down for the conduct of each individual."

Discipline at Shorncliffe was based on esprit de corps, and the following extract from "The Regulations of the Rifle Corps" might with advantage be hung up in every barrack room:—

"The rules of discipline may be what they will, and the system for good order, appearance and conduct of a regiment may be laid down by the Colonel with what precision he thinks just, yet the whole will never attain the wished-for perfection, unless a general anxiety that it should do so lies in every man's heart to a certain degree, and unless his officers in particular are animated with an equal desire of their regiments doing honour to the army they are in. To aid their endeavours in doing well, a system and a rule of conduct is here given them, and the best help is the putting their minds, as well as those who are under their orders, into a train of regularity, and upon a plan of health and comfort. The officer must, however, remember that example is the most powerful of all preceptors, and he will find that what he does not himself observe, with regard to conduct, will not be attended to to any successful degree by those whom he commands."

To foster this *esprit de corps* mutual confidence and self-respect were instilled. In the Rifle Corps every soldier had his "Comrade," his own personal friend, who helped him out of difficulties and whom he helped in turn.

Men who bore exemplary characters were presented with Good Conduct Medals, a thing quite unheard of in other corps.

All duties under arms were to be considered honourable, and such a punishment as giving a man an extra guard or picquet would have amazed a Shorncliffe officer.

Promotion from the ranks was encouraged, an act which must have outraged the ideas of that day. We read, "The best Generals have sometimes risen from the ranks, and no principle is so false, or more unjust, than that which in military life checks just ambition, or says even to the private soldier, if he is actually a man of merit, thus far shall you rise in your profession and no further." The road to promotion was open to all ranks at Shorncliffe: the only qualifications were ability and honour.

I will now run through, as briefly as I can, the actual training as daily carried out at Shorncliffe. First, it must be remembered that the camp was an active service one. On a clear day, with a powerful telescope, from Shorncliffe small specks could be seen moving about on the downs about Boulogne; these small specks were the French battalions destined, as Napoleon hoped, to conquer England. Moore watched them, and he determined, as far as it lay within his power, that, should they cross the Channel, they should never set foot on British soil, for his plan was to attack them in the water as they waded ashore.

Let us glance at his organization, and then follow the training carried out at Shorncliffe, which was training for active service.

The battalions at Shorncliffe were organized as one brigade. Each battalion consisted of ten companies: eight of the line, one of light infantry, and one of grenadiers. The Colonel was in supreme command, and to him all ranks looked for protection and favour, as well as displeasure and punishment. Under the Colonel came the

Lieutenant-Colonel, who was responsible for the discipline and interior economy of the regiment, under him the two Majors, and under the Majors the ten Captains. Each Captain had three subalterns, the senior, known as the Captain-Lieutenant, was responsible for the interior economy of the company, the remaining two were platoon commanders. The company in those days was organized in two platoons of two squads, that is four squads to the company. Besides these officers each regiment had an Adjutant, a Surgeon and a Quartermaster.

In the summer time reveille sounded at 5 a.m., in the winter at 7 a.m. Immediately after it had sounded the Orderly Sergeant went round the rooms and saw that all windows were opened and that beds were made; he saw that "every man washed his hands, feet and face, combed and tied his hair, and dressed himself properly." The rooms were then swept out and breakfast laid, a clean tablecloth being put on the table.

Perfect order was always maintained in the barrack rooms, a roll of the men in the room was hung on the door, and no article was ever to be without its place appointed.

The messing was done by squads, no sergeants being present, for they had their own mess, it being considered detrimental to discipline for them to have their meals with the men. Officers were also ordered to have a mess of their own, so that they might learn to know each other, and if they objected to join it they were ordered to leave their regiment.

Each man was taught how to cook, and was provided with a cook's frock; it was considered prejudicial to discipline to demean any one soldier to the position of perpetual scullion to his comrades.

The duties of the Orderly Officer were very much severer in those days than now, for each company had its own Orderly Officer, and besides these there was one Orderly Captain of the Day to collect the reports.

The Orderly Officers had to be dressed and up by reveille; they then went round their barrack rooms and saw that they were clean, they visited them again at meal hours, turned out the guard and visited the school and hospital, at "taptoo" they collected reports and handed them to the Orderly Captain, at the "Setting of the Watch" they saw that all lights were extinguished.

Besides carrying out the general supervision of the Company Orderly Officers, the Orderly Captain had to visit the Martello Towers at Hythe, which meant trudging miles over the shingle, which was no light task.

The hours of parade were as follows:—Morning parade, 10 a.m. in the summer, and 10.30 a.m. in the winter. Evening parade, 6.30 p.m. in the summer, and 4 p.m. in the winter. Usually the mornings were given up to extended order drill, and the evenings to close order drill.

On Thursdays and Sundays there was a full dress parade with side arms only.

The drill as used at Shorncliffe was an adaptation of Dundas's "Rules and Regulations" compiled by Captain Cross, the Adjutant of the 52nd Light Infantry. It was a good, sound drill; to-day it would be considered elaborate, but in those days it was simplicity itself when compared to Dundas's system. It comprised line, column and square formations, the three fundamental formations of infantry.

The instruction was progressive. First the recruit was taught individually, then he was squaded, ultimately he joined his company and was instructed in company and battalion drill.

Cross, in his preface, tells us that his "Book is arranged in Divisions, each Division is intended to form a different class of Drill; and the instructors will be appointed to the classes in progressive order, according to their qualifications; and they are not, on any account, to proceed from one lesson to another in their different Divisions until they are expressly ordered to do so by a Field Officer or the Drill Superintendent."

The basis of the extended order drill and the field training was taken direct from de Rottenburg's "Regulations for the Exercise of Riflemen and Light Infantry," and the drill as used may be found in Neil Campbell's "Instructions for Light Infantry and Riflemen." It is an admirable work, and was ultimately translated into Spanish and Portuguese, so that the whole of Wellington's forces might benefit by the system laid down in it.

According to de Rottenburg, light infantry training, that is extended order training, was carried out in three stages, each comprising three lessons:—

## Stage I.—Instructional.

- Manual exercise, to accustom a recruit to handle his arms smartly.
- (2) Loading and firing, so that he may learn to use them practically.
- (3) Extended order drill, or the formations under which he will use them.

## Stage II.—Drill Application.

- (1) Firing in extended order.
- (2) Firing advancing.(3) Firing retiring.

# Stage III .- Tactical Application.

- (1) Skirmishing
- (2) The formation of the chain.
- (3) The formation of the advanced guard.

Extensions were all carried out in quick time and usually by alternate ranks. The normal extension was twelve paces. Once extended, the skirmishers were instructed "to seize every advantage of ground."

At Shorncliffe minute instruction in musketry was carried out, and no trouble was spared to turn each individual man into a good shot.

Care of arms was the first lesson; this was followed by the manual exercise and the loading practice, carried out in seven motions. Once a man knew how to look after his arms, and how to handle them, range practices followed.

Recruits were taught without a rest, and commenced firing at

fifty yards, increasing their range up to three hundred yards.

Various targets were made use of. An iron one, a canvas figure one, and movable targets on wheels. In all target practice the ground over which the men fired was continually varied, and the targets were placed in a shallow pool of water so that the men could observe the fall of such bullets as missed the mark.

Range practices were followed by field firing.

A company firing book was kept as well as a daily register, and on the completion of their musketry the men, according to how they had fired, were classified as first, second, and third class shots, the third class being the marksmen. In the 95th marksmen wore a small green cockade in their caps, and the second class shots a white one.

The result of Sir John Moore's system of training is too well known to need our praise. He started with ordinary good regiments and left them as examples to the whole army. In 1804, when Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson enquired into the state of the military forces of the British Empire, of all its regiments he singled out the 52nd as the ideal of what a regiment should be like. "The 52nd regiment is at this moment," he writes, "indisputably one of the first Corps in the service, in every respect. The cat-o'-nine-tails is never used, and yet discipline is there seen in the highest state of perfection. In other corps, continual punishments are taking place in the fruitless attempt of rivalling the 52nd, whereas the very means employed for ever prevent the possibility of their attaining mediocrity."

By his training, he rendered the army of Wellington invincible. Little by little the system he adopted and perfected at Shorncliffe leavened the British Army. His light drill, or, rather, the light drill which he taught in his world-famous camp, was taught in Portugal, Spain and Minorca, and eventually, after the peace of 1815, became part and parcel of the official training manual, the "Rules and Regulations" of David Dundas. This can easily be proved by comparing the 1824 edition of this book with that of 1809.

"When the Light Division joined the army at Talavera," writes Napier, "it had not been engaged with the enemy, while the army it joined had been engaged on the Douro and the Tagus, yet was inferior in discipline for war, seeing its picquets were often in scrapes, and at Talavera a brigade had been surprised. But the men of the Light Division, though new in war, were looked up to from the day of junction as the veterans of the army! and by their discipline they sustained that character throughout the war, committing no blunders,

and showing themselves the same orderly soldiers on the breach as in the line."

On the fifty-third anniversary of Waterloo, Colonel George Gawler (52nd Light Infantry), who had seen in the field between 1810 and 1815 the practical working of the Shorncliffe training, wrote as follows to his son:—

"This really wonderful, thoroughly fought-out battle, was won under God (by British sturdiness, no doubt), but under the drill system of Pliable Solidarity. Stiff Solidarity characterized the European Armies up to the French Revolution of 1792. Then the wild sans-culottes, the French, were obliged to assemble and adopted the system of élan with as little of this solidarity as they could do Then good common-sense heads in England devised, first under Sir John Moore at Shorncliffe, Pliable Solidarity. With this system the old Duke out-manœuvred every army opposed to him, and never lost a battle. To the very end of the day (Waterloo) we manœuvred by well-formed battalions, as smoothly and as rapidly as we could have done on Southsea Common. While from the beginning of the day French élan, like soda-water, had to be corked up in masses. The moment the density was rudely broken, all went off in smoke and confusion."

Moore's system was based on human nature; he loved his men, consequently his men loved him; having won their affection, the rest simply depended on hard work.

At Shorncliffe, esprit de corps, discipline and moral, were the foundations of his training; once these were instilled, leadership followed, and from his small corps in Kent went forth a body of men who, as soldiers, were unsurpassed, and who, as civilians, have seldom been equalled.

On this foundation did Sir John Moore, with a handful of men, create a new army, not great in numbers, but great in prestige. Faith in their leaders, faith in themselves, and faith in their cause, led this army from the retreat to Corunna to the assault of Waterloo. Herein lies a happy omen for the future; for we ourselves began this present war by a retirement, and with firm determination and the old discipline of Shorncliffe, shall we carry it on to the final and victorious assault.

To-day, what is required is not so much a new army as the reconstruction of the old, and no better mould can be found for us to model ourselves on than the brigade of Sir John Moore, which, at Shorn-cliffe, one hundred and thirteen years ago, set out to seek victory by the path of discipline; following it, it gained not only victory and peace, but honour and unperishable renown.

this defence rather than for the capture of the Rock that the Royal

What the distinction between these two kinds of regidents for naval-duties was does not quite appear. The six Marine regiments were: By Colonel C. Field, R.M.L.I. (Rtd.).

> "The fortress rock—defence of Calpe's strait,
> The central hold of commerce and the gate Of rich Levant, 'twas their proud boast to gain
> And keep against united France and Spain.'

From "An Epitome of the Royal Naval Service" (1841). Heading of chapter on Royal Marine Forces.

WHEN on October 10th, 1827, a new stand of Colours was presented to the Woolwich Division 1 of the Royal Marines, by H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence (afterwards King William IV.), His Royal Highness made the following reference to the taking and defence of Gibraltar:-

"With reference to this capture, it had been said that other troops had the honour to co-operate with the Royal Marines, but his situation enabled him to know, from the despatches of Sir George Rooke and others, that no soldiers but Marines were engaged in this capture, and none but Marines were employed by the Prince of Hesse in the glorious defence made in the same year."

His Royal Highness was, as a matter of fact, rather too complimentary, for, without wishing to belittle in any way the part played by the Marines in this memorable capture and defence, it is only fair to point out that, while "no soldiers but Marines were engaged in its capture," yet, while they manfully played the part assigned to them, the actual assault was made by the seamen of the Royal Navy under Captains Whittaker, Hicks, and Jumper. Nor was it quite the case that "no troops but Marines" took part in the strenuous defence against the French and Spaniards which followed so close upon the capture of Gibraltar, for a battalion of the Guards, as well as two other regiments and some Dutch and Portuguese troops, were thrown into the place as reinforcements some time before the siege was raised.2 The Marines, nevertheless, without doubt deserved all the "kudos" they received, for, as an old work published very shortly afterwards put it, "Encouraged by the example of the Prince of Hesse, who spent his days in the works and the greatest part of every night in the covered way, the garrison did more than could humanly be expected,

<sup>1</sup> Abolished 1869; established 1805. In the empire will be a second of the second of th

and the British Marines gained an immortal honour." It is for this defence rather than for the capture of the Rock that the Royal Marine corps was granted the privilege of wearing the word "Gibraltar" on Colours, head-dresses, and accoutrements.

The four Marine regiments raised in 1698 were disbanded after a very short existence, but on June 1st, 1702, upon the declaration of war with France and Spain, Queen Anne ordered the formation of "Six regiments of Marines, and six other regiments for sea-service." What the distinction between these two kinds of regiments for naval duties was does not quite appear. The six Marine regiments were:—

Colonel Thos. Saunderson's-now 30th Regiment.

Colonel George Villiers'-now 31st Regiment.

Colonel Ed. Fox's—now 32nd Regiment. Colonel Harry Mordaunt's—disbanded in 1713.

Colonel Henry Holt's—disbanded in 1713.

Colonel Viscount Shannon's-dishanded in 1713.

The other six regiments for "sea-service" are now the 6th, 19th. 20th, 34th, 35th, and 36th Regiments. The 4th Regiment, the "Queen's," commanded by Colonel Seymour, were also made Marines in 1703, and reverted to the line in 1711.

The uniform of the Marine regiments is said to have been "highcrowned leather caps, covered with cloth of the same colour as the facings of the regiment, and ornamented with devices, the same as the caps worn by the grenadiers, scarlet frock-coat, buff waist-belt, black pouch carried in front, with bayonet belt attached, buff gaiters."2"

A very large number of the officers who had belonged to the four disbanded regiments were given commissions in the newly-raised ones, and it is most probable that a considerable proportion of their rank and file were recruited from the same source. Colonel Villiers' and Viscount Shannon's regiments and one of the regiments "for seaservice" saw active service almost at once at the attack on Vigó on August 15th, but we must pass over their services there in order to bring our story up to the more important operations connected with the acquisition of the famous Rock of Gibraltar.

The events which led to the War of Succession in Spain are matters of general history. It will be sufficient to mention that there were two claimants to the Spanish throne. England had espoused the cause of the Archduke Charles of Austria, while France supported the "man in possession," Philip the Vth.

It was to further the claims of the Archduke Charles that, on

January 5th, 1704, a fleet in which were embarked between five and six thousand Marines and soldiers sailed from Spithead to Lisbon.

<sup>1</sup> Triumphs of Her Majesty's Arms, 1707. 911 vd begannond

<sup>2&</sup>quot; Cannon's Historical Record of the Marine Corps, 1850." This is-I think: without warrant—generally assumed to be same as worn in 1742, of which plates exist in the British Museum. Vide also Note II.

Numbers present: Villiers' regiment, 520 officers and men-this battalion did not land; Fox's regiment, 834 officers and men-Colonel Fox was killed at Gibraltar; Shannon's regiment, 834 officers and men.

In command went Admiral Sir George Rooke.1 We may note that on entering the Navy he had served as a Volunteer till 1672, when he was made 2nd lieutenant of the "London," and in November of the following year captain of the "Holmes." In 1674 he got a commission in the Admiral's regiment-as ensign. This will serve to show the extraordinary mixture of naval and military rank that then obtained, as at that time he was a full captain in the Navy. second in command, Admiral Byng, supplies another curious example. This officer, shortly after he joined the Navy, got a commission in Trelawney's regiment, and later on another in the Horse Guards Blue. though he never served at all with the latter, but continued to carry out his duties as a naval officer. The military part of the expedition was under the command of the Prince of Hesse d'Armstadt, an officer who had served with great distinction in the Low Countries and in

The operations that immediately preceded the attack on Gibraltar are told in a somewhat interesting way in the Journal of the Rev. Thomas Pocock, Chaplain of the "Ranelagh." The Fleet at the beginning of July required wood and water, and anchoring on the 7th off Fungerole, orders were issued for parties to be landed for procuring what was necessary. Strict injunctions were issued against straggling, and no one was to be armed except the Marines on guard, who were directed to fire at anyone attempting to stray from the watering place. The chaplain continues, "We landed 900 Marines, English and Dutch, and then sent the boats for water in Malaga Bay, about 4 miles S.W. of the town. The Spaniards fired very briskly at first, but the Marines soon got possession of a mill that commanded the watering place, and made them retire to the hills. We were alarmed in the night; but the Dutch guard obliged the enemy to retreat.

"July 8th.-Major Lawrence and Lt.-Colonel Burr2 invited me ashore this morning. We landed 900 Dutch and English Marines to relieve the others. Colonel Burr and I rode upon mules to visit all the out-guards. We drove in about 50 sailors that were stealing onions, and four grenadiers that were among them we kept for our guard; and the Spaniards coming down upon us, we ordered one of them to fire and so retreated.

"I rode before the main guard that was led by Major Lawrence and Col. Burr. We marched about 2 miles, and then wheeled about; the quarter guards being ordered by Col. Fox, we went to the mill, where we were handsomely entertained by Admiral Byng: About 7, several squadrons of horse appeared, and our men were detached in several parties to attack them. There was a small skirmish, and we had only the Prince of Hesse's captain taken and stript and wounded in several places; but he was re-taken and dressed in the field. set fire to a large mill, wherein was near 10,000 bushel of corn, and then beat a retreat. I went with the Lord Nugent, Lord Dursley, Lord Hamilton and Colonel Fox and several sea captains; but the enemy's horse advancing towards us, we took to our heels. I went

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<sup>1</sup> Vide Note III.

<sup>2</sup> Generally spelt "Bor," second in command of Fox's Marines.

to Col. Burr and marched in the rear with him. Our men were alarmed very often in the night; but the Spaniards at too great a distance to do us any mischief.

"Admiral Dilkes was a-fishing in a little river with a net; but about 90 Spaniards coming down upon him obliged him to retire very

hastily; he had not above 7 men with him and narrowly escaped.

"I came off with Capt. Cowe, Mr. Masters and the Captain of

the 'Garland' (Mr. Hobart), who treated us in his ship.2

"July oth.-This morning Sir George Rooke sent orders to burn the houses and mills; and in the evening all the boats came off and the Marines; they were covered by some small ships, who fired upon the enemy that came down in great numbers. In all this time we had but 2 seamen killed in an onion garden, and 4 French soldiers deserted out of Col. Luttrell's 3 regiment. We heeled and scrubbed Nine seamen were whipt by every ship, so had no divine service. flag ship for disobeving the Admiral's orders.

"July 17th.—This morning Sir George Rooke called a Council of War; the result of which was, to attack Gibraltar by sea and land. Our Admiral was commanded upon one and the Prince of Hesse upon the other service. This morning a signal was made for the lieutenants of our division; they were ordered to send the Marine officers on board the 'Boyne,' to consult with Col. Fox about this The weather continues exceeding hot, and the sea is covered with a thin slimy matter, as is usual after a long calm. We have been sometimes near the Barbary shore, but could discover nothing but an ancient castle at a great distance.

" July 21st .- At 12 this day Ceuta Point bears N.W. by W. & W., distant to leagues. In the afternoon we come to an anchor in to fathom water. The Old Mole (at Gibraltar) bears S.E. by E., distant I mile. About 5 a shot from the town struck the head of our mainmast; about a hour after, or less, another shot beat a tub of water to pieces that was in the main top. About 7 all the Marines land in the N.W. part of the Bay. Some of our small frigates fired upon a party of horse that came down to prevent our landing and made them retreat in great precipitation. The Marines encamped to the northward of the town and took possession of three mills under the command of the Prince of Hesse.

"July 22nd.—Our army burnt some houses in the vineyards. A ship that lay in the Old Mole played upon our soldiers, but did them no harm. Sir George Rooke seeing a great body of the Spaniards

<sup>1</sup> Killed at the battle of Malaga.

<sup>2</sup> Vide Note IV.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> In command of Villiers' Marines. Colonel Villiers had been drowned at Priuti, December 6th, 1703. "Yesterday's foreign letters say Collonel George Villars, who had a regiment of Marines on board, Sir Clowdesley Shovells, as also Captain Courtney, returning home by the way of Italy, were unhappily drowned in a port calash, Thursday, November 11th, 1703."—"Luttrell's Brief Relation of State Affairs." Relation of State Affairs.'

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Captain Whittaker says they landed at 4 and another account says 3. According to Cannon, the 4th Regiment, then the "Queen's Marines," landed on this occasion.

upon the hills advancing towards our camp, he detached two small ships to the eastward and made them retire. This afternoon 2 Dutch bomb-vessels bombarded the town while the enemy sometimes fired at us. We warped nearer. The Prince sent in a drummer to the Governor to surrender, but he refused. The enemy still kept firing at us but did us little damage-about 12 this night some of our boats under the command of Captain Whittaker burnt a ship that lay in the Old Mole, and at the same time the Prince of Hesse made a feint attack, and we threw in several bombs and carcasses,1 and under the cover of this fire we warped into our stations; our ship had but one foot of water more than she drew. This morning (23rd), about 5, the Spaniards began firing from a small fort on the south side of the Great Bastion; and the signal was made for our ships to begin the cannonade, which they continued to do without intermission for the space of 6 hours. About 10 we perceived a great fire in the town near the Governor's house; but it was afterwards extinguished. About 12 a signal was made for all boats, which were manned and armed, and sent under the command of Captain Whittaker, to take possession of the New Mole, which was deserted. The mole is an artificial fortification running out into the Bay, making an oblique angle; it is faced with stone and has a breast work with embrasures. On the Great Bastion that covered this Mole was mounted 12 brass and 16 iron guns. Here was a blockhouse and a magazine of powder, which by the heedless courage of our seamen was blown up; for they climbed up into the rooms with lighted matches2 in their hands, and let one of them fall among the scattered powder; near 150 were killed and wounded; several Spaniards were found dead, and some of the guns dismounted. Many of our boats were staved in pieces, and our seamen began to retreat in great confusion, imagining they were trepanned<sup>3</sup> by the enemy; but, none appearing, Captain Whittaker led them to the brow of the Rock and ordered them to their several posts. Some took possession of a chapel on the south part of the Peninsula, where they found many of the best of the inhabitants, especially the women with their children; here they met with rich plunder; but the captains shared it among themselves and took away that which the seamen had got. This chapel is dedicated to St. Europa, whose image is saluted by all Popish ships that pass the Straits, and here are planted two small brass cannon to answer the salutes, which made bold to treat us a little more freely with shot at our coming into the Bay; but they did not kiss our ships. Deo. gr.

"In the afternoon our Admiral sent a letter to the Governor's (who is a Spaniard) to deliver up the Great Bastion within an hour, or else he would give no quarter; his answer was, if he would cease firing and bombarding the town that night, the next morning by 8

T" Memoirs of Lord Torrington "7"

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Carcass—"A kind of bomb, usually oblong, consisting of a shell, or case, sometimes of iron with holes, more commonly of a coarse, strong stuff pitched over and girt with iron hoops, filled with combustibles."—"Johnson's Dictionary." three days until relies a by some Marines."

<sup>2</sup> Vide Note V.

<sup>3</sup> Trapped.

<sup>4</sup> Don Diego de Salinas.

we should know his resolution. About half an hour after the castle blew up, several hundred of the inhabitants that retired to the south were returning into the town along a narrow way on the side of the Rock, upon which Captains Jumper and Hicks fired smartly among them from their ships, and I saw several killed. Towards the evening the seamen took possession of another small fort, and set up the English colours.

"July 24th.—I dined ashore with the Admiral, in a chapel near the New Mole. In the morning the Admiral conducted the ladies and others (that had been in the south chapel for two days without provision) to the gates of the town to prevent their being insulted or abused by the seamen. In the afternoon the Prince of Hesse came ashore and viewed the New Mole. In the evening the town was

surrendered to the Prince.

"After this the signal was made for our seamen to embark, which they did, except about 100 that remained to secure the Mole and small

fort above named.1

"Admiral Dilkes came in hither from cruising off Malaga. We saw great numbers of Spanish horse and foot appear upon the hills, but one of our small ships lay near the shore and frightened them from coming down. A captain of one of our yachts venturing on shore was seized by the Spaniards and barbarously used. He died

soon after.

"July 26th.—I went ashore this afternoon, and Major Lawrence did me the favour to carry me with him all over the town. Great disorders were committed by the boats' crews that came ashore and Marines. But the general officers took great care to prevent them, by continually patrolling with their sergeants, and sending them on board their ships, and punishing the Marines; one of which was hanged, after he had threw dice with a Dutchman, who hove to and the Englishman 9.2 I lay this night at Colonel Fox's quarters with Colonel Burr and Major Lawrence.

"All the inhabitants except 7 or 8 families went out of the town with their effects; for the priests had possessed them with an opinion that the French would come in a few days and retake the town.

"The Lord Nugent was made Governor of the town."

So far this ingenuous and concise relation by an eye-witness, which really reads as if it was a newspaper account of the day before

vesterday.

Elsewhere a few other items are to be found as to the part played by the Marines. It is on record that 3 "it was settled that every Marine at his landing should have 18 charges of powder and ball; and two grenades with match proportionable to each grenadier; that the officer commanding each company of Marines should have one of the largest cartridge cases filled up with musket cartridges of powder

Another account says:—"The same evening he embarked the seamen that were encamped, leaving only 200 men in the castle and 50 in the redoubt for two or three days until relieved by some Marines."—"Memoirs of Lord Torrington."

<sup>2</sup> Vide Note VI.

<sup>3 &</sup>quot; Memoirs of Lord Torrington."

and shot; and that there should be a sufficient quantity of shovels and light crows, and men with hatches to cut fascines, ready if there should be occasion." The eighteen rounds of ammunition seems to our modern ideas an absurdly inadequate supply for a landing party in an enemy's country who would probably be on shore for some days, but it must be remembered that they would take longer to expend than to fire ten times that number of rounds nowadays. While the seamen were so gallantly attacking the sea-front of the town the Marines had not been idle on the north front, but, under the leadership of the Prince of Hesse, "one of the bravest and most resolute persons in Christendom," they had advanced boldly to within musket range and opened fire on Fort Leandro, which was situated at the head of the Old Mole. Aided by the fire of the ships, which wrecked the battery, they were able to take possession of the Mole.

There is rather an amusing story connected with the capture of the Rock which may be worth inserting here. "Among the valuable articles captured by the British were two wooden saints of great renown, immensely prized by the Spaniards and endowed with wonderful grace and power. That these images should remain in the hands of heretics was intolerable, and the attempts which were made to recover them were characteristic of the Spaniards. A deep and elaborate conspiracy was set on foot with the object of saving the two saints. Immense precautions were taken, and at length in a happy hour the conspirators succeeded in recovering one of the images, which was taken through the fortress gates disguised as a woman, and borne on mule back. The triumph was great and genuine, but the odd part of the affair was its one-sidedness. The two worthy saints had, in fact, found their way into the quartermaster's lumber store, and might, and would, have been handed over with pleasure to the first applicant."

Although the Spanish garrison was but a weak one, mustering not more than 500 men, of whom only 150 were regular soldiers and 200 merely "armed citizens," yet the town was "extremely strong and had 100 guns mounted, all facing the sea, and the two narrow passes to the land, and was well supplied with ammunition. The officers who have viewed the fortifications affirm, I hear, never was such an attack as the seamen made, for that 50 men might have defended those works against thousands." While the Courts of Madrid and Paris were greatly concerned at the loss of this important fortress, its capture in such a smart and dashing manner was naturally the cause of great satisfaction and rejoicing in this country. In Austria, too, we learn that "The Emperor, Empress, and the whole Court went to a Spanish convent in the suburbs of Vienna, where 'Te Deum' was sung for the taking of Gibraltar, and the cannon round the town was thrice discharged." This was, as it turned out,

<sup>1&</sup>quot; Serious Considerations on the Present State of the War in Europe," 1706.
2" The Most Famous Rock in the World," in the New Penny Magazine, Vol.

<sup>1.,</sup> No. 11.

a little premature, for though the British had taken Gibraltar on behalf of the Archduke Charles of Austria, they kept it for themselves.

English statesmen had long recognized the importance of the "Rock." As far back as 1656 we find Cromwell writing to Blake as to whether "the town and castle of Gibraltar" were "attemptable." "Which, if possessed," he continues, "and made tenable by us, would it not be an advantage to our trade and an annoyance to the Spaniards?" Even Charles II. had his eye on it, for an elaborate plan and drawing of Gibraltar and its fortifications was made by his "Chief Engineer," Sir Martin Beckman, which is now in the British Museum. So that when the news of its capture arrived in England, Robert Harley writes to the Duke of Newcastle: "The taking of Gibraltar may turn to great account, it being the greatest thoroughfare of trade in the world." He says not a word about Charles of Austria.

## PART II. Now and worm about which was A said

#### How WE HELD THE ROCK. A DETWICED PERSONNEL

Having made himself master of the Rock, Sir George Rooke left the Prince of Hesse with the Marines as garrison and at once put to sea and went over to Tetuan to fill up again with wood and water. Having effected this operation the British Fleet, having detached Admiral Vanderdussen with six Dutch and four British ships to Terciera, was making for Gibraltar, when signals were made by the scouts that a French Fleet of sixty-six sail had been sighted about ten leagues to the eastward and was approaching with the wind behind it. A council of flag officers was at once assembled, and as a result of their deliberations it was determined to proceed to the eastward of the Rock and there wait for the enemy's attack. In the meanwhile two ships were sent in to Gibraltar to bring off 1,000 Marines to increase the complements of the ships, which, on account of leaving so many men to garrison the Rock, were below their normal strength. Nothing took place during the night, but from time to time the signal guns of the French and Spaniards were heard rumbling away in the distance. They sounded fainter and fainter as the night-watches went on, and it was guessed that the enemy was trying to make off. At daybreak the British made all sail in pursuit, but were unable to come up with their opponents till four in the afternoon, when it was considered too late to engage. Sir George Rooke's ships lay to with their heads to the northward all night. When the morning of August 12th broke grey and hazy, with a flat calm, the French Fleet was nowhere to be seen. It was feared the admiral had made use of his galleys to tow away to the westward, and sail was made in pursuit. Off Gibraltar it was ascertained that the French had not passed the Straits, and the next day-Sunday-they were discovered off Cape Malaga, pretty close inshore. On the approach of the British they at once formed line of battle, bows pointing to the south with the wind easterly. A long and closely-contested action followed, but with somewhat indecisive results, possibly owing in some measure to the shortage of ammunition on board the British ships, which had expended an

enormous quantity in the bombardment of Gibraltar. The galleys with which the French Fleet was provided were also favourable to the enemy, as they were able to tow disabled ships out of action.\(^1\) The British Fleet put back to Gibraltar, where it refitted, and was ready for action again in eight days, so, though no ships were sunk or taken on either side and it was more or less a drawn action—and even claimed by the French as a victory—the balance was somewhat on our side, as the French Fleet, after reaching Toulon, with all its dockyard facilities at its disposal, was unable to take the sea again for several months. The following account of the battle, from a seaman who claims to have fought in it, is both interesting and realistic:—

"In a little Time we weighed Anchore & sailed up the Streights, & some of our Ships went to T- in Barbary to water. In the mean Time there were some of the French Fleet in View; the Rest of our Fleet espied them, & the 'Restoration' came to call us as we were watering, with Topgallant-Sheets flying; they told us by a speaking Trumpet that the French Fleet was in View. Then we weighed as fast as possible, slung our Yards, down Chests, up Hammocks, & every Ship in its Station for there was a Signal for the Line. Next Day Admiral Leak led the Van with his blue Flag at the fore-topmast-head. We were about fifty Sail of the Line of Battle; it was a beautiful Line, & would have cheered the Heart of any who loved their Queen & Country to have seen it. And the French were as beautiful. We sailed in the Morning till within Gunshot, looking at each other. When Admiral Leak got up to their Van, Sir George Rooke fired a Gun, for every Man to be at his Post. Then at it we went, loading & firing as quick as possible. We were closely engaged, & for my Part I loaded twelve times the eleventh Gun, in steering on the Starboard Quarter. And would have loaded more, had I not been prevented by a Cannon Ball which cut our Powder Boy almost in two, & I thought it had taken my Arm off: for it took a piece of my Shirt Sleeve, which caused my Arm, in a Moment, to swell as big as my Thigh. I went down to the Doctor & he put a red Plaister to it, & would have had me to have stayed below; but I said I would go up and see how my Comrades sped, & do all I could as long as I had Hand or Leg to support myself, When I came up I found four of those I had left killed, & another wounded. I said to him that was wounded, 'I am sorry for your bad Success in this Quarter of an Hour's Time.' He shook his Head saying, 'I wish you better Success in all your Undertakings, for I am a dead Man.' Then I went to work, & as I could use my right Hand, my Business was to stop the Touch-Hole whilst the others spunged it.

"I continued in high Spirits, having no Apprehension of Danger, for when I came to be warm at it, it drowned all weak Imagination; & I spirited up those that were faint hearted when they saw our Ship

like a Slaughter House & they wallowing in Blood.
"Though I have since thought that it made a very shocking Appearance, for we were very much shattered, which was visible to

all the Fleet. Sir Cloudsley sent a Lieutenant, who when he beheld us, gave us his Voice with a speaking Trumpet, for to tow out of the Line. Our Captain's Spirit was too great for that, so he answered, that he would not stir out of the Line as long as his Ship could swim. Thousands would have been glad of such an Opportunity of getting out of Danger; but our Courage overcame our Fear, though we were much damaged: for they shot our Main & Fore Topmast by the Board; and also splintered our Mainmast, our Foremast, & our Boltsprit & Mizzen, besides killing a great Number of Men, which, as I observed before, made our Ship like a Slaughter House. I leave the Reader to judge whether we were much disabled or not; for we belonged to Sir Cloudsley's Squadron, & he ordered the 'Tartar,' pink, to lie pretty nigh us. By that we found they were in great Torture for us; & they expected, every Moment, that we should be swallowed up. I must acknowledge Sir Cloudsley's tenderness was very great, in sending a Ship for our Safeguard to take us in Case of the Ship sinking, which everyone expected to be our Fate. Notwithstanding we were so much disabled we continued fighting as long as any, which was from ten in the Morning till seven at Night; when the French thought proper to sheer off for Fear we should make greater Slaughter amongst them. They were pretty much shattered, and I believe in the general more than us; which made them sick of the Day. So ended the bravest Engagement ever known since the Memory of Man. All the Officers behaved with Gayety, & their Actions were Gallant. The Sailors were very diligent in observing their Commands throughout the whole Engagement."1

The French and Spanish Courts were fully alive to the importance of Gibraltar, and lost no time in making arrangements to besiege it. The Marquis Villadarias, a Grandee of Spain, was given supreme command of the Army destined for this service, and at the time of the Battle of Malaga was already on his march thither. In the meantime Sir George Rooke had come into harbour and anchored at 5 in the afternoon of August 19th, saluting the garrison with twenty-one guns. The garrison, not content with answering the salute with the same number of guns, after dark fired their cannon "quite round the town, and the Marines made a fuge fire and bone fires." Having once more disembarked those Marines who had been withdrawn to take part in the naval action with the French, the Fleet weighed and made sail out of the Bay on August 25th. Sir George Rooke left for the defence of the place 2,000 Marines, above 100 gunners, armourers, and carpenters, provisions for six months, and forty-two pieces of cannon, including "four demi-cannon, to be planted upon the New Mole." According to Luttrell, he left "200 cannon mounted." About this time the enemy began to appear in great numbers upon

<sup>1&</sup>quot; Life and Adventures of Matthew Bishop, of Deddington, in Oxfordshire." London, 1744. Whether this little book is a record of actual experiences, or whether, like the well-known "Memoirs of Captain Carleton," it is a piece of realistic fiction, I am unable to say. But in any case it is well worth transcription.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Probably a "feu-de-joie" is meant.—From Journal of Rev. Thos. Pocock. <sup>3</sup> Ibid. Demi-cannon—a gun of about 6½in. bore, firing a 30 to 33 lb. shot.

the mainland in sight of the Rock, but at first made no attempt at attack. The garrison, on its part, had been busily engaged in strengthening its defences, building extra bastions, a tower to overlook the enemy's camp, mounting additional guns at the Land Port gate, and in making an inundation on the isthmus at the north-west corner of the town to still further restrict the ground available for the enemy's approaches. Some alarm was created in the garrison by the news that the Spanish land attack was to be assisted by a powerful French fleet operating in the bay, and, indeed, before many days were past a squadron of nineteen Frenchmen did put in an appearance and landed 3,000 men to join the Marquis de Villadarias, who by this time had formed an encampment to the north of the isthmus. The Prince of Hesse at once wrote off for assistance to Sir John Leake, who had been left at Lisbon with eighteen sail, when Sir Geo. Rooke and the remainder of his fleet had gone back to England. His great fear was that his ammunition would not hold out.

According to a contemporary account the besiegers' forces consisted of 4,500 French, 1,200 Walloon, and 9,000 Spanish troops. Their siege train, which was "put ashore by a squadron of 22 men-of-' comprised 36 heavy guns, firing balls of from 24 to 48 pounds weight, two 12-pounders, four 3- or 6-pounders, seven mortars, "most of them thirteen inches in diameter, and the rest to fling grenades royal," and a large quantity of ammunition.

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The Spaniards opened their trenches on the 9th October, "about 400 toises 2 distant from the Rock," but they made very slow progress. The enemy "first dressed a battery of 3 guns, then another of 4 guns, another of 7, another of 12 guns, and their nearest to us of 8 guns, and had several small pieces firing upon the mountain which oversaw their trenches, where we had some cannon."1 The British guns kept up a heavy fire upon their working parties, and the Marines made sally after sally. However, their batteries opened fire upon the Round Tower on the 15th, and succeeded in doing it considerable damage. Sir John Leake, upon receipt of the Prince of Hesse's despatch, lost no time in hastening to his assistance. English and Dutch recruits had now accumulated at Lisbon, and had been reviewed by the King of Portugal, so that they were evidently considered ready for service. The British squadron made a very successful dash into Gibraltar Bay, where it surprised several French ships, most of which were driven ashore and burnt, and supplied the garrison with seven months' provisions and 200 barrels of powder. "The arrival was very seasonable, for the enemy had got together a great number of boats from Cadiz and other ports, with which they intended to have transported 3,000 men to the New Mole, in order to attack us that very night, and storm the town both by sea and land. and in 5 several places at once." The presence of the relief squadron

3 Affairs of the World, December, 1704.

<sup>1</sup> Hist, MS. Com. MS. of Mrs. Frankland-Russell-Astley, of Chequers Court,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Toise = 6 feet or 2 yards. "Le pied de Roi est de douze pouces. La Toise est de six pieds de Roi."—"Les Travaux de Mars," Mallet, 1696.

in the bay much hampered the Spanish siege operations, as its guns raked their trenches.

Partly, it is possible, on account of this, and partly because it was considered that its presence would render the garrison less likely to expect a sudden attack, it was determined to take advantage of a by-path, with which the Marquis de Villadarias had been made acquainted by a goatherd, by which it was possible with much danger and difficulty to ascend to the top of the Rock on the eastern side. A forlorn hope of 500 men was placed under the command of a Colonel Figuera, and, after partaking of the Sacrament, moved off after dark on its desperate undertaking. Led by their guide, Susarte, the goatherd, some of the party contrived, by the aid of rope ladders, to reach St. Michael's Cave, where they concealed themselves till daybreak. Hardly had light begun to glimmer on the eastern horizon, before the Signal Station at the top of the Rock was rushed and the guard put to the sword. More men were hauled up by the ropes and ladders, and the enterprising Spaniards were beginning to congratulate themselves on their success when the alarm was given in the town below, and 500 Marines, under Colonel Bor and Prince Henry of Armstadt,1 were at once sent up to attack them.

As, by some extraordinary oversight the forlorn hope had only been provided with 3 rounds apiece, and the Marquis Villadarias had not carried out his part of the programme, which was to support them by a general attack on the land side of the fortifications, the adventurous Spaniards were not able to withstand the attack of the British Marines for very long, and they were defeated with the loss of 200 killed and 100 prisoners, including Colonel Figuera and 33 officers. Prince Henry was wounded in this attack.

"About 500 seamen were sent ashore to help to repair the damage done by the enemy's cannon, and in making several new works for the security of the town. The enemy made a breach, but it is inconsiderable, and in case they should widen it, we are preparing a counter-work from whence we can take them in flank, front and rear, especially if Admiral Leake should, as he designs, man all his boats with small arms to come upon their other flank by sea, which the enemy cannot avoid."2

A letter written shortly afterwards gives the following account of the state of the garrison and defences of Gibraltar:

"Our Garrison, notwithstanding the losses we have sustained, can still make 1,000 men in arms, besides the sick and wounded; we want neither stores nor provisions; and Admiral Leake neglects nothing that may contribute to the preservation of the place. The enemy's batteries continue to fire very briskly; they have much damaged the Round Tower and the line of communications from it to the town; however, we have made new works within, and do not fear losing it, for the approaches thither are extremely difficult.

A younger brother of Prince George. When on November 11th the Governor, onel Nugent, and General Fox (of the Marines) were killed, Colonel Bor succeeded to the command of the English troops.

2 Affairs of the World, December, 1704.

There is a flanking line which runs from the Round Tower up to the mountain, which the enemy has likewise battered down, but we have raised very good works behind it, though with a great deal of labour, being forced to carry up earth thither to make them, it being a solid rock. This being the way by which they will probably attack us, we use all possible means to defend it, which we the less doubt of, because of the most difficult access to it, and that the enemy cannot draw up any number of men to make their assault without being discovered. Besides this wall, there is another to the body of the place, part of it they have ruined, but not so much but we have a cover for our men-and to possess themselves of this last wall, they must mount two breaches, which it will be very hard for them to do, and after all this they must force us from very good intrenchments which take in all the breaches on the inside, before they can storm the place: all which we look upon as impossible for them to do, not only because of the great fire they must sustain from the mountains that hang over the ways through which they pass, and from several great guns that we can bring to bear upon them, but because of the badness of the way which they must come, which is up a steep hill full of rocks and holes, where a man can hardly go had he no other This is the manner of their upper attack. They have also for a long while fired upon the curtain next the sea, and think they have made a sufficient breach there, so that we presume they may make a safe attack on that side. But as to the breach, it is not practicable to mount it, for besides the works we have made within, we every night clear away all that they beat down in the daytime from the feet of the wall, and the rubbish we cast from it has raised a work so high, that it almost covers the breach and leaves a deep ditch between it and the wall. The ditch is doubly palisadeed, with very good flanks within, to scour the moat when they enter, and a lodgement for 300 musqueteers within the breach, to fire upon the enemy when they mount it. But before they can proceed thus far, they must be masters of the Covered Way, which is well palisadoed and guarded by 300 men, and under its glacis we have run a mine from the Rock to the sea, which is about 150 paces, and will in 3 or 4 days have 4 chambers ready to spring, if there be occasion. And besides this the enemy, to come at it, must march without any cover above 300 paces, exposed to all the fire from the line between the town and the Round Tower, from our Covered Way, from all our guns on the Old Mole, and from about 10 more on the curtain and in other places. The enemy has cast up an intrenchment in front of his batteries for fear of any surprise; and from thence, under the side of the Rock, has made approaches, in order to cast up a work as near as they can to our Covered Way, to flank our men upon the hill when they made their attack, but we have kept continually such a fire upon them, that we beat them away, and throwing down fire barrels near that intrenchment every night, they cannot move without our perceiving them; and notwithstanding they brought a great number of chandeliers to cover their workmen, we still beat them off; and now

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Wooden frames, or racks, to support piles of fascines and so form a shield for the workers.

those approaches being filled with a great rain which fell 3 days together, we believe they have given over that design. The enemy's batteries have been in disorder some days, by reason of the wet weather, but they have now repaired them, and fire as before. They have only 3 mortars, which fling small shells and do little harm. Their Army is but weak, and if not reinforced cannot attack us, many of the French being sick; and if we have more rain it will be impossible for them to go on with their siege." 1

We have the following very interesting account of this portion of the siege from the pen of the seaman whose experiences at Malaga have already been quoted, and who was landed at Gibraltar:—

"The Morning we got thither, the Spaniards were discovered that came up the back of the Hill. Then there was a Command for Twenty of our Men to go on shore with fire Arms. I was glad to hear that I was pitched upon for one; and the Sailors, hearing that I was to go, were all eager for going. They knew me to be well versed in the Affair, as I had been upon a like Expedition before.

"When the Officers had determined who should go on shore, we got into our Boat, & made all the haste we could; for we had them continually in our Eyes. We were all in high Spirits & fit to do Execution, not being at all daunted at their Numbers; for they were like Swarms of Bees upon the Hill, & in great Confusion, & we like Lions in the Valley seeking whom we might devour; as our Duty

required.

"At it we went, loading & firing as fast as we could. Our Men had a great Advantage of the Spaniards in firing up Hill, and it was a very great Advantage they were not obliged to wade; for the Water often overflows that part where we were obliged to engage them. We were happy enough in missing that Tide; had it been otherwise, we had been but in a bad situation. The Spaniards rolled Pieces of Rocks down the Hill and wounded a great many of our Men, but our Advantage in firing was more than all they could do. When they found they could do no good they laid down their fire Arms.

"Col. Bur was a Man that had great Compassion on a Soldier & would see that they were rightly dealt by upon all Occasions; & exerted himself as far as in his Power in his Queen & Country's Cause. I am sensible he behaved valliantly & loved to see his Soldiers

couragious & bold in their duty.

Ship. They found the Duty was too hard for the Soldiers, & then there were Orders sent for ten Men of a Ship to go on Shore again. When we went over we found that the Works were very much demolished, for there was not a Gun that we could fire one Day without it's being unfit for Service the next; for the Spaniards would dismount them. At Will's Battery I have seen the very Muzzles of our Guns broke with their Cannon Balls: the Round Tower was demolished, & the North Bastio, the Curtain that is between the Bridge & the North Bastion, they battered to such a Degree that a Coach and Horses might have gone through in several Places. We

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found the Duty extremely hard, for what they beat down by Day we were obliged to clear away by Night. We went to work again & made a Trench under the Wall lest they should storm us. Then we made a large Breastwork under the Bridge in the two Arches. They sent us a great many Bombs, once I thought they had sent us one too many; for I was at Work just in the Bastion, & there came one swift as Lightning. I had much ado to get out of its Way, for as soon as it fell, I fell by it; & found it was much better to so than to step over it, for it blew up in a Moment, which made the Ground tremble. I was not above a Yard from it when it fell, & had I been so unwise as to have stood up when it fell, I should have been lifted up by its Wings. I was hardened in that Employment, & a great many of our Men ran in a terrible Fright, thinking that I was blown up. They said, when they saw me, we are glad to see you alive. I thanked them for their regard for me, & told them I never minded a Bomb at all only to observe its falling & step out of the Way, & fall with my Face to the Ground, which I would advise you to do if ever they should drop near you; for it will prevent their Effect. They said they were surprised that it did not hurt me, as I was so near it, & it killed a Man a Furlong off. I told them the Reason was this, that when a Bomb falls, it rises in a Moment again and ascends perpendicular, breaks & spreads to a vast Distance; & when the Pieces of Steel fall they do great Damage and destroy Men at a great Distance. Wherefore I would have you always observe the Rule I have given you. They returned me a Thousand Thanks; & we continued making our Works by Night, & in the Day Time we were employed in drawing Guns from the New Mole to Wills's Battery.

"We had very indifferent Ground some Part of the Way, therefore we were obliged to draw in Gears, in the same Manner as Horses do. But when we came among the Rocks we were obliged to lay Deal Spars, & parbuckle them up with Hausers; & by these Means we haled them up to the Battery. When we had drawn all the Cannon up, & provided for our Safeguard, we divided the Prisoners equally, so that each Ship might have its Share. When we had done we went merrily along, & every Party went to it's Boat, to make for their Ships; we had a Signal to be as expeditious as possible, so we rowed away for Life, as it was our Duty to do. When we came to the Ship there was nothing extraordinary to be done, only Orders to

take the Prisoners to Lisbon."

Early in December the troops which had been despatched from Lisbon to reinforce the garrison of the Rock came in and landed a welcome reinforcement of nearly 2,000 men. They had a narrow escape from the French fleet under Monsieur De Pointi in the Straits, which was the luckier in that Sir John Leake, who had news of their danger, was unable, by reason of contrary winds, to go out and escort them in, as he had intended to do. Feeling that no time should be lost in making use of the increase in strength which he had received, the Prince of Hesse sallied out a night or two after the arrival of the reinforcements at the head of 300 men, "and burnt and destroyed the enemy's works for above 70 paces, with the loss only of 7 men

killed and 13 wounded," 1 and about ten days later he followed this up with another equally successful attack on the Spanish entrenchments. In one of these sorties the British lost a sergeant-major, who was made a prisoner by the Spaniards. He must have been rather a valuable officer, as no less a personage than an Admiral was given in exchange for him-Don Diego Vienna. The expense of the siege began to make itself felt at Madrid about this time, for it is reported that "The Council has been very much taken up of late in finding out funds for continuing the war, especially for carrying on the Siege of Gibraltar, which is a great expense, but they do not find out a more prompt expedient than to demand of all the Kingdoms that

compose this Monarchy a free gift of nine Millions."2

The Marines in the garrison seem by this time to have been reduced by losses and other casualties down to 1,000 men. Possibly, too, some of the original garrison may have been required on board ship and re-embarked. The enemy were much harassed by the persistent wet weather, which filled their trenches and workings with water, many of their guns are said to have been "spoilt," and they were also short of ammunition. Still, they had about 7,000 men to the account that made up the strength of the British granteen and conthe 3,000 that made up the strength of the British garrison, and continued to press their attack, but with very little success. According to the reports of some deserters who came in from the Spanish lines at this period, "the enemy's miners are hard at work either to discover our mines, or to undermine the Round Tower," but as to the latter, "it appears impracticable, since to do it they must dig about 60 paces through a solid rock." However this may have been, it is certain that the Spaniards had selected the Round Tower as their next point of attack, and towards the end of January, 1705, a sudden rush was made upon it by 50 selected Grenadiers, who, with their swords in one hand and hooks in the other, tried to clamber up the breach that had been made in it by the Spanish batteries. They were repulsed without much difficulty, and from what happened a few days later it was conjectured that this assault was merely made for the purpose of reconnoitring the breach. For nearly a week later, "by break of day, the enemy made an attack with five or six hundred Grenadiers, all chosen men, French and Walloons. They were to be supported by 1,000 Spaniards, and the attack was commanded by Lieutenant-General Tuy-300 were to storm the breach above the Round Tower and the remainder the Tower itself. There is a work that covers all the breach, made by Capt. Bennet's; and a piece of the old wall is still standing, which joins to the rock above the breach. Both these posts are guarded at night by a captain, 3 subalterns and 90 men; but at break of day, the captain, with 60 men, draws off the hill, and stays in the Round Tower all day, to relieve the officers and soldiers that remain above at the breach. The Round Tower is guarded by 180 men commanded by a lieut.-colonel and other officers."

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<sup>1</sup> Affairs of the World, December, 1704.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Ibid, January, 1705. <sup>3</sup> Ibid, February, 1705.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> This officer was Chief Engineer at Gibraltar during the siege.

The enemy, having by some deserters got intelligence of this disposition, mounted the hill with great silence, and lay concealed in the cliffs and hollow ground till such time as the captain and his party was drawn off, then they got at the point of the wall, and, throwing granadoes down on the lieutenant and his party, obliged them to quit their post. At the same time 200 Grenadiers stormed the Round Tower, where Colonel Bor made a very good defence, though the enemy got above the breach and threw great stones and granadoes down on his men; but those who had got in at the wall marching down to cut off his retreat into the town, obliged him and his men to get over the parapet of the line, and to retire into the covered way, where the English guards were posted. The alarm being by this time got through the whole garrison, all the officers ran to their respective posts. Captain Fisher, of the Queen's Marines, charged the foremost of the enemy with seventeen men; but his small party was soon routed, and himself taken prisoner. Colonel Moncall, Major of my Lord Barrymore's Regiment, with some other officers, having soon after got together a body of about four or five hundred men, marched into the line that goes to the Round Tower, and charged the enemy so vigorously with sword in hand, that he drove them from place to place, quite out of the Round Tower, and retook that post after it had been an hour in their hands; and Captain Fisher was retaken. Colonel Rivett, of the Guards, having got up the Rock, on the right of the covered way, with 20 Grenadiers, favoured very much Colonel Moncall's success. The whole garrison, being by this time got together, made so furious a fire that the enemy was at last obliged to retire in great confusion; a captain of grenadiers, 4 lieutenants, and 40 of their men were taken prisoners; and about 70 were killed on the spot, above half of them officers, and above 200 were wounded.1

"The next day the Prince of Hesse d'Armstadt being upon the New Battery with several officers, Colonel Moncall, who was with him, lost a leg by a cannon shot, which killed a Spanish officer and

wounded 5 other persons."1

"The enemy of late had thrown 150 to 200 bombs a night, but since this last action have been very quiet. Colonel Gonsalez, a Spaniard, hath been shot to death for corresponding with the enemy. One Hopper, and one Brown, the first a lawyer, the other a merchant, have been put out of the town, with halters about their necks, for the same crime." 1

Nor were these the only traitors in the garrison. Luttrell, writing on 3rd February, records that "Yesterday an expresse was sent to Portugal for executing an English and an Irish Major, for designing to betray Gibralter, 2 Spanish officers having already suffered for the same."

The besiegers had other friends in the garrison. "The enemy," says another contemporary account, "has held correspondence in this place with a friar now in custody, and a letter being sent to him

our out sentries took him, but in rifling his pockets the letter was lost, yet the bearer says the import of it was only to know if the mine had been charged, and if it was not, their army was resolved to make an assault at the Old Mole, the covered way, and hill, and would have sent 500 Grenadiers in boats to amuse us on the end of this island where they got up before, but having no answer did not think fit to attack."1

The Spanish Grenadier Captain who had been captured was soon after exchanged for Captain Fisher, of the Marines, who seems to have been made prisoner a second time during the fighting in the neighbourhood of the Round Tower.

Guns, men and ammunition now began to pour in to the beleaguered fortress from Lisbon, and the enemy on their part, according to the stories of Walloon deserters, were beginning to think seriously of raising the siege. They withdrew some of their mortars and sawed "22 of their cannon in pieces for the better conveniency of carrying them away," 2

By other reports there were "not above 2,500 of the French left by new wines and sickness," 800 Walloons, and about 5,000 Spaniards, "but in a miserable condition." Most of their horses were dead for want of forage, which could only be procured by sea from Malaga; they had fired away nearly all the ammunition they could collect from every quarter available, while many of their cannon were either broken or their vents had "grown too large," so that they could only be fired with safety by laying a train of gunpowder to them.3

The following letter from an "Ingineer," dated 2nd February, gives an interesting account of the position of affairs in Gibraltar at

this juncture:—
"I am so much fatigued that I am hardly able to write to you these few lines. I arrived but yesterday morning and spent the whole day and the greatest part of the night in the Works, to take an exact view thereof, and give my assistance to others. I am just returning thither, for in the circumstances we are at present nobody ought to sleep.
"The Garrison upon our arrival consisted of about 2,000 men in

health, the rest lying sick."2

Referring to the attack on the Round Tower, he says:-

"I must tell you that our officers, even the most modestest among them, say that there appeared a great deal of confusion amongst the enemy, for had their first detachments been supported, as they ought to have been, it is not unlikely but that they would have maintained themselves in the posts they had taken on the Hill, notwithstanding the bravery of our troops, which, indeed, cannot be too much commended. The breaches in all the places through which we may be

Letter, 1705. Hist. MS. Com. M Chequers Court, Bucks.
 Affairs of the World, March, 1705. Hist. MS. Com. MS. of Mrs. Frankland-Russell-Astley, of

<sup>3</sup> Hist, MS. Com. MS. of Mrs. Frankland-Russell-Astley, of Chequers Court,

attacked, and those in the body of the place, are sufficiently wide, and their trenches, which they carry on every night, are so near our Rondella or Round Tower, that they may storm it when they please. I don't know what has hindered them from it till this day; but certainly they must expect either their Fleet or a reinforcement of troops. This delay is favourable for us, as in the mean time we are hard at work, for rendering the breaches of a more difficult access, and erecting batteries which will very much annoy them, if they give us time to perfect them, as I hope they will. The Prince of Hesse is the soul of our garrison. I never saw the like: he sleeps neither day nor night, he is General 'Ingineer,' Gunner, Carpenter, Mason, Soldier, Pioneer, and everything else, which you may be sure cannot but encourage our soldiers. We daily expect a general storm and the arrival of Monsieur de Pointi with his squadron; but if we repulse them, as I hope we shall, they must need send for a greater number of forces, and our Fleet will have time enough to come to our assistance. situation of this place is so advantageous against a storm that I have nothing to wish as to that point; but let the enemy do what they please, we shall make a terrible fire upon them in their flank, and they will find it very hard to lodge themselves on our Works, because there is nothing almost but a hard rock. The breaches are indeed very wide, but I have great hopes of our defence by the reasons I have told you, and because I see that the Prince, our Officers, and even our private Sentinels are fully persuaded that we shall beat the enemy; and I have often observed that persuasions of this nature go a long way, &c."1

The Spanish Court, finding that the Marquis de Villadarias was making such very poor progress, despatched Marshal de Tessé, a Frenchman, to supersede him, together with a reinforcement of 4,000 men. The day before his arrival the Spanish batteries had effected a breach in the wall beside the Land Port, and, anxious to have a last try for success before supersession, the Marquis de Villadarias ordered an immediate assault. With grenadiers in front, 18 companies of French and Spanish foot advanced at dawn, but as soon as the assault was checked the Frenchmen gave way and left their allies to bear the brunt of the terrific fire that was poured down upon them from the British guns and musketry. The Spaniards fell back in good order, but with a loss of 200 men. Towards the end of February, 1705, a French squadron, under M. de Pointi, came into the Bay, and arrangements were put in progress for a combined attack by land and sea. This, however, had to be postponed on account of a heavy gale which sprang up. In the meantime, Admiral Sir John Leake, who had returned to Lisbon, received news of the arrival of the French squadron in Gibraltar Bay, and at once put to sea. He caught M. de Pointi in the Bay and utterly defeated him. Two of de Pointi's ships ran themselves ashore; and Mathew Bishop, who was present, and who has been quoted more than once, calls them "Hen-hearted blockheads in being terrified at the sight of us." What happened and in what state were the besiegers by this time, is briefly told in the following extract from a letter sent by Marshal de Tessé to his

Sovereign (Louis XIV.):-

"SIR,—The annexed Journal of the Progress of the Siege will inform your Majesty of the great difficulties the besiegers have met with, as well by reason of the vigorous resistance of the garrison as the continuation of the bad weather, the rains having so annoyed our works that the soldiers are up to their knees in water and mud. The Spanish Infantry who have undergone, without murmuring, the fatigues of so long and tedious a siege, though almost naked, illpaid, and in great want of ammunition and other necessaries, have, to their honour, expressed more patience than could be expected from them in carrying on such a difficult enterprise. 'Tis true, Sir, that Baron Pointy sollicited me several times for leave to retire with his squadron from Gibraltar; but your Majesty knows that both of us were commanded to obey the orders of the Catholick King 1; whose Council would by no means consent to the retreat of your ships, and orders were sent to me from the Court of Madrid to retain them in the Bay, Baron Pointy protested against the same, and foretold the fate of his squadron; and being a vigilant man, took all possible precautions to prevent surprise. In the mean time the enemie's ships approached, undiscovered either by the cruisers in the Straits, or by the forces posted along the coasts, and attacked 5 of your Majesty's ships which were ranged near Cornero, taking 3 of them after a long defence, and obliged Baron Pointi's ship and another to run aground near Estepona. After this unfortunate encounter, I gave orders for making a new retrenchment to prevent insults from the garrison, who received a considerable supply of men and necessaries the day after this action happened; and despatched Mons. Renaud to represent to Your Majesty and King Philip the impossibility of continuing the siege."2

This practically was the end of the siege, which was formally raised on April 18th, only a small force of Spaniards being left to blockade the fortress. This, however, they contrived to do with but indifferent success, as shortly afterwards the Spanish journals published

the following:-

"Our troops posted in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar use their utmost endeavours to hinder the country people from corresponding with the enemy; but notwithstanding their care, and the severity used against some for example sake, yet money has such charms that they venture to get into the place, and supply the garrison with

provisions.3

"The victorious garrison on St. George's Day celebrated the raising of the siege by being reviewed in the afternoon by the Prince of Hesse, after which they 'marched and lined all the works about the town; there was a triple discharge of all the great guns, and at each time a running fire of all the small arms, with fireworks from the Castle and other rejoicings."

3 Ibid, June, 1705.

<sup>1</sup> The King Philip of Spain.
2 Affairs of the World, April, 1705.

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No account of the taking and holding of the famous Rock would be complete without some further reference to the leading characters in these operations, the Prince of Hesse d'Armstadt and Colonel Bor, neither of whom very long survived the raising of the siege.

In the summer, at the suggestion of the Prince of Hesse, it was decided to attack Barcelona on behalf of the Archduke Charles. With the expedition detailed for this purpose went the Guards and Marines 1 from Gibraltar and the gallant Prince of Hesse himself.

Marines 1 from Gibraltar and the gallant Prince of Hesse himself.

Space forbids any account of the siege of Barcelona, but it is worthy of mention, as showing the extraordinary state of military discipline at this period, that upon the Marine regiments effecting a landing, a quarrel took place between Colonels Rodney, of Holt's Marines, and Bor, who drew their swords and fought a duel in front of their men, probably a unique example in the history of duelling. Both were wounded, Rodney so severely that he died the day following. Bor, however, recovered; was a Major-General in 1710, and commanded the 32nd Regiment till 1723. Barcelona proved the death-place of the Prince of Hesse, the hero of the defence of Gibraltar. During an attack upon the fortress of Montjuich outside the town, "he advanced with great eagerness through all the fire through two bulwarks and a curtain, without any shelter, and was shot with a musquet ball, which, passing through his thigh, tore an artery; by which the Prince, losing a great quantity of blood, after he had marched above 50 paces, animating our men as if he knew nothing of being wounded, at last fell down; the strength of his body and the vital spirits of that great heart, being no longer able to support him to whose undaunted courage no danger or wound could otherwise have put any stop. The Prince thus falling, they carried him off to a little house that was near, and as soon as he was brought thither, before they could look upon the wound he expired, to the great grief of everyone."2

Colonel Jacob Bor, who was second in command of the Marine troops at the taking of Gibraltar, was the son of Jan Bor and Margaret Byse, and was born October 12th, 1665. He was appointed Major in Fox's Regiment of Marines, February 12th, 1702; succeeded to the command of that regiment on December 5th, 1704, and on June 5th, 1706, was appointed Quartermaster-General to Lord Rivers, who commanded an expeditionary force destined for a descent on the French coast near the mouth of the River Charente. He was promoted to Brigadier-General on January 1st, 1709-10. The regiment which Bor commanded ceased to be Marines in 1713, and became the 32nd Regiment of the Line, now the 1st Battalion Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry. A descendant, Major-General J. H. Bor, C.B., C.M.G., served in the Royal Marine Artillery from 1874 to 1915. "It is not too much to say that it is to Prince George of Hesse d'Armstadt and Colonel Bor that Great Britain owes possession

<sup>1</sup> John Campbell, a Marine who served in this memorable siege, died in 1791, at the great age of 120, at Dungannon, in Ireland. He had been at the relief of Londonderry in 1689, so probably was rather over than under the age mentioned. 2 Affairs of the World, September, 1705.

of the Rock. For eight months the siege lasted; with its garrison of 2,000 men, soon to be reduced by casualties to half that number, with inferior armament on battered fortifications, they held the place against a besieging army of 12,000 men and a formidable fleet. By their staunch, soldier-like qualities, in the presence of a hostile population, and that worst of foes, internal dissension, they kept their worn-out troops together, and enemies outside the lines, until the arrival, long deferred, of a relieving force, when the siege was raised." Colonel Bor and Captain Bennet, the Engineer, were recommended by the Prince of Hesse d'Armstadt to Mr. Methuen at Lisbon "as fitt persons to be preferr'd, they having done signal service at Gibraltar."

In his duel with Colonel Rodney, of Holt's Marines, before Barcelona, Bor was dangerously wounded, and so took no part in the operations at that place. On his return to England he not only brought home with him the honour he had won in Spain, but a Spanish bloodhound, which proved the cause of his death, which occurred in Ireland on July 8th, 1723. He had wagered that his dog would recognize him and not attack him, however disguised. On putting it to the test, the dog killed him before the onlookers could interfere.

Note I.—"The troops being in quarters, I went to Lisbon, where I had certain advice that Gibraltar was besieged, and Marshal Tessé gone thither. Upon which, considering the importance of the place, I immediately sent the Prince of Hesse four of the best regiments of foot under my command, viz., the battalion of Guards, my Lord Barrymore's, Lord Donegall's, and Lord Mountjoy's, together with a large supply of ammunition and provisions, which the garrison wanted extremely. This relief arrived in good time, and proved so successful, as not only to defend the place, but to hold out a siege that entirely ruined the enemy's infantry, and prevented their being able to take the field the following spring in Alentejo."—The Earl of Galway's Narrative, read by the Clerk at the table of the House of Lords, January 9th, 1711.—From "Annals of Queen Anne."

Note II.—Marines' Caps, 1707.—An extract from the record of "George the First's Army," giving the official account of the battle of St. Estevan, in 1707, when Colonel Sir Charles Wills was in command of his Marine Regiment, the First, states:—"Six companies of Marines were ordered to march up the hill in six columns, and to beat the 'Grenadiers' March' when in sight of the enemy. These orders were so well executed that at the same moment as our Dragoons entered the plain, killing the enemy's advanced sentinel, our infantry showed themselves and beat the 'Grenadiers' March' upon the hills. The enemy, being unused to the uniform of the Marines, mistook the six companies of Will's Marines for six companies of the Grenadiers, as the Marines wore Grenadier caps, and knowing there was only one company of Grenadiers in each British foot regiment, they naturally thought that there was a regiment of foot to every company of Grenadiers, and that we had six regiments in the background ready to attack them. Brigadier Wills had laid this trap for them."

Note III.—According to a writer in the "Historical Review" (Vol. VII.), "Sir George Rooke was the son of Colonel Sir William Rooke, a Kentish gentleman who was in favour with the Duke of York" Of George it is said: "He was a very unlucky boy and much given to stealing. His father would have placed him with an attorney but durst not trust him, but having discovered his propensity for the sea, contrary, it is said, to the wishes of his relatives, at last resolved to send him to sea, and being asked the reason, said he had rather hear of his being drown'd at sea than have him hang'd at land." It is curious

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to note that on his monument in Canterbury Cathedral, which records that "Gibraltariam copiis navalibus, paucaribus horis capit," he is described as a "soldier," the son of William Rooke, a soldier, and also, of course, as a Vice-Admiral of England.

NOTE IV .- It has often been pointed out in comparisons between our present strength at sea and the fleet which flew our flag "in the days of wood and hemp," that our modern war vessels are greatly handicapped as against the old sailing ships in having to renew their coal from time to time and watch carefully its expenditure. It seems to have been forgotten that this business of filling up with wood for the galley fire, and water for drinking purposes, was almost or

quite as much an awkward necessity.

Note V.—Unless the "matches" mentioned were for lighting hand-grenades, it would appear from this that the seamen were—some of them at any rate armed with the very obsolete matchlock. This seems curious when it is remembered that so far back as 1664 the Admiral's Regiment had on its first raising been armed with "1,200 Snaphaunch Musquettes." These were an improvement on the wheel-lock muskets which had superseded matchlocks for some time, and were practically fitted with the same action as the flint-locks which survived till half through the 19th century. They were so called, it is said, "from having been invented by a set of Dutch marauders designated 'snaphans,' or poultry stealers, who, finding the light of the match betrayed them in their marauding trips, and the wheel-lock too expensive, used a lock consisting of a piece of steel furrowed like the wheel of a wheel-lock, set on a steel post, and which moved on a pivot, and a cock in which was fixed a flint instead of a piece of pyrites." 2

Note VI.—Throwing Dice for Execution.—This custom seems to have been a usual procedure at this period. Luttrell records (June 29th, 1693) that "Yesterday three soldiers, Prince Hesse's Regiment, were brought to St. George's Fields, being condemned by a court martial for deserting their colours, where they threw dice upon a drum for their lives, and one of them was shot to death." Again, Barclay (in his "Icon Animarum") tells a story of an Englishman of the Spanish side in Flanders, taken prisoner among divers other soldiers. "Dice was given them to throw for their life. The Englishman takes the dice stoutly before all the rest and throws, and throwes high and escapes; presently after, the same man seeing a Spaniard tremble and quake as he was going to throw, offered to throw for him for twelvepence, and did it and escaped againe."

Note VII.—The advantage which the possession of galleys gave to the French Fleet in calm weather seems to have been tardily recognized at the British Admiralty. Three were building at Woolwich and Blackwall at the time of the battle of Malaga. Each was to pull forty oars. But after this engagement it was considered that a larger number of smaller vessels would be of more use in the Mediterranean, and in November, 1704, sixteen galleys of sixteen oars apiece were ordered to be especially constructed for service in that sea.

1 Warrant Book No. 3, 1664-5. 2 Text-book for officers at the School of Musketry, 1880.



### NAPOLEON I. AND THE BRITISH PRESS.

By C. R. B. BARRETT.

TO what extent Napoleon I. profited by the information conveyed to him through the careless publication of naval and military intelligence in the British Press it is not quite easy to determine. That, however, he did so profit there is documentary evidence to prove the fact, though, unfortunately, the number of times in which any mention is made of such sources of information is singularly small.

Letters, speeches, manifestoes, bulletins have been searched to collect references, but with rather scanty results. Still, some information has come to light which sufficiently proves that Napoleon not only derived benefit from paragraphs in British journals, but also that he most earnestly requested that copies of the English papers should be specially sent to him, and, moreover, that even mere rumours current in commercial and other ports should be at once reported to him.

How seriously the Duke of Wellington regarded the unrestricted publication not only of home news, but also of letters written by individuals at the seat of war may be read in his published despatches.

A war censorship of the Press was at that time unknown in England. In France, however, it was quite different, for there the most rigorous censorship prevailed, and it may not be out of place to briefly describe the journalistic situation in France at the time of the Peninsular War.

The French newspapers, of which a large number suddenly sprang into existence during the Revolution, were small in size, containing little news, and mainly consisted of articles in essay form and political in character.

Under the Directory the number of papers or journals somewhat decreased, and a certain amount of police supervision over printed matter was established.

When Napoleon became First Consul for life he for a time interfered but slightly with the French Press; still, on the subjects of censorship and repression he held very strong views; witness the following extract:—

"Le caractère de la nation exige qu'on restreigne la liberté de la presse aux ouvrages d'un certain volume. Il faut que les journaux soient soumis à une police sévère."

As early as July 15th, 1797, Napoleon writes from Milan to the Directory complaining of attacks on the French Army as follows:—

"L'armée reçoit une grande partie des journaux qu'on imprime à Paris, surtout les plus mauvais; mais cela produit un effet tout contraire à celui qu'ils se promettent. L'indignation est à son comble. Le soldat demand à grands cris si, pour prix de ses fatigues et de six ans de guerre, il doit être,

As a consequence a much more severe police surveillance over

printed matter was established.

On May 20th, 1798, Napoleon embarked for Egypt, and shortly after found himself cut off from all intelligence as to events in Europe generally. How he suddenly returned to France we know, and of all the events which took place in Egypt after his departure we are well informed. The reasons which impelled him thus hastily to return we will now give in his own words. The extract is taken from a letter to the Directory, and runs as follows:—

"Lettre au Directoire exécutif-Raisons politiques qui ont déterminé le Général Bonaparte à quitter l'Egypte."

It is dated from Aix-en-Provence, October 10th, 1799.

".... Je me procurai, à l'issue de plusieurs conferences diplomatiques, les gazettes d'angleterre jusqu'au 6 juin dernier par lesquelles je fus instruit des défaites de Jourdan, en Allemagne, et de Schérer en Italie. Je partis sur-le-champ, à l'heure même, sur les frégates la Muiron et la Carrère, quoique mauvaises marcheuses. Je n'ai pas pensé devoir calculer les dangers où ma présence pouvait être le plus utile." (See "George Barral," Chapter 2, No. 12, p. 43.)

Professor Rose tells us that it was through Sir Sidney Smith that Napoleon obtained this packet of English and German news-

papers which gave him intelligence up to June 6th, 1799.

They contained the following important items:-

 The imminent formation of a new and powerful coalition, that is to say, England, Russia, Germany, Turkey, Portugal, and Naples. This coalition actually bore date June 22nd, and consequently could only have been threatening on June 6th.

- consequently could only have been threatening on June 6th. The loss of Italy. The defeat of Scherer happened thus. The Austrians had 65,000 men under Kray on the Adige. Both French and Austrians took the offensive. Scherer, who commanded the French, started certain manœuvres which were ill-conceived and ill carried out. Kray crossed the Adige near Verona and fought the battle of Magnano on April 5th, when Scherer was beaten and driven over the Adda, having lost 8,000 men. On April 27th Scherer was superseded by Moreau. On April 28th the French were beaten in the battle of Cassano and driven from the Adda by the Russians under Suwarof. Moreau, then reduced to 20,000, executed his masterly retreat in two columns, one on Turin and the other on Alessandria, near which place he occupied a central position. His war material was saved by being sent back to France.
- 3. Defeats on the Rhine. Jourdan, after some preliminary manœuvres which began on March 1st, was beaten by

the Archduke, who crossed the Leck and Iller and fought the battle of Ostrach (March 22nd). Three days later the French were defeated at Stockach and were driven over the upper Rhine on April 6th.

4. The general condition of disorder in France where schisms rent the Directory, disgust at the incompetence of the Government angered the people, and a general feeling of despair filled the nation.

One cannot but wonder if the astute Sidney Smith had not a settled purpose in permitting the negotiations to come to a favourable issue, for assuredly the news in these British and German papers was of immense importance. From the point of view of Napoleon, however, it seems doubtful whether the unfavourable news, now some months old, from Italy and Germany was the real cause of his hasty return. It seems far more probable that the war news merely acted The Directory was moribund-it was dissolved on as a cloak. November 10th in that year, and the so-called Consular Government was established. Changes of this kind involved either intrigue or violence. Napoleon knew well in what direction his ambition led him, and it was far wiser from his point of view to be in France as soon as possible after the receipt of important information regarding the imminent dissolution of the Directory. Hence, cloaking the desertion of his troops in Egypt beneath a professed anxiety for the welfare of France, he hurried home on August 23rd, leaving Kléber in command and reaching Fréjus on October 9th, he despatched on the following day the missive already quoted to the nearly defunct and impotent Directory.

Of a truth Napoleon had reason to be grateful to the British Press.

On December 13th Napoleon was chosen First Consul.

As regards the British Press, matters remained unchanged in France until August, 1802. On the 2nd of that month Napoleon was elected First Consul for life. This was the next step towards the hereditary dynasty for which his soul hungered.

Now, however, English journalists, who had initiated a series of powerful attacks on the conduct of Napoleon, fell under his displeasure. In March an embargo was laid on all British newspapers save one. (See "Correspondence 6246, Letters to Fouché," August 13th, 1802.) In addition to this, reading rooms and libraries were definitely forbidden to supply English news. Clearly Napoleon attached no little importance to public opinion in England as expressed by the English Press. True France and England, in consequence of the signature of the Peace of Amiens, were to be technically friends for the space of about a year—but that the friendship would be either real or lasting few could believe; and this was made more than evident by the articles which appeared in the English Press.

Meanwhile, the French Press was left in peace, and indeed, until 1810, was subject to the régime established by the Consulate—a régime, however, which involved a severe police supervision.

After 1810 censors and official editors were forced on the principal journals, and the control consequently became more severe.

Outside Paris only one journal was allowed for each department, and this, by a decree dated August 3rd, 1810, was under the control

of the Departmental Préfet.

After October, 1810, only four newspapers were left alive in Paris, and these were the *Moniteur* (official); *Journal des Débats*, which professed to furnish news, and was then renamed the *Journal de l'Empire*; the *Journal de Paris*, which mainly dealt in gossip; and, lastly, the old *Gazette de France*, of which the columns were chiefly filled with religious news.

The fate of these papers was this:-

By a decree dated February 18th, 1811, the Journal de l'Empire was appropriated by the Government and not one sou of compensation was paid to the unlucky proprietors, the Bertin frères. On September 17th, 1811, by another decree, all the other Paris newspapers were confiscated. Hence the political news, such as it was, only rarely appeared, and then only with Government consent. It was usually false, and of course the same drawback applied to the military intelligence. Naturally, Napoleon had no intention of divulging military secrets.

But the very fact that, in order to avoid the introduction into France of hostile opinions, as figured in the Press, he had forbidden the introduction of English newspapers, cut both ways. It may have protected him from unfriendly criticism at home, but it also deprived him of useful information from abroad, especially from England. In "Lecestre," Vol. 1, p. 81, we read two letters dated in 1806. They were written from Posen by Napoleon, and were both addressed

to his brother Louis, the King of Holland:-

"Posen, le 15 Décembre, 1806.

"..... Je vous remercie des journaux anglais que vous m'avez envoyés. Continuez à m'envoyer exactement tous ceux que vous recevrez, et faites-moi part de tous les bruits d'angleterre que circulerait dans vos places de commerce...."

The other, to the same and addressed from the same town, Posen, gives some interesting information regarding commercial reprisals, a subject of which we have heard not a little of late. It runs as

follows :-

"Je vois dans les journaux anglais qu'il est question de se saisir tous les fonds que nous avons en Angleterre. Il serait bon de veiller à ce qu'il ne se fit aucun transport de ce qui est sur votre grand-livre au compte des Anglais. La matière est extrêmement délicate; causez-en avec votre ministre des finances. Mon intention n'est pas qu'on se saisisse des créances anglaises qui sont sur le grand-livre; mais si les Anglais le faisaient, il faudrait bien le faire aussi."

It is curious to note that there are no other references to the British Press in the correspondence, the speeches, or bulletins of Napoleon.

The protest of Talleyrand, shortly after the Peace of Amiens, against the "outrageous libels" on Napoleon published in the British Press which were, he alleged, "repugnant to public decency, the rights of nations, and the state of peace," will be remembered, and how, after prosecution, an English editor was condemned and punished.

So at any rate some British newspapers filtered through to France

and were attentively perused by the Government.

When war was again declared with France, in May, 1803, the sources of information as to what was going on in England were again dried up, save where an enterprising French agent in England managed to forward to his Government a package of newspapers as well as his written report. The messengers in most cases, nay, nearly in all, being smugglers.

In France the conditions of the Press were as we have already stated, and the muzzling of the French Press Napoleon kept rigorously in his own hands and under his own control. In vain Fouché, who desired that all surveillance of printed matter should be allotted to his department, urged it on his despotic master. Napoleon's reply

was an emphatic No.

Though details are lacking, and letters and speeches tell us but little of Napoleon's indebtedness to the British Press, it is possible from Wellington's despatches to gather how serious at times was the leakage of news which must inevitably have been of the uttermost

service to the enemy.

Writing from Badajoz to Lord Liverpool, under date November 21st, 1809, Wellington bitterly complains of the frequent publication in English newspapers of paragraphs describing the position, numbers, objects, and the means of obtaining such objects by the armies in Spain and Portugal. He goes on to state that not only the regiments occupying positions are named, but that the number of men fit for duty of which each regiment is composed is given. This news must, he writes, have been known to the enemy as soon as to himself, and at a moment when it was most important that the enemy should not see it. He encloses a recent paragraph which describes the line he should follow in case of the occurrence of a certain event—the preparations he had made for that operation, and where the magazines were in position. This condition of things he states is "mischievous to the public exactly in proportion as it is well founded and correct."

From Celorico on August 10th, 1810, he writes to Lieut.-General Graham an order forbidding officers to permit the publication of their letters to friends at home if containing news useful to the enemy.

He instances a detailed account which had been published in the English Press of the batteries and works erected at Cadiz and on the Isla, with the number of guns, of what calibre they were, their distance from each other and from the works of the enemy.

We may note here that Wellington refers only to officers. The information likely to be communicated by the N.C.Os. and men was a negligible quantity, the percentage who could read and write among the rank and file being very small indeed.

In these days how different are things. But Wellington had

also grounds of complaint against the Cadiz Press.

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It appears that, in November, 1810, certain serious attacks were made therein on the Marquis de la Romana, who was much distressed thereby. These remarks reflected also on Wellington, and were calculated to damage him personally in England. They also were detrimental to the character of the army, and much damage to the country had been done by these foolish observations in the Press.

In England, Wellington remarks, we are accustomed to it, but in Spain persons cannot be defended without giving information to the enemy. A few months later the source of much information to the enemy was discovered. It appears to have been worked through Lisbon and Torres Vedras. Certain unpatriotic inhabitants were in the habit of supplying the enemy with supplies of tea and coffee, for which there was a great demand and for which a huge profit was obtained. With the consignments of these goods, letters and English newspapers, forwarded through French agents or spies in England, were carried at the same time, thus giving most valuable information to the enemy. This nefarious practice was, as may be at once conjectured, speedily ended.

In the Wellington despatches there are, of course, a great many other references to the Press, but it would have served no good purpose to have quoted them more extensively. Sufficient has been given to show how it was that Napoleon was compelled to rely considerably on the unthinking, if not intentionally unpatriotic, paragraphs in the English newspapers. He was, in a way, between two fires. Liberty of the Press he dare not grant to France, nay, he was for self-

preservation compelled to rigorously restrict its operations.

English papers not unnaturally vituperated his words and deeds—to have such publications freely distributed in France would have been impolitic, to say the least of it. But news of his enemies he must have, and there can be no doubt that the unwise and ill-considered paragraphs of war news were of the greatest assistance to our enemy Napoleon and of the greatest detriment to the operations and conduct of the war, and consequently to the well-being of ourselves and our allies.

Two more brief extracts may be added in conclusion. Writing from Frenada as late as March 16th, 1813, Wellington goes so far as to say that "In England it is not impossible to communicate intelligence by a newspaper; indeed, the contents of all the newspapers are intelligence to the enemy upon which I know that plans of operations have been founded." And this after years of protest at the folly and wickedness of the paragraphs in the English Press.

One wild cat scheme which was promptly crushed by Wellington is really amusing. It was seriously proposed to get English news published in a French newspaper and thence to send it to Spain! Wellington considered—and rightly—that the scheme would not work owing to the restrictions of the French Press. One is inclined to speculate as to his opinion on the general conduct of the European newspapers in this year of grace 1916. But the world is a century older.

## WITH SMUTS IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA.'

By G. D. H.

AFTER five months' strenuous training at Potchefstroom, it was with delight we read the orders for our embarkation. For the next twenty-four hours everyone was working at top pressure striking tents and clearing up: the next afternoon saw us all ready at the station, waiting for our troop trains.

Forty-eight hours brought us to Durban. Durban's Comfort Committee did us well, and overwhelmed us with fruit and cigarettes.

Our trip along the coast was all right, lots of food, Swedish drill to keep us fit, and inoculation to keep the doctors busy. The inoculation after a time became rather a bore to us, but the R.A.M.C. men thought it great sport; now and then a man would get the syringe stuck into him three times a day, in spite of vigorous protests. I came off lightly—three inoculations and one vaccination all within five days. The doctors' greatest hoax was when we were paraded with our pannikins: there were no late comers to this, everyone thinking it was a rum issue, but to our horror all we received was a fat quinine tabloid and a dram of water!

Our first sight of British East Africa was magnificent—beautiful palm trees and everything green and luxuriant: it was a feast to the eye. We disembarked in substantial lighters, 300 to each barge. Having packed us in there with all our kit, we were left to swelter for a couple of hours, until a tug came along and hauled us alongside

the wharf.

On landing we immediately entrained, and were able to size up the Uganda Railway. The Uganda Railway may be most excellent when you travel as a tourist, but viewed from a South African infantryman's point it lacks a great deal. Very narrow gauge, hard wooden seats and backs about twenty inches high, and eight of us, with all our kit and the various odds and ends that go to make the

complete soldier, all packed in one compartment.

We had forty-eight hours of this horror; even the stoppages when we got out and rushed banana plantations did not help matters, and we were all decidedly pleased when we reached railhead. We detrained at Mbuyni at mid-day, and were just in time to see the brigades marching out; we had to unpack ourselves in a hurry, and in less than an hour we were following on the heels of the last brigade. It was a bit of an eye-opener; nice red sand, and lots of sun and thirst. It was soon over, however, as evening brought us to our brigade, and we were able to move around and get our fires alight. Over hot tea and biscuits we discussed all the camp rumours and went to sleep content.

We remained here till noon next day, drawing ammunition and food, and, incidentally, saying good-bye to our kits which were to be left behind here. At 2 p.m. water was issued to us, and we then moved off in Indian file and had our first experience of cross-country marching in Central Africa. We kept going all night, with the exception of a halt for half an hour at midnight. At times we had to plough through vegetation as high as the waist, and we found it jolly hard going. We had with us an Indian Mountain Battery, and a fine lot of fellows they were: they had been in the field for over eighteen months, and on every occasion had done good work. We had good reason later on to be thankful they were with us. On our trek we had been lucky enough to cross a couple of rivers, and so had been able to refill our water-bottles. It is almost impossible to describe Central African vegetation and growth: the best way is to let your imagination run as far as possible, and then you may get somewhere near it. On March 9th we arrived at Lake Chala, a magnificent stretch of water. We rested here a whole day, revelling in the icy-cold water. At this place we had a few casualties, the enemy's Askaris holding up our convoy as it came along, and our wagon escort had an exciting time, while the Germans kept them busy with a couple of maxims. The enemy finally gave it best, and at sunset retired to another position. The Germans have trained their Askaris to lie in wait for stragglers; when they spot a poor fellow coming along dead-beat, they jump out with a yell to try and put you off your balance. If they see you are rattled, they are on to you at once with their heavy machettes, and all that is left then are little pieces.

In the majority of cases our fellows are usually too fed up to show any sign of scare; result, the Askari gets rattled in his turn; this gives the S.A.I. man time to remember he has a rifle, and he promptly plugs the nigger. The lions saved many of our lives on these night marches. I have been so utterly dead-beat that I have just dropped in my tracks and lay there, in spite of orders and jolly vigorous kicks. One can get so done up that you do not care whether you go on or go under, it is all the same; all you want to do is to

lie down and sleep.

And then an old lion starts calling to his mate, only a few yards from you, and in nine cases out of ten you manage to summon up that extra ounce of strength to carry you on a few more hundred yards, and then you drop again and curse the Germans for having caused all this trouble.

At nearly all our camps we usually had to stand-to all night; in this delightful land it starts to rain at nightfall and ceases about 10 p.m. By that time you are drenched, and to lie down is impossible; in less time than it takes to write the whole ground is a swamp, and the only thing to look for is daylight.

After leaving Lake Chala, we had quite an exciting time. Two of our companies went out to look for the enemy, but met him coming to look for us. In the dark our platoon got cut off, owing to some infernal ass not passing on an order. This was hard luck on us.

There we were, only a handful of men, and within a stone's throw of the enemy. About 800 yards away their main body was very busy attacking the camp we had just left, and machine-gun and rifle fire kept on for over two hours. All we could do was to lie down

in the swamp and await developments.

Towards dawn the enemy in his retreat blundered right on to us and we had a warm time; luckily he was too busy getting away to worry over us much, so we had a great time pumping lead into him. At dawn we found our other two companies, and the whole column moved out after the enemy who had retired on Tavieta. On nearing the river a small party of us were sent ahead to examine the bridge, and we came out on a party of the enemy who were getting ready to blow the bridge right up. We disposed of them just in time, and then started to unpack the dynamite. We were not sorry when we had got the lot out, over thirty sticks of it; they would have made a tidy mess of us and the bridge if we had not been in time. We were jolly lucky here, as we struck any amount of goats and cattle; having been without rations for two days we had some royal feeds. Everything domesticated is on the small side, fowls the size of a pigeon; goats, one can carry six and not feel the weight; and the largest ox I ever saw was about as big as a small sized donkey. Outside Tavieta camp the enemy were in the hills, and it took us two days to shift them out. Two regiments of South African Infantry were on our left with the heavy artillery and had the heaviest of the fighting; where we were they had only left enough to keep us busy and prevent our outflanking them. During the night they charged down and tried to get our guns, but this was a failure. At dawn our aeroplanes were up bombing them; they tried a few shells at them, but instead of the aeroplanes getting hurt we received all the bits that fell.

Close to here lies Kilamanjaro, one of the most wonderful mountains ever seen; we had seen its snow summit when over 150 miles away, but when close to it its magnificence was overpowering.

After the fall of Tavieta we went on to the Himo river, but our scouts were unable this time to stop the enemy, and when we reached the river the bridge was in ruins; this led to delay as the river was in flood. Our Indian engineers soon set to work and very quickly had a trestle bridge for us to cross by. This was rather a hair-raising experience as the bridge was about eighteen inches wide, forty yards across, and a twenty-foot drop. It took some time to get us all over. When across we had to set to thoul our wagons over, and by the end of the day we were quite authorities on manhandling wagons.

About March 17th we heard that we were to march out on the enemy, who were in force at a place called Kahe. This engagement took place over an enormous tract of country, and I am only able to describe what took place on our immediate front. On the 18th we moved off in the early morning, but the going was so bad that noon still saw us four miles from the enemy's position. Their naval guns had been making very bad practice at us, and our heavy artillery had been giving their position a royal time. In the afternoon we

formed up for the attack, and confidently looked forward to having

our afternoon tea on Kahe Kopje.

We went on and news came to us that the enemy had retired. This was jolly cheering for us, as the day had been a scorcher, and the heat had taken all the go out of us. About 4 p.m. we trotted right into an ambush; the enemy had let us get within one hundred yards before they opened fire-maxims and field guns well concealed and snipers up in trees. We lay very, very low, and my poor little platoon found itself right up against our machine-guns, which were the centre of attraction for the Germans. Our casualties here were very heavy, our colonel and many of the officers having been bowled over at the commencement of the action. We stuck it until the Germans worked right round us, and only then were we ordered to retire. Our mountain battery, on a kopje to our rear, saved us, as they pumped shell all over the Germans. Darkness came on, and by 10 p.m. we had fought our way back, and, incidentally, brought along one of their maxims.

At 11 p.m. we were ordered to dig ourselves in in case of attack. Happily, they gave us a rest and amused themselves by attacking Stuart's column, and from 1 a.m. till 2 the next afternoon they kept hammering at them, but in the end suffered heavily and had to clear

right out.

By this time we had been reinforced and we marched back to where we had been in action, and from there on to the German camp. Realizing the game was up, they did not wait but left their camp all standing and cleared off in a hurry.

We had two days' rest here and then marched back to Kilamanjaro; here we had a week's rest in which to learn how to construct dug-outs and fell trees! Didn't we grouse, as all this had to be done mostly on one-quarter or no rations!

About the 28th orders came for the brigade to move on to Moschi. As usual, everyone in a frantic hurry to get us away by dawn and we ended up by leaving at 2 p.m., the hottest and most trying part of the day. The mounted men all passed us here; they were going

right ahead to finish the whole job.

Unluckily for us Van der Venter and his men did not succeed. Their aim had been to reach Tabora, where the Germans had their munition factory. This was a three-hundred mile ride. one hundred miles from Moschi they all got held up by swollen rivers, and had to come back for supplies. The luck was not with us this time, and to crown all the rains set in and our poor old motor transport got stuck everywhere. There is the old saying: "I would rather be a dog than a soldier," but there is nothing a man would not rather be than one of the mechanical transport.

Rain, night attacks, and no rations fill my diary till April 5th. A big help to us were the natives, who used to bring in bags

of fruit and so enabled us to fill empty spaces.

Bacon none of us ever wish to see again. Some bright idiot, for the sake of appearances, had packed bacon in biscuit boxes. Bacon as a ration is all right, but when you get it in lieu of biscuits three times a day for three weeks, you begin to learn that a very little bit

of bacon can go a very long way, especially in the tropics. As we came down in the hospital train we passed car load after car load of biscuit tins, and we felt certain that ninety-nine out of one hundred contained bacon.

The enemy were very much on the war-path, and laid themselves out to be a nuisance to us and wired into us on every possible occasion. In one of these engagements I stopped a bullet and was promptly haled off to hospital and well looked after. The one idea in British East—and an excellent idea it is—is to remove the wounded and sick as far as possible from the firing line, and you get shifted from one base hospital to another. Unfortunately there is a standing order in all military hospitals. All patients entering hospital, whether minus head, socks, or anything else—it is all one to the authorities—are put on milk diet for twenty-four hours.

When, however, as was my luck, you happen to be moved from four different hospitals in five days, and be placed on milk diet in each—well! you begin to wish that you may never see a hospital or

milk again.

The ladies of Nairobi saved us. When our very swagger hospital train steamed in they were all waiting for us with any amount of tea and bread and butter, and we made up for a full week's starvation. We were then carted off in most swagger ambulances to Muthaiga hospital, and our troubles were over. When better we were shifted up to the sanatorium at the Lake Victoria Nyanza, and from there those who were useless were sent down to the coast and put on board the hospital ship "Ebani." She had just come from the Dardanelles, and was a revelation as to what medical men can do when given a free hand. There was nothing that they did not do for us. On our way in we called in at Zanzibar and in a small way saw a little of our good old silent Navy. A good voyage brought us to Durban; some were landed there and then others taken on to Capetown for

leave or discharge.

The only trouble with the young South African is that he will not stay in hospital. As soon as he can put one leg in front of another he will crawl out and try and join his regiment, even if he is hundreds of miles from it. It is this spirit that has enabled the South African infantry to overcome dangers and difficulties that would otherwise be enough to break men's hearts. I cannot conclude this without adding a tribute to those gallant Indian soldiers that I met while in German East. Most of us in South Africa have hazy ideas as to Indians, and take the coolie hawker or fruit-seller as the type. It did us good to meet the Indian, whether gunner, cavalryman, or, like ourselves, merely infantry. We have met them and made friends with them; we have seen them in action and have learnt to be proud to be alongside them. Many of us when nearly dead from thirst have been saved by our Indian friends. One of my gunner friends time after time used to come and give me a chupattie when rations were too scarce for words.

It will be one of our pleasantest memories of Central Africa, that we met such gallant and courteous representatives of our Indian Army.

# FROM A RECRUITING OFFICE NOTE BOOK.

# I.—RECRUITING THEN AND NOW.

#### 1705.

THE time is the reign of George I. and the scene is the Market Square at Shrewsbury. Sergeant Kite is haranguing a mob of yokels to the

accompaniment of the beating of drums.

"If any gentleman," he shouts, "have a mind to serve His Majesty, if any 'prentices have severe masters, any children have undutiful parents, if any servants have too little wages, or any husband too much wife, let them repair to Sergeant Kite at the Sign of the Raven in this good town and they shall have present relief and entertainment. Gentlemen, I don't beat my drums here to ensnare or inveigle any man, for you must know, gentlemen, that I am a man of honour. Besides, I don't beat up for common soldiers; no, I only 'list Grenadiers, Grenadiers, gentlemen. Pray, gentlemen, observe this Grenadier cap, this is the cap of honour! It dubs a man a gentleman in the drawing of trigger, and he that has the good fortune to be born six feet high was born to be a great man. Sir, would you give me leave to try this cap upon your head?"

But the yokel, fearing that it was a trick to enlist him unwarily,

But the yokel, tearing that it was a trick to enlist him unwarily, refuses; and another item of the crowd shouts out, "Look ye, Sergeant, no coaxing, no wheedling, if I've a mind to 'list, why, so I will."

"I coax? I wheedle?" Sergeant Kite exclaims indignantly, "I'm above it, Sir; I have served twenty campaigns—but, Sir, you talk well, and I must own that you are a man every inch of you; a pretty, sprightly young fellow! I love a fellow with a spirit; but I scorn to coax, 'tis base! Though I must say that never in my life have I seen a man better built. How firm and strong he treads! He steps like a castle! But I scorn to wheedle any man. Come honest steps like a castle! But I scorn to wheedle any man. Come, honest lad, will you come and take your share of a pot at the Raven?"

Captain Plume, the Recruiting Officer, comes up and enquires

what success Sergeant Kite has had.

"I have 'listed," says Kite, "the strong man of Salop, the king of the gipsies, a Scotch pedlar, a scoundrel attorney, and a Welsh parson."

"An attorney? Art thou mad? 'List a lawyer! Discharge him at once, this minute!"
'Why, Sir?"

"Because I will have no one in my company that can write. I say, discharge him !'

"And what shall I do with the parson?"

"Can he write?"

"He plays rarely upon the fiddle."

"Then keep him by all means. But hold, have you made any use of the German doctor's habit since your arrival?"

"Yes, and my fame's all about the country for the most faithful

fortune-teller that ever told a lie."

For Sergeant Kite has a double part to play in the recruiting drama. As fortune-teller Kite, disguised in the German doctor's habit, he sends a tailor and a shoemaker to Recruiting Sergeant Kite, by telling the former that he would be a Captain of Marines, and the latter that he would be a Major of Dragoons; and, by the slim trick of persuading a would-be recruit to accept a portrait of His Majesty, the latter finds that he has taken the irrevocable step of taking the King's shilling.

Thus Farquhar in his comedy, "The Recruiting Officer." The author, an Irishman of Scotch descent, had served in Flanders and on the Danube as an officer under Marlborough, and, while still a young man, became an actor in Shakespearean drama, and finally a playwright. The play was written in 1705, and it no doubt gives a correct impression of the recruiting methods of that time; and as it was revived with success more than a century later at Drury Lane and Covent Garden, those methods would appear to have been still in use during

the Napoleonic Wars.

The inevitable female element in the play is a certain young person named Sylvia, who, by the sudden death of her brother, has become heiress to an estate of £2,000 a year. She is in love with Captain Plume, but her father thinks that such a fortune would be wasted on a mere Recruiting Officer, so he orders a coach and six and despatches her at three minutes' notice to his country seat. Sylvia, however, under the mask of filial obedience, conceals a wilful and headstrong nature. She is a woman of advanced and liberal views, and had she lived two hundred years later would probably have been a leader in the Suffragette movement. For not only does she send ten guineas for the purchase of a layette to the mother of Captain Plume's illegitimate son, who has just made his appearance in Shrewsbury—a sum which through no fault of the donor never gets beyond the fingers of Sergeant Kite, the intermediary through whom it was sent, and who consents to be appointed honorary husband of the lady, in which capacity he retains the ten guineas as her dowry-but as soon as she reaches her home in the coach and six she puts on man's clothes and returns to Shrewsbury in order to be near Recruiting Officer Plume. All comes right in the end, as in every properly constructed comedy; the heavy father is placated, and as the curtain falls Sylvia and Captain Plume, hand in hand, make their bow to the audience.

## 1915-1916.

Of the recruiting methods of the year 1705, one only, namely, the Voluntary System, was still in use in the year 1915; and that was on the point of being placed in cold storage by the operation of the Military Service Acts. The Market Square and the beerhouse are no longer

as they were in Farquhar's time, and for many generations after, the

Recruiting Offices of a county town,

The Recruiting Officer is now installed in as many rooms as he can commandeer in a regimental depôt, and his demands for accommodation are constantly increasing. He must have not only his own private office with a telephone on the table by his side; but his registration office; his pay office; his document room; his card-room, in which, however, no card games are permitted except the dealing of cards red, white, and blue into their respective trays; an office for his assistant; as well as a suite of apartments for the sub-area Commander and his subordinates; and in addition odds and ends of rooms for minor departmental work.

A stranger who saw a score or more young women, most of them with their hair down, passing out of the barrack gates about one o'clock, might well suppose that a class of a high school for girls was held within, and that the two or three women of stouter build and less youthful appearance mingling with the little groups were the teachers. They are in fact the staff of she-clerks employed in a Recruiting Office as typists, shorthand writers, or copyists, and they are leaving for their midday meal, and in an hour will have returned to their tables. There was no opening as a she-clerk for Sylvia two hundred years ago, so she was compelled to masquerade in man's clothes in order to be near her Recruiting Officer; and from what we hear of him Captain Plume, with a staff of young women as his assistants, would probably have neglected his duties.

Sergeant Kite has also disappeared, and with him all unworthy devices and questionable tricks for bringing in a good harvest of recruits. His place in the Market Square was occupied by Sergeant Poster. From the beginning of the war up to the time of the passing of the Military Service Acts, under which he found, like Othello, that his occupation was gone, Sergeant Poster was to be found wherever there was a blank wall or other convenient situation for his activities; and, unlike Sergeant Kite, his word could always be relied on. He never indulged in random statements or made extravagant promises. In plain and simple language he invited the hesitating youth to join the Army. He appealed, sometimes in print, sometimes in picture, to the dormant patriotism of the nation, and with greater success than Sergeant Kite. He was always at hand and ready to be interviewed, and was stationed at every street corner to point out the way to the Recruiting Office, where the would-be recruit met with every attention. The Recruiting Officer and staff were there to tell him what regiments were open to him, and to help him make his choice, having regard to his physical and professional capabilities; and to guide his first footsteps along the military path; while Corporal Leaflet was at hand to point out the pecuniary advantages which would accrue to him and those dependent on him. If through not being up to standard, or for other reasons, it was doubtful whether he was eligible to be a soldier, he was invited to remain at the depôt as the guest of the King until authority for his enlistment could be obtained; and the acceptance of 2s. 7d. daily for pay and subsistence while his case was in suspense

by no means involved him, for pocketing the King's money was no longer, as it had been in the days of Sergeant Kite, the symbolic act which converted the civilian into the soldier.

### II .- THE MILITARY SERVICE ACTS.

A restless, self-indulgent, petrol-and-cinema-ridden generation, addicted to spending much of its spare time, and not a little of its time that was not spare, in studying and practising one or more of eight different methods of applying motion to a ball, accepted these Acts with remarkable composure. To its credit, be it recorded, that it seems to have recognized that they only converted a moral into a legal

obligation, which came to many with a sense of relief.

The answers reported by the Parliamentary canvassers who during the summer of 1915 were sent afield to ascertain the general feeling were rarely in terms of direct refusal. Such expressions as "Will come when fetched," "Will come when all the single men have joined," "Farmers and their sons must go first," "Thinking of enlisting," "Relatives object," "Want conscription," "Cannot come owing to family, business or agricultural ties," "Will come presently," "In charge of a lunatic," and so forth, constituted the bulk of the replies made to the canvassers in a certain agricultural area which may fairly be presumed to be typical; they were in fact excuses for procrastinating the performance of a duty that was felt to be incumbent; and the residue was rarely antagonistic.

A few protests were indeed made against the trespass on the liberty of the subject by certain platform politicians of no great influence outside their own circle of admirers, but these protests were merely formal and were ignored; for the nation at large, with unerring instinct, saw that the Liberties of the Empire were more to be considered than the Liberty of the Subject. The Trades Unions, which for many years had rigorously enforced industrial conscription, with no mercy shown to the conscientious objector who declined to join the Union of his trade, were estopped from raising their voices against the Acts. The attempt to make a martyr of the occasional conscientious objector met with little success. In many instances he gave away his own case by consenting to perform non-combatant service in the Army or munition work at home. The soldier in the field is dependent on the former, whether in the commissariat, the medical, or the transport services, for his efficiency at the front, and on the latter for the shells and cartridges, the grenades and the bombs with which he slays his enemy. The distinction between combatant and non-combatant service is purely artificial. If it is a crime for Private Thomas Atkins to kill a German the non-combatant conscientious objector who supplies him with food, medical attendance, and ammunition, is equally guilty as an accessory before the fact. A truly consistent conscientious objector should refuse to perform any direct or indirect military work except digging graves for the fallen.

The Military Service Acts may be briefly defined as Conscription tempered by Tribunalism. The first Act laid the obligation on single

men and also on those men who after a certain date had entered the married state, and who presumably had hurriedly faced its perils in the hope that they would thereby avoid the perils of military life.

The Tribunals were set up in order to answer a complex question: "In the present national crisis what is the best use we can make of John Smith, who may be a cowman, an undertaker, a prosperous farmer, an independent gentleman, a prize fighter, a railway porter, an exciseman, a chauffeur, or a tramp and a scamp?" and so on through the whole catalogue of callings and occupations, with their sub-divisions into married, widower, and single. "Will John Smith serve his country better behind the plough, behind the counter, beside the armchair of an aged mother wholly dependent on him, or wheresoever his place may be, than as a soldier in the trenches; and therefore are we justified in recommending him for absolute, conditional, or

temporary exemption from military service?"

If it was often difficult to discern any guiding principle governing the decisions of the local Tribunals (which were subject to revision by the Appeal Tribunal, and by leave of the latter by the Central Appeal Tribunal), and if different local Tribunals often took widely divergent views of identical conditions and circumstances, yet it may be said that in general they performed their tasks fairly well, quite as well in fact as might have been expected. As was inevitable from their composition, they often displayed a manifest bias in favour of the claimant for exemption and against the Military Representative, which was perhaps not altogether to be regretted. A harsh and rigorous application of the Acts would have impeded their action, which, considering that they were a new departure, that but three years ago would have been scouted as one impossible for the nation to take, has produced far less friction than was anticipated; a fact which has greatly impressed our allies, and, it may be conjectured, our enemies also. No doubt a considerable percentage of men whose claims for exemption were somewhat shadowy was excused temporarily or permanently from service; but with all their many imperfections the Tribunals seem to have given expression to the general opinion of the nation; which is often illogical and perverse, but which "gets there" without much ado. A State that was governed by Logic, which takes little account of indefinite things and moral forces, would soon perish by civil war.

The Tribunals engendered a considerable growth of egotism. It was surprising to find how many men of obscure avocations professed that they were indispensable to the national life in their civil capacities. It was, of course, impossible to define in the Acts, except in general terms, the conditions under which exemption could be claimed, whether for national reasons, such as a calling necessary to the State; or for personal reasons, such as the hardship that would be inflicted on the dependents of a man compelled into the Army; and it is not surprising that the Tribunals were often freely criticized. They were certainly liberal in their views of what constitutes necessary work at home; but the wonder is that they did not do worse with such a bewildering task before them. Many were the freak claims presented to them, and a

new column of Tit-bits from the Tribunals appeared in the daily journals.

The Military Service Acts changed the functions of a Recruiting Office and gave it new parts to play in the recruiting drama. Under the Voluntary System it might be compared to the local branch of a great retail firm. It was expected to do its best to attract custom by the display of a "full line" of commodities to suit a variety of individual tastes. On one counter might be seen the cuirass of the Household Cavalry, on another the badges of the Guards, on another the spurs of the mounted corps, on another the kilt, sporran and bonnet of the Highlanders, on another the green garments of the Rifle Regiments, and so on down the scale to the Royal Army Medical Corps, the Army Service Corps, or the Army Veterinary Corps. It might happen that the stock on certain of these counters might be temporarily withdrawn from the market, but, speaking generally, the departmental manager had something acceptable to offer to all customers, however fastidious they were in their tastes. Even a semi-conscientious objector could usually be suited in a non-combatant corps.

After the passing of the Military Service Acts a mistaken idea arose in the minds of many people that the Recruiting Officers were left with little or nothing to do and they were now unnecessary officials. As a matter of fact the Acts, in conjunction with the Registration Act, enormously increased their work and their responsibilities. If some of the executive work, such as the attesting of voluntary recruits, with its litter of Army Forms to be filled in and signed, was either abolished or greatly simplified, the administrative work increased week by week. Staffs had to be doubled, trebled, or increased even tenfold; barrack rooms, school rooms, and even officers' quarters had to be taken over as offices for newly organized departments; and yet the idea still lingers on that the Acts set up a species of automatic penny-into-the-slot machine which with little expenditure of trouble and with great

facility furnished the Army with recruits.

The voluntary recruit was a comparatively easy person to deal with. The Compulsory Service man, with his red, white, and blue cards, his own personal or his employer's claim for exemption, his appearances and re-appearances before the Tribunal, his appeal and further appeal, his medical and physical condition, and, in certain cases, the difficulty of finding him when wanted, and in addition the correspondence on these and other matters which he entails, is often an intricate problem which can only be solved by the united efforts of subordinate offices spread over half a county, yet working together in harmonious co-operation for which the Area Recruiting Officer is responsible and which it is his duty to maintain. He must not only be a capable and hardworking administrator, but must have an expert knowledge of the working of the Registration and Compulsory Service machines, the complicated details and accessories of which are constantly being scrapped, changed, or renewed at short notice. there are persons who still imagine that with the suspension of voluntary service the Recruiting Officer holds a comfortable sinecure.

The Poster, which up to the end of 1915 made such a brave show on every available vertical plane, was virtually abolished by the Military Service Acts. Opinions differ as to whether it was ever a really effective recruiting instrument, but the least that can be said of it is that it continually brought the recruiting question before the public eye. Only the blind or the utterly illiterate could escape from it. The man in the street, however, rarely studied it with interest or attention, but, like the Pharisee in the parable, passed by on the other side. It bored him and he was disposed to resent it.

There were three classes of poster, the "Enunciative Poster," the "Persuasive and Rhetorical Poster," and the "Emotional Poster"—the last usually pictorial. The first, with its young cousin the Leaflet, gave information in language that was simple and frequently easy to understand. Of the other two classes of poster it may be said that they were in general composed or designed by persons who had no wide knowledge of human nature as it exists in that portion of the community which we are pleased to term the Lower Orders, and which, though not unfeeling or unpatriotic, is sub-cynical, undemonstrative, and irresponsive to cheap rhetoric and appeals to the emotions, except, perhaps, from behind the footlights. It resents the sight of any outward thing that clashes with this temperament. The Pictorial Poster, with the figure of Nelson under the caption "England expects every man to do his Duty"; or of the widow resigning her claims on her young son and bidding him go to the wars; or of the draped Union Jack, left it cold; and if any remark was elicited that remark was probably some cheap witless jibe. It is the present writer's opinion that a poster setting forth the details of the liberal scale of rations supplied to the man at the front, accompanied, if possible, by an unofficial leaflet giving an account of the "tuck boxes" and other gifts of little luxuries and comforts constantly sent out to various regiments in the trenches by their good friends at home, would have excited greater interest.

The Military Service Acts swept the Persuasive and Emotional Posters into the dustbin. Here and there they may be still seen in tatters on the wall, the fossils of a recruiting epoch that is so near and yet so far. Only the Enunciative Poster remains, and it sometimes assumes a minatory form with the heading "Warning."

To kidnap a metaphor from geology, the Group or Derby Scheme may be termed the pleiocene period of recruiting in Great Britain. It was still in theory voluntary, but behind it loomed the grim figure of Conscription; the nightmare which has disturbed the repose of many worthy persons who persist in identifying it with militarism. The scheme did not of itself greatly change the functions of the Recruiting Officer, for no one was compelled to intern himself in a group, but it might be darkly hinted to him that he had better do so. To the man in the street the scheme appealed in two ways; firstly, he could always boast that he came up of his own accord and not as a conscript; and secondly, the evil day was postponed indefinitely, and in the interval anything might happen—even the war might come to an end.

## III .- THE PLEASE HABIT AND OTHER VICES.

Communications between different military offices on simple matters of routine not requiring elaborate explanation are commonly made on memorandum forms, the usual formalities being dispensed with. There is therefore no necessity to reflect whether the communication must end with the elliptic, "I have the honour to be, etc.," in one line, or the full, "I am, Sir, Your obedient servant," in three. These and other formulæ of the same nature are, save in a negligible percentage of cases, manifest untruths suffixed to many thousand letters every day, and sanctioned by custom. They were, however, too lengthy for the limited area of Army Form C.348 and its kind, yet it was felt that the simple and bald statement or request written thereon should be softened and toned down. Hence arose in recent years what may be termed the "please habit," to which so many commissioned and non-commissioned baboos in military offices became The word "please," which is the sentence "if it please you" compressed into a monosyllable, should often be on the lips of a child but seldom on the lips of an adult. The victims of the habit, like the victims of morphia, find that they cannot shake themselves free of it, and the word appears in strange company and grotesque situations. It is quite superfluous in the following request: "Will you kindly exhibit enclosed poster please?" or in the covering note, "For favour of approval please." But the two most distressing instances of the baleful effects of the deadly "please habit" which ever came to the present writer's notice were replies to enquiries which he had made at a certain Record Office :-

"In reply to your wire, records here show that Private Williams is in a state of desertion please."

"Private Johnson was discharged medically unfit for further service, having defective teeth and chronic dyspepsia please."

It is probable that the two words which closed this communication had never before found themselves side by side.

Passing in this connection to a higher stratum of official literature, namely, to the printed papers, orders, circular letters, instructions, and the like, which are daily, almost hourly, showered upon the Army, not a few of these are expressed in slovenly and indefinite language. The Staff Officers and others who compose them are apt to assume, with unconscious egotism, that whatever is present in their own minds will also be present in the mind of everyone who has to read and act upon them. If an ambiguous word or obscure expression is used it is taken for granted that the person at the other end, who may be stupid, unimaginative, and a slave to the littera scripta, will be guided by instinct to the correct interpretation. It is rare to find a military document that is a model of perspicacity. It may be that the English language, which as a medium for conveying ideas lucidly and explicitly is far inferior to the French language, is partly to blame for the fog which so often envelops official communications.

A fault which is less reprehensible, because it is not so likely to cause misunderstanding, is the fault of careless composition and arrangement. A Staff Captain promulgates the following ukase:—

"It having occurred in many cases where charges for coal have been charged against the contingent fund, the Colonel Commanding

the District orders that the practice shall cease.'

Apart from the cacophony "charged charges," which could easily have been avoided, the word "where" is meaningless and should have been "that."

Again, an Adjutant makes an unfounded charge against a hard-

working and conscientious Recruiting Officer:-

"I have to-day despatched to you recruit—whom you sent to the Depôt yesterday as being wholly unsuited for duty at this depôt."

A Command Order gives a new definition of a new unit:—"Old civilian pattern great coats now with units that are new (i.e., that have never been worn) will be sent, etc."

In each of the last two examples a phrase has been carelessly forgotten, and hurriedly replaced in a situation in which it makes havoc of the context.

Even the compositions emanating from the highest quarters are not impeccable. The following passage occurred in the appeal issued by Lord Kitchener in May, 1915:—

"Those who are engaged in the production of war material should not leave their occupations. It is to men who are not performing this

work only (sic) that I appeal."

The word "only" should have been the third word in the sentence, if it was to appear at all. As it stood it implied that the appeal was made to those who were doing munition work and some other work as well. A few days later the appeal was amended, the word "only"

being struck out.

After a quarter of a century and more of free and compulsory education it is disappointing and surprising to find that a considerable proportion of the recruits coming up in an agricultural district is unable to read fluently or, as the signatures in the pay list will show, to write legibly. About five in each hundred still "make their mark," and Captain Plume, who "would have no one in his company that could write," would have little difficulty in raising even a battalion in many country areas. Even men who have been in the higher standards seem to have forgotten much of what was taught them in the village school and to have lost the habit of reading, if, indeed, they ever acquired it. The writer is inclined to debit the English Spelling Book with the dismal failure. Many weary hours are spent by the child in what is usually an unsuccessful struggle with its anomalies, and this time is abstracted from the limited period available for other subjects. It has been calculated that it handicaps the British child to the extent of eighteen months in the international educational competition. As a training for the mind the English Spelling Book is about as useful as a Greek irregular verb with all its accents sticking out; which some Grecians have lately assured us

is an excellent foundation on which to build a knowledge of technics or science.

The colloquial lapses in grammar are due to the fact that the English language has no grammar but only that Spelling Book, and they are common to all classes. The "you was" or "they was" of the country yokel is no worse than the "who did you see," the "it was me," or the "these sort," which falls constantly from the lips of persons who would be affronted if they were told that they were not well educated.

### IV .- LEAVES FROM THE LETTER TRAY.

At the top of the pile lies a letter from an employer who was asked to speak to the character of one of his employes. The humour is probably unconscious:—

"I have always found — strictly honest and straightforward and very conscientious (the reason he left me was he thought he could better himself)."

To an assistant who desired to join the Supply Branch of the Army Service Corps a butcher gives a testimonial which the German Emperor might have sent with the Iron Cross of the 1st Class to one of his generals:—

" — was with me two years which did my killing satisfactorily and trustworthy."

A chit flutters to the ground, is retrieved and found to be a brief covering memo:—"Bill omitted by mistake (in former application) now enclosed with regret." The regret no doubt referred to the omission, but as it stands the formula is commended to the use of tradesmen desirous of conciliating their customers when applying for payment.

The letter of the semi-illiterate is usually what in the jargon of the day is termed a "human document." The present writer holds to the paradoxical opinion that education is not favourable to the art of letter writing, and that the interest of a letter is usually in inverse proportion to the amount of education which the writer has absorbed. The letter of a man or woman to whom the use of pen and ink is not habitual, and only resorted to upon occasion, may be said to be addressed to the writer rather than to the recipient. The dominant note in it is Liberavi animam meam. It is a sort of soliloquy which some chance person, preferably the official or other individual to whom it is ostensibly addressed, may hear and give heed to. It violates all the rules of grammar, composition, and spelling, and punctuation is an art unknown to it. But it goes straight to the point without periphrasis or attempt at fine writing, and declares, often in strikingly picturesque and precise terms, what the writer has been brooding over, which is in all probability a real or imaginary grievance; and without this incentive the pen is rarely put to paper. It may contain a few formal and well-worn phrases of respect or regard, but no attempt is made to conciliate the recipient with gossip or trivial pleasantries.

It is what every letter should be, and what letters written by educated persons rarely are, a mirror of the thoughts and the mind of the writer, rather than an approach to the mind of the recipient; and as such it is full of "I's" and barren of "You's."

All the letters from which the following extracts are taken were received at a Recruiting Office in an agricultural area. The majority of them demand answers to one or other of the following questions. The friends of A want to know why he has been called up; the foes of B want to know why he has not been called up; with interpolated scraps of autobiography or of family history. All the extracts are quoted verbatim, literatim et punctuatim, and no attempt is made to explain the cryptic remarks and phrases which occur in some of them.

The letter bears the printed heading "Sausage Casings Manufacturer Offal Contractor," and the writer is in trouble because his son-in-law, who assists him in the business, has been called up:—

"I am Partley Disabled having a broken sholder am under contract to all butchers in —— and —— to clear all Offal each morning which take 2 Horses and Carts to do William takes one I the other this refuse has to be cooked in 3 large coppers for Food for Ducks of which we keep 5 to 800 also a Large Quantity of Fowles all for Food which I think very important in face of Present Prices of Food in Peace time I had 3 then but now onley this one in Question and we are not able to do all the Work so I have to make my onley single Daughter help Feed and Pluck Birds for Market Should I be compeled to loose this man then I must close and go to the Workhouse has I should have no other way of living You may say Find an older man that is not Posable has they must be brought up in the Traid to Understand it. also I am not able to clean Horse or Harness them I may say we are only to Pleased to do all in our Power to help and we think by contributing to Food Supplys though trifling must be a small help and I must beg your Parden for trespesing on your Valuable time."

A called-up youth presents a note from his father:-

"I have sent my son to join the colors as he is ordered he is eighteen years old and very bad in his speech and me and his mother have to watch him very close of nights as he jumps out of bed in his sleep and runs all over the house if he has to join he would like to go in the Army Service core as we are working for Mr. ——, Government Contractor."

Yet another applicant for admission into the Army Service Corps Asylum:—

"I got to —— yesterday and the officer did not know about I was comming. I had not got the money on me yesterday so I had a good way to walk which has upset my legs again for I am troubled with them at times and have a job to walk that is why I wanted to go into the Army Baking I have not done any baking for some time and the Ref I have will not take me through for the Army as only a Table Hand becaus they want men who can make dough. Bake it. set it in the oven and take it out and I am not a first class Baker

but I have got into a gentleman's Hands who is Baking for the Troops at — and he is going to show me right through the Baking for the Army and he said I should not be many days picking it up."

There are few officers who would not be glad to have under their command on active service the Irishman who asked to be "taken back to go to the front," albeit that he had "been sentenced to imprisonment by the civil power":—

"I wish to apply for permission to rejoin the — until this war is finished. When I left the redgiment I left with a good character but I have got into a few crimes for assault since I left therefore when this war was started I was doing 8 months imprisonment for assault. If Colonel — was in command I think he would take me back for I was a clean soldier while I was in the redgment but I am like every Irishman a bit quick temper but willing to defend England with my heart's blood. So therefore Sir I hope you will take me back to go to the front and give me a chance of proving myself an Irishman and a british subject."

Most of the letters received at a Recruiting Office complaining that this or that man has not been called up are written by women. It is true that they are usually anonymous, but the sex of the writer is betrayed either by the handwriting or by certain feminine touches which would not have occurred to a man; and, incidentally, they disclose some of the postures of a woman's "mental attitude."

A village maiden sends in a return of the chief shirkers of the place:-

"Sir, I am sending you a list of all the young men in —— that are fit and able to join the Army but will not and I think it is time that they did as they are single and have nothing to stop them and of course the girls cannot join the army like the boys here are the names of some of them. (Here follow the names and addresses of eight young men, of whom four are apparently of one family and three of another.) There are several others round here who are such cowards and will not go all the married men are going and leaving the others behind and it is not fair hoping you will stir them up I remain yours sincerely A Girl."

It is rash for a man of military age "not to keep himself clean and wear socks" in a village where such habits are noticed by the womenfolk:—

"Sir there is a certain man in the Parish of — who as not yet been called up to do his share in this War and as all other Married Men have had to go and leave their Wives why is it that this one certain Man is allowed to stay behind anymore than the rest he walks about like a Cripple but it is only because he is too lazy to keep himself clean and wear socks he as got double the strength to what a good many have had that have been called up the said Man's Name is — and his Address is —."

It is possible that the writer of the following letter was the wife of the man referred to, who desired to exchange a troublesome husband

for a comfortable separation allowance. The handwriting was a

woman's with the postscript, "please keep this as private":

"Sir I am sending to ask why you dont see about such men as Mr. — done 2 years 7 months in the South African War he as also been in India he only has a wife and 2 children not like some with large families and I no he say he is not coming until he is called or fetched so I think it would be wise to send for him at once think this over and do your best for there are lots I could let you no about your humble servant a citizen."

A saucy word to a female boss—sic itur ad astra. The faithless lover who in the days of old "loved and rode away" now loves and joins the Royal Flying Corps, wherein he is as free from irksome

encumbrances as a swallow on the wing:-

"Respected Sir, Dear Sir, Though I take the liberty as it leaves me at present to ask if you will be good enough to let me know where is my husbin. Though he is not my legible (sic) husbin as he has got a wife though he says she is dead but I do not think he knows for sure but we are married though I am getting my allotment reglar which is not fault of Mr. Lloyd George who would stop it if he could and Mr. Makenna but if you know where he is as he belongs to the Royal Fling Corps for ever since he joined in January when he was sacked from his work for talking back to his boss which was a woman at the laundry where he worked. I have not had any money from him since he joined though he told Mrs. Tomkins what lives on the ground floor that he was a pretty ossifer (sic) for 6s. a day and plenty of underclothing for bad weather and I have three children what he is the father of though he says it was my fault. Hoping you will write to me soon and you are quite well as it leaves me at present I must now close hoping you are quite well."

A vein of determination and grimness, a sort of reminiscence of the avenging Furies, seems to traverse most of the letters written under a female hand; but now and then a delightful letter with a softer touch finds its way into the letter tray. She was a she-clerk in the Recruiting Office and she thus acknowledged a wedding present from

the staff :-

"Dear Sirs, I wish to thank you for the wedding gift. For 14 days I have been trying to think of words to write which would adequately express to you the pleasure I feel but they will not come to my mind and so the fulness of my gladness is all my own. We shall soon be very busy getting our home and I will buy a copper kettle and some tea things with your gift; a china tea-pot and cups with roses and trailing bits of green patterned on them. Then don't you think that we shall be perfectly happy taking tea together? and we shall think of you and wish all kinds of good things for you. I wish I could tell you of the pleasure I feel as I amuse myself with mental speculations of what will be, and in them all you officers are remembered. So when I say I am glad and I thank you that isn't enough, you are to be recalled happily to mind in the years to come when we shall appreciate fully the sympathy and good feeling which you have expressed to us now."

The two following letters, which belong to a batch of miscellanies, are in curious contrast.

A man who was called up but failed to report himself on the appointed day writes reproachfully:—

"I am sorry I did not turn up I have lost my right arm in this war and should not like to lose the other but if you are hard up for men I will come."

A countryman suffering from cold feet makes an appeal to his family physician:—

"I am asking you a favour. Would you write me a certificate for health. I've had two Derby letters. I have not been attested and I don't feel I can go in the midst of strangers. I feel a lot better when I keep myself quiet I feel fairly well at present. Not so well as I should like to. But still I suppose I mustn't grumble. As you have attended me for the last five years and that you understand my case I thought you were the gentleman to apply to. I hope you will do your best for me I am thankful for what you have already done for me. I am enclosing a penny stamp for reply."

The doctor forwarded the letter to the Recruiting Officer, with the following certificate:—

"— who works for his father, a robust middle-aged man, is a big robust young man, a blacksmith by trade, who enjoys excellent health. I have attended him for a cold and a sore finger, nothing worse. A year ago I urged him to enlist. He said he would 'rather stay with feyther!'"

#### V.-POST BELLUM.

The recruits file past the Attesting and Enrolling Officer and he wonders upon which of them the choice of the final Approving Officers, the Valkyries in Valhalla, will fall. Will it fall upon that scamp and tramp, that son of a widow, that young farmer, that grocer's assistant, that solicitor's clerk, that cowman, that ex-soldier whose "less than fair" parchment certificate of character was "burnt in the fire," the fire of his own kitchen; or upon any or all of them? And of those who are not chosen what will be the opinions, the thoughts, and the activities when the war is over and they return to their own place in the current life of the Empire?

The answer to this question must necessarily be a matter of conjecture and speculation, but a clue to it may perhaps be found in history.

A critical period during which Great Britain was fighting, as at present, for her life, was closed by the Battle of Waterloo; and although from that date until the outbreak of the present war there was scarcely a year in which the doors of the temple of a British Janus would not have been open, yet, with the possible exception of the Crimean War, all the wars in which she was engaged were either in defence of, or on account of, her colonies and dependencies, and her existence as a nation was never at stake. They were regarded as troublesome and

inevitable concomitants of Empire, but the smooth current of peaceful

progress and evolution was scarcely rippled by them.

It is probable that the century which shall follow the close of the present war will witness as great changes as the century which followed the cessation of the Napoleonic War, and that they will be upon similar lines. What were the chief characteristics, movements, and developments of the nineteenth century which we may reasonably expect will be maintained and continued in the twentieth?

The democratic movement, which may be said to have had its origin in this country (for the French Revolution was not a truly democratic movement); a continuous and extraordinary progress in the arts and sciences which substantially changed the mode of life; a feminist movement; religious and social movements in various directions; a great increase in wealth and luxury which the democratic movement was unable to check; and an intellectual movement which, in spite of Education, Journalism and Books in abundance, did not keep pace with the other movements.

These are some of the threads straying at a loose end while the war lasts, which the recruit now standing before the Attesting Officer will take up and finger when he returns from the front, and which he shall weave into a texture, it may be of the old pattern and fashion, traced in more glaring colours, at his will.

### VI.-THE DREAM.

And the Recruiting Officer, who had been worrying A.B. 414 for the space of nine hours, fell asleep in his chair;

And a Dream came to him through the Ivory Gate;

And he Dreamed that he was attesting a deaf and dumb dwarf for ninety and nine years or the duration of the Coalition Ministry;

And on the Attestation Form was printed in alternate lines, Army Council Instruction, .6945i, of 31 February, 1705.

T. o. T. Will a Calver, for the oath the siment of Cook in mouth to Six as



# JOURNAL KEPT BY LIEUTENANT HOUGH FROM 22 MARCH, 1812, TO 13 MAY, 1813.

March 22, 1812. At Sea.

MARCH 22 (SUNDAY).—I sailed from Spithead for Lisbon with a favorable breeze, in the "Latona" frigate (fitted up as a Troop Ship), mounting 24 guns and commanded by Captain Sotheby.2

were 15 other Officers on board and a detachment of R. Artificers.<sup>3</sup>
General Wheatley and his Aid-de-Camp (Sir H. Lambert b),
Colonel King, of the 5th foot, and Captain Calvert, 98th foot, aid-de-camp to Sir Thomas Graham,8 dined at the Captains table on

Colonel Waller,9 R.A., Captain McGregor,10 79th foot, Captain Darling, 11 51st foot, Captain Cheyne, 12 R.E., Captain Arabin, 13 R.A., Lieutenants Waters, 14 and Grierson, 15 R.E., Baldock, 16 R.A., Ensign

1 The "Latona" (38 guns) was armée-en-flûte, i.e., she carried a part only of her proper armament, and was serving as a transport.

2 Captain Charles Sotheby, R.N.

3 The Corps of Royal Military Artificers. The officers, with the exception of a sub-lieutenant, were furnished by the Royal Engineers. In August, 1812, the title of the corps was changed to "Royal Military Artificers, or Sappers and Miners," and in March, 1813, to "Royal Sappers and Miners."

4 Major-General William Wheatley, of the 1st Regiment of Foot Guards. He commanded a brigade in the 1st Division of the army, and died at Escoriál on September 1st 1822 of typhus fever.

September 1st, 1812, of typhus fever.

<sup>5</sup> Sir Henry John Lambert, 5th baronet. He was an Ensign in the 1st Regiment of Foot Guards. His brother, Francis John, married Catherine, General Wheatley's only daughter.

<sup>6</sup> Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. Henry King, 5th Regiment of Foot, fourth son of Robert, second Earl of Kingston. Afterwards Lieut.-General, etc.

7 Captain Felix Calvert, of the 29th Regiment of Foot, not the 98th as stated by the diarist.

8 Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham, commanding the 1st Division of the army. Afterwards Lord Lynedoch. See "Dict. National Biography."
 9 Lieutenant Colonel Charles Waller (696), R.A.

10 Hugh MacGregor, who afterwards exchanged into the 91st Regiment of Foot.
11 William Lindsay Darling. Served on the staff of the army as Brigade-Major.

 12 2nd Captain Alexander Cheyne.
 13 2nd Captain Frederick Arabin (1151), R.A. He was going out to Portugal to join Captain G. Thompson's company of the 7th Battalion, R.A. (having exchanged with H. B. Lane), which embarked at Lisbon in June and sailed to

exchanged with H. B. Lane, which embarace at Lisbon in june and salied to the east coast of Spain-Alicante—to join the force which came from Sicily.

14 Marcus Antonius Waters. Afterwards—1855—Major-General.

15 Crighton Grierson. Afterwards—1871—General.

16 2nd Lieut. Charles Robert Baldock (1510), R.A. He belonged to Captain S. Maxwell's company of the 4th Battalion, R.A. He went mad later in the year, and is mentioned in the diary of Lieut. W. Swabey, R.A., on October 20th.

"Being obliged to quarter myself with poor Baldock, who has gone mad, I was allowed of course no rest all night, and nothing contented him but strutting about allowed of course no rest all night, and nothing contented him but strutting about in my pelisse, and overturning all the apples, etc., that he met with in the streets.

March 22-30, 1812. At sea.

Harkness,1 79th foot and Lieut. Booth,2 Royal Artificers, messed together in the cabin. Did not get a comfortable dinner this day, everything being in such confusion, and most of us young sailors, but the wind continuing favorable kept us in good humour till the

next morning, Monday,

23, when we found ourselves off Alderney, the wind blowing very fresh and a great deal of motion. Saw the Cherbourg blockading squadron<sup>3</sup> a-stern. Got cold roast mutton, biscuit, and smoaky tea, without milk, for breakfast. About 11 o Cl. spoke the "Thrasian" gun brig, cruising, soon after which it began to rain and blow very hard. Reefed some of our sails but the wind was still favorable. About 1 o'cl. we lost sight of land, going at this time nearly 8 knots an hour. There was a very great and sickly motion of the ship in the afternoon, and with difficulty we managed to keep the dishes on table at dinner, continually getting the contents of your neighbours plate into your lap.

Went to bed very early. Next morning, Tuesday,

24. found that we had not made any way scarcely during the

night, having had contrary winds which obliged us to tack.

During the night we brought to an American vessel, and the Captain not liking the account she gave of herself and thinking she wished to make the French coast from the tack she was going on when we first perceived her, ordered the 1st Lieutenant and 12 men to board her and overhaul the log, but not finding anything against her the Lieutenant and men took to the boat again to return and just as they got a-longside, the boat stove against the side of the ship and went to pieces. With great difficulty the Lieutenant and men were saved by lowering another boat & some ropes.

25.-Wind favorable and blowing a heavy sea. Near the entrance

of the Bay of Biscay.

26 .- Wind more favorable with heavy rain.

27.—Fine weather but wind right a-head, S. by S.W.

28.-Wind still contrary.

29 (SUNDAY).-We lost all most all our crockery-ware this day by the ships giving a sudden roll during our dinner hour, and had not the Officers of the gun room volunteered their china, I fear we should have experienced great inconvenience the remainder of the

30.-At day break we found ourselves surrounded by the English Squadron (cruising for the French Squadron that had just put out from L'Orient a short time before) under Admiral Durham, viz.

Ensign Thomas Harkness, 79th Regiment of Foot. He died in 1812.
 Sub-Lieutenant Charles Booth, Royal Military Artificers. He died at Freineda on March 4th, 1813.

<sup>3</sup> A British squadron was at this time blockading Cherbourg.
4 The "Thrasian," gun brig.
5 Rear-Admiral Philip Charles Calderwood Henderson Durham. The "Venerable" (74 guns) was his flag-ship. He commanded the squadron in pursuit of the French which had just escaped from Lorient.

March 30-April 5, 1812, At sea.

"Cumberland," "Venerable," "Plantagenet," & "Elizabeth," 74, and the "Leonidas," frigate. About 10 o Cl. the Admiral made signal and backed sails. Soon after our Captain with 12 men got into a boat, and went on board the Admiral's ship.

About ½ an hour after the Captain returned, when he told us that the Admiral had taken us during the night for one of the French ships from L'Orient (a very lucky thing for us, I thought, that it was not the French instead of our own Squadron that had so nicely got us in the centre of them). The Admiral desired the Captain to persue his course, and shou'd he hear or see anything of the enemy to return 15 leagues off Cape Finisterre where we should fall in with the English squadron again.

31.—The wind changed suddenly this morning to N.W. Crowded all sail and went nearly 8 knots an hour till 7 o Cl. in the evening when it began to blow fresh and we found it necessary to reef some of our sails, going during the night about 4 knots.

APRIL 1.—Wind still favorable. The evening was very fine and

the sailors had a jig on deck.

2.—About noon perceived land at a great distance. It proved to

be Villa Conde; 1 appeared very barren and mountainous.

3.—A dead calm till about 3 o Cl. a.m. when a very strong breeze

sprung up, which took us along at the rate of 6 and 7 knots an hour.
4.—We were opposite The Burlings<sup>2</sup> (a number of rocks so called). About 12 o Cl. made the Rock of Lisbon. About 9 o Cl. p.m. we drop'd our anchor just opposite Belem Castle, having crossed the bar, to wait till the tide next morning.

5 (SUNDAY).—Got under weigh about 5 o Cl. but the wind being against us obliged us to tack, and the south bank being very high, the sails did not catch the wind and we wore twice, consequently lost instead of making way, and the Captain again ordered the anchor out.

I could see the "Barfleur" quite distinct which of course annoyed me very much, but I was soon relieved by the Admirals boat coming along-side to get letters, &c., that we had brought out, and I obtained leave to return in it. John was on shore when I reached the ship but very shortly after came on board. He was thunderstruck at seeing me. The Officers behaved very polite to me and got breakfast laid out. After which John introduced me to Sir Thomas Hardy. When church was over we went on shore; walked to the Artillery Barracks to enquire when I should go up to the Army.

<sup>1</sup> Villa do Conde—a small village on the coast of Portugal about ten miles N. of Oporto.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Islas Berlengas—some rocky islets off the Portuguese coast, due W. from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> H.M.S. "Barfleur" (80 guns), flag-ship of Admiral the Hon. Sir G. C. Berkeley, Commander-in-Chief at Lisbon.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> John James Hough, Lieutenant, Royal Navy, then serving in H.M.S. "Barfleur."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Sir Thomas Masterman Hardy, Bart., Captain of H.M.S. "Barfleur."

April 5-24, 1812. Lisbon to Azambuja.

Returned on board to dinner and passed a very pleasant evening.

Slept on board and breakfasted next morning,

6, on board. At 10 oCl. went on shore. Got a horse appointed to me. Walked about Lisbon to see the Lions and dined at Mr. Sarles. Slept on board.

20.—Being my last day in Lisbon, and having a great many things to do we accepted Mr. Sarles invitation to dinner, it being

most convenient.

During my stay in Lisbon the news of Badajoz having fallen arrived 2 and I was ordered to fire a salute of 21 guns in the square of Roçio. The guns from the castle also fired, and the Admiral's ship. In the evening there was a general illumination, and fire works, which the Portuguese are very partial to.

Parted with John this evening at Mr. Sarles, & the next day,

Tuesday,

21, I left Lisbon to join the Army. The first day I marched to Sacavem, taking with me two domestics, a country horse, and a mule for my baggage, this being all my establishment, and the only way

you can travel up the country.

Upon my arrival at this village I waited upon Juiz de Fora (or chief magistrate) for a billet, according to the custome of the country: found him shoeing a mule, but he gave me a billet upon a house, some distance from the village which was occupied by some Portuguese Officers.

Had to return for another and after some trouble was well accommodated. Dined off rations, fat salt pork, and went to bed about

g o Cl.

22.—I marched to Villa Franca, 4 leagues.

At Villa Franca I fell in with Lieut. Brydges 3 of the 14th and Cornet Bertie 4 of the 12th Light Dragoons, Marlow 5 friends. They were going up the country and it was proposed to march together.

Was billeted at the Juiz de Fora's.

23.—We all marched to Azambuja, 3 leagues. The villages through which we passed bore evident marks of French devastation.

Had rations for dinner, and bought some country wine.

24.—I went to Santarem. It lies very high and is divided into Upper and Lower Town. The former bears very evident marks of former grandeur. There are four hospitals for our sick here, a resident Commandant, and a great number of sick Officers.

This town was occupied by the French during their retreat from our Lines, and upon evacuating it, they set fire to all the convents,

and damaged and ransack'd all the houses.

<sup>3</sup> John William Egerton Brydges.

Lindsey James Bertie

de derse bienrenant Commissary fra

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Things of note, celebrity, or curiosity in a town—sights worth seeing. This use of the word is derived from the practice of taking visitors to see the lions which used at one time to be kept in the Tower of London.

<sup>2</sup> It was taken by storm on April 6th—7th.

<sup>5</sup> Probably at the Royal Military College, Great Marlow, whence it was removed to Sandhurst in 1812.

April 25-30, 1812. Azambuja to Niza.

25.—I went to Gollega, 5 leagues. Was billeted in the same house one of the French Generals occupied, when retreating. It was very little destroyed.

The rations we drew at Santarem were not eatable. Met with a fish, something like salmon, which we bought and dressed part of it for dinner. Could not get any vegetables in the place, and had no sauce, so that we made but an indifferent dinner.

There is a large depôt of cattle here, for the use of the British Army. 26.—Marched to Punhete, built on the banks of the Tagus. We crossed a bridge of boats just before we entered the town. The French lay here some time, and the night before they quitted it blew up a bridge. The British Army was on the opposite bank, and Lord Wellington had the present bridge made to pass over after them.

Had middling billet, but the people of the house could not accommodate me with anything. They told me that the people that owned the house went away when the French came down and that they had not heard anything of them since; that the French took everything they had. But this story you get every house you enter.

they had. But this story you get every house you enter.

27.—I reached Abrantes. This town lies high, and is not only strong by art, but by nature. Deserters from the Portuguese Army were employed in repairing the batteries under the command of English Engineers.

Abrantes is reckoned the key of the Tagus.

It is a garrison town and the regiments always come down to receive their clothing here, which makes the billets very indifferent for Officers passing through. I was billeted in a Priests house, but it proved the worst lodging I had had since leaving Lisbon. It was strictly according to Lord Wellington's orders, viz., "That no British Officer was to expect more than bare walls, a chair and table." The ceiling was burnt in several places, the walls quite black and hung round with cobwebs, and the floor broken in every two yards, which admitted a refreshing smell from the dirt of my two horses that were in a kind of stable below.

I got my route renewed here to Castello Branco. Met an Officer here I knew and dined with him (Lieut. Spong).<sup>2</sup>

28-Marched to Gavião, 4 leagues. Crossed the Tagus about 1 mile from Abrantes. The bridge consisted of 21 boats.

Gavião is a small place and but thinly populated.

29.—I got to Niza, having marched the whole way, 5 leagues. Several Dragoon regiments were in the town. Heard that Head Qrs. was near Ciudad Rodrigo, and that the Army was coming to the south.

30.—I started at 5 o Cl. in the morning for Sarnadas, 4 leagues, but on the Niza side of Villa Velha I met Captain Eligè's brigade 3 of 9 pounders, and Captain E. told me he had received a letter from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The present-day spelling is Gollegã, but the spelling has varied—sometimes Golegão, Golegam, and so on.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> 1st Lieutenant Commissary Francis M. Spong, R.A. Drivers.

<sup>3</sup> Captain John P. Elige, R.A., commanding a company in the 8th Battalion, R.A., attached to a brigade of 6 Prs. in the 6th Division of the army. Hough did not belong to this company.

April 30-May 10, 1812. Portugal. Niza to Sarnadas.

Major May 1 to inform him I was on my route up from Lisbon to

join his brigade. I therefore returned with them to Niza.

MAY I.—We went on to Povoa das Meadas. The road being through a wood, we pressed a guide, and he being annoyed at it, took us a great distance out of the road, but finding it out we gave him a good horse whipping and sent him off without rations, it being customary when they behave well to give them the same allowances as our own men.

Upon our arrival we received orders to halt till further orders. Part of the 6th division (Clinton's) 2 halted here also, but the General having heard that a fever had raged in this village for some time, gave orders for the marching regiments to move next morning to another village, desiring that our surgeon should visit all the houses and report such as might be occupied; and finding there was sufficient accommodations for our brigade with safety we were desired to remain here. Having the place to ourselves we got very comfortable quarters.

2.—Men employed in repairing and cleaning the harness, gun carriages, &c., &c. Our horses were in very bad condition having

marched for 3 months with very little intermission.

3 (SUNDAY).—In the morning Captain Eligè read prayers to the men, and in the evening we muster'd and had the Articles of War read.

4.—Officers went out coursing; killed one hare.

5.—I rode to Castello de Vide. Heard of the death of Major L. Potter of the 28th foot, who died from the wounds he received at Badajoz.

6, 7, AND 8.-Nothing particular occurred.

9.—Received a route about 2 o Cl. a.m. to Assumar. We were ready to march about 7 o Cl. but a letter from Head Quarters, which was delivered to me just as we were about to start, brought orders for me to join the reserve under Captain Baynes, without loss of time, and that I should meet it at, or near, Niza. Instead therefore of accompanying the brigade I returned to Niza which was occupied by the Foot Guards and where I was informed that the reserve was near Castello Branco.

10 (SUNDAY).—Started about 4 o Cl. in the morning for Sarnadas

(5 leagues).

Crossed over the Tagus by a bridge of boats at Villa Velha, which separates the provinces of Alemtejo and Beira. Sarnadas is a wretched village. My rations were bad, and I could not purchase anything for love or money, but my servant unknown to me stole a fowl for my dinner.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Captain (Brevet Major) John May, who was at this time holding the appointment of A.A.G., R.A., on Wellington's staff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Major-General Henry Clinton.
<sup>3</sup> 2nd Captain Henry Baynes, R.A., at that time commanding May's company of the 1st Battalion (May being employed on the staff, vide footnote supra) which was in charge of the reserve ammunition (artillery and small-arm) of the army and marched with the army.

May 11-21, 1812. Portugal. Castello Branco to Niza.

11.—I went on to Castello Branco. It is situated on a high hill and the ruins of an ancient white castle, from whence it derives its

name, is very conspicuous.

Captain MacDonald's troop of Horse Artillery and the 7th division (General Alten)2 were in cantonments here. I found from the Artillery Officers that the reserve was about 2 leagues to the left of this town, which determined me upon going on, tho' strongly pressed by all the Officers to stop and dine. My march this day was s leagues to Cafede, a small village off the high road. Found Captain Baynes, a pleasant gentlemanly man. He introduced me to the Doctor (Mr. Pratten).3

12.—I employed myself looking over the ammunition, &c., &c. We have only small arm ammunition at present but Lord W. has ordered the Reserve to be made a very large command, and in future

to carry gun ammunition, and move near Head Quarters.

13.—Nothing happened worth notice, except we received a route for Niza.

14.—We marched at ½ past 5 in the morning for Sarnadas. Breakfasted with Captain MacDonald's troop at Castello Branco.

15.—Moved at 4 o Cl. towards Niza. Niza being occupied by troops before our arrival, we were very badly billeted. The room allotted for me had been converted into a stable by some person and the rats were innumerable. I got it clean'd out and procured a chair and table. It is no use being particular in this country!!

16.-We were going over to Alpalhão to see Major Carncross,4 but met him with Captain Gardiner 5 on the road about a league out

of the town, and returned with them.

17 (SUNDAY).—There was a very large fair held here. The people assembled very early, and the fair generally breaks up between 2 and 3 oclock p.m. A Portuguese was detected stealing, which being known through the fair, a crowd came round with large sticks and gave him a most dreadful beating, according to the customs of punishing theft amongst themselves, but it is not thought any crime with the Portuguese to rob an Englishman.

18.—Celebrated my Fathers birth day by having a better dinner, asking a friend, and taking an extra glass of grog in the evening.

19.-The Doctor and I rode to Alpalhão.

20 AND 21.-Nothing particular, except that Major Currie, Brigade Major to General Hill, passed through this town with dispatches for Lord W. from General Hill, mentioning his having destroyed the bridge at Almaraz, and taken a large depôt, &c., &c.

<sup>1 &</sup>quot;E" Troop, R.H.A., under the command of Captain Robert MacDonald. <sup>2</sup> Major-General Charles, Count Alten, Colonel Commandant of the 1st Light Infantry Battalion, King's German Legion. He was only in temporary command of the 7th Division at this time.

3 2nd-Asst.-Surgeon John W. Pratten, R.A.

Major Joseph Henry Carncross, R.A.

Robert William Gardiner, R.A., Captain, and Brevet Major.

Robert William Gardiner, R.A., Captain, and Brevet Major.

Edward Currie, of the 90th Regiment of Foot. He was Hill's aide-de-camp not Brigade-Major.

May 22-31, 1812. Portugal. Niza to Aviz.

22.—Captain Cleeves, King's German Artillery, and Lieut. Robe,<sup>2</sup> Royal British Artillery, breakfasted with us. They were going to the north. Lord C. Spencer<sup>3</sup> dined with us. He came in here this morning on his way to Castello Branco to join his regiment, 68th Light Infantry.

23.—Captain Lawson's brigade 4 came in here and the Officers

dined with us.

24 (SUNDAY).—The Doctor's mule was missed from the field where he was put to graze and in the evening my groom came to me and said he could not find my mule anywhere. I reported the circumstance to Captain Baynes and he sent men out in every direction, but they returned (late) after an unsuccessful search. morning, Monday,

25, parties went out mounted, at day break. They were out till noon, but brought back no tidings of my beast. The Doctor's was found in a stable in the town. Make no doubt but mine was stolen, as the fore legs were tied to prevent his straying. It is a very common thing to lose mules. The muleteers steal them, disfigure them by cutting the tail, shaving the carcase, and many other contrivances which they have are put into execution, to prevent the right owner knowing it again, but it is not unfrequent to meet with your mule many months after.

27.—Captain Williams, 5 Royal Engineers, dined with us. He was

wounded at Badajoz, but nearly recovered.

28.—The Guards returned to Niza from Castello de Vide, and General Graham 6 ordered the Reserve to march to Aviz to make room Our accommodations are very bad, but the village was desireable on account of the quantity of green forage round it. I was most inhumanely bitten by musquitos, bugs, &c.

29.—Being King Charles day the parades were dispensed with.

30.—Removed our park to a more shady spot.

31 (SUNDAY).—Heard that Captain Eligè's brigade was at Niza. Baynes and myself rode over to see them. Found Major Gardiner's

fifth Duke of Marlborough.

<sup>1</sup> Andrew Cleves.

<sup>2</sup> William Livingstone Robe, son of Lieut.-Colonel W. Robe, R.A. He was killed at the Battle of Waterloo.

<sup>3 2</sup>nd Lieut. Lord Charles Spencer, 68th Light Infantry, second son of the

Captain Robert Lawson, R.A. He commanded a company of the 8th Battalion, R.A. Lawson records in his diary on this date:—" Marched to Niza," etc. The company was without guns, having just handed over to Captain R. W. Gardiner the brigade of 9 Prs. to which it had been attached. It was now on the march to Trancoso to take over a brigade of 6 Pr. guns. See Lawson's Diary—May, 1812, to August, 1813—in the Dickson MSS., Series "C," Chapter IV., pp. 696 to 727.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> 2nd Captain John Archer Williams, R.E. He was killed at the siege of Burgos, later in the year-September 24th.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 8, page 840.

May 31--June 15, 1812. Portugal. Aviz to Pedrogão.

brigade 1 there also, and General Wheatlev's brigade, 2 36th & 42nd, &c., going to the north. They were encamped and we stopt dinner.

Heard a report that Mr. Perceval was shot going to the House

of Commons, and that Cork was burnt down by the rebels.3

IUNE 1.—Sent a detachment of Royal Artillery Drivers off to join Major Gardiner's brigade at Villa Velha, consisting of 1 N.C. Officer and 14 drivers.

4.—King George's birth-day. All parades were dispensed with. 5.—The 3rd and 15th regiments of Portuguese marched through this village for Niza. They form a brigade and are commanded by Colonel Spry 5 of the 77th English regiment.

11.—Received a route this day for Ciudad Rodrigo, and march'd to Niza in the cool of the evening. No accidents.

12.—March'd with an intention to go to Sarnadas, but this march being so very bad we bivouac'd between Villa Velha & Sarnadas in an olive wood. One of the gun carriages back'd going up Villa Velha hill and upset; fortunately no men or horses injured.

13.—Left our bivouac about ½ past 2 oclock in the morning and proceeded towards Castello Branco which we reached safe, having halted about half way, to feed & water the horses. No accidents this march. Got pretty decent billet. Lieut. Elgee 6 joined us here.

14 (SUNDAY).—Started at 3 o Cl. in the morning for Lardosa, 2 leagues. Passed through Escalhos da Cima, a pleasant village & well sheltered with cork & chestnut trees, and arrived about 9 o Cl. at this village where we got a good house for the Officers, but we were obliged to bivouac our men and form our Park about half a mile from the village.

15.-Left Lardosa about 3 o Cl. for Pedrogão, 4 short leagues. There are only two decent houses in this village, the best occupied by us (Captain Baynes, Lieut. Elgee, myself, and the Doctor) and the other, by our Driver Officer and some Officers of the Line. Lord

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 5, page 846. Gardiner commanded a Company of the 8th Battalion, R.A., with a Brigade of 9 Pr. guns, attached to the 1st Division of the army. Care must be taken to distinguish between a Brigade of guns, and a Brigade of Infantry, as mentioned in the same line.

A Brigade of guns consisted of 6 pieces of ordnance, with the usual complet of waggons, etc. To a brigade of guns was attached a Company of ment of waggons, etc. Artillery, furnishing the personnel for working and fighting them. The word "Brigade" refers to the materiel as contrasted with the personnel of the unit.

The Drivers were furnished by the Corps of Royal Artillery Drivers.

The organization of a Troop of Horse Artillery was different. From its original formation in 1793, as at the present day, it was an unit complete in itself, i.e., with its own Officers, N.C.Os. and Men (Gunners and Drivers), horses, and

2 In the 1st Division of the army. The 36th regiment, however, belonged at

this time to the 6th Division.

3 Spencer Perceval, Prime Minister of England, was assassinated in the lobby of the House of Commons by John Bellingham, on May 11.

4 H.M. King George III.

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June 15-19, 1812. Portugal. Pedrogão to Ciudad Rodrigo (Spain). Wellington generally stops at the former house, when going from north to south, or vice versa.

It is a regular system with the French upon leaving a town or village to set it on fire, and the only houses that have any chance of

escaping are those occupied by General Officers.

16.-We went on to Meimão, a small wretched village, but pleasantly situated. We bivouac'd under some olive trees, and picketed

the horses.

17.—Marched at 3 oclock for Quadrazaes, 4 long leagues. We passed through Sabugal where there is a very fine ruin'd castle and the river Coa runs at the foot of the rock that this pile stands on. You pass over this river by a stone bridge of three arches. Had the spot pointed out to me that Lord Wellington formed his Line on, during the time Head Quarters remained here.

The men bivouac'd by choise, but the Officers came into the

village.

18.—We march'd from Quadrazaes about 3 o Cl. but the guide we took with us directed us wrong and we had near a league to go

before we got into our right road.

Aldeia da Ponte is near a league farther on, which we passed through. Took a fresh guide here and got to Nave de Haver about i oclock. This is the place occupied by Sir T. Graham last September during the ennemys movements towards Ciudad Rodrigo, and skirmishes took place in most parts of the country in this days march, particulars of which was given by Lord Wellington, dated Ouadrazaes, September 29, 1811 and published in the London Gazette on the 16th October 1811.

Got a good room, the only one in the town, for the Officers, which General Graham, Campbell, and many others have occupied

before us, as their names still remain writen on the door. The Gunners, Drivers, and horses bivouac'd.

19.—We left Nave de Haver about 3 oclock in the morning, taking a guide with us having to go across the country to Ciudad About half a league from where we started, the guide Rodrigo. pointed out the boundary of Spain & Portugal, and half a league from this we passed through the first Spanish village, Espeja. The difference between these two nations was already very visible. Tho' very much destroyed, yet the houses and inhabitants were very clean, and, as I have been told, the females were much handsomer, so I found it.

Two leagues further on we came to Carpio (de Azaba). also is very much destroyed but the same neatness appeared. Reached Ciudad at 9 o Cl. having seen it some distance before we arrived there. We crossed over the river Agueda by a stone bridge of seven arches, and went round the works to the suburbs where we were ordered to be billeted. Form'd our Park, and after some difficulty

obtained accommodations for our men and horses.

<sup>1</sup> El Bodón, September 25, and Aldeia da Ponte, September 27, 1811.

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17.—Marched at 3 oclock for Quadrazaes, 4 long leagues. We passed through Sabugal where there is a very fine ruin'd castle and the river Coa runs at the foot of the rock that this pile stands on. You pass over this river by a stone bridge of three arches. Had the spot pointed out to me that Lord Wellington formed his Line on, during the time Head Quarters remained here.

The men bivouac'd by choise, but the Officers came into the

village.

18.—We march'd from Quadrazaes about 3 o Cl. but the guide we took with us directed us wrong and we had near a league to go

before we got into our right road.

Aldeia da Ponte is near a league farther on, which we passed through. Took a fresh guide here and got to Nave de Haver about This is the place occupied by Sir T. Graham last September during the ennemys movements towards Ciudad Rodrigo, and skirmishes took place in most parts of the country in this days march, particulars of which was given by Lord Wellington, dated Quadrazaes, September 29, 1811 and published in the London Gazette on the 16th October 1811.

Got a good room, the only one in the town, for the Officers, which General Graham, Campbell, and many others have occupied

before us, as their names still remain writen on the door. The Gunners, Drivers, and horses bivouac'd.

19.—We left Nave de Haver about 3 oclock in the morning, taking a guide with us having to go across the country to Ciudad About half a league from where we started, the guide Rodrigo. pointed out the boundary of Spain & Portugal, and half a league from this we passed through the first Spanish village, Espeja. The difference between these two nations was already very visible. Tho' very much destroyed, yet the houses and inhabitants were very clean, and, as I have been told, the females were much handsomer, so I found it.

Two leagues further on we came to Carpio (de Azaba). also is very much destroyed but the same neatness appeared. Reached Ciudad at 9 o Cl. having seen it some distance before we arrived there. We crossed over the river Agueda by a stone bridge of seven arches, and went round the works to the suburbs where we were ordered to be billeted. Form'd our Park, and after some difficulty

obtained accommodations for our men and horses.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> El Bodón, September 25, and Aldeia da Ponte, September 27, 1811.

June 19-24, 1812. Spain. Ciudad Rodrigo to Salamanca.

There is a Spanish garrison here. Don Miguel Bebez is Governor. After cleaning and dressing myself, I went in to the town, and round the works. Saw the breaches made during the siege, and the spot where General Craufurd was buried, and General McKinnon 2 blown up.

Several hundred men were employed repairing the works, and making them much stronger. After this I went in to the town, which is very much ruin'd and destroyed, but the inhabitants are beginning to repair their houses, and a tolerable trade is going on. The English have erected two strong batteries to the north of Ciudad, near the spot our Artillery occupied during the siege, and have fortified a convent, which is to the south of the place. The cathedral must have been a very fine building, but it is now nearly in ruins, but there still remains some good specimens of architecture, and there are many more fine buildings in the place and about the suburbs.

20.-Was taken suddenly unwell with vomiting and dysentery. The doctor said it was the Collora Morbus. I went to bed again, and after taking medicines felt myself much better.

21 (SUNDAY).-Was somewhat better, but still very indifferent. Was very much amused in the evening seeing the Spanish men and women dancing the Fandango.3 This day according to their custome is spent in merriment & pleasure.

Received a route about 10 p.m. for Salamanca, to march next morning. Captain Baynes had also a letter from Colonel Robe 4 mentioning that "our Army was on the heights before Salamanca waiting Marmonts attack" and that my late Captain, Elige, just killed" in the batteries, opposite the fort, at Salamanca.5

22.—Not having corn or rations drawn, we did not march before 10 oclock. Went to Puente de Castillejo, named only from a bridge which is here. Bivouac'd in an oak wood.

23.—Pursued our route to Tejadillo at 2 o Cl. in the morning and arrived there by 8 o Cl.

Heard from a Bombardier of our regiment that we met on the road, going towards Celorico for ammunition, that there had been a general engagement and that the French had been driven back, at every point. Almost mad not being there, but consoled in some

degree by such good tidings. 24.—Went by a forc'd march to Salamanca. It is a remarkable fine town. Received orders in the evening to encamp in the rear of the Army, at Villares.6 The 6th division was in the town.

<sup>1</sup> Robert Craufurd, Commanding the Light Division.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Henry MacKinnon, of the Coldstream regiment of Foot Guards. He commanded a Brigade, in the 3rd Division.

A lively Spanish dance in \$\frac{1}{4}\$ time.

Lieut.-Colonel William Robe (654), Royal Artillery.

See footnote 3, page 844. He was killed on June 19, during the attack against the Salamanca forts.

About 3 miles N. from Salamanca.

<sup>7</sup> In Salamanca. The 6th Division was under the command of Major General Henry Clinton.

June 24-27, 1812. Spain. Salamanca.

Endeavour'd to take the convent by storm, but were repulsed (on the evening of the 23rd). Skirmishes took place between the Cavalry

this day and yesterday.

25.-Was ordered into the batteries. It was intended to fire red-hot shot into the convent but not having any heavy ordnance arrived, it was ordered to be given up, as we found the metal expand so much and the guns so very warm, that it wou'd be impossible to fire many rounds. A slow fire was kept up from the F. [? French.-

Ed. Fort all night.

26.—Army in same position. Heavy artillery arrives.¹ Lieut. Elgee ordered to Ciudad [Rodrigo.—Ed.] to bring up 18 and 24 Pr. ammunition. Baynes on duty in the town. Remained in charge of Reserve till about 3 o Cl. p.m. when I received Colonel Framingham's 2 orders to go into the howitzer battery with 2 N.C. Officers and 20 gunners. Got there about 1/2 past 4 o.Cl. p.m., and commenced firing red-hot shot at the fort & continued till about 12 oclock Saturday morning. Captain Edward Michell 3 was in the same battery.

About 8 o Cl. Friday evening [i.e., the 26th.—Ed.] we set the roof of the left wing of the fort on fire, which burnt for near 4 hours and then was extinguished, the French batteries playing upon us all the time, their riflemen very troublesome indeed. Kept up a firing all night, they returning us shot for shot, and shell for shell, with

plenty of grape into the bargain but thank God with not much effect.

27.—Near abouts 7 o Cl. Saturday morning we got it in flames again, & had a very hard struggle which should put it out, or which should keep it in, but our batteries cracking shrapnells over their ears, and sending plenty more red-hot into the same spot, soon made a fine blaze, and made them abandon their batteries, and send out a

flag of truce.

Their offers of giving up two forts, provided we wou'd let them quiet 2 hours, Lord Wellington wou'd not listen to. The Officer returned and we rattled away again as hard as we could lick 5 at them. This made them send a second flag, which was also refused, and we gave them another taste of the red-hot, the 6th Division (Clinton) storming at the breaches at the same moment. They took the two forts, without any opposition, and then advanced on into the large

of 1889 referring to a horse.

<sup>16 24</sup> Pr. howitzers, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel A. Dickson, R.A., serving with the Portuguese Artillery. See Dickson MSS., Series "C," Chapter

<sup>2</sup> Lieut.-Colonel Haylett Framingham (624), R.A.

3 2nd Captain Edward Thomas Michell (1152), He belonged at this time to Captain W. Morrison's Company of the 8th battalion, R.A., stationed at Gibraltar, and had, like a few other Officers, managed to get "to the front"

4 Although in ordinary parlance they were called "shrapnells," i.e., Shrapnel's shells, the official designation was "Spherical Case Shot." The name "shrapnel" shells, the official designation was "Spherical Case Shot." The name "shrapnel" of Maior General was not officially adopted until 1852, at the request of the family of Major-General H. Shrapnel, R.A. (588), the inventor of the projectile. See Proceedings, R.A. Institution, Woolwich, Vol. III., p. 398.

5 The origin of the use of the word "lick" in this sense is obscure. The Oxford English Dictionary gives it as "To ride at full speed," with a quotation

June 27-July 3, 1812. Spain. Salamanca to Gallegos.

fort, where all the French garrison had retired. The place was soon filled. I was there a very short time, when I got orders to repair to the small fort and collect the ammunition together, where I was confin'd till near 5 o Cl.

A general illumination and dances took place in the evening, but I was too fag'd to enjoy the amusements. Got to bed about

past 8 oCl. and at 6 oCl.,

28 (SUNDAY) I was sent to one of our batteries with a party to see the guns safe out. This detained me till about 11 o Cl. when I got some breakfast, the first food I had taken since 7 o Cl. the former morning. March'd just after, with my party back to Villares. Had not been there long before I received a route to Almeida, to bring up gun ammunition.

29.-March'd with 5 ammunition cars to Calzada de Don Diego,

with 31 horses and 24 men—a good road and 5 leagues.

30.-March'd at 4 o Cl. Got over about 4 leagues before the heat of the day came on. Halted under the shade of some trees till the cool of the evening and then went on to Puente de Castillejo,

4 more leagues. Bivouac'd and went on next morning,

JULY I, to Ciudad Rodrigo. Had great trouble in getting billets,
and after all, most of them so dark, that you cou'd not see till you had been in them some time, the windows of the Spanish houses seldom being more than a foot square, with two iron bars crossed. There are four forts to the north of Ciudad-Fort Wellington, Craufurd, MacKinnon, & Fletcher,1 and one to the south near a large convent, named Castaños.<sup>2</sup> The French prisoners taken at Salamanca were here.

2.—Reach'd Gallegos, 3 leagues, a clean little village. The French

prisoners march'd out of it, just as I entered it.

3.-March'd for Almeida, 4 leagues. About a league & a half from Almeida, I went to see the ruins of Fort Concepcion, which was destroyed by the English, when the French first took Ciudad Rodrigo, and were advancing towards this place. They min'd and blew it up, which has completely rendered it useless, but there are still very visible marks that it was a fort both of strength and neatness.

Sent my route on to the Governor, it being a fortified town, for permission to enter through the gates. There is a Portuguese garrison doing duty, the greater part employed repairing the works. When the French garrison escaped from it, they blew it up. Dined with the Governor, a Lieut. Colonel in the English service, and Colonel in the Portuguese (Le Mesurier).3

<sup>1</sup> Evidently named after Wellington; Major-Generals Robert Craufurd, and Henry MacKinnon (see p. 850), who were both killed at the siege in Ianuary, 1812; and Colonel Sir Richard Fletcher, Bart., Royal Engineers, who was C.R.E. at the siege.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> After General Don Francisco Xavier de Castaños, of the Spanish Army. <sup>3</sup> Colonel Havilland Le Mesurier, commanding the 14th Regiment, Portuguese Infantry. He was formerly a Captain in the 21st (British) Regiment of Foot, and had entered the Portuguese service as a Major on April 4, 1809. See "Dict. National Biography."

July 4-11, 1812. Spain. Gallegos to Salamanca.

4. Got my ammunition collected together & went round the works.

5 (SUNDAY).-March'd at 4 o Cl. for Gallegos, 4 leagues.

6.—Arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo about ½ past 8 o Cl. a.m. Met Captain Grimes, R.A. Drivers with a detachment of 40 horses here from Lisbon. His route not extending beyond C. Rodrigo he delivered over 13 fresh horses to me, to relieve those I brought with me from Salamanca, and two going to head quarters for the Brigade Major.

7.-Got to Puente de Castillejo. Bivouac'd in a wood.

8.—Reached Tejadillo. Met a Gunner from the Reserve, on the road this morning going with muleteers to Celorico for S.A.2 ammuni-He delivered a note and some dollars to me from Captain Baynes, begging I wou'd bring up some prog from Salamanca, for that they were starving. His letter, dated 4th July, mentioned "that we were advancing slowly, and the ennemy retreating; that the French retired over the Douro yesterday, and destroyed the bridge at Torde-sillas; that several charges had been made by our Cavalry, from which the ennemy had suffered a good deal. The Light Division & Cavalry are forward, and we were throwing a bridge over the Douro, & expected to pass over shortly."

9.-March'd at 3 o Cl. in the morning for Calzada de Don Diego. Met the ordnance, &c., taken in the fort at Salamança going down to Lisbon, on my route this day. Large droves of cattle going up to the army, upwards of 15,000, and there being a little wind stirring,

it made this march very unpleasant.

10.—Arrived at Salamanca. Received a fresh route as far as Nava del Rey, with permission to halt the 11th. Lieut. Pascoe 3 was here with part of the battering train, and employed collecting shot from the ruins of the fort. Dined with Lieut. Reid 4 of the Engineers who was left to destroy the works.

11.—Halted at Salamanca. Went over the convent and forts Astonished at the strength of the works and with Lieut. Pascoe. the means the French had made use of to cut off all communication with the inner works, where we had made breaches. Parties were employed digging the shot from the ruins. A great many bodies were found that had perished in the flames, endeavouring to extinguish

Visited the cathedral, churches, & convents. The convents, most of them at least, are totally gutted. There are however some very fine scripture paintings & very fine specimens of architecture still Most of the canvass paintings were sent to Paris, as remaining. presents to Buonaparte.

1 George H. Grimes, Captain Commissary, Royal Artillery Drivers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Lieutenant John Pascoe (1415), Royal Artillery. He belonged to May's Company of the 1st Battalion, but was at this time attached to the Battering Train, with which he had served at the siege and capture of Badajoz. See Dickson MSS., Series "C," Chapter IV., p. 624.

<sup>4</sup> Lieutenant William Reid, Royal Engineers. See "Dict. National Biography."

July 11-17, 1812. Spain. Salamanca to Cañizal.

Dined with Lieut. P. & went to theatre in the evening. A neat house, but wretched actors & actresses.

12 (SUNDAY).—Marched for La Orbada, but hearing that two detachments were halting there, I halted my party about a league short at a pleasant village, Pajares.

13.—Intended to get to Torrecilla de la Orden, but not rightly understanding the guide I had brought part of the way with me, I went to Alaejos which was considerable out of my route, but I here found the 6th division. They came in the over night, the whole army having fallen back, cause not known. Soon after, I saw a corporal belonging to the Reserve. He informed me that the battering train under Colonel Dickson, & the Reserve were about a league and a half off rather to the right of this town. I determined upon going on, thinking they might move, which would have obliged me to have made a forc'd march, when not so convenient. I reached the village about ½ past 2 o Cl. p.m. (Castrejón), found Captain Baynes, reported the state and strength of my detachment, & the different ammunition I had brought up with me. He was much pleased at the haste I had made, & the condition of my horses, & very glad to see me again. This was the first day they had been under shelter since I had left, having moved with the army & always encamping.

14.—Received a letter from John [see footnote 4, page 842], dated Sunday 5th, mentioning having received my letter from Salamanca, & that he should sail for Old England on Tuesday or Wednesday.

A report in circulation that 45,000 Russians had landed at Coruña to co-operate with the combined army. Also that Astorga<sup>2</sup> had fallen. Not much credit however was given to either.

15.—The army moved more to the left in consequence of the ennemy moving considerably to their right. Head quarters changed from Rueda to Nava del Rey. The Reserve & battering train remained stationary.

16-17.—About 10 o Cl. at night we received a route for the Reserve and battering train to march to the village of Cañizal as quick as possible. At ½ past 11 o Cl. p.m. the same night we moved in the direction of the above place, the Light & 4th divisions occupying the village we left.

The village of Cañizal was allotted for Head Quarters & the baggage of the several divisions. We encamp'd on the heights about 1 of a Spanish league short, & shortly after the 1st and 5th divisions, with Major Gardiners 9 Pr. 3 & Lawson's 6 Pr. 4 brigades, join'd us,

Dickson was at Castrejón. See Dickson MSS., Series "C," Chapter IV.,

pp. 676-7.

2 The reports were not true. Astorga, in León, held by 1,600 French, was being besieged by a Spanish force (15,000) under General Castaños, but it did not capitulate until 10 August.

being besieged by a Spanish force (15,000) under General Casalas, but not capitulate until 19 August.

3 This company is now designated No. 78 Company, Royal Garrison Artillery. See footnote 1, page 848; also Dickson MSS., Series "C," pp. 685 and 687.

4 Captain Robert Lawson's Company of the 8th Battalion, R.A., with a brigade of 9 6 Pr. guns, was attached to the 5th Division of the Army. This company is now designated 87th Battery, Royal Field Artillery. See footnote 4, page 847.

July 17-21, 1812. Spain. Cañizal to Salamanca.

the 3rd lying a little to the left of us, the 6th & 7th at Fuentelapeña. The cause of this movement was the ennemy crossing the bridge at

Toro in a column extending 3 of a Spanish league.

18.-We were ordered to march at daylight to Castrejón, but when we had moved about ½ a league we were ordered to return immediately, and wait further orders. A very heavy firing was heard all this morning & about 8 o Cl. several of the divisions formed up on the heights near the village, Cañizal, to receive the French who were advancing rapidly. The firing ceased a short time & about 11 o Cl. a sharp cannonading commenced again. Battering train & Reserve & Head quarter baggage with the Commissariat, were ordered to the rear. I was then dispatched to the front to tell the different brigades where to send for ammunition. Got just in time to see the 27th regiment foot 1 charge a column of the ennemy. They had 4 Officers killed & wounded, and several rank & file. The French lost a greater proportion & many prisoners. Walk'd over the field of battle, the first I had ever seen, & it made a great impression on me. It really is a shocking sight. The charges made by the Cavalry was severe on both sides, & altho' not a general thing, we lost more Cavalry this day than in any former skirmishes. This was the 3rd day I had scarcely been off my horse & exposed to the heat of the sun, covered with dust, & little to eat or drink, & obliged to sleep on the ground with only my boat cloak 2 round me, not being certain what orders we might receive & being obliged always to be ready at a moments notice.

Ordered in the middle of the night to retire on the Salamanca road. Just going to start, and received orders to remain still again. 19 (SUNDAY).—Thus were we kept saddled & bridled till 8 in the evening when we moved to Vallesa, evening of the 19th, & at 6 o Cl.

on the

20 we marched across the country to Villafuerte where we halted about sun set, not being able to unharness the horses, expecting from the movements of the army that we should not rest quiet long.

21.—At break of day on the 21st we march'd towards Salamanca with the 7th division but got very near the ennemy in consequence of breaking one of our ammunition cars, which detain'd us shifting the stores, &c., & to destroy the carriage was absolutely necessary. However with good luck I did not spend my birth day with the Françoises, tho we were in the rear of the whole army & very close to the ennemy. Got to our position near Salamanca at 10 o Cl. a.m. The army drew up & skirmishing and manœuvreing took place immediately. In the evening we crossed the river Tormes for greater security.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The 3rd Battalion of the 27th Regiment of Foot, which belonged to the 4th Division of the Army. This was the action of Castrejón. It resulted in the British Army being pushed back to Cañizal and Vallesa, which eventually led up to the battle of Salamanca. See Dickson MSS., Series "C," Chapter IV., pp. 677 and 705.
 2 A large cloak worn by officers on duty at sea.

July 22-26, 1812. Spain. Salamanca.

22.—All the families friendly to the British were leaving the town, & every thing look'd like retreating but thank God on the morning of the 22nd we were still in the same position and the ennemy seem'd inclined to attack. Heavy cannonading kept up all the morning & about noon a great number of riflemen were thrown out by both armies & soon after the ennemy trying to turn our right flank, had their own turn'd by General Pakenham, in consequence of which the action became general, which as I all along had anticipated ended in our giving them a most decisive beating, & obliging them to retreat.

Lord W. followed them & prisoners came in during the whole

night.

23.—The army were still in pursuit. I march'd to Calvarrasa de Abajo with ammunition cars to replenish the different brigades & return'd about 11 o Cl. a.m. I was then sent with a party of gunners & horses to collect the guns, &c., left behind, & taken by our troops on the field of battle. This detained me till about 1 past 8 o Cl. in the evening, when I must say I was quite tired out, having breakfasted about ½ past 5 o Cl. in the morning, & not able to get anything more till my return.

I got 8 guns, 5 ammunition waggons, & a great many horses. Undressed & went to bed this night, the first time since leaving

Castrejón which was on the night of the 16th.

24.—Sent 6 more ammunition waggons to Almeida and found 4 more French guns. Prisoners & wounded coming in all day, amongst the latter Lt. Col. May of our corps, who was shot throw the thigh in two places when leading some cavalry to the charge under General Bock.2

25.—Removed all the French guns into the Plaza or Grand Square at Salamanca, & got billets in the town for the detachment. reserves of the different brigades march'd through on their route for Almeida.

26 (SUNDAY).—Lieut. Dalton 3 arrived with the 7 ammunition cars from Almeida.

1 Major-General the Hon. Edward Pakenham, second son of the second Baron

Longford, now in command of the 3rd Division of the Army.

<sup>2</sup> Major-General Eberhardt Otto George von Bock, Colonel Commandant of the 1st Dragoons, King's German Legion, and now commanding a brigade (two regiments, King's German Legion) of cavalry.

On the morning of July 23, the day following the battle of Salamanca, Bock's cavalry attacked the rear-guard of the French Army near the village of

Garcihernandez.

"Bock was near sighted, and not being aware of the proximity of the enemy, when Colonel May brought him the order to charge, added, after expressing his readiness to comply:—'but you will be good enough to show us the enemy.' To readiness to comply:— but you will be good enough to show us the enemy. To this request Colonel May readily assented, and gallantly accompanied the first squadron in the charge, where he was severely wounded. When afterwards relating the circumstances, the gallant Colonel was wont jestingly to add:—'That is what I got by playing the Dragoon, and leading the Germans.'" See Beamish's "History of the King's German Legion." 1837. Vol. II., page 82.

3 1st Lieutenant Commissary John Dalton, Royal Artillery Drivers. July 26-30, 1812. Spain. Salamanca to Medina del Campo.

Received an order from Lord Wellington to fit out a brigade from the French guns for General Santisilas 1 to consist of 5 8 Prs. & 1 6 inch howitzer.

27.—Captain Baynes received an order from head quarters to remain at Salamanca till the brigade for General S. was complete & also to send to the army as quick as his transport wou'd allow 4000

18 Pr. balls, with a proportion of ammunition.

A route sent for the reserve to march (under my command) next day, for Alba de Tormes; from thence to Peñaranda, there to collect what information I cou'd respecting the route of the army, & to join it as soon as possible—reporting to head quarters every opportunity.

28.—March'd at day light for Alba de Tormes, 4 leagues. The first part of this march was over our position & the French position. The latter part is the road the French retreated on, which cannot be mistaken, as dead bodies & dead horses are lying in every direction. Before you enter the town you pass over a very good regular stone bridge, close to which is the remains of a very fine & large convent which the ennemy had fortified. It was in flames when I entered the town, orders having been given for it to be destroyed, & the works round it, in case the French should come into the neighbourhood again. It stands high, & commanded the bridge, & the roads to Salamanca & Ciudad Rodrigo. Upwards of 100 wounded Frenchmen lay in town which the ennemy left behind on their retreat. They were in a dreadful state, not having any surgeon to attend them, & only allowed (by the Alcalde) a pound of coarse bread between 3 of them.

29.—Had a long & tedious march to Peñaranda.

30.-Arrived at Madrigal.

Met French prisoners & deserters going to the rear.

Went & visited the Nunnery with the Doctor. The Nuns, like

the works, were rather ancient.

Just after I had thrown myself on my bed, two English soldiers came to me & said that "the French were coming down, from the direction of Olmedo in great force & were only 2 leagues from us; that they had met an Officer who told them to go off to their right, instead of going the route by Medina del Campo." I ordered the trumpeter to sound boot & saddle & be in readiness to march at a moments notice. I then went out to a village about ½ a league off, to the right & made every enquiry. Some said "the ennemy was very near, but others that they believed it to be Spanish troops."

Not having any route I determined upon halting, keeping every thing in readyness to move, if I heard anything more of the Fran-

coises, but I believe it to have been all false

<sup>1</sup> General Don José Maria de Santocildes, of the Spanish Army. He was in command at Astorga, when that town surrendered to the French on April 22, 1810, and was sent as a prisoner to France. He managed to escape, and made his way back to Spain. In 1812 he was in command of a division of the Galician Army.

<sup>2</sup> The Mayor or Chief Civil Officer of a city.

July 31-August 8, 1812. Spain. Medina del Campo to Segóvia.

31 for I arrived at Medina del Campo on the morning of 31st July without interruption. Found upon enquiring that our army was divided into two columns, one gone in the direction of Madrid, the other Valladolid & the route I had chosen was in the centre of both.

Sent an orderly over to Mojados, head quarters, for orders & he

returned next morning, Saturday

AUGUST 1, with directions about my farther progress, & leave to

halt this day.

In the evening we got the bands of the 2nd regt. & 61st regt. who were marching for the army, & knock'd up a dance. We had a very fine assemblage of beauty & kept it up till 12 o Cl., having English & Spanish country dances, with lots of waltzing.

I lay down for about 2 hours & then march'd for Mojados.

2 (SUNDAY).-42 leagues. Heard here that head quarters were at Cuéllar & did not expect to move.

3.-March'd at 4 oclock a.m. in the direction of Cuéllar, about 2 leagues from which village I found Col. Dickson, & join'd him.

The 1st division was about \frac{1}{2} league in our rear, the rest of the divisions in front near head quarters.

4.-Halted, & nothing particular occurred.

5.-Halted.

6.—March'd at 3 oclock a.m., & encamp'd in a wood on the banks

of the river Piron near the village of Mudrián.

7.—Moved at 3 o Cl. in the morning in the direction of Segóvia (head quarters) but the divisions halted about 4 leagues short at a small village (Zangevs) or some such name & the reserve encamp'd close to Carbonero.

The people were delighted. It was the first time an English army had pass'd this part of the country. They made very favorable reports of the bad condition of King Josephs 1 army & said that the inhabitants of Madrid had shut their gates upon him & that he had retired with some confidential friends into a castle in that neighbourhood.

The people of this province plat their hair different to any other, viz. in 3 plats, the centre one hanging below their posteriors several inches, & the other two are tied together by the ends, behind.

8.—Arrived at Segóvia, the entrance to which, over the river Segóvia,2 is one of the most picturesque & butiful sights I ever saw. We encamp'd on one side of the city, under a walk similar to the Bird Cage in St. James's Park, London, the above mentioned river washing the left bank of this, their celebrated promenade.3

After breakfasting I rode to see the Lions [see footnote 1, page 843.-Ed.] in the town, & was extremely pleased with their cathedral, which tho' not near so large as the one at Salamanca, for lightness & simplicity of architecture, in my opinion is far superior. The whole is paved with blue, a kind of red, & white marble, tastefully intermixed.

<sup>1</sup> Joseph Buonaparte, eldest brother of Napoleon Buonaparte, by whom he was nominated King of Spain in 1808.

<sup>2</sup> The river Eresma.

<sup>3</sup> Called "Alameda."

August 8-12, 1812. Spain. Segóvia to Puente de Retamar.

A fine building,1 which formerly was celebrated (being an Academy for Cadets) I went over. The French had converted it into a depôt for ammunition & stores of almost every description. We found 18 pieces of cannon & 10,000 lbs. of powder which had been water'd by the ennemy, & the guns they had spiked.

9 (Sunday).—We halted, in consequence of the carriages of the

18 Prs. wanting a thorough repair.

I went and heard Mass performed at the cathedral & in the evening was highly pleased with the females, &c., coming to see our Park. It was quite new to them, & they were very much gratified.

The Light and 1st divisions were about a league & a half from the town, in a large castle (Rio Frio) capable of holding 5000 men. Head Quarters at the Palace of San Ildefonso, one of the most butiful & complete buildings in Spain.

10.-We reached Otero de Herreros & encamp'd on one side of the village, in consequence of the Light and 1st divisions having arrived before us, & taking all the quarters. Head Quarters this day at Navacerrada. General W. gave a ball last night at the Palace of

San Ildefonso.

11.-We had a long and very fatiguing march over the Guadarrama mountains to the camp between the villages of Guadarrama & Galapagar. Our encampment was in the park, belonging to the Escorial Palace, and most of the Officers visited this building in the evening. It was reckon'd the 8th wonder of the world, but is now very much destroyed. The whole of the tapestry King Joseph took away, & all the fine paintings sent to France. The chapel, cemetery, & library are however nearly perfect and affords a great treat to the visitor. Nearly the whole of the architecture both of the chapel & library is of marble, & the cemetery, which contains the ashes of the Kings & Queens in marble coffins, surpasses anything that can be fancied.

At Guadarrama the French had fortified a small church against the Guerrillas.

12.—The 1st and Light divisions with the Battering train, &c., halted. Lord Wellington entered Madrid at the head of the 7th division with Don Carlos 2 on his right & Don Julian 3 on his left,

2 Don Carlos de España was a French Emigré who adopted the name of Charles d'Espagne. He was born in France in 1775, and took service in the Spanish Army in 1808, commanding a newly raised regiment—Los Tiradores de Castellon. He quickly rose to the rank of General, and frequently distinguished himself during the Peninsular War.

On the death of Fernando VII., King of Spain, in 1833, he declared for Don Carlos, Fernando's brother, and espoused his cause throughout the Carlist war until, in November, 1839, he was assassinated by his own soldiers. His cruelty

was hideous and appalling, and this, no doubt, hastened his tragic end.

3 Don Julian Sanchez was one of the most daring and successful of the Spanish guerrilla leaders. Kincaid, in his "Random Shots from a Rifleman," 1847, describes him as "a middling-sized thick-set fellow, with a Spanish complexion, well whiskered and mustached, with glossy black hair, and dressed in a hussar uniform," and adds that "he became the most celebrated throat-cutter in that part of the world."

August 12—19, 1812. Spain. Puente de Retamar to Madrid. followed by several English Generals, and a very large staff. The manner in which the inhabitants received him was beyond believe. He was surrounded and nearly draged from his horse and "Viva! Viva! Viva los Engloises!!" was only to be heard. In the evening

illuminations, music, & dancing.

13.—We moved about 2½ leagues, to Puente de Retamar, between

Galapagar & Las Rozas.

14.—March'd to Madrid, & encamp'd our men and horses in the Retiro.¹ The Officers went into billets. The fort, consisting of a garrison of 1800 men, surrendered about 2 p.m., and were allowed to march out with all their private property. We found here 189 pieces of cannon, 20,000 stand of arms, a great quantity of clothing, & provisions sufficient to ration our army for 6 days, besides in stores, pontoons, carriages, tumbrils, &c., &c.

Yesterday there was a grand procession & the people proclaimed Ferdinand 7th King, turn'd all the magistrates out of office that they thought at all friendly to the French, in short did every thing they

possibly cou'd to assist the Allied Cause.

Madrid, to speak plain, is in my opinion, far superior to London.

15.—Went round the Fort & Stores, & paraded most of the streets. They are very fine, & very clean. In the evening went to the Ball given to the British Officers. It was exceedingly crowded & there was a fine show of females. There was also a very grand illumination, with fire works. This was the 4th night they had had rejoicings.

In the evening I went with a party to the theatre, which is a large & plain building & wants that lightness of architecture necessary for a place of amusement. Lord W. and Staff occupied the King's box, & the house was crowded in every part. The scenery, dresses, & decorations of the stage was very grand, and the performers very good & perfect. Between the acts we were entertained with music, which was much admired. The Fandango & Bolero<sup>2</sup> was danced in a very superior style.

17.-Went and pass'd the day with a friend, in the 4th division

camp, about 2 English miles from the city.

18.—Went over the Fort & examined the works. They are strong & extensive & would have required at least 8000 men to have garrison'd them.

19.-Went and saw the churches. There are none of note.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The palace of Buen Retiro was situated on the eastern side of the city. It had been converted into an entrenched post and fortified by the French, with a star fort, called "La China;" inside it. It contained an enormous quantity of stores, stands of arms, etc., and surrendered to the Allied army on 14 August, 1812. The celebrated Artillery Museum now stands upon its site.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> A lively Spanish national dance. It is danced in moderately quick threequarter time by two persons, to the accompaniment of the castanets and guitar. Like the fandango it is said to be a refined form of an old African dance, still performed by the Congos under the name of chika.

August 19-September 4, 1812. Spain. Madrid to Villa Castin.

Captain Baynes joined from Salamanca. Walk'd in Prado 1 in

the evening.

20.—On duty in the Fort getting the ordnance out, & sending the stores to Ciudad Rodrigo. Breakfasted with Col. Johnston<sup>2</sup> of the 68 Lt. Inf., the Commandant, & dined with Col. Dickson. In the evening went to theatre.

21.—Sat on Court Martial. Dined with Baynes & lounged the

evening in the Prado.

22.—Ordered to join Captain Douglas's brigade 9 Prs. Took charge of left 1/2 brigade. Inspected horses, carriages, &c., &c.

23 (SUNDAY):-Went to the Museum, & dined with Captain Ewart,4

52nd Ft.

24.—Being off duty, kept George's birth-day instead of the 25th. Had a party to dine with me & all drank his health.

Lord W. gave a ball, but confined his cards of invitation to Field

& Staff Officers.

25.—Colonel Robe inspected the brigade. Dined with Captain Douglas.

26.—Went over the King's palace & in evening went to the theatre. 27.—Again on duty in the Fort, which detained me till about 5 p.m.

28, 29, AND 30.—Nothing particular.

31.—The Junta of Madrid gave a bull fight, to which all the British Officers had admittance. Lord Wellington gave a ball in the evening.

SEPTEMBER 1.—Head quarters moved to Escorial (7 leagues). Received a route to march next morning.

2.—March'd to Galapagar, 5 leagues, a very heavy march.
3.—Moved at day light (4 leagues) to the Estrellage, at the foot

of the pass of the Guadarrama mountains.

4. March'd at the usual hour to Villa Castin, 3 long leagues, and over a mountainous country. Obliged to leave several guns & cars behind in consequence of the strake 6 nails falling out from the heat of the sun, which contracted the felloes of the wheels.

Captain MacDonald's troop H.A. came into this village, by a

different route, & halted.

Foot (Light Infantry).

3 Captain Robert Douglas's Company of the 9th Battalion, R.A., with a brigade of 9 Pounder guns, was at this time attached to the 3rd Division of the

4 Captain John Ewart of the 52nd (or the Oxfordshire) Regiment of Foot. <sup>5</sup> Spanish, meaning a deliberative or administrative council.

6 Strakes are iron bands by which the felloes of a wheel are secured to each other, being not continuous as a tire is, but made up of separate lengths.

7" E" Troop, R.H.A., under the command of Captain R. MacDonald. It

was at this time attached to the 7th Division of the Army.

<sup>1</sup> Prado is literally a meadow. Richard Ford in his "Handbook for Travellers in Spain" describes it as "the Hyde Park of Madrid; here on the winter days from three to five, and summer evenings from eight to twelve, all the rank, beauty, and fashion appear. The Prado was in the time of Philip IV. a wooded dip, renowned for murder and intrigues, political and amatory."

2 Lieut.-Colonel William Johnston of the 68th (or the Durham) Regiment of

September 5—14, 1812. Spain. Villa Castin to Torquemada.

5.-Halted, the wheels being so much out of repair.

Captain MacDonald's troop march'd.

6 (SUNDAY).—March'd 5 leagues to Orbila through Adanero.

7.—We did not march from Arévalo this day till 12 o Cl. the brigade having to receive some fresh horses, and send the same number to Salamanca from the cast 1 with us.

We halted at the village of Bocigas.

8.—Moved to the village of Mojados, 4 short leagues and a tolerable road.

9.—Reached Valladolid after a long march of 5 leagues. forded this river about 2 leagues from Valladolid, the French having destroyed ye 3 bridges that were over this river, in hopes of preventing our following them. We found Hd. Qrs. here, and we encamp'd out of the town a short distance on the Burgos road. The ennemy retreated 3 days ago from this, and our Cavalry went in pursuit.

This evening the people illuminated and the theatre was opened.

Lord W. gave a ball.

10.-Moved very unexpectedly at day light to the village of Cabezón, 2 leagues, road very good. Hd. Ors. went to Cigales a little farther on to the left. The French drew up in position about

2 short leagues in front, & our army halted near them.

Met Mr. J. Evans of the 16th Light Dragoons<sup>2</sup> in this village, waiting with sick and wounded. We passed the day together and chatted a good deal of Old Gloster and Monmouthshire. He show'd me a letter he had received a few days ago from his Mother in which she says-" We expect Miss Hough & her brother here tomorrow.'

11.—The ennemy retired in the night, and our army moved on.

Hd. Ors. went to Dueñas.

12.—To Dueñas, 3 leagues. Some skirmishing had taken place in this neighbourhood, as we saw many bodies on the march. ennemy left this town ye day before yesterday. The inhabitants seem'd glad to see us.

13 (SUNDAY).-We march'd 4 leagues & halted close to the village of Torquemada, where we encamp'd, the village being entirely occupied by Hd. Qrs.

The ennemy were driven thro' this village last night by our

Cavalry, and retired 2 leagues.

Met an Officer of the 44th (Lt. Pearce) 3 who spoke to me, in a very friendly way, and ask'd after my Brothers. He told me he was a Gloucestershire man, and went to school with me. I remember'd his face but cou'd not call to my recollection his family.

14.—We remained quiet as Head Quarters only removed 1 league. This village was totally destroyed by the French when they first came to the country, and all the inhabitants murdered in consequence

<sup>1</sup> i.e., cast horses. A horse rejected as unfit for service is termed "cast," and in more modern times a "caster."


2 Asst.-Surgeon John Evans of the 16th Light Dragoons.

<sup>3</sup> Lieutenant William Pearce of the 44th (or the East Essex) Regiment of Foot.




## SKETCH PLAN OF THE CASTLE OF BURGOS BY AN


The figures refer to the dates from 19 September



## Y AN OFFICER OF THE ROYAL ENGINEERS.

September to 10 October.





September 14-19, 1812. Spain. Torquemada to Burgos.

of their attempting to prevent the French from entering the village, by blocking up the bridge, & putting the ennemy to great inconvenience by being obliged to ford the river.

15.—March'd 2 short leagues to Quintana del Puente. We received a route first to go to Cordovilla but Spanish Cavalry coming there unexpectedly was the cause of our route being altered.

In the evening General Castaños's army, near 15,000 men, passed

through this place.

16.—Received our route to Pampliega (Hd. Qrs.). The ennemy removed from this place early in the morning, and drew up in position about 2½ English miles from us. Upon our arrival His Lordship ordered their outposts to be driven in, which was executed in a very short time, & we took possession of a village, which they had occupied.

17.—We march'd at day-light, following the Cavalry on the high road. The ennemy retreated from their position about 9 o Cl. last night, and our advance moved off about 2 this morning & came up with their rear about 8 o Cl. a.m. Skirmishing took place, & the enemy took up a strong position but shortly after abandon'd it, & retired in very good order over the hills. We followed them for some time & halted after a march of about 9 hours, having gone 4 leagues. We then halted & encamp'd for the night, & moved on next morning,

18, on Burgos, where we drew up, almost within cannon shot

of the Fort & Works, which are exceeding strong.1

The castle (A) stands on a very steep hill, and is entirely surrounded with works, and on another steep hill to the left is a very strong redoubt,<sup>2</sup> in which is a battery of 3 18 Prs. and several other pieces of ordnance of smaller calibre—the whole surrounded with ditches strongly palisaded, and supported by loophol'd works, from which they are capable of keeping up a very strong fire of musketry.

In the evening Lieut. Pascoe & myself ventured into the city of Burgos & about 6 more British Officers also went in; but when we were looking out for some things to purchase, an alarm was given that the garrison had made a sortie & that if we did not immediately

go out at the other end of the town we should all be taken.

In the bustle to get off one dropt his rice, another sugar, and as we went down one street the ennemy came down the other. They gave us a volley, but thank God we were out of range, and we made the best of our way back to camp where we remained quiet for the night.

19.—The 1st & General Packs division moved round the hills in order to get round the town, the ennemy having taken up a position on the hills about \( \frac{1}{2} \) a league from the city, but they retreated, and our divisions invested the redoubt to the left of the town. They shortly after drove in some of the ennemy from their out-works &

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For full details of the artillery operations at the siege of Burgos, see the Dickson MSS., Series "C," Chapter V., pp. 742-72, from which the sketch plan is taken.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The horn-work (C), called Fort San Miguel.

September 19-23, 1812. Spain. Burgos.

took possession of them, and waited till the evening to storm the redoubt.

About 8 oclock the 42nd Highlanders with the light companies of the 79th & 24th, with part of General Pack's brigade of Portuguese, commenced the attack, the musketry fire continuing like the roll of a drum for upwards of 20 minutes, when our brave soldiers formed on the parapet and drove everything before them. This work (C) which had a garrison of 600 men, consequently came into our hands, but the ennemy having a covert way which communicated with the Fort, greater part of them got away.

We took the Governor who was severely wounded, and many

prisoners, and they had a number wounded.

They drove our parties back once, but they rallied again and succeeded, but had the Frenchmen done their duty we should not have found it such an easy task. Our loss however was severe, upwards of 300 men killed & wounded, and many Officers.

The ennemy thought we were going to attempt the castle, and continued a very heavy fire of cannon & musketry all night, particularly at our parties in the redoubt, that commenced working immediately.

20 (SUNDAY).—The 18 Prs. and heavy howitzers moved to the other side of the town, & encamp'd near the village of Villatoro, Head Qrs., to be ready for moving into the batteries when finished.

Lieuts. Elgee & Pascoe relieved each other with the 18 Prs. and Lieut. Love 1 & myself the howitzers. The divisions for the storming not yet known.

21.—Halted. Batteries, &c., went on. Not so much firing from

the castle & fort this day, as yesterday.

22.—Our Working parties still employed. The 5th & 7th divisions moved about 2 leagues in the direction of Vitoria. At dusk Lieuts. Pascoe & Love got our guns into the batteries, & Lieut. Elgee & myself had to get the French guns out of the redoubt, both of which was accomplished without a single casualty on our side, but the working parties of the Line lost several men, the fire of shells & grape from the castle being very constant & very true.

About 12 oclock a detachment from the Guards & 79th, with some Portuguese, stormed some out-works of the castle, but after losing several Officers and about 150 men killed & wounded they were

obliged to retire.

23.—Works still going on. A flag of truce was sent by Marquess Wellington about ½ past 10 o Cl. a.m., for permission to bury the dead & remove the wounded, consequently all working parties discontinued working and the firing ceased till the Flag of truce was taken down, which was about 3 hours after; no firing took place for near ½ an hour after this, when the ennemy fired a round shot, and our riflemen immediately commenced from the Trenches; a very brisk cannonading continued by the ennemy all this evening, and continued

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Lieutenant James Love (1489). He belonged to Captain F. Glubb's company of the 5th battalion, R.A.

September 23-28, 1812. Spain. Burgos.

most of the night. Lt. Elgee and I relieved Capt. Dansey 1 and Lt. Pascoe in the batteries at 5 o Cl. p.m. and continued there till

5 o Cl. a.m. on the morng. of the

24th. Our loss during this time being one gunner wounded and 1 Portuguese Artilleryman killed. The Engineers began upon another Battery which commands the castle, but we were told not to open till we received orders from the Marquis. We therefore did not unmask our batteries, but remained quiet. Our magazine and furnace was completed this night and we expected to open at day light. Our batteries at present consist of 2 18 Prs. and 2 51 inch Howitzers, and

a battery of 1 5½ inch Howitzer.

A slow fire from the castle this day. About 9 o Cl. in the evening Colonel Robe sent to me to desire I would immediately get another 18 Pr. and two 51 inch Howitzers into the works. The fatigue party from the Line, not parading when ordered, I was not able to move before ½ past 11. I however succeeded in getting them in safe, altho' we had a brisk fire upon us. The batteries were altered this night, viz. the 3 18 Prs. into the new battery on the left of the redoubt and 4 5½ inch howitzers in the centre, and 1 5½ inch howitzer in the right Battery. I was to have gone into the Batteries at 5 o Cl. next morning but this duty detaining me till past 3, I was told not to come in till the relief after.

25.—Smart fire from the Fort on our working parties. Went to the Batteries at 5 p.m. for 12 hours; was employed all night shifting guns. Captain Williams,2 R.E., killed; two of our gunners wounded.

26.—Came out of the Batteries at 5 a.m. being relieved by Capt." Dansey and Lieut. Pascoe; shortly after, Capt. D. was woundedthe fire heavy upon the Sappers. Lt. Love went sick to the rear.

27 (SUNDAY).-Went at 5 o'Cl. a.m. with Capt. Power 3 to the Batteries; we had a very heavy fire upon us for about 3 hours after going in; the remainder of the day we were left pretty quiet-towards evening when the reliefs came the firing began again, and many

shells were thrown during the night.

28.-Lt. Elgee and Major Arriaga went to the Batteries-mine 5 At 5 p.m. Capt. Power and myself relieved the above mentioned officers. We formed a communication this day between the two approaches, and the ennemy threw a great many shells, &c., over the walls on our working parties; 12 or 14 men of the Line were wounded this night, but no casualty in the Batteries. I got two F.6 Guns out of the hornwork this night; they were both spiked,

 <sup>1 2</sup>nd Captain Charles Cornwallis Dansey (1138). He belonged to Captain S. du Bourdieu's Company of the 8th battalion, R.A.
 2 Captain John Archer Williams, Royal Engineers.
 3 2nd Captain William Greenshields Power (1074). He belonged to Captain F.

Glubb's company, of the 5th battalion, R.A.

Major Sebastião José de Arriaga, Portuguese Artillery.

5 A subterranean passage which is excavated under an enemy's works and charged with gunpowder, which, when exploded, destroys the fortifications. This mine was exploded on the night of September 29-30.

6 i.e., French.

September 28—October 1, 1812. Spain. Burgos. and unfit for service. I was much shock'd this night, during the search for the guns; it being dark, we were obliged to feel our way very carefully, and seeing something very imperfectly I went to see if it was any part of a gun, but judge how disappointed I was, instead of stores, I laid hold of a dead Frenchman, and after recovering I found myself surrounded by dead bodies and in the dark trod on many others. Just after, I received a smart blow on my right ancle from a stone which was knock'd off the Trenches by a round shot

from the castle. 29.—Relieved at 5 a.m. from the Batteries. In the evening about past 6 the mine (e) was completed and about 1 past 12 at night it was sprung; the explosion was not very loud, but it brought down about 6 feet of the wall, which was 7 ft. thick, and made a tolerable breach; a party were to have established themselves immediately after, but the night being very dark, the Officer commanding the party missed his way and the garrison having recovered from the shock,

concluded they were going to be attacked and opened a very heavy fire of shells, grape, and musketry, in consequence of which nothing

was done that night.

30.-Went into the Batteries at 5 a.m. About 10 o Cl. received an order from the Marquis to open 4 guns, to make the breach more practicable, and to knock down some palisading from which the ennemy kept up a strong fire of musketry. Shortly after we unmask'd our embrasures and commenced firing. After two or three shots, we got the range, and in the course of 4 hours we had entirely destroyed the ennemy's shelter, and improved the breach. About } past 2 o Cl. p.m., we shut our batteries. During the time we had them open, the fire upon us was very severe and heavy, but fortunately we had only one man wounded. Relieved at 5 p.m. by Lt. Pascoe. When dark the 18 Prs. were removed to another battery (f) only 70 yards from the first wall, to make another breach. We lost. this night one man killed (Geo. Sang) and one man severely wounded (William Hunter),1 the former by a musket ball, the latter, shell splinter.

OCTOBER 1.—We completed a new Battery (f) of 3 18 Prs. within 70 yds. of the outer wall and was just going to open when the ennemy opened 4 mortars and 1 gun upon it, and kept up such a very heavy fire of grape and musketry at the same time, that we were obliged to withdraw our men and abandon our guns; in a short time the Battery was almost totally destroyed, and the carriages very much injured. Capt. Power and myself went in at 5 p.m. and when dark we received orders to get the guns out and place them under cover. About 8 p.m. we commenced working expos'd to a tremendous fire of musketry; it being dark the shells did not much annoy us as they did not make very good practice, and we could see them burning and had time to avoid them. The first gun we got out tolerably well, the wheels not being much damaged-the other two detain'd

<sup>1</sup> They were both gunners and belonged to Captain J. May's Company of the 1st battalion, R.A.



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t the week of the

October 1-4, 1812. Spain. Burgos.

us till day light and even then we were obliged to leave them dis-Our loss was two British Gunners killed, 2 wounded 1-I Portuguese Artillery man wounded,2 and about 9 or 10 of the party that came to man the drag ropes killed and wounded; in short, life was uncertain one moment, for the balls struck in every direction. I never spent such a night before, and sincerely hope I may have no occasion to relate a similar duty.

2.—Relieved at ½ past 5 a.m. by Capt. Blachley 3 and Lieut.

The engineers during the last night threw up part of a Pascoe. fresh battery (ff) but the enemy opened upon that at day light and prevented our finishing it. At dark the above Officers got the guns round to the mouth of Trenches, from the place we left them in the over night; one had a trunnion struck off and another much damaged.

Violent rain all this night.

3.-Capt. P. [Power.-Ed.] and myself went at 5 a.m. into the Batteries. Employed during the day making ramps to get the guns in at night. About ½ past 6 o'clock we began working and by ½ past 9 had got 2 18 Prs. into the Battery, and taken out 1 5½ inch Howitzer, and a French 8 Pr. Our loss was 4 men wounded 5 occasioned by the Howitzer upseting-from the fire of the ennemy we

had no casualty.

4 (SUNDAY).—Col. Dickson and Lt. Elgee opened the batteries, and made very excellent practice. Capt. P. and myself went in at past 3 o Cl. and opened with shrapnell and spherical about 1 past 4 o Cl. to support the 24th Regt. that stormed about that time at two breaches one of which was made at the same hour and served as a signal to attack. Upon our men showing themselves at the top of the Breach on the 1st line, the ennemy retreated in great confusion to their 2nd, losing many killed and wounded and several prisoners, besides several that perished when the mine (h) blew up. From the 2nd Line and the guns and mortars, &c., on and about the castle, a most tremendous fire was kept up, for upwards of an hour. The fire over our battery for 20 minutes was truly awful; we lost many killed and wounded and I had a most miraculous escape, by a grape shot passing thro' my cock'd hat slightly touching my head, and killing a poor fellow who was standing in my rear (Bombr. Ridley), besides which I was struck several times with stones from the top of the Battery; in short, we cou'd not expect to escape without being wounded. Our men established themselves on the 1st line, and continued firing all night.

<sup>5</sup> A corporal and two gunners of Captain J. May's Company of the 1st battalion, R.A., and one gunner of Captain R. W. Gardiner's Company of the 8th battalion, R.A.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> They belonged to Captain F. Glubb's company of the 5th battalion, R.A.
<sup>2</sup> Of Major S. J. de Arriaga's Company.
<sup>3</sup> 2nd Captain Charles Blachley (1171), who belonged to "I" Troop, R.H.A., but was doing duty in the trenches during the siege.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Trunnions are the two solid cylindrical pieces of metal, projecting from the sides of a gun at right angles to the axis, by which it is supported on, and attached to, its carriage.

October 4-8, 1812. Spain. Burgos.

Capt. P. and I removed the guns into different batteries (ab and cd) when dark.

5.—Capt. Blachley and Lt. Pascoe relieved us at 5 a.m. Preparations being made for opening with red-hot shot and breaching another wall. At 5 p.m. went to relieve the above Officers just after which the ennemy made a sortie and drove back our men from both breaches, except a few of the 42nd who kept their ground the whole time. Our loss was very severe, but our soldiers rallied and drove the French into their second line again. We opened from 4 Howitzers with spherical and common shell and had a very tremendous fire upon us, while this business lasted, but the ennemy remained quiet the remainder of the evening. We lost near 350 killed and wounded, and the ennemy's loss is supposed not to exceed 25 or 30—for immediately they reached the second line, shells, Hand Grenades, &c. &c. were thrown over the covert way and rolled down on our men which did great execution, and one of their Tumbrils which they had run down close to the breach exploded and killed and wounded many.

6.—Capt. Power and I again went to the batteries as we came down the over night immediately after the sortie. About 12 o Cl. Capt. P. opened with 2 18 Prs. to breach and I commenced firing at some Palisades from 3 Howitzers. We had rain all this day and at times a great deal of fire on us, but fortunately with little effect.


7.—Opened the batteries at day light upon the same points. Very severe fire upon us. Lt. Elgee was wounded and we had an 18 Pr. destroyed by being struck with a round shot in the muzzle and a trunnion knock'd off. Went into the battery at 5 p.m. Shortly after left off firing, being too dark. Very heavy rain all night. The ennemy made 3 sorties and got once in our rear and did a great deal of mischief. We however maintained our ground, but our loss was very severe. Major the Honble. Mr. Cocks¹ was killed by a grape shot which struck him in the neck; two other Officers killed, and 2 or 3 wounded, and in men severe.

8.—Relieved at 6 a.m. Shortly after Battery opened at the breach, but the ennemy having 6 guns to bear upon our two, they knock'd the merlon 2 of the battery all down, which exposing our men very much we were ordered to cease firing till next day. 5 p.m. went on duty; when dark, removed an 18 Pr. from No. 3 to No. 1 Battery, and took in a fresh carriage to No. 3 in order to mount the other 18 Pr., the carriage being much damaged; but the Trenche's being so very dirty and bad, and having rain all night, and very dark, it was day light before I had performed this duty, therefore did not remove the gun to the other carriage not being able to do it without

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Edmund Charles, eldest son of the 1st Earl Somers. He was a most distinguished officer, and had previously served in the 14th and 16th Light Dragoons. Wellington, with the whole of his staff, attended his funeral, and in his despatch of October 11th, wrote—"I consider his loss as one of the greatest importance to the army, and to His Majesty's service."


That portion of the parapet of a work between the embrasures.

## THE CASTLE OF BURGOS.



Sectional elevation through G H on plan facing page 863.

Vertical intervals = 40 feet.



The letters refer to those given on the map facing page 863.

 October 8-11, 1812. Spain. Burgos.

exposing the gin,1 which the firing would in all probability have destroyed it and made many casualties. Capt. P. having received a slight wound the former evening, and being afterwards seized with

the ague, I took charge of his relief.

9.—Came out of the batteries at 6 a.m. Lt. Monro<sup>2</sup> from Capt. Greene's brigade joined us to take a relief, Capt. Blachley and myself being the only effective officers left (Capt. Dansey wounded, Lt. Elgee do., Lt. Love gone sick to rear, Lt. Pascoe and Capt. Power, ague and fever). Made a small breach in a wall running from the 2nd line to the 1st in the night the ennemy made a sortie but did no mischief.

10.-Went on duty at 5 a.m. with Major Gardiner, in consequence of so many officers of the 1st detail being unable to do duty. About 9 o Cl. we began firing red-hot shot from 3 51 inch Howitzers and 1 18 Pr. We had the convent in flames several times but cou'd not keep it in, and having a very heavy fire on us, we were obliged to cease firing from the 18 Pr. and one of the Howitzers, the battery being so knock'd to pieces that it exposed our men too much. About past 4 p.m., we mask'd our embrasures, our loss this day being man killed, 3 wounded. Relieved at 5 by Capt. Greene.

11 (SUNDAY).—Had to mount an 18 Pr. that upset the over night. At 5 p.m. went to Batteries; at dusk mounted another 18 Pr. and got a carriage into the battery to replace one disabled; finished about past 11 o Cl. and Capt. Blachley gave me leave to quit the Batteries. We fired red-hot shot all this day, with the same success as yesterday. A deserter came from the Fort. He informed us that the garrison had given in a round robin to the Governor, requesting him to surrender, but he returned them for answer "that he would be buried under the walls of the castle sooner than give up the Fort." Report says that the men are very discontented and that many have thrown their arms over the works. Some are so sanguine as to think that if we storm they will not fight, however I do not flatter myself we shall get it so very easy.

2 2nd Lieutenant Frederick Monro (1498) belonged to Captain R. W. Gardiner's Company of the 8th battalion, R.A.

<sup>1</sup> Now generally spelt "gyn." A mechanical apparatus used for hoisting heavy weights, mounting and dismounting guns, etc. It is usually a tripod in form, one leg being moveable for variations in height, and the other two a certain distance apart wi'h a winch between them round which the rope is wound.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> 2nd Captain William Greene (1105) belonged to Captain Robert Douglas's (958) Company of the 9th battalion, R.A., and was now in command of the brigade of 6 Pr. guns formerly commanded by Captain J. P. Eligé attached to the 6th Division of the army. See footnote 3, page 844.

Eligé was killed at the attack of the Salamanca Forts on June 20, 1812, and Captain T. A. Brandreth (990) was promoted in his place. Greene remained in command of this Company until November, when Brandreth joined it.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>A document (especially one embodying a complaint, remonstrance, or request) having the names of the subscribers arranged in a circle so as to disguise the order in which they have signed. Originally used by sailors and frequently referred to as a nautical term.

October 12-22, 1812. Spain. Burgos to Celada del Camino.

12.—The Howitzers fired at the roof of the convent and very much destroyed it but could not set it on fire, the ennemy having

removed every thing into the castle.

13.—Went on duty in the morning; had our fires ready for hot shot, but received orders not to open our batteries. This night the good 18 Pr. and the 2 that had lost trunnions were all placed in No. 3 Battery, by orders of the Marquis.

14.—About 3 o Clock p.m., we opened from 2 Howitzers at their defences in the 2nd line and continued firing for two hours.

15.—Opened at 11 o Cl. from 3 18 Prs. and 1 Howitzer, but the ennemy kept up such a very heavy fire from 10 pieces of cannon that in a very short time we had our battery knock'd to pieces and lost 2 men killed, 4 wounded, and we shut up the embrasures.

16.—The battery not being thoroughly repaired we did not fire. The mine was finished this morning and it was intended to spring it, and storm the 2nd line in the evening but the engineers received fresh orders. Report said the French were countermining.

17.—Kept up a fire upon the breach all day; it was intended to storm this evening but his Lordship did not think the breach

practicable.

18 (SUNDAY).—Kept up the same fire as yesterday. In the evening stormed, but did not succeed—the 6th Division went to the Front.

19.—Batteries quiet all day—the ennemy very busy in the Fort repairing the breach &c. Major Gardiner's Brigade went to the Front and the 1st Division received orders to hold themselves in readiness to move. The Marquis also went to the Front in consequence of the ennemy seeming inclined to advance.

20.—Got all the ammunition, small stores, &c., out of the batteries, at night withdrew the guns, which detain'd us till about

6 o Cl. next morning

21, when we received orders to move to Villalón. We got every thing ready and began moving about 9 o Cl. a.m., but the roads were so very bad that we could not get on at all with the heavy ordnance, and the whole army retiring very unexpectedly we were obliged to destroy the 3 18 Prs. and burn the carriages so that we did not reach Frandovinez till 10 at night, where we expected to halt till next morning, but an order came to move again in the middle of the night to Celada del Camino and the muleteers in charge of the Powder ran away, thinking the ennemy were close behind us, and all our other Transport being in front we had no other recourse left but to destroy this ammunition also; therefore Col. Dickson, Capt. Grimes, Lt. Pascoe and myself with two gunners knock'd the ends of the casks out and rolled the Powder and Barrels into the river. This detained us some time and we did not get in before day light on the

22, and we had scarcely pitch'd our Tents before we were again order'd to move to the rear. This rapid movement was not in consequence of the ennemy being too strong for us, for the Earl had

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Possibly Captain G. H. Grimes referred to in footnote 1, page 853.

October 22-26, 1812. Spain. Celada del Camino to Cabezón. determined upon fighting, but report says, owing to a movement made in the South, which required our army going to join Genl. Hill near Madrid. This I think likely for we left 2 guns in the batteries in order to fire upon the ennemy in the Fort, which we were obliged to leave behind having destroyed all the French carriages, Stores, &c., that we had taken in the redoubt, and the two light brigades from the 1st and 6th Divisions were ordered to blockade the castle, and these were also withdrawn in a great hurry; consequently the siege was raised, not by the force the army of Portugal brought against us, but our presence being necessary in the South; 1 however it will be an opening for the French papers to boast.

23.—Moved at 8 o Cl. and continued marching till ½ past 4 o Cl. p.m. when we drew up at Torquemada, 12 leagues from Burgos; the ennemy pressed us very hard this morning and their advance guard and our rear had some smart skirmishing. A great quantity of commissariat stores were obliged to be abandoned the last march, and the evening we began retiring, and a great many Officers (sick) and men, were missing which are supposed to have fallen into the

ennemy's hands.

24.—At 4 o Cl. a.m. went to the Front with orders to Capt. MacDonald's Troop; returned to camp and at 7 marched off for Duenas 4 long leagues, the French quite close to our rear. Major Bull's Troop, H.A.2 and the cavalry skirmished all day. Our loss both this and yesterday was rather severe, the ennemy having a great

superiority in cavalry.

25 (SUNDAY).—We did not move, but were in marching order the whole day. A great deal of manœuvreing took place this day, and several of the Divisions, 5, 6, &c., were smartly engaged. We blew up three bridges and attempted a fourth, which gave the ennemy an opportunity of throwing a force on the other side of the river (left bank of the Pisuerga); they came down a great way and their vedettes were all along the bank of the river, directly opposite our camp. The 5th Division lost near 500 men in the morning (by the ennemy fording the river Carrion in two places) and they had to drive them back. Capt. Lawson's Brigade 3 was engaged and lost 1 Officer, Thompson, wounded and 5 men killed. We sat down to a pick nic dinner about 3 o Cl. in sight of the ennemy and I afterwards drank my dear Father and Mother's health in a glass of grog.

26.—Moved at 4 o Cl. a.m. in rear of the 6th Division to Cabezón. The whole army retreated on this village; there is a bridge, and it

<sup>1</sup> Evidently a façon de parler. <sup>2</sup> I '' Troop, R.H.A., now commanded by its 2nd Captain, W. N. Ramsay, Bull being absent in England on sick leave.

<sup>4</sup> 2nd Captain Alfred Thompson (1141) who belonged to Lawson's Company.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See footnotes No. 4, page 847, and No. 4, page 854. See also Lawson's Diary published in the Dickson MSS., Series "C," Chapter IV., page 712. The entry for 25 October is "Remain in position at Villamuriel and were attacked by the enemy, the 5th Division only having care of that post. My brigade losses, 3 killed, 6 wounded. One Officer wounded and a gun carriage disabled with one horse & one mule wounded."

October 26—November 1, 1812. Spain. Cabezón to Peñaranda. is reckoned a good position about this country; the ennemy moved after us, and pressed our rear very hard; at 12 o Cl. at night the French attempted to force the bridge but were repulsed.

27.—About 8 o Cl. a.m. we began moving; we drew up some guns near the bridge to enable our rear to get off safe; about 1 o Cl. there was a very heavy cannonade upon the ennemy, which obliged them to retire. They then forded the river and attempted to get round the hills, but we were prepared for this movement also and they were driven back. We halted about ½ of a league from Valladolid on the road leading to Puente de Duero. Hd. Ors. remained at Cabezón.

28.—The ennemy moved 6 or 8 pieces of cannon round the hills and about 9 opened a sharp fire upon the Town of Valladolid which caused great confusion with the baggage, and set the town on fire. They soon after got some guns round the hills, a considerable way round on our left, and opened upon some of our artillery defending a bridge, and fired at our reserves and baggage a great deal, but without much effect. They put a shell into one of our carriages and was the cause of two more upsetting. A civilian and a soldier were wounded and several baggage and commissariat mules. We moved to the Puente de Duero in consequence. About 4 p.m. received an order to march immediately to Salamanca for ammunition, but the night being very dark and not knowing the road, I halted at Boecillo instead of Mojados as ordered, about 10 at night; got a chop and lay down for the night.

29.—Arrived at Bocigas, & league short of my proper route, the horses being much fatigued. Almenara was the village specified in my route. Heard firing all this day's march.

30.—Marched at ½ past 6 o Clock for Arévalo. Heard that the French got to Medina del Campo and that our Hd. Qrs. were to come to Rueda.

31.—March'd from Arévalo for Cabezas del Pozo 4 leagues, passed through the villages of Aldeaseca (on my right), Villa Nueva del Aceral (on left), and Fuentes de Año. Met Lt. Col. May going up to the army having recovered from his wounds received at Salamanca. The French did not get across the Douro for we destroyed all the bridges, but they went off to their right in direction of the —— Mountains, supposed with an intention of getting to Salamanca, our army coming down on the opposite side, through Rueda, Olmedo, &c.

NOVEMBER I (SUNDAY).—Started at ½ past 6 for Peñaranda, went through the villages Flores de Avila and Cisla; stoped a few minutes in the church of the former Place to see the ceremony the Spaniards use to receive the Sacrament; it appears strange to a Protestant, to hear slow music and see every person with a light and bread before them, but at the same time there is something solemn and awful in the manner the inhabitants of Spain receive the Lord's Supper. Arrived at Peñaranda about ½ past 12 o Cl.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Montes de Torozos, N.W. from Valladolid.

November 2-6, 1812. Spain. Alba de Tormes to Peñaranda.

2.—Reached Alba de Tormes and after seeing the Horses put up, &c., I went and visited the ruins of the convent (that was in flames when I passed through before) and afterwards walk'd along the banks of the Tormes and was fortunate enough to fall in with an angler, who was obliging enough to sell me sufficient fish for a fry, and it being rather a scarce dish in this country I invited an old friend of the 42nd Highlanders to partake of them, which with some fruit and wine after dinner enabled us to pass the evening pleasantly away. In the middle of the night an orderly came from Hd. Qrs. with a letter for me, desiring me to return to the army with the cars that would arrive at Alba de Tormes the next day, and that I would send my empty ones down with the Officer or N.C.O. that came with the full ones; but I found it impossible to comply with this order without going to Salamanca, as my detachment were without rations, and there was no other depôt nearer; consequently I halted my party the next day,

3, and went over to Salamanca, procured Transports and Provisions, sent them off that evening with an order for the Detachment to march next morning at 6 o Cl. for Peñaranda, where I would join them, having many little things to do before I could start, which I knew must detain me till the next day. I dined with some Officers of our corps that were here on command and sick, and breakfasted with Lt. Patten 1 of the 32nd Regt. next morning.

4, and then started off for Peñaranda which place I reached safe. Slept there and,

5, moved the following morning for Cabezas del Pozo, intending to reach Arévalo next day and there wait for further instructions. But, judge my surprise when I was informed on my arrival that Genl. Hill's army was close to me and that the French (Soult's force) were in or near Arévalo, and that it would be dangerous to proceed further on the same road. I then made every enquiry and found I was placed in a very awkward way, without instructions, without knowing where Hd. Qrs. of the Marquis of W's army was, and without rations or forage. I therefore kept my horses harnessed and ready to move at a moment's notice as I was aware my charge was of some consequence. I then dispatched orderlies in several directions for intelligence, and also to endeavour to obtain some rations; the former was very unwelcome, and I could only procure 2 days meat without bread, biscuits or anything else, for my detachment to subsist on. Various reports reached me during my stay here which was till 4 o Cl. next morning,

6, when the rear guard of Genl. Hill's army passed through this village and I then thought it high time to face to the right about, and followed the rear of the column to Peñaranda, where we halted for a few hours and then retired about 2 leagues farther. In the course of the morning I sent two N.C.O. orderlies off, one to find out

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Probably Ensign William Peyton. There was no one named Patten in the 32nd Regiment at this time.

November 6-15, 1812. Spain. Peñaranda to Calzada de Don Diego. Ld. W's. Hd. Qrs., the other to Col. Waller,1 Commg. R.A. with Genl. Hill, to inform him how I was situated.

7.—An orderly from Ld. W's. head quarters arrived during the night with orders for me to return to Salamanca and there wait further orders. About 7 o Cl. moved off and got safe to Alba de Tormes; drew up near the bridge. Genl. Hill's army halted about 1 league from the town, but in the evening we all received orders to pass the bridge except two Divisions and the cavalry. During the time we halted the first time, I sent for Col. Cother and Lt. Cox 2 of 71st Regt. to take some breakfast, who came immediately not having had anything that morning, being separated from their baggage. Very heavy rain

all this night accompanied with a violent wind. 8 (SUNDAY).-Marched for Salamanca where I found Hd. Qrs. and joined the grand reserve encamp'd near the Bridge. Ld. W's. army were about 2 leagues in front on the right bank of the Tormes and Genl. Hill's halted about the same distance on the other side of this river

9.-Divisions in same position. I received an order from Col. Dickson desiring me to reconnoitre the villages within 2 leagues to the rear of Salamanca; to report if they were convenient for our reserve to move to, so that we might be supplied with straw, &c., convenient to our stables; made a report accordingly.

10.—We were ordered to Parada, one of the villages visited

11.—Heard a good deal of firing towards evening and saw several columns of smoke ascend which appeared to us like the explosion of

ammunition waggons.

12.—Capt. Thompson went over to Salamanca. Had a marching

order parade. 13.—Lts. Elgee and Wilford 3 went to Salamanca. The French made an attack upon Alba de Tormes with 3 Divisions and 20 pieces of artillery, but were driven back by Genl. Howard's English brigade,4 and Genl. Hamilton's Portuguese brigade 5 with great loss.

14.—Hd. Qrs. received an order to pack and load their baggage, to be ready to move at a moment's notice in consequence of the French during the night having cross'd the Tormes about a league above Alba de Tormes, and threatening our right flank. Ld. Wellington left his position on the other side of Salamanca, and sent the 3rd. 4th, and Light Divisions to assist the 2nd.

15 (SUNDAY).—About 12 o Cl. an order came to march immediately to Calzada de Don Diego Head Ors. baggage and commissariat stores took up the whole village and we were obliged to remain out all night.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 9, page 840.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Major (Bt. Lieut.-Colonel) Charles Cother, and Lieut. Charles T. Cox.

Ist Lieutenant Commissary John Wilford, R.A. Drivers.
 Major-General Kenneth Alexander Howard commanded a brigade in the 2nd Division (Hill's) of the army, consisting of the 1st Battalion of the 50th, 71st, and 92nd Regiments.

Lieut.-General John Hamilton was at this time in command of a division of the Portuguese Army.

November 16-28, 1812. Spain. Calzada de Don Diego to Souto.

16.—Encamped near Tejadillo; incessant rain the whole day.

17.—Halted and encamp'd near Martin del Rio. Rain. disastrous retreat is it seems owing to our being outflanked, and a fear of the enemy's reaching Ciudad before us. Disastrous indeed it may be termed, for such scenes of misery and distress as we witnessed to day and yesterday, on the road, are only to be imagined.

18.—Moved suddenly at 1 o Cl. a.m., and the state in which the roads were from the rains, detained us till near 11 o Cl., for we did not reach Ciudad Rodrigo before that hour, which place was only 5 leagues from Martin del Rio. A smart skirmish took place yesterday.1 Genl. Sir E. Paget <sup>2</sup> was taken prisoner, and Major MacDonald, <sup>3</sup> R.H.A., was severely wounded in both legs with a shell splinter.

19.-Halted. The greater part of the army crossed the Agueda

and encamp'd.

20.—Marched at 7 o Cl. a.m. for La Alameda and being Officer on duty for the day it was my misfortune to bring up the rear. I did however after the greatest exertion and fatigue get all the carriages up within about \frac{1}{2} mile of La Alameda (at 1 o Cl. at night), having destroyed 5 horses and left 6 dead on the road, indeed if one animal was destroyed or lost this day I am certain one hundred must have

21.—Moved from encamping ground, and marched for Poço Velho, through Fuentes de Oñoro, crossed the Dos Casas river which separates Spain from Portugal and about 1 o Cl. p.m. drew up and halted for the night. We encamped, there being only two houses fit for billets in the village, which were occupied by Captain Parker

and Capt. Thompson.

22 (SUNDAY).—Left Poço Velho for Aldeia da Ribeira, a small

and wretched village, which we reached about 1 o Cl.

23.—Regulated the stabling, parades, &c., and had all the harness repaired and cleaned. Lt. Elgee took charge of night half brigade, and I took the Left.

24.—Had a parade at 9 o Cl.; afterwards sat at a Court Martial. At 2 o Cl. mustered the company and then walked till dinner.

25.-Marching order parade.

26.—Remained at home, in consequence of the other Officers wishing to go to Hd. Qrs.

27.-Col. Dickson came over to inspect our horses. Dined with

the Commissary.

28.—An order came for part of the reserve (Capt. Parker's brigade) to march to Souto, but in consequence of our brigade being short

1 It is known as "The combat of the Huebra," and took place at a village named San Muñoz.

<sup>2</sup> Lieut.-General the *Hon.* Sir Edward Paget, K.B., now in command of the 1st Division of the army. He was a younger brother of Henry, Earl of Uxbridge, who afterwards became the first Marquis of Anglesey.

 See footnote 7, page 861.
 2nd Captain J. B. Parker (1117) who belonged to and was now in command of Captain H. Stone's company of the 9th Battalion, R.A. Stone was absent in Persia attached to the British Embassy to the Persian Court.

November 28-December 17, 1812. Portugal. Souto to Covilhã. of horses, we were not to move for a couple of days; but in consequence of the 2nd brigade of the 5th Division coming in, we were ordered to move also, leaving 3 cars behind to wait the arrival of fresh horses. We got to Souto about 5 in the evening, procured lodgings and rested very comfortably, altho' we had the Patrão, his wife and child, 5 servants, a goat, 2 dogs, and lots of baggage, besides ourselves (the Doctor and I) in one room.

29 (SUNDAY).—Got to Sabugal.

30.—Went to Casteleiro, a small but decent village.

DECEMBER 1.—Arrived at Caria a very tolerable village; there are four or five large and good houses in it which will put up ½ a dozen Officers very well. There was a large fair here this day and

many articles, scarce in Portugal, were to be procured.

2.—Started for Covilhã, a large and good town on the side of the Estrella mountain. We formed our park 2 at the foot of the mountain about 1½ mile from the town. Got a very good billet on a house that gave me a sitting room, bed room, and a place for cooking, and the Patrão and Patrona appeared remarkably civil.

4.-Capt. Thompson, Lt. Elgee dined with us.

6 (SUNDAY).—Breakfasted at home. Inspection of men's appointments, harness, carriages, &c., &c., afterwards.

7.-Rode over to Tortozendo and returned to dinner.

8.—Capt. Thompson and Lieut. Evans, R.A.D.,3 dined with us.

9.-Dined at Capt. Thompson's.

10.-Surgeon Bradley, R.A., and Lieut. Wilford, R.A.D., dined with us, also the eldest son of the Commissary's Patrão (Costa).

11.—Rode over to Tortozendo to Lt. Evans's; took a mutton chop

and returned home to dinner.

12.—Dined with the other mess and got three sheets in the wind.

13 (SUNDAY).—Took a ride and returned home to dinner.

14.—Capt. Thompson and Mr. Bradley, Surgeon, dined with us.

15.-Rode out to exercise my horse. Dined at frome.

16.-Colonel Dickson arrived from Hd. Ors. on his way down to

17.—Called upon the Colonel, and had a long chat. He informed me that another Battalion was raised (which promoted me); however I had not had it noted to me officially.5 Lt. Stanway, R.A.6 dined

1 Portuguese-the landlord of a house.

<sup>2</sup>A term originally applied to artillery only, meaning the space occupied by the guns, waggons, etc., of the artillery in an encampment. It also means the guns themselves, and it still lives as the Gun-park of to-day.

3 ist Lieutenant Commissary Matthew Evans, R.A. Drivers.
4 i.e., very drunk. A "sheet in the wind" signifies only half drunk. Origin uncertain.

<sup>5</sup>This was not the case. The last augmentation of the Royal Artillery took place in 1808 when the 10th Battalion was formed. No further increase was made until 1846 when the 10th battalion, which had been reduced in 1819, was reformed. Hough was not promoted until 2nd September, 1813.

<sup>6</sup> 2nd Lieutenant Henry Stanway (1474) had belonged to Stone's company of the 9th Battalion, R.A., and was still doing duty with it. On promotion to the rank of 1st Lieutenant he was posted to Captain W. Morrison's company of the 4th Battalion, in the muster rolls of which he is shown as being "on command" from October 1812, to February, 1813.

December 17, 1812-January 18, 1813. Portugal. Covilhã.

with us, and we all drank Arthur's "good health." Played a rub at cribbage afterwards, and broke up about 11 o Clock comfortable.1

22.—Gave a ball to the families of Covilha. Sat down to supper, consisting of every delicacy that could be procured, about 12 o Cl., and recommenced dancing about 1 past 1 o Cl. and kept it up till 5, when the company broke up highly pleased with the entertainment of the evening.

23.—Called upon the families this morning and was received with

much attention. Col. Dickson and his Adjt. dined with our mess. 24.—Making preparations for Xmas day, having been chosen by

my brother Officers to superintend the dinner for that day.

25 (XMAS DAY).—Breakfasted at home, lunched at Senhor da Costa, and at ½ past 5 oCl. p.m. sat down to dinner, having previously been called upon to take the chair. Our dinner consisted of soup, salt fish, roast beef, boild beef, mutton, vegetables, &c., &c., and a remove of turkey, fowls, ham and tongues-afterwards pastry. The first toast I gave after the cloath was removed was-"All absent friends and the Compliments of the Season to them," which was given and drank in a bumper by the whole company. Church and King—Prince Regent of Portugal—England—Lord Wellington— Navy, and many others which were well received, and we parted, at a late hour, very well satisfied.

26.—The Officers called on me and voted their thanks to me for the able manner with which I had supported and held the chair, the evening before, and expressed themselves much obliged to me

for the trouble I had taken in procuring the dinner.

31.-Went out coursing; had several runs but did not kill. Saw

the New Year in.

JANUARY 1.-Visited several families, to pay the Compliments of the Season. A party dined at our Mess, and all thought of our absent friends.

13.—Called upon the Freire family at their quinta, a short distance from Covilhã; had a great deal of chat with the females, eat oranges and drank hum poco vinho,2 and returned to Covilhã, and accompanied the doctor to see a patient, a most charming and delightful girl, Maria da Cama.

14.—Went out coursing; had many runs, but owing to the country being very strong we did not kill. Dined at Capt. Thompson's mess.

17 (SUNDAY) .- All the Officers went out coursing, or rather hunting, for we collected all the curs we could find in the place, which afforded us much diversion, tho' we only killed one hare, which we were obliged to shoot, for in this country "it's all for the pot." Went in evening to a dance at the house of Senhor Bernardes and passed a most pleasant evening. Broke up about 2 oCl. On the

18, about 12 oCl. we called upon the several families, and after-

wards rode out.

<sup>2</sup> Portuguese—a little wine.

<sup>1</sup> Probably synonymous with Samuel Pepys's "pretty content."

January 25-March 19, 1813. Portugal. Covilhã.

25.—Lord Wellington slept at Sabugal this night on his road up from Lisbon.<sup>1</sup>

28.—Went and visited the Freire family. Afterwards rode across country.

29.—Sat on a Court Martial. Afterwards went with two or three Portuguese families to show them our Park. We fired two guns, and cut down two fir trees, which pleased them very much, never having seen artillery before.

FEBRUARY I.—Captain Parker, Lieuts. Palliser, Williams, and myself went to the top of the first ridge of mountains (term'd Estrella) after great difficulty. The tracks of wolves were plain and fresh, and we thought it most advisable to make a hasty retreat, having only fowling pieces and no slugs.

16.—Colonel Dickson arrived from Lisbon. Two Portuguese dined with us.

MARCH 10.—Had our races. Pitch'd some tents, and gave wine, cake, &c., to the Ladies that honor'd us with their company. We had many excellent matches and well contested. We finished with a sweepstake for ponies. I rode Lieut. Elgee's pony and came in first.

16.—On this day year I left my friends for Portsmouth, to embark for Portugal. Brought old friends and scenes to my remembrance and drank my Father and Mother's, &c. &c., healths in a bumper.

17. Went with another Officer to Penamacor to spend the day. Captain Cairnes's brigade, Royal Artillery, were cantoned there. Saw some old friends—Lieuts. Mainwaring, Bridges, and James.

18.—Breakfasted with Captain Cairnes and at 11 o Cl. started for Covilhã (6 leagues) which we reached at ½ past 2.

19.-Colonel Dickson came from Hd. Ors.

<sup>1</sup> Wellington went to Cadiz in December for the purpose of conferring with the Spanish Government, and on his way back to the army travelled viâ Lisbon where he remained four days. He left Lisbon on 20th January and arrived at Head Quarters (Freineda) on the 25th.

<sup>2</sup> 2nd Captain Robert MacPherson Cairnes (1106), R.A., belonged to, and was at this time in command of, Captain Alexander Dickson's company of the 10th Battalion, which early in the year had joined the army in the field from Cadiz, where it had been serving since April, 1810. It was attached to a brigade of 9 Pr. guns with the Artillery Reserve. See Dickson MSS., Series "C," Chapter VII. (1813), page 901, etc. Cairnes was killed at Waterloo.

<sup>3</sup> 1st Lieutenant George Henry Mainwaring (1305), R.A., belonged to Captain H. Owen's company of the 5th Battalion, which had been serving at Cadiz since January, 1810, and had joined the army in the field towards the end of 1812. In April, 1813, Cairnes records in a letter that Owen's company "is now getting broken up, that is, sending them off in detachments to supply the casualties of other Troops and Brigades."

4 ist Lieutenant Edward Jacob Bridges (1438), R.A., belonged to Dickson's company of the 10th Battalion. See footnote 2 above.

<sup>5</sup> 1st Lieutenant George James (1593), R.A., belonged to Holcombe's company of the 6th Battalion, stationed at Lisbon. He is shown in the Muster Rolls of this period as being "on command."

March 24-May 8, 1813. Portugal. Covilhã to Sabugal.

24.—Colonel Fisher 1 having arrived from Head Qrs. last evening inspected all the horses this morning and condemned all those he thought unservicable.

26.—Colonel Fisher left Covilhã for Head Ors. The Commissary

and Lieut. Evans dined with us.

APRIL 13.—Breakfasted with Dr. O'Beirne, R.A. At 1 p.m. went to see a grand match at Foot-ball with 16 men of Captain Parker's brigade against 16 of Lieut. Colonel May's company, which was gained by the latter, after a stout contest.

20.—Captain Cairnes and Lieut. Bridges came over from Penamacor. Dined with Lieut. Evans at Tortozendo and returned home

about 11 o Cl.

25 (SUNDAY).—Superintended the painting of carriages and packing and distribution of stores. The Adjutant and another German

Officer of the 1st Hussars 2 dined with us.

26.—Rode over with Colonel Dickson and Adjutant and Captain Cleves to Tortozendo to inspect Lieut. Evans's horses, having received an order to have all his effective horses and send him our unservicable ones. Returned about 2 o Clock and inspected brigade.

27.—Lieut. Bloomfield,<sup>3</sup> Royal Artillery, with remount horses,

arrived.

May 1.—Rain most of the day. Paraded at 3 o Cl. p.m. for Pay Muster. I read the Articles of War & Regimental Orders. Dined

with Captain Parker.

2 (SUNDAY).—Received an order to march next morning. Went to Tortozendo to select horses from Lieut. Evans's Detachment and upon my return found Colonel Dickson had arrived from Head Qrs. He gave us orders not to move until he heard again from Head Qrs. as he inspected the village we were to halt at, and found the accommodations, &c., so indifferent that it would be impossible to put up our Brigade there.

4.—Captain Parker received orders to move and for all our horses

to be given up to bring on the pontoons.

5.—This order countermanded. Lieuts. Palliser & Bloomfield

dined with us.

6.—An order came for our Brigade to move next morning. Employed all day getting things in readiness to march. Very violent rain.

7.—Marched from our cantonments (Covilhã) to Casteleiro, 4 leagues. Rain every yard on the march, but got safe in about ½ before 7 p.m. with 2 wheels minus, 2 carriages upset, and one perch pole split. About 8 p.m. got a mutton chop, a glass of grog, and smoaked a segar and then turned in.

8.—Started at 6 o Clock for Sabugal. On our arrival we found instructions for Captain Cleves & myself with all our horses to

Lieut.-Colonel George Bulteel Fisher (677), R.A.
 The 1st Hussar Regiment, King's German Legion.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> John Bloomfield (1516) belonged to Captain A. Bredin's company of the 8th Battalion, R.A., stationed at Lisbon. He is shown in the Muster Roll of April, 1813, as being "on command."

May 8-13, 1813. Portugal. Sabugal to Pedrogão.

proceed without loss of time towards Castello Branco, to meet the Pontoon train, & get them (with the assistance of Captain Cairnes's horses) up the country as quick as possible. Having arranged everything we set off about 5 p.m. to make Meimão, which we accomplished this night with some difficulty, the roads being so very bad from the heavy rains; about ½ past 11 we had all our horses in stables & plenty of green forage. We then went & got something to eat ourselves & got to bed about 2 on the morning of the

9 (SUNDAY), when we again moved at 7 for Pedrogão where wearrived safe, having made one halt to feed our horses. Captain Cairnes also came in here with his horses. Pedrogão I found very much improved since I was last in it (15 June 1812) the inhabitants having repaired several houses very nicely, & put roofs to several

others.

10.-Marched at 5 o Cl. towards Castello Branco. Near Lardosa met the Pontoon train, consisting of 35 boats, besides forge carriages, store do., & others of different descriptions. Captain Boteler 1 of R.E. who had command of them dined with us & gave everything to Captain Cleves. Ordered to march at 5 in the morning, with the

ist Brigade to Pedrogão.

11.-Moved off with 17 carriages with pontoons. I had the misfortune to break an axletree—a wheel—upset one pontoon—& several trifling accidents with the harness. I however got safe in, and encamped about 4 o Cl. p.m. having been 12 hours going 4 leagues. By the time I had made arrangements respecting shoeing of the horses, repairing of wheels, carriages, harness, &c., &c., and seen my horses fed, it was 8 o Cl. 1 then got a little soup and bouillé, a glass of grog, & lay down on my bed for the night. The staff of General Sir Thomas Graham<sup>2</sup> passed us on the road this morning. I never (I may almost venture to say) experienced such a day of labour and fatigue.

12.—Moved about \frac{1}{2} league in front of Meimão. From the heavy rains the roads were so very bad that we were obliged to leave several carriages in the road during the night, and even then did not get into camp before 1 past 7, and was forced to sleep on the ground

in our cloaks not having our tents with us.

13.—Did not get off our encamping ground before 9 o Cl. in consequence of having so many repairs to make. Went a league to the rear to bring on the pontoons that had been left behind, which I got safe up after being obliged to mend the roads almost every 500 yards.

The diary ends abruptly. Hough left the company in December, 1813, on being promoted to the rank of First Lieutenant. Hough's

spelling has been preserved throughout the diary.—Ed.]

1 2nd Captain Richard Boteler, Royal Engineers.

<sup>2</sup> Graham had gone to England on account of ill-health in July, 1812, but returned to the Peninsula in 1813, reaching Lisbon on April 20th. He was now evidently on his way to the front to rejoin the army, and to resume command of the 1st Division.

## THE VIA DOLOROSA OF THE SOLDIER.

By GUY N. STEPHEN, M.R.C.S. Eng., D.P.H. Lond., Late Foreign Office and Colonial Office Medical Services, Temp. Lieut.-Colonel, R.A.M.C.

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IF there is nothing in a name, there is certainly something in a title. In the case, for instance, of a chapter dealing with one item of a many-sided subject it may be a useful reminder, both to writer and reader, of the objective directly in view.

This is why the words at the head of this page have been chosen. The general military value of an efficient medical department has been so far recognized that the collection of the wounded and the arrangements for their removal and treatment have become merely a section of the duties of the Royal Army Medical Corps and of the Army Medical Staff by which that corps is controlled.

Nevertheless, they remain a very important part, alike from the point of view of individuals and of Army commanders. The former demand that the wounded soldier shall be given as good a chance of recovery as possible, and the latter cannot afford to have the morale of their troops depressed by the sight of unheeded suffering, or their front lines encumbered by ineffective men.

Consequently it is worth while to endeavour to show to what extent and by what precise means the needs indicated have been met in France and Flanders.

To deal with both questions in general terms would be easy. To suggest the degree of success obtained it would suffice to point to certain well-known facts: (a) Within forty-eight hours of any big engagement hundreds of men who have taken part in it can be seen leaving Charing Cross Station on their way to complete their treatment in hospitals in their own country, if not near their homes; (b) Almost in every dispatch published since the beginning of the war there has been some reference to the excellence of the work of the Medical Sérvice; (c) On the occasion of the advance in July the Commander-in-Chief went so far as to issue on the subject a special order of the day. It left no room for doubt as to his satisfaction with the way in which the medical needs of the situation had been met both from a military and a medical point of view.

Similarly, in regard to the means employed, it would almost suffice, in the case of an article written for a professional journal, to indicate that in their foundation principles they are the same as those familiar to several generations of soldiers, as also of such sailors as have taken part in land operations.

It is true that the means have been cleverly modified and remodified to meet the needs of a constantly siege-like but never stationary warfare, and that numerous opportunities for improving and speeding up the machine have been made or seized. Still the underlying principles have not been altered. They are those described with some fullness in Part II. of the well-known Field Service Regulations, and with still greater fullness in the training manual of the R.A.M.C.—a book which in several places exhibits an almost uncanny prescience of conditions that have since arisen.

....

In accordance with those principles all the medical units concerned in the general task of dealing with casualties are distributed each according to its direct purpose, in one or other of three imaginary zones. The first of these is a triangle with its base facing the enemy front, while its apex joins the second zone, a narrow band which connects it with the third zone: this latter, too, is triangular, but its apex points upwards, not downwards.

Along the base line of the first triangle, or collecting zone, lie the regimental aid-posts; a little farther back the advanced dressing stations of the field ambulances; still further back the main dressing stations or headquarters of these same ambulances; and at the apex a casualty clearing station or field hospital. Here begins the narrow second or evacuating zone along which run the hospital trains. In it, too, may perhaps be found a stationary hospital or two for cases which cannot be sent any further. In the third or distributing zone are the general and other hospitals among which the wounded are distributed to remain till cured. It is a big zone, which, in the present war, lies partly along the coast, partly overseas in Great Britain.

This is a description which, mutatis mutandis, could have been applied to the arrangements in almost any war during the last three or four decades; and to bring it up to date as a description of the skeleton system of those in the present war it would merely be necessary to add that the previous existing facilities for dealing with the wounded have been increased by the addition of a new unit. This is one which enables the Medical Service of the Army to keep the wounded continuously in its own immediate charge from the beginning of their Via Dolorosa to the moment when they are safely installed in the hospitals where they are finally to be treated.

In other words, a gap which, very much against the will of the Medical Service and very much to the detriment of the wounded, formerly existed in the arrangements has now been filled.

But to deal in detail with the two questions raised would be a

much more difficult matter; and this for several reasons.

Changeless in its character as the war has seemed, there have really been several quite distinct phases, and the medical arrangements have varied accordingly.

Alike as seem all sections at the front when mentioned in daily communiqués, they really differ so greatly as to necessitate quite different medical dispositions.

Identical as are the names of all medical units of equivalent purpose, they often cover institutions of quite a different type. So much for the one set of reasons. The other consists in the fact that any reasoned assessment or critical appreciation of the degree to which the varying needs of the situation have been met would be impossible without entering somewhat deeply into the techniques both of medical and military science and the medical history of past wars.

It is clear, therefore, that full treatment of the two questions suggested would involve the writing of a somewhat ambitious volume, and that all that can be attempted in a magazine article is to endeavour to suggest the answers by a description of the units that handle a wounded man during the course of his progress from the place at which he falls to that in which he receives his final treatment. This progress is described in the title of this article as the *Via Dolorosa* of the soldier, and it happily may be said forthwith that the adjective used is much less appropriate than it would have been in any previous war.

#### THE FRONT LINE.

In this war it is not necessary to be in a battle to become a battle

casualty.

Many a man has achieved this feat in some sunny spot where nothing has seemed likely to disturb the peace but the clucking of some exultant hen; and many another at a moment when a shattering of faith in the waterproof seller seemed the only thing to be feared.

It is only necessary to be at the front, and "the front" in Flanders

and France is a very indeterminate area.

For the purpose of giving a visitor a thrill, it begins at any spot which the enemy, if extravagantly inclined in the matter of ammunition, can reach with his long range guns. For housekeeping purposes, so to speak, it begins at the "dumps," where the Army Service Corps lays down its useful burdens, to be picked up in due course by the horse transport of battalions and of other units.

For reserve and supporting troops, it is anywhere between their own and the nearest fire trench; and for the occupants of the latter it is anywhere "over the top" and as far beyond the opposite trenches

as the enemy will allow them to get.

The Via Dolorosa of the soldier may commence at any of the levels of the front just described, but it is only exceptionally that it does so in either of the first two. It is the other three levels that supply all but a fraction of the casualties, and unless an actual advance is in progress their proportionate contributions are much more nearly equal than might be expected.

There are times, both by night and by day, when those going up from the level of the "dumps" breathe a sigh of relief when they reach

the reserve trenches.

There are others, when the men in these latter have reason to envy the position of those in the fire trenches themselves; for, when in doubt as to the intentions of the enemy, "strafing" his second and third line trenches is a favourite way of soothing any symptoms of unrest.

Still, numerous as are the ways of becoming a casualty, it is preferable for the purpose of this article to take the case of a man hit in a fire

trench or out in front of it. It is trench warfare that up to date has furnished the bulk of our casualties, and the special arrangements necessitated by rapid advances can be considered incidentally.

#### OUT IN FRONT.

It is a rule—in this war—for every man to carry in the skirt of his tunic a field dressing wrapped in a waterproof cover; and it is this dressing that will be applied in the first instance to a man wounded in, or in front of, the trenches. It may be applied by the man himself, but is more likely to be applied by one of the trained orderlies distributed along the trench by the medical officer in charge of the battalion occupying it. The man may also be seen by such medical officer himself, and will certainly be so if the wound is at all severe or a large bone has been broken. To secure his attendance nothing is required beyond telephoning a message to him at the battalion headquarters, which are likely to be a few hundred yards in the rear.

The knowledge that they will receive highly skilled attention if required is a great encouragement to the men, so battalion medical officers habitually keep themselves well en evidence; that is to say, they visit the fire trenches as often as possible. But how much of their time they spend there depends on circumstances. When the approaches to the fire trenches from battalion headquarters, or the battalion aid-post, are bad, they are not allowed to go up unless they have some definite duty to perform. Superfluous risks must not be run: it takes practically six years to make even a junior medical officer, and in the best of circumstances more of them are bound to figure in the casualty lists than can easily be replaced.

The first aid dressing applied, the patient is probably given a dose of morphia, though there is generally much less necessity for doing so than might be expected. Provided that any broken bone be kept at rest, the majority of even very extensive wounds seem to cause very little pain until many hours are past, if even then.

#### THE REGIMENTAL AID-POST.

Whether the soldier is wounded in the fire trench or out in front, or receives attention immediately or not for some little time, the next step taken, so soon as the first aid dressing has been applied, is to remove him to the regimental aid-post as soon as this is reasonably possible. It is not always possible forthwith for the same reason that may prevent a medical officer moving freely between his station and the fire trench; namely, that it has been found impracticable in the section of the line concerned to establish any communication with the fire trench that can be used otherwise than with grave risk, except under cover of darkness. This is oftener the case than might perhaps be expected, for, apart from other reasons, our troops in many parts of the line have hitherto often had to occupy positions lying below the level of the German trenches and in waterlogged ground.

If the patient himself cannot be moved, and the case is at all severe, the medical officer is certain to come up himself and take any further steps necessary. These will include the application of any special splint or dressing that may be required and placing the patient in such a position that he is protected from the elements and is not likely to be jarred accidentally by a man moving along the trench. In very wet trenches it is a common practice to contrive a bed out of a trench floor board placed on the fire step, the whole being covered with blankets and a ground sheet.

In such cases patient and bed are, as soon as darkness arrives, lifted over the parados and received by waiting stretcher bearers who

then make their way to the regimental aid-post.

These units always have certain features in common. They provide means for dressing a wound and splinting a fracture in a satisfactory way, giving an anti-tetanic injection and a warm drink. Otherwise they vary greatly. Some are represented by a deep and covered-in section of a trench; some by the cellar of a collapsed cottage; others by a real dug-out with a steel and sandbag roof; or, in the case of a rapid advance, by nothing perhaps but a natural or shell-created depression in the ground, sufficiently deep to secure more or less protection from anything but a direct hit.

In such aid-posts the patient, whether he reaches them soon after he has been wounded or not for a long time, receives any further treatment or attention required, and then, after having a label attached to him, he is ready to start on the second stage of his journey.

#### THE ADVANCED DRESSING STATION.

When the moment comes for the wounded man to leave the first aid-post he says good-bye to his regiment, for he is at once handed over to a divisional unit, namely, a field ambulance. Sometimes a stretcher squad is habitually posted at the aid-post by the Commanding Officer of the field ambulance concerned in order to be ready to remove forthwith any men who have been brought into the post and have there received the first aid attentions required. But if not, a party comes up either in response to a telephone or other call or at some pre-arranged hour. In any case it is a field ambulance party which is in charge of the patient during the next stage of his journey, and it ends at a field ambulance advanced dressing station.

How long this stage takes and the means employed to complete it necessarily vary according to the character of the section of the front concerned, as also with the incidence of circumstances such as the time of day, the state of the weather, and whether things are fairly

quiet or otherwise from a fighting point of view.

In some parts of the line where the ground is hilly or the German trenches lie below the level of our own, the advanced dressing stations may lie close to the battalion aid-posts. In others a couple of miles or more may separate them, and to get from one to the other means either going over ground dangerously exposed to the fire of machine-gun, shell-fire, and sniping, or traversing an immensely long winding

communication trench whose footboards are always more or less slippery and at places are often submerged a foot or more deep in water.

The way in which the patient is carried also varies. If the ground be rough his stretcher must be carried by hand throughout. If fairly smooth, it can be put on a wheeled carrier. It may happen that, although the actual distance between the first aid-post and the advanced dressing station is long, the distance for which the patient has to be carried by hand or on a two-wheeled stretcher carrier, is short, because the path leads to some place on a road to which a horse or other ambulance can be brought with reasonable safety.

There are also parts of the line at which, from a short distance behind the trenches, trolly lines run to the rear. They are primarily intended only for bringing up ammunition and like supplies, but where they exist they are generally provided with low trucks, on which loaded stretchers can be carried as well. Similarly, in some long established parts of the line arrangements have been made for trollies to run along part of the communication trench itself. But these are few; a commoner arrangement when any kind of mechanical transport below the surface of the ground is possible is an overhead cradle running along a steel wire rope.

As for the advanced dressing station itself, it may possibly be in the underground part of a church or other large building still tottering in some village whose existence has not yet become a mere memory. But it is much more likely to be of precisely the same type

as the regimental aid-posts that it serves.

It habitually, however, affords more accommodation, and is commonly better protected from shell-fire, since the engineers have a better

chance of working on it.

Almost always, too, it lies on a road of some sort, and whenever possible the engineers arrange hard by a shelter in which a small ambulance car can be kept. If this can be done the advanced dressing station concerned prides itself on its perfections, since it is in a position both to save the labour of the stretcher-bearers on their way down to it from the regimental aid-posts, and also to send straight off to a casualty clearing station a man with an abdominal or other very serious wound, in whose case a big operation, if promptly performed in suitable surroundings, and followed by first-class nursing, may spell all the difference between life and death.

Another ambition is to provide some place in which a certain number of seriously wounded men, who cannot be sent on forthwith, can be put aside out of the general bustle and lie undisturbed by noise. Absence of noise, however, is impossible unless the advanced dressing station happens to own a cellar or a dug-out so deep or so far removed from the main entry that the boom of a bursting shell or the crash of a near-by gun cannot reach it; for one noise or the other is perfectly certain to pervade the general atmosphere quite apart from that created by its own work. An advanced dressing station likes to be on a road, in order that it may send its patients quickly down. And roads of any sort at the front are none too common.

The other aims of a Commanding Officer of an advanced dressing station are limited for the most part to endeavouring to arrange that light cases can be kept apart from severe cases, and that there is both a way in and a way out. If quick work is to be done the two streams of patients must not meet.

Finally, he must take care to be provided with a gas lock for all apertures leading into any place in which he proposes to put any helpless patients. For the possibility of having at a moment's notice to protect their patients and themselves against a gas attack is one of the sporting chances of the lives of medical officers, both at advanced

dressing stations and regimental aid-posts.

Whatever may be the character of its habitation, an advanced dressing station always receives the sick and wounded from at least three battalion aid-posts, and sometimes many more. Consequently it is generally pretty busy even when fighting is not active, and when it is otherwise the staff attached may be almost overwhelmed for days

and nights together.

Its busiest times as a rule, however, are late at night and early in the morning, and at either of these—or for that matter at any time when things are moving—an advanced dressing station at full work is as weird a sight as can be imagined; an orderly disorder, viewed for the most part by the light of an acetylene lamp or by weak sunlight filtering down from an overhead inlet. At times something in the way of an emergency operation may have to be performed, but most of the work consists in overhauling or supplementing any dressings or splints that may have been applied at the battalion aid-posts, special attention being paid to the obviation of risks from hæmorrhage, seeing that patients who require anti-tetanic injections receive them, and serving out hot drinks to those who ask for them. Such steps taken the patient is started on the next stage of his journey as soon as possible.

How soon this will commence depends, as in the case of the two

previous stages, on varying circumstances.

Should the fighting in progress be only of normal trench warfare character, and the advanced dressing station not specially exposed, the wounded man will be sent off again with his companions in one of half a dozen or more waiting ambulances. These will have arrived simultaneously at a time previously arranged according to experience in that part of the line as to the hour by which it is usually possible to complete the clearing of the battalion aid-posts and the preparation of the patients for their next journey.

But often—even if there be sufficient turning room near the advanced dressing station—it is much too dangerous for a string of ambulances to be sent up simultaneously if this can be avoided. In such case the ambulances will come up one by one, with a good interval between them, and the wounded man will be placed in the first that arrives after any attention that he requires has been given to him. The same, too, will be his experience if active fighting is in progress, the ambulances then travelling continuously one by one between the advanced dressing station and the field ambulance headquarters (or

main dressing station), loading and unloading, going down and

returning, without cessation.

Furthermore, whenever the roads leading between the advanced dressing station and its headquarters are habitually subject to shell-fire, the ambulances employed commonly have their sides, tops, and backs covered with shrapnel-proof steel netting in order to protect the

patients from further injury.

Whether the road between the advanced dressing station be dangerous or otherwise, it is certain to be cut up by traffic, if not by old shell holes, so the drivers must be skilled and careful men. When pitch black darkness alternates with flashes from Verrey pistols, gun muzzles, and bursting shells, it takes a good man to keep on the road and a better man still to avoid shaking the patients in the ambulance by driving into ruts. An orderly or a second driver accompanies each car.

#### FIELD AMBULANCE HEADQUARTERS.

The pace is always slow, but, unless the traffic be unusually heavy, half an hour or so usually suffices to complete the journey to the field ambulance headquarters, which will be found established either in a collection of tents in an open field bordering on a high road, or more probably in a building in some still inhabited but more or less

battered village or town.

Here the ambulance will be off-loaded, and probably the first thing the patient will notice is a non-commissioned officer bending over him and looking at his identity disc or regimental tag, and making a swift note of his name and regimental number. Later on, before he leaves again, he will see that there has been tied to a buttonhole of his jacket a waterproof envelope containing a card which indicates through what ambulance he has passed, and conveys information on such points as the character of his wound and any specific treatment carried out, and whether he has received an anti-tetanus injection.

Meanwhile he will have been passed on into a room or tent where a swift diagnosis of his condition will have been made by a medical officer, and at the same time it will have been decided what to do with him. If his wound be very slight, he may be kept at the ambulance in the expectation that in a few days he will be fit to send to the divisional rest camp and thence back to his unit again. He will also be kept back if an emergency operation of some sort is deemed necessary, or if he is so exhausted that further transport, at least for some hours, seems very undesirable. On the other hand, if none of these decisions be reached he will be passed on to a tent or room to await the beginning of the next stage of his journey, meantime being kept warm and, if necessary, fed.

It may also happen that, though the ambulance conveying him calls at the field ambulance headquarters, its stay there is only momentary, and he will not be off-loaded at all. This is certain to be the case if he has been sent down from the advanced dressing station in a special ambulance. A medical officer will then mount the ambulance, and if he deems the patient's condition fairly satisfactory despite

his wound, he will direct the orderly in charge to take him on forthwith, either to the nearest casualty clearing station, or to some other unit where special arrangements have been made for abdominal and allied work.

The field ambulance headquarters, in short, is mainly a sifting and recording unit, but acts also as a dressing and emergency operation station, or even as a short-stay hospital when the advanced dressing stations connected with it are so pressed that some of the wounded passing through them are likely to benefit by receiving further attention at the earliest possible moment.

Such occasions only arise, however, when very active fighting or an advance is in progress, and it is then common to break up the headquarters work into two divisions established in different localities, one dealing with sitting cases—commonly known as "walkers"—and the other with stretcher cases—commonly known as

"lyers."

A corresponding arrangement is also made in like circumstances at places nearer the actual fighting; collecting posts to which slightly wounded men as well as stragglers can find their way, being established in addition to advanced dressing stations.

#### THE MOTOR AMBULANCE CONVOY.

The next, or fourth, stage of a wounded man's journey is that which takes him altogether out of the fighting area and lands him at a hospital at the head of the lines of communication, or, in other words, at a spot where the collecting and evacuating zones meet.

In all previous wars it was this part of a wounded man's journey which best justified the title "Via Dolorosa," for at this stage he used to pass for a time out of the hands of the medical department, and the latter could do little to secure his well-being and comfort.

The field ambulances attached to the divisions in action had their horse-drawn vehicles, but these were all busy bringing down the wounded from the regimental aid-posts to the advanced dressing stations and field ambulance headquarters. They could not be sent eight, ten, or twenty miles back to the field hospitals, casualty clearing stations, or whatever the next medical unit might be called, and the Royal Army Medical Corps was given no vehicles of its own to transport its patients over the gap intervening between the fighting army and the lines of communication.

Consequently the Royal Army Medical Corps had to do the best it could, and this best consisted in improvising ambulances out of whatever country carts it could manage to commandeer, and arranging with the wagons of ammunition and general supply columns to call at the field ambulances when they had off-loaded and load up again with

wounded on their way to the supply points of railheads.

<sup>1&</sup>quot; Walkers" are men whose wounds are of such a kind that they can easily either make their way to the rear on their own legs or can sit up in the interior of an ambulance or any other vehicle available for their transport.

Happily this hiatus in the arrangements no longer exists, and has not existed for approximately two years. Practically speaking active operations for the British Army did not begin till after the third week of August, 1914, and for the next few weeks rear and front were so mixed that the Director of Medical Services of the original Expeditionary Force had little gap to fill. He could load his trains—when he could get them—direct from his field ambulances, and thus send off the wounded forthwith to his constantly moving base hospitals.

He had to contend with immense difficulties, but the gap in question was at this time hardly one of them. It arose, however, a little later, when the Aisne line was formed, but he managed to meet it to a large extent by securing offers of private and other motor cars transformed into ambulances or otherwise for the transport of his wounded to such

railheads as had then been established, or elsewhere.

Then came the transfer of the line of the British Army to the Ypres front, and a week or two later the arrival in France of the Director-General of Medical Services. By this time a considerable number of motor ambulances had been secured from one source and another, and, as their value in existing conditions had been proved, the Director-General obtained the permission of the Commander-in-Chief and the War Office to replace seven of the horse-drawn vehicles of each field ambulance by auto motor cats, and to add definitely to the Royal Army Medical Corps a new type of unit called a Motor Ambulance Convoy.

The earliest of these were made up of the cars already to hand (including a British Red Cross contingent which, having already done good work, was given the status of No. 2 M.A.C.), and their number was steadily increased pari passu with the growth of the Army in France. A convoy consists of fifty cars, which as a rule work in three sections under medical officers. At first they were Army units, but now each corps has been given its own convoy, the Deputy Director Medical Services of such corps disposing of his cars according to the needs of the moment.

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Their value to the Army is very great, for they can be used to hasten the work of the advanced dressing stations, or to transport the wounded from the headquarters of field ambulances to casualty clearing stations. The latter is their usual work.

A later annexe to this Royal Army Medical Corps special transport is a series of chars-a-bancs of precisely the same type as those employed in England for cheap trips round about seaside towns. They are used for transport of lightly wounded men wherever it may be desired to send them. This may be sometimes to a casualty clearing station, sometimes to a special camp at the front, sometimes even to a camp in the distributing area.

The journeys undertaken in the latter case are not necessarily long. Theoretically, of course, the collecting and distributing zones are widely separated from one another by the evacuating zone, but in France the three military zones to which they roughly correspond, namely, the Front, the Lines of Communication, and the Base, some-

times interdigitate so closely that the first and third zones of the medical

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This fact, coupled with the circumstance that the so-called "rail-heads" are merely stations on permanent lines of railway running at various distances behind a very extensive front, obscures the existence of the skeleton system described on page 882 of this article, as underlying the medical arrangements of the present and all recent wars.

on here and villages near the front, but now habitable towns had

#### THE CASUALTY CLEARING STATION.

When the wounded man has reached a casualty clearing station his Via Dolorosa is almost at an end; quite at an end as compared with that of a sick or wounded soldier in any previous war. For now the wounded soldier finds himself in an atmosphere totally different to that which he has just left, and in surroundings which, though not suggestive of peace, are in fact—if his wound be at all serious—precisely those of peace times in all but external appearances.

For a casualty clearing station is not, as its name might suggest, an organized collecting post on a large scale—a wayside caravanseri for sick and wounded soldiers—but in some respects one of the most notable developments of this war. Whatever the nature of its habitation—and this, as will be seen, varies greatly—it unites the essential features of an advanced dressing station and of a field ambulance head-quarters with the operating and nursing arrangements of a civil hospital of the most up to date kind.

These casualty clearing stations form a kind of fringe along the front, sometimes within five or six miles of the firing line, sometimes

ten or more miles back.

Their precise distance is of little importance, the main desideratum being that they should be accessible by different roads from several sections of the front and that these roads shall be good. To a patient travelling over a good road it makes little difference whether his journey lasts a quarter of an hour longer or a quarter of an hour less. Indeed, if the quarter of an hour more (or at motor ambulance pace, say, another four miles) meant getting away from the sound of the guns, the extra distance would almost be worth adding on this account alone. For curiously enough the one thing that the wounded soldier seems to resent, both physically and mentally, is the sound of shells or guns when he has reached a hospital.

Whatever the distance from the actual front, the casualty clearing stations are generally placed in pairs, so that while one is busy receiving patients and dealing with the most urgent among them, the other may complete the task of handling those whom it has received during the previous eight hour or twenty-four hour period, or whatever it

may be.

Furthermore, they are always placed if possible near some nominal railhead, that is to say, near a station on some permanent line of railway; while if it be inevitable that they should be placed elsewhere a branch line is laid as near to their doors as it can be got.

Such dispositions are desirable not only in order that the casualty clearing station may be kept supplied with ease with all that it requires, but also in order that it may be possible for the patients, after any operations required have been performed, to be placed on a hospital train almost at its doors.

As has been said, their habitations vary greatly. In the early days they were usually schools, convents, and other large buildings in towns and villages near the front, but now habitable towns both near the front and containing suitable buildings are not sufficiently numerous. Hence the habitations of the majority perhaps of casualty clearing stations are constructed ad hoc. In other words, they consist either of tents with one or two wooden buildings erected for surgical or other special purposes, or entirely of huts of precisely the same character as those used for stationary and general hospitals at the bases in France, and for military general hospitals in Great Britain.

It is the latter plan that is usually adopted when it is foreseen that the site occupied is certain to be useful for a long time, or that it will be a good site for a base hospital as soon as a big advance in that part of the line has taken place.

Whatever the nature of their habitations may be the accommodation provided at all casualty clearing stations is much the same in respect of general purposes, though not in extent.

The common aims of all of them are to keep the streams of wounded moving as steadily and smoothly as possible: light cases being separated from severe; those which require redressing from those which can be sent on to a base as soon as a hospital train arrives; those which must go to the operation ante-room, to await operation, and thence to the wards, from those which must be placed in the wards forthwith for some other reason than the performance of an operation.

The operation room has all the annexes usual in permanent civil hospitals of great towns, and there are generally at least four tables which, when anything like serious fighting is in progress, are certain to be constantly at work night and day. The beds in the wards, whether these be in tents or huts or in transformed buildings, are of much the same character as those seen in peace-time hospitals, and around them constantly flit the red-caped sisters of Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service and its reserves. There is also in some of them a special ward or set of beds in which are placed and treated cases that for the time being can neither be moved on nor submitted to operation. These wards are sometimes known as "resurrection wards," and the treatment adopted is commonly so successful that the title is not unjustified.

The operating staffs of all these casualty clearing stations are firstclass surgeons, and every man, whatever his particular work may be, is carefully chosen for it. The perfect working of a casualty clearing station is a matter of the greatest importance. The quicker it does its work the quicker the front can be cleared and the greater the proportion of all desirable operations that it can perform, whether these be small or great, the better will be the condition in which the wounded as a whole will arrive at the base hospitals where they either receive their final treatment or else are got ready to be sent overseas for treatment in some home hospital.

As in the case of the base hospitals, all the casualty clearing stations in any given section of the general front are visited daily or at other frequent intervals by some consulting surgeon, of senior rank, who is responsible for their working from a strictly professional point of view, and is generally a man well known in civil life.

Again, just as in the case of base hospitals, there is great rivalry between casualty clearing stations. Each desires to earn the reputation of being "it" in respect of the skilled celerity with which it deals with each arriving convoy, the excellence of the reports received as to the condition of its patients on their arrival at the bases, the lowness of its death rate, and also in respect of the provision of well-built paths about the hospital grounds and the cunningness of its arrangements for speeding up and perfecting its general machinery.

An average casualty clearing station, in short, is never really at rest, even though the work it may be doing at the moment is not of a purely professional kind; and when the front is at all active it

commonly supplies a striking picture.

A wave of ambulances arrives, and within an hour or two the flood of patients they bring has resolved itself into two or three trim wards which look as though their occupants had been there for days; into two or three marquees whose floors are closely covered with stretchers bearing men soundly asleep or quietly conversing while awaiting evacuation; and into scattered groups of men, some capless and muddy, some wearing helmets and equally muddy, strolling about the hospital grounds drinking cups of coffee, eating sandwiches, smoking, chatting, and exchanging experiences, and all with bandaged heads or arms or lame; but all cheery and all totally indifferent to the state of the weather unless it be actually pelting with rain.

Nothing, in fact, better brings home both the pitiful and the splendid sides of this war than the sight of a casualty clearing station on a fairly rainless day an hour or two after the arrival of a convoy.

The stay of the wounded man at the casualty clearing station may be anything from a couple of hours to a couple of weeks, according to the condition in which he has arrived and the nature of the operation, if any, to which he is then submitted.

The majority of operations undertaken at a casualty clearing station fall into two classes: those which may or may not have to be followed by others at a later date but meantime render it safe for a patient to proceed on a journey of uncertain length; those necessitated by the existence of an abdominal or other wound of a kind formerly regarded as almost inevitably fatal. The latter are very often successful.

#### HOSPITAL BARGES AND TRAINS.

In certain parts of the line the next stage of the wounded man's journey may be passed in a hospital barge, this taking him either straight down to a sea port whence he will be transhipped to England,

or disembarking him at an advanced base where a general or other hospital has been established.

These hospital barges closely resemble the large sailing barges to be seen on the Thames and are, in fact, barges ordinarily used on the Flemish canals, transformed to their present use by gutting their interiors and re-lining them with boarded floors and walls. The ends of the vessel are partitioned off to afford such accommodation as a dispensary, a kitchen, stores, baths, sleeping berths for the staff, and a place for an electrical plant to drive air fans and produce electric light. The centre provides a 30-bed ward that looks very much like an ordinary shore hospital ward and is fitted up accordingly. The different sections of the overhead deck can be lifted off, and in one of these is a hand lift by means of which the stretchers of the incoming patients are lowered into the ward. There is also provision for the performance of operations in case of necessity.

The staff consists of a surgeon, two nursing sisters, a certain number of nursing and general service orderlies, a sergeant dispenser, a cook, and a couple of barge men drawn from a specially enlisted section of the Royal Engineers known as the "Inland Water Transport Corps." Each barge has a tug attached to it and travels by day at the rate of about four miles an hour. Sometimes they travel in pairs, one surgeon then looking after both of them.

The patients carried in these barges are usually any particular chest wound or abdominal case for which absolute avoidance of movement is desirable; and they serve their purpose well.

It is much more probable, however, that the wounded man will be sent down to the base in an ambulance train, his embarkation thereon being superintended by an officer who, if his case is one of gravity, will see that he is placed in a central section of the train and thus throughout the journey be under constant observation of the medical officers in charge. A few of these trains are still made up of transformed passenger saloon and other carriages fitted with open berths and various like appliances; but the majority are specially built corridor trains presenting a vista of a narrow ward, 100 or more yards long with three tiers of berths on either side. These latter trains sound the best and look the best, but among medical officers who spend their lives on trains there is some difference of opinion as to whether the made-up or specially built hospital train is really preferable.

The number of patients they carry may be anything from 300 to 500, according as whether the majority of the cases embarked must be kept lying down or may be allowed to sit up. The duration of a train run may vary between six and eighteen hours, but, as the trains are completely equipped with all the ordinary provisions of a ward unit in a civil hospital and also with an operating room which can be used with ease by running the train into a siding, the patients could be kept upon them if required for several days in succession. Each train carries as a rule three medical officers, three nursing sisters, two or more cooks, and a large number of nursing and other orderlies. An ambulance train in short is an entirely self-dependent unit.

As for the degree of comfort afforded, a suggestive point is that, except when awakened for feeding or other purposes, most of the patients sleep as a rule from beginning to end of the journey. In any case the trains are certainly designed so as to secure the maximum degree of comfort possible. The beds are good, all seats are padded, and the various compartments are duly warmed and lighted by electricity. Furthermore, the carriages are almost invariably mounted on bogey sub-carriages, while the pace is not allowed to exceed about twelve miles an hour, and the engine drivers are specially selected men. Consequently the patients are rarely shaken or jolted.

The control of the ambulance train service is the work of a special department of the Director-General's staff, and represents a by no

means light undertaking.

The officer in charge of it has to deal both with the French authorities and the railway branch of the Royal Engineers, and his first task is to contrive that a train shall always arrive at a railhead in time to take over the patients from the casualty clearing stations stationed thereat, as soon as they are ready for evacuation. Furthermore, he must endeavour to arrange with the Director of Railways staff to do his, however much traffic there may be on this particular part of the line at the moment, and despite the requirements of supply, ammunition, and troop trains.

His second task is to secure that when hospital trains arrive at a given point on their way down from the front they are duly switched off in the direction of the base which at the moment is best capable of

dealing with a fresh inrush of patients.

His third is to ensure that all his trains are maintained in thoroughly good order from an engineering point of view, and are also kept properly equipped in the matter of personnel and all kinds of supplies. He even has to arrrange for the washing of the linen used on them during each journey. Linen washing is a matter which never concerns the medical staffs of civil hospitals, but is a constant source of worry to Commanding Officers of all hospitals in France, whether these be at the base or at the front.

### ben to be the later The Base Hospital.

When his train arrives at its destination the wounded man, if awake, may notice that there is a short conference between the medical officer of the train and another Royal Army Medical Corps officer waiting on the platform, during which various papers are handed over from one to the other. This done, the wounded man and his companions are either lifted or helped out of the train, according as whether they are "lyers" or "sitters."

If the former they are carried on stretchers to the exit door of the station, while the "sitters," unless they are able to walk quite freely, sit on low trolleys and are pushed along to the same place. Arrived at the exit door, they are carried, or directed, to one or other of a row of waiting ambulances and chars-a-bancs (or sometimes tramway cars), all bearing labels indicative of the hospitals at which they are to

deliver the patients loaded on them. The decision as to the hospital to which the wounded man shall be sent is given by a Royal Army Medical Corps officer, who stands at the doorway and makes a rapid scrutiny of each patient's label or field medical card. The stretchers are carried by squads of men drawn from permanent base details, that is to say, men found no longer fit for service at the front, who have been specially trained in the work.

In the early days of the war this used to be done in certain cases by men supplied and trained before the war by the St. John Ambulance Association, and they did it so well that, when it became clear that these men were of too fine physique not to join the fighting forces, there were gloomy anticipations as to the result of their departure. Fortunately they have proved unjustified, for the present arrangement is found to work admirably.

The hospital to which the wounded man is directed to be taken will vary with the exact nature of his wound, for though all the base hospitals are fitted to receive any kind of patient, most of them cater in particular for some special type of cases. Some, for instance, deal mainly with head cases, others with chest, face, or fracture cases.

This fact, however, does not affect the general equipment of the hospital, or even its work except in a minor degree, for it is characteristic of this war that wounds are seldom single. Consequently a head case may also be a leg fracture case, an eye case a chest case, and so on throughout a varying series of possible combinations. Still less does the same fact affect the structure of the hospital itself.

In the early days most of the base hospitals were in permanent buildings rearranged for the purpose, but though casino hospitals and hotel hospitals still exist, and are more completely rearranged than ever, the majority of base hospitals now consist of huts. These hutted hospitals are arranged in camps which lie outside the limits of the towns of which they nominally form a part, and are in some bases so large as to rival in size—as invariably in sanitary arrangements—the townships near which they stand. In a few hospital camps marquees as well as huts are used, but even when this is the case they are lighted, as are the camps as a whole, by electricity, and duly warmed. These hospitals, in short, are so well arranged and fulfil all medical and surgical needs so excellently that the professional papers are already beginning to discuss the question of whether in future it can be considered legitimate to sink the funds of voluntary hospitals in brick and stone structures of the kind hitherto familiar.

To whatever hospital the wounded man is assigned he will therein find himself under the care of a surgical and nursing staff of the same class as those who looked after him when he was in the casualty clearing station, and if any operation be forthwith considered desirable it will be duly performed. Meantime, it will be decided whether he shall be sent home or kept for treatment where he is, at any rate for some time.

The latter conclusion will be reached if it is thought that he will be practically fit for duty again in about three weeks; or, on the other hand, that it is better for him that he should not be moved at present however much he may wish to be sent home.

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The hour and the day on which the wounded man can commence his next journey will depend a good deal on how many other like men are ready for transfer from his own or other hospitals at the same base. Sooner or later, however, he will suddenly realize that "Blighty," hitherto a mere symbol and a dream, has become a rapidly approaching reality. A senior medical officer has inspected him; a special tally has been put on his bed rail; a splint more suitable for transport has been applied, perhaps, to his injured limb; he has been clad in warmer garments than his ordinary bed attire; and at least one person has thrown him a passing congratulation. His actual departure is a repetition backwards of the mode of his arrival. Instead of his name being taken down in the reception room of the hospital and his being assigned to a certain ward, the medical officer on duty therein makes a rapid survey to see that he has been properly prepared for his journey, ticks his name off an already compiled list, and nods to the bearers to load him on the waiting ambulance.

If the base at which he has been treated is at a considerable distance from any port, a second but short journey in an ambulance train may intervene between his departure from the hospital and his arrival at the quayside. Otherwise he will reach the latter in the

ambulance car which has picked him up at his hospital.

Arrived there he is quickly off-loaded and carried up a gangway on to the deck where the R.A.M.C. officer in charge will direct in what part of the ship he shall be placed. This will be in a ward fitted with swing cots closely resembling ordinary hospital beds, if his case requires special attention throughout the sea passage, or one fitted with tiers of open-ended berths if he is an ordinary stretcher case.

If, on the other hand, he is a "walker" it will be a deck shelter, where he is free to sit about, smoke, or do whatever else he pleases, including taking a meal, as soon as, with the assistance of an orderly, he has got himself fitted up with a life-belt.

He is not likely to be sea-sick as hospital ships are good sea boats and avoid rough crossings whenever possible. Furthermore, the passage is so short that those in the wards have only just time to realize that they are being treated exactly as if they were still on shore, by the sisters and surgeons on board.

A hospital ship, in fact, is rather a cheerful institution, and those on deck have commonly ample strength and spirits to exchange a cheer or hand-wave salutation with the khaki-clad occupants of any ship passing in the opposite direction.

However short or long the passage may be, it ends in a harbour on whose quayside one or two Royal Army Medical Corps officers are waiting. They have heard by wireless telegraph what number of each class of case to expect, and have caused the corresponding amount of accommodation in the way of ambulance trains to be brought to the dockyard siding.

Here, as on the arrival of the hospital train from the front, there is a short conference between the medical officer of the ship and the

senior disembarkation officer, and this ended, the wounded man is handed over, and thereon ceases to belong to the Expeditionary Force. He is then placed in the train appropriate to his condition, and as soon as this has been filled the last stage of his journey commences.

Throughout this he remains as before under skilled observation, and in a few hours will find himself either in London or in one of the great provincial towns and installed in a hospital which, just as those on the French side of the Channel, specialises more or less in the treatment of the cases represented by the principal injury from which the wounded man is suffering. The latter may be a V.C. hero, or a D.S.O. or a M.C. or a D.C.M., or just one of the thousands of men whose devotion to duty has not secured special recognition, but anyhow, he is "Home," and if he has any luck is also at a place where his personal friends can visit him.

Gratiæ tibi, Domine, et gloria; Et nobis misericordia: Nunc et in horâ mortis nostræ.

This fragment of a Latin chant pens itself spontaneously as an image of the completion of the Via Dolorosa of the wounded man rises to mind. And its aptness does not seem lessened by the fact that of every thousand wounded men who reach Great Britain about gog proceed to recovery.

#### SOME ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

Looking over the foregoing pages, the writer observes that though he has managed, perhaps, to convey an idea of the methods that the R.A.M.C. employs in performing its task in connection with the collection of the wounded and their evacuation and treatment, he has left unnoticed sundry items in the general arrangements which require mention because they contribute in varying degrees to the

success with which the whole task is indisputably performed.

Instances in point are as follows. All the casualty clearing stations in any given section of the front have attached to them not only a surgical consultant but also a physician of corresponding civilian distinction, who gives his advice in respect of any matter or case which represents a medical as well as a surgical problem. There is a similar arrangement at the bases, where also there are stationed consultants in sundry special branches of medicine. Furthermore, if a patient at a casualty clearing station stands in instant need of the attention of a pure specialist, and this latter cannot come up at the moment, the patient is sent down in a special ambulance forthwith.

Also of importance is the work of the bacteriologists and others who endeavour to detect the precise cause of the blood poisoning from which any given patient may be found to be suffering, and to suggest a means of combating it in this and other like cases. Likewise that of the X-ray operators who, both up country and at the bases, help to show where missiles have lodged and the safest way of removing them; and of the hundred and one ordinary officers who each in some particular case are constantly endeavouring to find the best way of setting a fracture or of lessening the drain of a wound on the patient's strength.

Another arrangement which also adds considerably to the chances of the wounded man's recovery is that as he passes from hospital to hospital there pass also notes concerning his previous treatment for the information and guidance of those next responsible for his welfare.

Likewise there are certain arrangements which, though not strictly medical in character, have been made because they are likely to help in the task of keeping up the *morale* of the wounded man, a matter of great importance. If he be in immediate danger his near relatives are allowed to come out to see him, and when at a base hospital he is encouraged to fight his way towards recovery by being kept in touch with his friends at home through an officially recognized woman visitor, who writes his letters for him and acts for the time being the part of a personal friend.

#### THE DEGREE OF SUCCESS.

In regard to the degree of success obtained, this in its military aspects is sufficiently indicated by the three circumstances mentioned

in the fifth paragraph of this article.

In respect of its medical and surgical aspects, it can hardly be discussed in detail without entering into purely technical questions such as are beyond the scope of this article. It must suffice, therefore, to mention that the lowness of the wound mortality rates, as also of the sickness mortality rates, and the extent to which men recover from the most hideous multiple wounds, are in professional circles regarded as remarkable, even by those who have taken no part in bringing these results about.

Finally there is the point of view of the patient himself; in regard to this the writer must content himself by quoting an incident which

throws a certain amount of light on the question.

It was supplied unintentionally—a day or two before these lines were written—by a Canadian soldier who in the stress of his illness lapsed once more into the accent of his earliest home. He had arrived at a base hospital in an excessively battered condition, and for several days seemed totally unconscious of his surroundings. But at length he gave tongue, and his first speech was as follows:—

"Ahv bin in 'orspital at (mentioning a city in Canada) and ahv bin in 'orspital in Lunnon, but this 'ere French 'orspital beats the lot." Why he thought he was in a French hospital could not be

discovered.

The only other light the writer can throw on the subject is in the nature of negative evidence. So far as he is aware, the only criticism ever directed against the medical work in France has been to the effect that it need not involve calling from their private occupations so many civilian practitioners.

Really the strength of the Medical Service in France has always been below the authorized establishment, and the view originates in

the following circumstances:

(1) Among those directly or indirectly interested are a certain number of practitioners who, not finding themselves utilized in the exact way they hoped, consider their abilities wasted; and others who, under illusions as to the nature of military operations, deem that at any time when the wounded are not pouring in by hundreds and thousands the medical men otherwise required ought to be in a position to place their services at the disposition of the general public at home.

(2) The medical organization in France is on so intricate and vast a scale that a man who does not set to work to study the subject deliberately, or whose experience and knowledge are necessarily limited to certain aspects of it, cannot possibly understand the why and wherefore of all the arrangements made.

#### OBITER DICTA.

The original questions proposed for discussion were: To what extent and by what precise means have been met in France (1) the claim of individuals that the wounded soldier shall be given as good a chance of recovery as possible, and (2) the wish of Army Commanders that the morale of their troops shall not be depressed by the sight of unheeded suffering or their front lines encumbered by ineffective men.

These have now been answered so far as the writer is capable of doing so in the space at his disposal. But since the successful working of any piece of machinery or organization depends largely on the quality and number of its component parts, it is necessary that he should add something on this aspect of the general question

likewise.

The components which are either an essential feature of the medical machine in France, or otherwise help to secure its success, fall into

numerous classes.

First comes the wounded soldier himself; he does a great deal because his initial physical condition makes him a splendid patient, and in the vast majority of cases his mental condition is equally favourable to his recovery. Getting wounded is part of the game in which he is engaged, and he is determined not to die if he can awoid it, and meantime to make the best of everything as it comes along. It is an attitude of mind very helpful both to himself and to all those concerned in his treatment. It is, of course, not universal, but the exceptions are rare, and, curiously enough, when they do occur, are usually found among officers. These exceptional patients are usually men whose wounds are not very serious in themselves, but whose naturally nervous temperament has previously been subjected to a long strain.

Next comes the rank and file of the Royal Army Medical Corps who, whatever their previous occupation may have been, do their work with conscientious zeal. That they also do it with courage when required is sufficiently demonstrated by the fact that, even since the beginning of the July advance, over 1,500 of them have suffered the fate of the wounded combatants they were trying to assist.

Next come the members of Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service, increased as it has been by the accession to its ranks

of hundreds of civilian nurses.

They belong to a class which has voluntarily adopted an altruistic form of existence, and is accustomed to long hours of work. In this

war they are having both to the full; furthermore many of them are for the first time in military medical history being intentionally employed in hospitals at the real front.

This step counts for a good deal in achieving success for the work as a whole, and is rendered possible by the existence of another component of the general machinery, namely, the V.A.D. contingent. This in France consists of women of good social class who have both the time and the disposition to forget their previous social existence and to submit themselves to discipline, and devote themselves whole-heartedly to the work of assistant nurses. At first the Army, having before it the tradition of the "pillow smoothers" of the South African War, and a well-grounded prejudice against amateur work, was not disposed to welcome their arrival, but it now realizes that they constitute quite an important cog-wheel. For they arrive already possessed of at least an elementary knowledge of their new occupation, and bring to it, as a rule, both intelligence and steady industry.

A further cog-wheel composed of the same metal, though of minor but still definite importance, is represented by the list of ladies who, either as agents of various societies or as officially recognized private workers, help to keep up the spirits of the patients by visiting them in the afternoon and for the most part spend the rest of their time as assistants in the various canteens run for the benefit of still active soldiers.

Next come the combined British Red Cross Society and St. John Ambulance Association, together with their kindred bodies. Seeing that such hospital treatment as they furnish, and such motor ambulance cars as they contribute to the general stock, would in any case be provided by the Army itself, their activities are to this extent of the kind classed by old theologians as works of supererogation. Nevertheless, they are a true component of the general machinery, since the first-named bodies relieve the Royal Army Medical Corps of all trouble in connection with ambulance transport work at the bases by undertaking it on its behalf and doing it with entire efficiency.

A certain proportion of the motor ambulance cars are driven by women, but the majority of the chauffeurs are men who, being unfit for ordinary service, or over military age, the Army itself could not employ. This is in itself a distinct advantage of the arrangement.

The most important output, however, of this particular component of the general machinery is a form of work of which little is ever heard. All the Red Cross Societies supply newspapers, cigarettes, and other little luxuries for wounded and ailing men, and in addition the two first-named societies jointly maintain up-country stores, whence any Commanding Officer can instantly draw almost any form of hospital equipment that he finds reason to think would be a useful addition to the general outfit of the unit he runs.

The next component is that represented by the general body of civilian practitioners, and the readiness it showed from the very beginning to join the Army in France. It is one of the essential components because, without it the Royal Army Medical Corps could not possibly have been brought up to the necessary strength in executive officers. It is also an additionally effective component, because the

medical men concerned bring to the work the professional experience of civil life, coupled in many instances with the moral assistance of great reputations, and in almost all cases with a readiness to fall in with the spirit of the original corps itself and perform the duties

assigned to them conscientiously and without question.

Finally comes, perhaps, the most important component of all, this being represented by the members of the original Royal Army Medical Corps. They early realized the greatness of the task before them, and that it could not be performed with efficiency unless they set aside a thousand inherited military scruples and preconceptions; and, thanks to this fact, form a framework for the whole organization, which is equally invaluable both from the administrative and executive points of view.

From the foregoing paragraphs it will be clear that the medical machine in France is not only highly complex, but formed of very heterogeneous materials. Neither quality is in itself an advantage, but, in view of the variety and extent of the work to be done, both are

inevitable.

These qualities are, in fact, even more accentuated than the paragraphs indicate; although the great majority of the units that help to build up the machine are staffed from Great Britain and Ireland, some are staffed by Anzacs, some by Canadians, one or more by South Africans, and two by nurses and surgeons drawn from certain university cities in the United States of America.

Those who operate the machine are the officers of the Army Medical Service, with the Director-General of the Medical Services of the Army in France at their head; and of course they are all experts in military

medical work.

The successful working, however, of an organization of the complexity and character of that described demands a good deal more than expert knowledge on the part of anyone whose lot it is to control it. Width of view, a readiness to receive new ideas, and a quality which the French call "doigté"—a term whose nearest equivalent, perhaps, in English is the horseman's phrase, "good hands"—together with a capacity for rapid and fearless decision, are all essentials to success.

Seeing, therefore, that the machine has worked so excellently it is evident that these essentials must have all been forthcoming. And on this fact the wounded man and the public at large alike have reason

Commanding Officer can instantly draw almost any form of hospital

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to congratulate themselves.



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# THE NECESSITY FOR AN ADEQUATE ARMY IN THE FUTURE.

By C. N. W.

WHATEVER the result of this war—whether it ends in an inconclusive peace with all to do over again within a generation, or with the complete defeat of Germany—the lessons of the last two years have proved conclusively that never again should the British land forces be reduced to the pitiful level, as regards numbers, of August, 1914. If peace with Germany is concluded on any other terms than her

If peace with Germany is concluded on any other terms than her paralysis for aggression, the vital necessity for a big Army, as well as a predominant Navy, will need no demonstration in the present temper of the people, whose views on the responsibilities of the late Government, and on politicians generally, are aptly expressed in the following quatrains, after Omar Khayyam, by an anonymous parodist:—

Awake! Our country in her hour of need
Has cast aside the robe of sloth and greed;
And lo! the politician out for place will get
All he deserves—the scorn which is his meed.

Dreaming, when War's dread signs were in the sky,
We heard his voice from many a platform cry:
Sleep on, electors! War will never come;
The pessimists who say it will—they do but lie.

The people now no value place on "Ayes and Noes,"
On Party claims, or any politician's pose;
The elector has awakened, he has found them out,
He knows about them all, he knows, HE knows.

The pessimists, of whom Lord Roberts was the greatest, did not lie, however, and the war caught us unprepared; had the Expeditionary Force amounted to even half a million of regular troops of the quality of the little "Old Army" of July, 1914, the whole course of the struggle would have been very different, and many lives and

vast expense would have been spared.

That fact is at present realized, but the public memory is very short, and it is to be feared that in the event of a decisive defeat of the Central European Powers the fatuous belief in the arrival of the Millennium will be very widely held, and that the exponents of peace (at any price), retrenchment (only as affects the armed forces of the Crown), and reform (as defined by the Manchester school of Radicals), who just now are discredited, may, with the swing of the pendulum, once more gain power to work mischief.

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It is therefore incumbent on all honest men, irrespective of party, to be prepared to combat betimes the efforts which will most certainly be made when the war is over by the Little Englanders and Pacifists to cut down the Army, if not the Navy; however complete the victory of the Entente, it will be a long time before the present strength of the former can be materially reduced. The Navy has more than fulfilled all that was expected of it in bottling up the German Fleets, or defeating them whenever they venture out of harbour, and so safeguarding us from invasion, and in maintaining the freedom of the seas for us and our Allies; but, had not the British Army been increased from a few hundred thousands to several millions and thus become a deciding factor, the command of the sea alone would no more now than during the period 1805-15, have brought about the decisive defeat of the enemy.

Nor, had she not become a great military as well as a great naval Power, would Great Britain have been now in a position to take a leading and predominant part in the direction of the war, or, later, in the negotiations for peace.

Clearance of the enemy's fleets from the seas and financial and industrial contributions to the common cause are impalpable efforts; the British Army of three million men is a very tangible effort—and asset in the councils of our Allies.

Assuming the most favourable ending to the war—the acceptance by Germany of the terms of peace imposed by the Entente Powers—there is no doubt that the British Government in power will be hampered by maudlin exhortations to magnanimity.

But, however magnanimous the terms our Government may be willing to accord (and there are those with influence behind the scenes who, for reasons now well understood, will strive to be very magnanimous), the French and Russian Governments will, fortunately, have a say in the matter, so that it is inconceivable that no large indemnity, in cash or in kind and apart from reparation to Belgium and Serbia, will be demanded from Germany; and that will involve, as in the case of France in 1871, the occupation of at all events a considerable portion of territory till the indemnity is paid, or other reparation is exacted.

France in 1871 paid off in a few months, it is true, an enormous indemnity—as it was then considered—but the Franco-German War only lasted six months and the French resources were only tapped, not drained as must those of Germany be after this war, even assuming it ends next spring.

Will Germany, after her huge losses in man-power and with a crippled trade and diminished credit, recover sufficiently, financially, to be able to pay within a year from the conclusion of peace her indemnities, not to one but to several nations? Till she does it is certain neither Russia nor France will withdraw their armies of occupation, and, therefore, neither shall we be able to—which is a very strong reason for the continued maintenance of a large Army in the immediate future. Again, although our relations with our Allies are most

cordial, it must be acknowledged that the growth of the Army to its present dimensions and standard of efficiency, has contributed more to that cordiality than our sea power and financial help to all and sundry.

There are powerful arguments for a large Army till a universal limitation of armaments is agreed to by all the Powers, or, in other words, till the Millennium; since such a limitation is impracticable, even in the opinion of such an ardent pacifist as M. Yves Guyot, who has written that "limitation of armaments is in practice absurd, entailing an armed surveillance which is impossible."

The most effective argument against the maintenance of a large Army will be that of expense, but it is to be hoped that the nation will not speedily forget the lesson that it costs far less in the end to be prepared for all eventualities, by land as well as by sea, than to improvise Armies as we have been forced to do in this war.

That Labour stalwart, Mr. Will Thorne, recently reminded a Trades Union Congress at Birmingham that, years ago, he had advocated a Citizen Army for home defence, and pointed out that if his plan had been adopted this country would not have been placed in the position in which it found itself at the beginning of the war, adding that a Citizen Army would be necessary in the future to defend "our Homes and Labour."

At long last the Coalition Government was forced by public opinion, on the failure of voluntary enlistment, to adopt Conscription, but only for the period of the war, in deference, doubtless, to the views of Mr. J. H. Thomas, M.P., and his kind, who hold that "It would be better to make a determined stand, even to the extent of a combined industrial strike after the war, than to let their freedom! be replaced by a Prussian militarism."

Fortunately the Thomases are in a minority, and unless we are cursed with a weak-kneed Government when peace is inaugurated, a modified continuance of Conscription will present few difficulties and require little fresh legislation.

The obligation of every citizen to bear arms is no new thing; "Militia" originally meant the armed forces of the State, raised under the common law which imposes that obligation, and in 1860 an Act was passed regulating the holding of the compulsory ballot for raising the armed forces of the Crown to the required strength should the number of voluntary enlistments prove insufficient. That Act is still valid, but it has never been enforced, and was in fact, though not in law, superseded by the voluntary system it was meant to supplement.

The nation, by the logic of events, has been brought to see the necessity for Conscription during the war; its military sense has been awakened and will be kept alive for many years to come by the men now serving in the "temporary" Army, three-quarters of whom are drawn from the ranks of Labour, and very many of whom will possess a vote, so that the re-affirmation of the principle that every ablebodied citizen within certain ages is liable to bear arms in defence

of the State will meet with no real opposition, provided it is now made clear to those who, like Mr. Will Thorne, do not yet quite grasp the tactical axiom that "a vigorous counter-attack is the soul of the defence," that "our Homes and Labour" will be best defended—at a distance—by an adequate Army capable of attacking the enemy outside the confines of the United Kingdom.

Yet, although it is essential for the recruitment of the bulk of the Army of the future that the principle of universal liability for military service shall be re-affirmed, its universal enforcement on the adult male population of fighting age would be neither necessary nor expedient on the score of expense if an Army organization is adopted which will provide with certainty by means of the Act of 1860—and train as economically as is consistent with efficiency—as many men as may be required to:—

- (1) Expand a comparatively small Regular Army to the dimensions necessary in modern wars in the case of major operations overseas, or, in that of lesser operations, to provide reinforcements for it in the shape of organized and adequately trained second line units—or formations, battalions, batteries, brigades, or divisions as the case demands.
- (2) Form a Home Defence Army.

Further, in regard to the compulsory training of the youth of the nation; whatever the hardships of universal Conscription on an adult population, none attend universal military training of boys, who, on the contrary, benefit by it, morally and physically. This by a simple enactment can be made obligatory on all boys in Great Britain and the Province of Ulster, as a corollary to the Ballot Act of 1860, and will be most easily imparted through the agency of Cadet Corps in schools of all standards. These corps already exist in the form of Officers' Training Corps at all the public, and as Cadet Corps in a good many secondary, but not in the board, schools. The question of the ages at which the training should be carried out is, however, somewhat complicated by the fact that, whereas boys do not generally go to a public school till they are fourteen, and usually remain at one till their seventeenth year, or later, they leave board schools at fifteen, when they go to work. According to the class of school then, and assuming that the period of boy-training is to be three years, boys at public schools will be trained from their fifteenth, and those at board schools from their fourteenth year of age; or alternatively all boys will be trained from their fifteenth year, the third year of training being dispensed with in the case of board school boys-the curriculum to consist of platoon and company drill, miniature range musketry, and the inculcation of loyalty, discipline and smartness.

The chief difficulty to be overcome in any system founded on a modified Conscription undoubtedly lies in determining the nature of the training to be undergone—by the balloted men—in other words, how to combine the most effective training possible with the least dislocation of trade; greater efficiency would be attained if men were trained without a break during a certain number of weeks in camp,

or barracks, annually—as in the old Militia—than if they put in—as did the Territorial Forces before the war—a certain number of drills during the year, culminating with a short period in camp, but at a greater cost and derangement of business.

In the hopes of inducing a wider consideration of the subject, the following outline of a scheme based on compulsory military training of all boys, a Regular Army recruited by voluntary enlistment, and the application of the Ballot Act to the Territorial Forces, is put forward for criticism and discussion.

The British Army of the future to consist of:-

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- (a) A FIRST LINE—REGULAR—ARMY—recruited by voluntary enlistment as far as possible for garrisoning India, Egypt, the Crown Colonies, etc.
  - (b) A SECOND LINE—TERRITORIAL—ARMY—composed of young men of 19 to 30 years of age, drawn by ballot and liable for service overseas in cases of emergency—Class B.
- (c) A THIRD LINE—TERRITORIAL—ARMY—composed of older men of 31 to 40 years of age, drawn by ballot and liable for home defence only—Class C.

The ballot to be held annually in every county on a given date—say January 1st—of all men who will reach the age of 19 (for Class B) and of 31 (for Class C), during the succeeding twelve months, to supply the numbers required.

(a) FIRST LINE—REGULAR—ARMY—to be of about the same strength as, and composed of the existing units of, the old Regular Army; in the event of the number of voluntary enlistments proving insufficient at any time, First Line establishments to be filled by men from the Second Line who draw the lower numbers in the annual county ballots.

Period and conditions of service—as ante-bellum, with the exception that on completing twelve years' service (seven or eight with the Colours and five or four in First Line Reserve) men will pass, for ten years or till they reach the age of forty, into the Third Line, Emergency A, Reserve with liability only to be called up in case of invasion.

Inducements to enlist in the First Line—a full-dress uniform; a guarantee by the State that all men of good character will, on transfer to First Line Reserve, be given Government employment; and the prospect of seeing the world.

(b) Second Line—Territorial.—Army—including the existing Special and Extra Special Reserves, to consist of units of all arms and administrative branches, organized in county formations—brigades and divisions.

Period of service—twelve years; seven with the Colours and five in Second Line Reserve; after which men will pass into the Third Line, Emergency B, Reserve with liability only to be called up in case of invasion.

Training—during Colour service, either

- (a) three annual trainings of four weeks and four annual trainings of two weeks, continuously, in camp or barracks; or
- (b) on the lines of the Territorial Force training before the war—men putting in a certain number of drills, etc., each year from their homes, with a short annual camp.

During Second Line Reserve service—as in (b) without going into camp.

(c) THIRD LINE—TERRITORIAL—ARMY—to consist of artillery, infantry, and administrative units, organized in county brigades.

Period of service-ten years; six with the Colours and four in Third Line Reserve.

Training—during Colour and Reserve service, as suggested for the Second Line Army.

UNIFORM AND PAY—in both the Territorial Armies, men to be clothed, etc., as in the Regular Army—field service scale—and to receive pay if called upon to undergo continuous training as in (a).



Period of actions from yours; seven with the Colours and divide Second Line Reserve; after which men, will pass into the Third

## GERMAN ACCOUNTS OF THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL ACTIONS, 1914—15.

(Selected and translated by Thomas F. A. Smith, Ph.D., author of "The Soul of Germany" and "What Germany Thinks.")

BEFORE proceeding to the main topic of the article there are two minor points which perhaps deserve to be recorded. The report of a High School for Girls in Lübeck for the year 1914-15 contains an interesting account of Sunday, July 26th, 1914. Horse-racing was going on in the neighbouring town of Travemünde, when at midday the sirens of a torpedo-boat flotilla in the harbour summoned all the crews on board. Even rockets and signal lights were sent up, and, according to the headmaster's report, there was a scene of indescribable jubilation as the boats steamed away. It seems tolerably certain that this was the mobilization order for the German Fleet.

A few days later, Friday, July 31st, a German warship reached Heligoland at 2 p.m. In a short space of time placards appeared ordering the civilian population to leave the island next morning. At 6 a.m., Saturday, August 1st, crowds of civilians flocked to the harbour and on to the passenger steamers which were to convey them to Cuxhaven. One steamer, however, started under full steam without taking any civilians on board. This was the "Königin Luise," a mine-layer, sunk by the "Amphion" a few days later at the mouth of the Thames.

A retired German Admiral has collected a large number of personal narratives, told by officers and men in the German Fleet, and published them in book form.<sup>1</sup> The work contains 319 pages, and there is material in it about every naval incident which had happened up to the date of its publication.

#### THE BATTLE OF HELIGOLAND.

In the night preceding January 24th we weighed anchor and steered for an unknown destination. The squadron consisted of four armoured cruisers ("Seydlitz," "Moltke," "Derfflinger," "Blücher"), four small cruisers ("Stralsund," "Rostock," "Kolberg," "Graudenz"), and a number of torpedo-boats. We men were in the best of spirits and worked with burning zeal. Everyone knew his post, and each was ready, when the order came, to do his duty, and more.

After a short time we noticed that the course changed to northwest, towards the English coast. It was a dark night and an uncanny

<sup>1&</sup>quot; Der Seekrieg, 1914-1915." Berichte von Mitkämpfern und Augenzeugen, herausgegeben von Hermann Kirchhoff, Vize-Admiral z. D. ("The Naval War, 1914-1915," in reports from Combatants and Eye-witnesses. Edited by Hermann Kirchhoff, Vice-Admiral, retired list.)

voyage. As all lights were covered we saw nothing, and could only hear the rush of the waves and the monotonous beat of the engines.

At 8 o'clock next morning there were thick, heavy clouds on the sky, but the dawn afforded us no great visibility. Suddenly the "Kolberg's" searchlight flashed beyond the horizon, where she was steaming some miles in advance. This was followed by a shot, which told us that enemy forces must have been sighted. The "Kolberg" at once changed her course, and the signal came: "Sammeln" (close).

Our ships formed up in battle order with the same calm as in peace manœuvres. Our ears were strained to catch every sound, and hundreds of eyes endeavoured to peer through the misty light. About half an hour elapsed before we could see the English approaching. Although they were under full steam they came slowly above the horizon, hidden by their own smoke. But when the single ships assumed definite shape through the fog and smoke, we saw ourselves confronted by an entire British squadron.

For another half-hour we steered a course to the south-east, and must have been about 150 kilometres to the north-west of the Dutch island Schiermonnikoog when the battle commenced. fired the first shot, and after her second shot the English opened fire. Meanwhile it had become quite light, and from my post I was able to

observe the course of events.

It was a wonderful sight, at the same time both splendid and appalking; shot followed shot and broadside after broadside. It seemed as if hell had been let loose. The ship trembled from end to end, while the air seemed to pulsate, and columns of water were thrown up wherever the shells struck the sea.

About an hour later I saw our "Blücher" get an entire English broadside. She immediately burst into flames amidships and slowed down. A quarter of an hour later they seemed to have got the flames under, but during this work her guns had not ceased for a moment.

In order not to leave the "Blücher" behind the squadron slackened speed. No doubt the English had recognized their superiority, for they were, to say the least, rashly brave (tollkühn). They came for us at full steam. I was able to recognize seven large battle cruisers. These were behind us. On the starboard side there were three other English ships, and on the port twenty-six torpedo-boat destroyers. Only one way remained open to us. But it is necessary to know the heroic spirit of our fleet; in spite of the evident odds against us the squadron did not increase its speed.

The English shooting was not bad, for the "Seydlitz" was hit, too. Our guns gave a fitting reply, for we shot still better than the enemy. Several enemy ships were hit and withdrew, disabled, from the Our guns gave a fitting reply, for we shot still better than the fighting line. It seemed, in fact, as if the English could not extinguish the flames on their ships. A thick cloud of smoke shot heavenwards from one of the big cruisers, but unfortunately I lost sight of this ship

tora-rays," in reports from Combatan Kirchhoff, Vice-Admiral, retired lim.)

and was unable to discern its fate. Modes A magnetil nor nedegra amandon

(A Danzig bank official, who was present at the battle as a seaman

on a torpedo-boat, tells the following narrative):-

Late on Saturday evening we set out for England. The night passed quietly. I had eight hours' watch, and was going to get my breakfast at 8 a.m., when the firing began. The "Kolberg," which was in front, had got into contact with some English scouts and driven them in. We continued our course, and while I was watching the outpost fight strong English forces appeared; six battle cruisers of the "Lion" class, far superior to our cruisers in size and armour. Behind them were eight ships of the line, five small cruisers and twenty-six torpedo-boat destroyers. Our big cruisers steamed one behind the other, the "Blücher" being last. The small cruisers and our boats parallel.

"Blücher" opened fire first, five shots, one after the other, to get the range; the distance amounted to twenty kilometres. A destroyer was steaming in front of the English ships, but when the two first shells from the "Blücher" struck dangerously near, she turned about to get behind the big ships. Just as she offered her broadside "Blücher's" third shot went home. Only two halves of the boat and a column of water and steam were seen.

Now the English commenced firing; the flash of the guns was plainly visible, and soon the shells began to drop between our ships, without any hits being scored, however. Our cruisers immediately returned the fire, and so it went on for full two hours. Suddenly a big shell struck the "Blücher"; for a short time she was on fire—a spectacle awful, yet grand. On account of engine trouble she gradually lagged behind.

The cannonade continued; the number of splashes throwing up huge columns of water caused by exploding shells increased; broadside after broadside flew across to the English. Two of our big cruisers were hit on the side, but the 345 centimetre shells of the English burst on the German armour. Through my glasses I saw a large English cruiser with a heavy list, and one explosion followed the other on board till the ship disappeared in the depths. A torpedo-boat, with less speed than the rest of us, had sent two torpedoes into her, and, although under heavy fire, escaped unharmed.

On January 23rd we made an advance towards the west of the North Sea. At dawn next day we met with enemy scouting boats. After a short fight a squadron of modern English battle cruisers appeared on the horizon, and with them we were heavily engaged for several hours. We saw many hits get home on enemy ships, while one cruiser was partly in flames. The "Blücher" was badly hit and disabled; unfortunately we could not help her, as strong English forces were behind the enemy's battle cruisers.

The enthusiasm on our ship 2 was immense; at last we were in an open sea battle with the English. Our sorrow was great at having

The narrator was a mate on the "Moltke."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> From this statement it appears obvious that the Germans had at once turned

to return to our home harbours without the "Blücher," which, after fighting to the last breath against a vastly superior enemy, went down with many dear comrades. Yet we remained masters of the battlefield, for when about 130 kilometres distant from Heligoland John Bull turned and broke off the engagement.

#### THE ENGAGEMENT OFF CORONEL.

Yesterday was All Saints' Day,¹ and a lucky day for us. I was cruising with the squadron southwards along the coast when I received intelligence that an English cruiser had put in to Coronel, a small coaling harbour near Concepcion. As a warship cannot stay longer than twenty-four hours in a neutral port, I determined to intercept her. I placed my ships so that "Nürnberg" should run past the entrance to the harbour to see if the enemy ship was still in there, while my other ships waited much farther out. At 4.25 my squadron was somewhat spread out when it was reported that two ships had been sighted to the west-south-west.

Ordering the other ships to join me, I held in that direction, for it was evident that they must be enemy ships—in fact, the "Monmouth" and "Glasgow." Soon afterwards the auxiliary cruiser "Otranto" appeared, and then a little later the armoured cruiser "Good Hope." The enemy attempted some manœuvres with the object, I believe, of getting nearer to the coast and thence to windward,

which would have been very harmful to me.

I immediately ordered "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" to get all their boilers to work, and in fifteen minutes I was running at twenty knots against a heavy sea, and got parallel to the enemy, but had to await the other ships. The enemy was so obliging as not to disturb me in this undertaking; the distance between us was then about nine miles.

When my ships—except the "Nürnberg," which was nowhere in sight—had come up at ten minutes past six, I began to diminish the distance. And when we were about five miles off I ordered the firing to commence. The battle had begun, and, with a few changes, of course, I led the line quite calmly.

I had manœuvred so that the sun in the west could not disturb me. The moon in the east was not yet full, but promised a bright

night. There were scuds of rain in various directions.

My ships fired rapidly and with success against the big ships. "Scharnhorst" engaged "Good Hope" (Admiral Craddock's flagship), "Gneisenau" fired on the "Monmouth," "Leipzig" against "Glasgow," and the "Dresden" against "Otranto." The lastnamed ship left the line after a time, and, I believe, escaped.

Fires broke out on "Good Hope" and "Monmouth." There was a tremendous explosion on the former, which looked like a splendid firework display against the dark sky. The glowing white flames, mingled with bright green stars, shot up to a great height. I made

<sup>1</sup> From a letter of Admiral Count Spee, dated November 2nd, 1914.

sure that the ship would sink, but no, she was still afloat, and the fight went on uninterruptedly.

Meanwhile it had become dark; I had diminished the distance between us to 4,500 metres; then I turned outward so that it gradually increased. The enemy's ships could only be made out by the fires, but the cannonade was kept up against them, and only ceased when the gunners could no longer aim. The enemy fire had ceased, and I ordered the small cruisers to take up the pursuit. But as it seemed that he had succeeded in extinguishing the fires on board, no trace of him could be found, and steaming round the enemy's line in order to get it into a favourable light brought no further result. The artillery battle had lasted fifty-two minutes.

At 8.40 p.m. I was on a north-west course, and heard artillery fire in front at a very great distance (estimated at nine to ten miles). I made towards it to help if necessary. It came from the "Nürnberg," which had failed to get into touch with us, and had accidentally fallen in with the "Monmouth" in flight. The latter listed heavily to starboard. "Nürnberg" went close up (ging dicht heran) and finished her off with gun-fire. "Monmouth" turned over and went down.

Unfortunately the heavy sea rendered rescue work impossible, added to which "Nürnberg" thought she had seen "Good Hope" in the vicinity—an assumption which was doubtless incorrect. Probably in the moonlight, at a great distance, she mistook one of our cruisers for the "Good Hope." I do not know what became of the latter. Lieutenant G., who had opportunity for observation, believed that she, too, had a heavy list; and, when I recall the incidents, I am inclined to think he was right, although during the battle I believed it to have been an appearance caused by the movements of the ship in a heavy sea. It is quite possible that she sank; in any case she was completely disabled. The "Glasgow" could hardly be seen; it is supposed that she got hit, too, but in my opinion she made good her escape.

Thus we were victorious along the whole line, and I thank God for the victory. We have been protected in an absolutely marvellous manner; we have no losses to mourn. There were a few cases of slightly wounded on "Gneisenau"; the small cruisers did not get a single hit, while the hits scored on "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" have inflicted hardly any damage at all. I found one 15-centimetre shell in a store-room on the "Scharnhorst"; it had come through an unarmoured spot, broken a lot of things, but fortunately had not exploded and lay there as a kind of greeting. One funnel was hit, but not so badly as to prevent it performing its functions. Similar trivialities occurred on "Gneisenau."

I do not know what unfortunate circumstances could have prevailed with our opponent which deprived him of any and every success. The enthusiasm among our men is enormous. I was especially pleased that the "Nürnberg," which through no fault of her own took no part in the battle itself, was still able at the end to contribute to our success.

If "Good Hope" has escaped, then in my opinion she will be compelled by her injuries to put into a Chilian harbour. In order to find out I am going to-morrow with "Gneisenau" and "Nürnberg" into Valparaiso. Should the "Good Hope" have sought refuge there I shall endeavour to have her disarmed and interned by the Chilian authorities, and shall then be rid of two strong

opponents.

"Good Hope" is bigger than "Scharnhorst," but her artillery is not so powerful. It is true she has heavy guns, but only two of them. "Monmouth," on the other hand, is inferior to the "Scharnhorst," as she had only 6-inch guns. The English have another ship out here like the "Monmouth," and, as it would seem further, a ship of the line ("Queen" class) with 305-centimetre guns. Against the latter we could hardly do anything at all. If the English had kept their forces together then we should certainly have got the worst of it.

You can hardly imagine the joy which prevails amongst us. At least we have been able to add to the glory of our arms, even if it may have little significance for the whole and in view of the enormous

number of English ships.

but its my opinious she reade good

November 3rd, 1914.

We arrived at Valparaiso this morning. Legation Secretary von Erckert and Consul Gumprecht came on board. The news of our naval victory had not preceded us, but it very soon spread. On landing to visit the chief of the station there was a huge crowd round the landing stage, while groups here and there shouted "Hurrah!" Of course, the Germans wanted to have a big celebration, a proposal which I absolutely refused; but under pressure I paid a visit to the German club and spent an hour, and a half there.1

#### Valparaiso, November 3rd, 1914.

I am going to tell you<sup>2</sup> a few details about our cruise. On September 6th we heard by wireless that the English had occupied Samoa. Seven days later "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" appeared before Samoa, hoping to surprise the English ships, but luckily for them they had already gone to Herbertshöhe. As we found no ships in Samoa we did not disturb the English troops there, but steamed off. On the 22nd we bombarded Tahiti, and on the 24th put in at Mona Maria, in the Marquesas Islands. There we stopped for eight days and then proceeded to Osterinsel (Easter Island), and from there to Mesa Jues (Masafuera)—two days' journey from Valparaiso.

Admiral von Spee's letter was evidently addressed to a near relation or intimate friend, as in the original the words "du" and "dir" (thou and thee)

are employed.—Translator.

2 From a letter written by an artillery mate on board the flagship "Scharnhorst" to his parents in Kiel. It was the last letter received from him, as he no doubt lost his life near the Falkland Islands.—TRANSLATOR.

On October 31st we heard that the small cruiser "Glasgow" was lying off Coronel. We started off under full steam. At about 5 o'clock a three-funnelled vessel was sighted, and a little later the officer at the masthead reported that there were four ships. When the enemy saw us he tried to slip away, but we were able to overtake him

gradually.

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The battle began at 6.30 p.m. by the enemy opening fire. "Scharnhorst's" first shot was fired at a range of about 10 kilometres, and then the firing was continuous. After the third broadside "Good Hope" was on fire in the fore part, and fifteen minutes later in the after part too. Then a great flame, higher than the masts, shot up amidships; after about twenty seconds everything became dark. I believe the waves had closed over the "Good Hope."

"Gneisenau" engaged the "Monmouth," which disappeared after three quarters of an hour. "Glasgow" and the auxiliary cruiser "Otranto," although badly knocked about, seem to have escaped.

How had things gone with us? A few hits had knocked the paint off the sides and one shell penetrated the ship's side at an unarmoured spot in the fore part. We had neither killed nor wounded, but there were three men slightly wounded on the "Gneisenau."

On Sunday, November 1st, we¹ were cruising along the coast of Chili. During the afternoon the rumour went round that English forces were in the neighbourhood; one of our cruisers had picked up an English wireless message and signalled the news to us. Shortly after 5 o'clock smoke clouds were visible beyond the horizon—it was the enemy. "Klar Schiff zum Gefecht!" ("Clear decks for action!") Dear God! what joy was that; at last there was another chance to shoot at something. My post is in the quarter-deck turret for 21-centimetre guns as reserve directing cannonier.

When the English perceived that they were discovered they did their best to get away. We began firing at a distance of 10 kilometres and scored hits with the second broadside on the commander's station. Then broadside followed broadside, and with such rapidity too that in all probability the English had no time to get over their astonishment.

The battle began at 6.30 p.m. At 6.50 the leader of the right-hand gun dropped out. The powder smoke was so dense that we could hardly breathe, although the ventilator was at work and the armoured turret open. I sprang to his post, but he soon recovered after getting some fresh air outside. He returned to the turret and lit his pipe, allowing me to take a few draws as I served the gun. The men were working and sweating their hardest; some of them became unconscious, but soon recovered.

Meanwhile both the "Good Hope" and "Monmouth" began to burn. We were firing at the former and "Gneisenau" at the latter, while the "Leipzig" and "Dresden" kept the other two busy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Extracts from a letter written by first mate Hans Stutterheim to his mother at Stargard, Prussia. The letter is dated Valparaiso, November 3rd, 1914.—Translator.

As the two big enemy ships were in flames we were able to economize our searchlights. We fired broadside after broadside, and, through the telescopic range-finder, were able to register hit after hit. At last they were all aflame, then one more broadside followed by a tremendous explosion—the flames and cloud of sparks must have reached a height of 300 feet—then all was dark. The English Navy had one ship less; that was the end of the "Good Hope."

Not long afterwards the "Monmouth" sank too; the "Nürnberg," which had been out of it up till then, had met her while approaching us and given her the finishing touch. The fight was all over in an hour; "Glasgow" and "Otranto" had cleared off, but probably they have sunk too, as they were both severely punished.

Conditions on the English ships must have been terrible, especially on the "Good Hope" and "Monmouth" for on them our shells must have made terrible havoc. We got a 12-centimetre shell in between decks; it went through the artillery mechanic's room into the quartermaster's store-room, and there the creature lay down without exploding. A 15-centimetre shell struck an armour plate and glanced off, while a 7-2-centimetre shot went through the top of the third funnel. "Gneisenau" received four harmless hits. Our total losses are absolutely incredible—three slightly wounded on the "Gneisenau." No one was saved on the English side; the "Good Hope" had 900 and the "Monmouth" 700 men on board.

#### THE BATTLE OFF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

#### Port Stanley,1 December 10th, 1914.

In the early morning "Gneisenau" and "Nürnberg" came up to the Falkland Islands in order to seize provisions and Government property. The other ships ("Scharnhorst," "Leipzig," and "Dresden") held back behind the horizon. As we approached we saw a cruiser with three funnels putting out to sea. Behind the hills we could see clouds of smoke.

All at once 30.5-centimetre shells began falling in our neighbourhood. We moved off and joined the rest of the squadron. Our speed was 38.9 kilometres in the hour, and we tried to get away by steering east, veering to the south. Eight enemy ships were steaming after us, but we could only see their smoke. When they appeared most of them were astern. Only two approached gradually nearer. We were soon able to make out their tripod masts and recognize them as English. They were running at 48 kilometres, so that we had to do with large battle-cruisers which—as we heard later—had only arrived at the Falklands twelve hours earlier.

Of course, we were compelled to fight, and in view of the odds the small cruisers were detached, and of them only the "Dresden" escaped. The enemy opened fire at an enormous distance. The battle began at 12.30 and finished with the sinking of the "Gneisenau" at 5.30. "Scharnhorst" sank at about 4 o'clock. We had only about

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Extracted from a letter written by Lieutenant Lietzmann after his rescue and capture by the British.—Translator.

half supplies of ammunition, as the rest had been fired at Coronel and Tahiti. The enemy squadron consisted of "Canopus," "Invincible," "Inflexible," "Carnarvon," "Kent," "Cornwall," "Bristol," and "Inflexible,"
Glasgow."

After the "Scharnhorst" had sunk, the three enemy ships ("Carnarvon" and the battle-cruisers "Invincible" and "Inflexible") fired against us alone for nearly two hours. That they did not settle us off sooner is simply disgraceful (ist einfach jammervoll). I estimate that we were hit twenty times, not including the innumerable splinters. "Inflexible" alone got rid of 600 heavy shells; I do not know how many the others fired. Against this we have scored little on the "Inflexible," but the "Invincible" was hit twenty times.

The range during the fight was mostly 15,000 metres. During nearly the whole time I was attached to the first officer or going through the ship on various commissions. Later I will describe the various scenes and episodes; it was awful beyond description. We kept up the fight till there were only eight more charges for the quarter-deck turret. These were never fired, however, for the ammunition hoist was

destroyed and all the guns on both sides out of action.

The next thing was—"All hands on deck with hammocks!" I had to see that everybody got one. As I got on deck the ship began to turn slowly over to starboard, and I was just in time to spring overboard. I got safely away from the ship and saw our dear old "Gneisenau," keel upwards, sink in the rushing waters. Two men were sitting on the cut-water (Vordersteven). The ship would have kept afloat for some time, but in order to prevent its falling into the hands of the English we destroyed the engines and hastened the end by leaving open the torpedo V uside chamber. The masthead flag was still waving, but the one had been shot away.

Our men worked more splendidly and with greater calm

than I had believed possible. Before the final act the commander called for three "Hurrahs!" for H.M. the Kaiser. Indeed, many cheers were given while we were in the water. Suddenly I observed Picht, badly wounded in the head, laughing and beckoning to me.

With the help of a sailor I got him on to a hammock.

Enemy ships approached, throwing large numbers of planks, etc., to the men in the water. In spite of a pretty heavy sea they lowered boats for rescue work. I had drifted a good distance with my hammock, but, by a marvellous bit of luck, was seen and fished out by a dinghy. Next we were hoisted on board and carried into hospital.

The commander was drowned; I saw him last, swimming near to me, holding on to an empty cartridge box. For my own part I

had swallowed quantities of water, and it was high time for me to be rescued, as my hammock was beginning to sink. I believe I lay unconscious on board the "Inflexible" for a considerable time, but was able to walk about the same day. The British admiral on the "Invincible" sent a wireless congratulating the rescued from the "Gneisenau," and expressing his high recognition of our behaviour in battle. This respect was shown us by every Englishman.

I cannot write much to-day, as I still feel quite stupefied; the others feel just the same. To-morrow we are due at Port Stanley,

but what will be done with us I do not know. Up till now the English officers have been exceedingly tactful and treated us with great kindness. There was nothing at all to betray that we are prisoners of war. Every possible provision has been made for us on board.

#### THE VOYAGE OF THE "AYESHA."1

Keeling or Cocoa Islands, November 9th, 1914. The landing party left the "Emden" at 6 a.m. There were forty-five men and three officers, equipped with four machine-guns. Some 700 souls inhabit the islands, of whom 200 are Europeans. On the island there are wireless and cable electric stations; from the latter three cables go respectively to Batavia, Singapore, and Australia. We knew that the English valued this station, and hence our desire to destroy it.

The steam-pinnace towed us between coral reefs to the landing stage. In the harbour we saw a sailing-ship—three-master—but little dreamt that this insignificant looking vessel would become of great importance to us. We sprang from the cutters; one party made for the wireless and the other for the cable station.

As we arrived there I saw the operator sending off signals of distress, but I quickly turned the machine off and the work of destruction began. We then proceeded to the cable station and blew it up, as well as the receiver for wireless messages. Then the cables were cut. The installations were very powerful and of great value; in fact we had no idea that the station was so large.

Suddenly at 9 o'clock the "Emden" signalled with her search-

Suddenly at 9 o'clock the "Emden" signalled with her searchlights in the Morse code telling us to hurry up. We loaded the cutters hurriedly and were towed out again, only to see the "Emden" putting out to sea. At first this manœuvre was quite incomprehensible; but she next fired a broadside, and then shells began to drop all round her. We were condemned to look on in complete helplessness, while the "Emden" seemed to be getting the worst of it.

We returned to the landing stage, climbed to the roofs to watch the fight which drew off to the open sea. Next we prepared to hold the island; the machine-guns were placed in position and all weapons taken from the inhabitants. Meanwhile the "Emden's" foremast and one funnel had been shot away. Lt.-Captain von Mücke called us together and ordered those men who had any experience of sailing ships to seize the "Ayesha" and make her ready for sea, his intention being to leave the island before sunset to find the "Emden" in case she had survived the fight.

It was bitterly hard to think of our comrades waging an unequal fight outside with forty-eight of the crew missing. Poor "Emden"! It was now 5 o'clock and the fight not ended. Meanwhile the schooner "Ayesha" had been provisioned and water taken on board—unfortunately very little of the latter for the needs of forty-eight men, for we hoped to make Batavia. Towards sunset the pinnace towed us out of the harbour and the voyage began.

<sup>1</sup> From the letters and diary of a sailor in the landing-party from the "Emden."
—Translator.

November 10th.

At sea. We camped on deck under very primitive conditions. I had never dreamed that I should ever set foot on a sailing-tub again in this life. We are making three knots in the hour. There is no water for washing.

A stop of only twenty-four hours was made at Padang in order to get provisions, but after "Emden II." (i.e., "Ayesha") had left the harbour she was followed by the "Choising," a freight steamer belonging to the Norddeutscher Lloyd. The "Choising" sighted the sailing ship in heavy weather on December 14th, and held by till the storm passed and a dead calm followed. After a conference it was decided to sink "Emden II.," and, by means of axes, holes were cut in her hull, everything of use taken off her, and at 5 p.m. she disappeared in 4,000 feet of water.

Black smoke clouds gushed out of "Emden III.'s" (i.e., "Choising") funnels as she steered south-west, and later on changed this to a westerly course. To the amazement of the world "Emden III." popped up, two and a-half months after the crew had left the Keeling Islands, in the Turkish harbour, Hodeida, in the Red Sea. During the voyage quite a number of small coasting steamers had been caught and sunk.

The long voyage had led across the Indian ocean, past the English fortress, Aden, through the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, past Perim to Hodeida on the Arabian coast, where the men had Janded in sight of a Prench armoured cruiser.

An attempt to leave Hodeida by land ended in failure on account of the climate, but in the night of March 15th they succeeded in dodging the English blockade and got clear in two small sailing ships. One ran aground in the dark in twelve feet of water. All the occupants were rescued, but a quantity of provisions had to be thrown overboard as the other boat was overloaded and there were seventy souls on board.

Dschidda was the next place where provisions could be obtained, and, as it was blockaded by three English ships, the Germans decided to land at Lidd and march the remainder of the way through the robber-infested country. After a six-days' march the caravan was attacked in the night of April 1st by Bedouins, but these ran off when the Germans attacked with the bayonet.


Nevertheless, a continuance of the march was impossible, for there were 300 armed Arabs opposed to sixteen German and thirteen Turkish rifles. One sailor was shot through the heart; Naval Lieutenant Roderich Schmidt was mortally wounded and died during the night. A demand from the Arabs for £22,000, our arms and ammunition, was rejected, but a regular little fortress with trenches, etc., was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The diary continues down to November 28th, when the "Ayesha" ran into Padang, Sumatra. The crew had suffered much from thirst. The remainder of the story is taken from Geschichte des Weltkriegs (History of the World War), Vol. II., by Georg Hölscher, published at Cologne, 1915.

completed. During a three-days' fight the Germans had several more casualties, but three had already escaped, disguised as Bedouins, to get help from Dschidda. On the third day of the fight a small force belonging to the Emir of Mecca relieved the German sailors and conducted them to Dschidda.

From this point they employed sailing boats, succeeded again in getting through the English blockading line and reached El Wesch. A five-days' march brought them to El Ulah, on the Hedjaz railway. Provisions sent by the German Consul in Damascus awaited them at that point. The heroes arrived in Damascus on May 10th, and from there to Constantinople their journey was a triumphal procession. On June 10th they reached Vienna.

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# THE SUAKIN GARRISON.

"Skylark" and "Conner, W. The accommodation for the means

MAY, 1885, TO MAY, 1886.

(From the Diary of a Medical Officer.)

ON the withdrawal from Suakin at the end of May, 1885, of the Expeditionary Force which had conducted operations there against Osman Digna and his Arabs since the beginning of the year, a garrison of mixed Indian and British troops was left to protect the town and keep the Arabs at a reasonable distance.

This garrison remained until May, 1886, when it was relieved by

Egyptian troops of the newly-organized army.

The garrison was composed as follows:—A brigade of Indian troops, made up of one squadron oth Bengal Lancers, the 15th Sikhs, 17th Bengal N.I., and the 28th Bombay N.I., with their complement of commissariat and transport, medical services and sappers; the British troops forming part of the garrison were a Mountain Battery 6.1. Scottish Division, R.A., with mules and screw guns, 1st Battalion of the Shropshire Light Infantry, the 53rd, a detachment of the Royal Engineers and of the Medical Staff Corps and Ordnance Department. The whole were under the command of Brigadier-General Hudson, of the Indian Army.

The distribution of the troops was as follows: -Two regiments of native troops and the commissariat, medical services, etc., and the native cavalry, were inside the town walls or close to the town; one regiment, the 15th Sikhs, occupied a large redoubt one-and-a-half miles west of the town on the plain; the battery and mounted infantry (a company of the 53rd) occupied a redoubt about a mile west of the town. On Quarantine Island, between the town and harbour, were the hospitals and detachments of the Royal Engineers, Ordnance, and Commissariat and Stores. At Graham's Point, a long coral sandcovered reef east of the harbour, the 53rd Regiment was encamped with separate hospital services.

The front of the town on the land side was protected by a long and fairly high mud wall with forts at intervals on it; these were

garrisoned by the native troops.

About a mile out, south of the town walls, were two strong stone forts, the right and left water forts, garrisoned by a few gunners and some native infantry, afterwards, in 1888, the site of the battle of

Gemaizeh; they mounted a Krupp gun and machine-guns.

About three miles out on the plain, south-west and beyond the Sikh redoubt, was the west redoubt, a very strong post, with a stone pepper-box look-out; this redoubt also had a Krupp gun and machine-guns, and was manned by a company of the 15th Sikhs and a few gunners. It was strongly protected by barbed wire and a ditch and rampart.

In the harbour were three gunboats, H.M.S. "Condor," "Skylark" and "Cygnet." The accommodation for the troops consisted of large E.P. double-roofed tents (eight men to a tent), and those for the British troops were pitched under a wooden framework with a straw roof; these afforded the best protection from the sun.

The water supply was a difficulty; there were a few good wells in the town enclosure and these were sufficient for the native population and friendly Arabs, a corps of whom was organized; there was also a good well of drinkable water at the right water fort; all other wells were brackish and fit only for washing purposes. Consequently all the water required for the garrison was condensed in the harbour by a large condenser under charge of the Royal Engineers. This was distributed daily by water carts to the various units. The rations during the very hot season, May to October, were difficult to vary, and consisted of newly-killed tough beef and tinned vegetables, bread, pickles and jam; lime juice was issued. As the weather got cooler some fresh vegetables were procurable, and mutton could be got more frequently. Native cooks were allowed for the British troops, and ice was freely obtainable for the hospital services, and aerated waters made in the Government factory were cheap and abundant.

The great heat and moisture of the climate were very trying from May to November, the average shade day temperature being 105° Fahr., and at night not often less than 85°, with very little breeze to relieve the stillness of the atmosphere. The men had to keep in their tents from sunrise to 5 p.m., with the exception of doing the absolutely necessary duties at stables, etc., and sunstroke (or, rather, heat stroke) was very frequent in June, July and August, generally occurring in the afternoon in the tents, as the hot air was very close, and there were no punkahs. A few of these cases were fatal, but most recovered and were invalided home or to Cyprus. Fortunately, ice was always obtainable, for treatment, from an ice ship in the harbour.

During the rains in the month of November malarial fever of a somewhat mild type was frequent, due to mosquitoes, which were afforded hatching grounds in the pools left by the rains. There was also some enteric fever throughout the occupation, and some dysentery, due, I think, to the germ-laden dust, as much of the ground near the town and camp had for long been used for interments by the Arabs, and the graves were shallow. The Principal Medical Officer actually found a corpse buried in the ground over which his tent was pitched, and, feeling feverish, investigated the site and had his tent changed.

In the early winter there was an outbreak of smallpox amongst the Arabs in the town, but owing to efficient vaccination only two cases occurred in the garrison.

There were also some cases of beri-beri amongst the native troops, due, I believe, to the difficulty of getting their usual fresh vegetable food.

Much of the sickness and invaliding amongst the British troops was due to simple exhaustion and debility, due to the excessive heat and moisture inducing gastric troubles. The craving for stimulants was a strong temptation to the men to include in bad, cheap spirits, which could be bought in the town from the native traders.

To counteract this tendency good beer was issued in moderate quantity, and also a ration of good navy rum during part of the season at night.

The duties of the troops during the very hot weather were confined to absolutely necessary fatigues, and at this time the Arabs were

at a long distance inland getting in their crops.

A patrol, formed alternately by the Indian cavalry and the British mounted infantry, went out daily, night and morning, round the country to the south to a distance of four or five miles, and were under cover of the guns of the forts. These patrols during the winter months occasionally met small bodies of the Arabs on similar duty, but our guns kept the latter at a distance. Only occasionally during the winter a few Arabs at night penetrated to the camp, more to reconnoitre and see what they could pick up than for aggressive purposes.

During the hot weather the men had to keep in their tents till 5 p.m., but were provided with games, books, etc., and plenty of aerated waters. In the winter, sports and gymkhana meetings were frequent, also polo and cricket matches, and an occasional regatta in

the harbour when some yachts came in.

There was a little shooting to be had a few miles out on the great plains, but it was dangerous to go out more than two miles, as the Arabs were more or less on the look out. An occasional bustard or ravine deer, hares and sand grouse, were got.

In November very heavy rains fell for a few days, flooding the lower ground and some of the tents, but the rest of the year was

almost rainless.

During this month the whole of the Indian troops were relieved by three Madras battalions and a squadron, but the British troops remained without relief for the whole year, except that invalids were periodically replaced by drafts sent from Cairo. The invaliding was very great, not more than one-fourth of the men forming the original garrison remained at the end of the year.

The service during the four hot months was of an exceptionally trying nature, and all the more so as no active operations were going on to take the men's attention from the enervating climate. Later, from December to March, life was comparatively enjoyable, and one could

be out of the tents all day and the nights were cool.

It was a little variety to ride out to the west redoubt of an evening and watch through a glass the cavalry or mounted infantry patrol going its rounds on the plain. Occasionally a group of Arabs was seen, and then the officer in charge of the redoubt laid his gun on them; on one occasion I saw a shell plump into a group of Arabs, who quickly separated, but I could not see if any were hit. The ships in harbour also fired occasionally when a group of Arabs could be located within range. In this way they were kept at a good distance, and this was necessary, as the transport camels had to be taken out on the plain to graze; on one occasion these were surprised by Arabs, and a good many were lost with some drivers.

Early in February, 1886, General Hudson was relieved in the command by Sir Charles Warren, who remained until March 15th, when the senior officer present took command till the garrison was relieved by Egyptians early in May.

We had a little excitement early one morning when Sir C. Warren took out about 100 of the friendly Arabs and engaged the Hadendowas some miles south of the town. The friendlies drove them off with considerable loss, and I treated the wounded friendlies at the west redoubt. One man showed me a hand he had cut off and a pouch full of ears. These slight engagements and a few night alarms were all that took place in the way of active fighting during the occupation.

We were all very glad to be relieved in May of 1886, and returned to Cairo.



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By Commander R. H. Keate, R.N.

NOTES ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF SEARCHLIGHTS AND LUMINOUS PROJECTILES IN LAND WARFARE. metric tames and apply are transfered for large southlights of an apply of the material and apply in the ground is southle an apply in the ground is southle at the country of the ground in the ground is southless.

# GENERAL REMARKS.

AMONG the most recent technical aids to tactics, searchlights are of great importance; their employment is now common in night actions, and they have the effect of greatly diminishing the efficiency and volume of the enemy's fire.

However, they cannot be of much use unless properly placed and directed, for which much experience and practice are required.

# SEARCHLIGHT UNITS.

A searchlight unit is composed of a searchlight and a power. The searchlight is an electric arc light, furnished with a reflector, which collects the rays of light and transmits them in the form of a cylindrical beam towards the object; the distance to which the beam reaches varies with the power of the light, which determines the diameter of the reflector.

The beam of light is directed towards the target by means of racks and pinions, which guide the beam horizontally and vertically, the racks being graduated in degrees to permit of laving the light by verbal orders.

In addition, there are the usual arrangements for regulating the distance apart of the carbons, and a shutter, or jalousie, by which the light can be diminished or obscured without extinguishing the lamp.

These operations can be performed directly, or from a distance by means of electric wires.

The power unit consists of a dynamo and a motor. The motor, besides actuating the dynamo, can be used for propelling the searchlight carriage in any required direction.

The searchlight also has a wire, connecting it to the dynamo, and two or more telephonic apparatus for communication between the searchlight operator, the observer, and the commander.

The personnel strictly required are an observer, two electricians, and a motorman.

The observer should be an officer instructed in the use of searchlights. One electrician directs the electric beam according to the telephonic orders of the observer, and the other looks after the dynamo; the motorman works the motor and superintends the power unit. This complement should be doubled if possible, so as to form a searchlight section.

The searchlight units used by various armies are transported as follows:—

(1) On their own special motor carriages.

(2) On field artillery carriages.(3) On two-wheeled carriages.

(4) By men on foot, or pack animals.

The motor carriages are required for large searchlights of 3,000 metres range and above, which are attached to large field units or to artillery, if the ground is suitable.

Searchlight units on artillery carriages are used in hilly country. Those mounted on two-wheeled carriages, though slow, are the best for mountainous and colonial work.

Hand transport is necessary in very mountainous country.

## CHARACTERISTICS OF SEARCHLIGHTS.

Taking as the range of illumination the average distance to which a good observer with a good glass can see ordinary objects with certainty from a position near the searchlight, the following table is obtained:—

A	25-centimetre		10-inch		light	rang	es 800	metres	s (900	yards)	
,,	35	99	. ,	14	97	, 99	. ,,	1,000	,, (	1,111	,, )
,,	60	,,,	E	24	,,	,,,	. ,,	2,000	,, (	2,222	,, )
- ,,	90	. ,,		36	23	. ,,	",,	3,000	.,, (	3,333	,, )
991	150	,,		60	3.7	* **	"	5,000	,, (5	5,555	,, )

For the 90-cm. (36-inch) light there are also the following data:—
At 1,000 metres. Intensity of light, 53 candles per sq. metre

At 1,000 metres. Intensity of light, 53 candles per sq. metre
,, 2,000 4, ,, ,, ,, 12 ,, ,,
,, 3,000 ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, 5 ,, ,, ,, ,,

One candle-power per square metre is equivalent to seven times the power of the full moon.

In practice it is not convenient to use searchlights of more than 90-cm. (36 inches) diameter, because of the infrequency of operations on level ground void of vegetation and houses, for ranges of more than three kilometres (3,333 yards); besides, the angle at which the beam of light cuts the ground at great distances becomes so acute that large shadows are produced by any vegetation or small hills which the beam encounters.

The area illuminated (intersection of the luminous beam with the ground) depends on the height of the searchlight above the target, on the inclination of the target, and on the distance between the light and the target.

Thus, on level ground a searchlight at 50 metres (55 yards) above the ground illuminates at 1,000 metres (1,111 yards) an ellipse of 1,000 metres longitudinal diameter.

At 2,000 metres the illuminated area is a parabola with the vertex towards the searchlight and about 1,000 metres from it.

The luminous beam cannot be seen through, so that all objects on the opposite side of the beam to the observer are screened from his view

The visibility of the target depends on the contrast between it and the surrounding country, and on the colour and intensity of colouration of the target.

Light objects, especially on a dark ground, appear nearer than

they actually are.

Colours are not seen as in daylight; yellow appears white; light green appears yellow; grey uniforms are practically invisible, especially against a grey ground; troops in white or black are easily seen.

against a grey ground; troops in white or black are easily seen.

Dry roads, earth mounds, walls, telegraph poles, leafless trees, appear clearly; wet roads and fields appear misty. Land sloping upward from the light is clearly seen, and looks higher than the reality, while small undulations of land look flatter.

Arms and accourrements, especially the metallic parts, reflect the light, and are shown up clearly. Horses' eyes shine brightly with a

greenish light, even at considerable distances.

Up to 2,000 metres small groups of men are seen, beyond this only large units in close formation; troops are seen more clearly when in movement; in extended order they appear more numerous

on account of the shadows.

Moonlight, especially in front, diminishes the range of the search-light; damp and rain diminish the range; fog and smoke are impenetrable to the electric rays. Thus, behind a smoke screen movements of troops can take place and work be performed without fear of discovery. Finally, the light of a searchlight diminishes the range of enemy searchlights of less power when directed towards them.

### FUNCTION OF THE OBSERVER.

To obtain good observers they should be trained in peace time, and be selected from the various arms, the searchlights being an aid to the employment of their particular arms.

Thus, for searchlights that are to be directed on artillery positions, artillery officers should be attached to observe the effect of gun-fire

when assisted by searchlights.

Under the general instructions of the commander, the observer

chooses the positions of the searchlights and his own position.

The highest positions are most suitable for the lights, especially if they allow of a flanking illumination of the undulations in the landscape which run parallel to the front.

According to the length of the electric wires, searchlight positions

must also allow of placing the power units under cover.

If, in the sector assigned to a searchlight, there are such inequalities in the surface of the land that important zones are left in shadow, the lights on either flank are placed so as to command these zones as far as possible.

The best observing positions are slightly higher than the search-

light positions, when possible.

The observing positions should not be near enough to be disturbed by the lights, and not far enough off to reduce the luminous zones viewed by the observers. These desiderate are practically fulfilled by a distance of 50 metres.

Level and clear ground gives greater scope to the powers of searchlights, but makes observation more arduous, as there is more

ground to search.

Over close country observation is more difficult, but can be

restricted to the directions of likely enemy approach.

The observer should accurately reconnoitre the ground in front during the day, and prepare a sketch showing the ranges and angles of depression of his light for the most important points. The choice of these points depends on tactical circumstances, such as the enemy's objective, his probable intentions, the zones of easy enemy advance, points of his inevitable passage, road junctions, good defensive positions, etc.

The searchlight can be used beyond its proper range if the observer goes forward sufficiently to compensate for the diminished luminosity. Thus, searchlights of 90 cm. (36 inches) diameter can range up to 4,500 metres (5,000 yards); 75 and 60 cm. lights can range 3,500

metres; and 40 cm. lights can range 1,500 metres.

The observers should be in telephonic communication with the commander for orders and instructions, and with the searchlight operators for directing the search and the switching on and off of

the lights.

If electrical command at a distance allowed of giving exact and continuous training and elevation, the observer could direct the beam himself, but hitherto this has not been found possible, and it is necessary to pass orders to the electricians.

Special signals are arranged between the motorman and electricians

with regard to switching the lights on and off.

The observer should not comply with requests which conflict with the commander's orders, which requests may often come from

adjoining stations.

In night observation a telescope is better than binoculars because the magnification of the target is more important than magnification of the field of vision. If binoculars are used they should not be above power 6, otherwise the luminosity of the image will be too much diminished.

#### ACTION OF SEARCHLIGHTS.

(1) Exploration.—Observation of the enemy's operations.

(2) Battle.—Facilitation of gun-fire by illumination of the target presented by the enemy forces.

(3) Moral.—Retardation of the enemy's advance, the latter thinking his plans are discovered.

(4) Material.—Blinding the enemy and disturbing his forward march and firing capacity.

(5) Signalling.—Signals made by searchlights are visible up to 70 kilometres (40 miles).

#### EMPLOYMENT OF SEARCHLIGHTS BY THE DEFENCE.

On the defensive, especially in prepared positions, searchlights can be disposed accurately and scientifically. Having found the general direction of the enemy's probable approach, the commander of the defence, aided by the commander of engineers, disposes the searchlights along the front, generally in groups, one group to each sector of the defence.

Each commander of a searchlight group decides on the positions of his searchlights and indicates the sector each one is to guard; he is in telephonic communication with the commander of the defence

and with the observers of his group.

The commander of the defence keeps the group commanders informed of the situation, objective, his own intentions, and those of the group commanders in the vicinity; this information must be given in good time, in order to allow the group commander to define the exact duties of the observers.

The sector of exploration assigned to each light is limited to about 60°, as a larger angle than this would diminish the efficiency of the exploration. There is generally one searchlight of 90 or 75 cm. to each kilometre of front, and a few in reserve. In mountainous country the number of lights can be reduced as higher positions are available so that each light commands a greater zone.

Heavy searchlights of long range are usually placed behind and above the firing line. If no elevated positions are available, and there is no time to construct elevated mountings, the lights are placed

on the flanks, or in the intervals between the regiments.

Small searchlights can be placed slightly in front of the firing line if the country is undulating, arrangements being made for with-

drawal in case of surprise or attack.

Between the long-range lights, shorter-range lights of under 75 cm. are placed, in such numbers as the conditions of transport and configuration of the country allow. The smaller lights are generally assigned to the infantry.

After making a daylight reconnaissance, the observer decides on the positions of the searchlights and of the observer, the communications between them, and, according to the situation and orders received,

he arranges the details of procedure as before described.

The lights should not be placed all on the same line, or in such a manner as to indicate the extremities of the defensive position.

In order to surprise the enemy while in movement, and to avoid becoming a target for his artillery, the electrician directs his light at irregular intervals on the most important points of the country in front, such as zones of easy enemy advance, road junctions, points of inevitable enemy passage, good positions for resistance, etc.

The light is not shown for more than twenty seconds at a time,

which is too short an interval for the enemy to get the range.

Large searchlights, besides exploring the country as far as its configuration allows, are of great assistance to the defence when firing at infantry advancing to the attack.

The infantry of the defence can sometimes open fire at a considerable distance from the attackers with the help of the searchlights; for this purpose it is useful to select by day numerous imaginary targets as offered by the landscape on the lines of probable enemy approach.

The large lights also neutralize the action of enemy lights and form luminous curtains, masking the movements of the counterattackers. They must avoid lighting up their own defences or any obstacles likely to impede the enemy's advance.

The enemy's artillery are not often discovered, being generally

beyond the range of searchlights.

When the attacking infantry are less than 1,000 metres off, instead of shifting the long-range beams, the small lights come into play,

thus assisting the rifles and machine-guns of the defence.

The enemy is lit up as long as possible with due regard to the danger incurred by the searchlights. If there are four lights per kilometre, two can take any target alternately; if less than four they must be traversed during the intermittences of light.

The machine-guns can fire while the enemy is lit up by the beams,

and also during the obscurations.

In order to defeat the enemy when he is trying to overcome obstacles or destroy auxiliary defences, a certain number of small lights must come into action at the right moment: oxv-acetylene lights are useful for this purpose.

When the small lights are in use, the large ones can light up the more distant zones, and thus surprise enemy reinforcements and

reveal the arrival of material for the assault.

#### EMPLOYMENT OF SEARCHLIGHTS ON THE OFFENSIVE.

In this case searchlights have fewer opportunities, as the attacker endeavours rather to take advantage of the darkness to surprise the defender's position which he has reconnoitred or attacked unsuccessfully during the daytime.

Nevertheless, searchlights can be used in case of a check in the attack, due to heavy losses or other cause. The attacker's searchlights.

are then used as follows:-

(1) They allow the attacker's artillery to fire against the defender's positions.

(2) They light up the defence and disturb the defender's proceedings.

(3) They counteract the defender's searchlights by blinding his electricians with their own rays.

(4) They neutralize the defender's searchlight beams.

(5) They establish a zone of light in front of the attacker's columns, lighting up the line of advance to his own troops and hiding it from the defence; this screen should be mobile and directed so as to deceive the enemy as to the direction of the advance.

(6) They help by revealing obstacles to their own artillery, which is thus enabled to destroy them. It of same the variable

- (7) They light up the whole defensive position when about to
  - (8) Just before the assault they discover the enemy reserves behind his firing lines.

(9) They cover the retreat of an unsuccessful attack.

To perform these duties the lights must be mobile, mounted on carriages able to traverse any country, and be capable of being mounted and dismounted from the carriages to facilitate their transport and installation.

## USE OF SEARCHLIGHTS 'ASSIGNED TO THE OUTPOSTS.

A good use may be made of them, at the same time increasing the safety of the troops, in enabling the complement of troops required for outposts to be decreased as follows:—

(1) They illuminate the most important lines of approach.

(2) They help in the outpost actions, lighting up and blinding the enemy.

(3) They cover the retirement of the outposts with a screen of light.

(4) They assist the aim of the artillery and machine-guns of the defence.

The rules for their employment by outposts are practically the same as for the defence in general.

#### EMPLOYMENT OF SEARCHLIGHTS IN COLONIAL WARS.

Here the enemy has little or no artillery, and is not much skilled in such as he does possess; the landscape is generally open and undulating, which allows of augmentation in the period of illumination and of decrease in the number of lights.

The lights can be placed at intervals equal to twice their range; particular attention must then be paid to the zones in shadow, due to the undulations of the country; if there are not enough lights to deal with these zones, small lights such as oxy-acetylene lights can be directed on the auxiliary defences and natural obstacles.

Large lights are used as follows:-

(1) Having fixed the vertical angle of the light to cover a certain range, generally 1,000 metres, the lights are trained round till they meet the adjacent searchlight sectors of illumination, or if there is only one light the training is stopped when it comes near to discovering the defending troops. This training should be performed as fast as the observer can follow the beam with a telescope.

(2) If during the training small groups of men are discovered, the movement should not be checked, as there might be

larger enemy forces further round.

(3) When a considerable force is discovered, the electric beam is stopped in its horizontal rotation and elevated as necessary to show up the enemy's depth of formation, and thus assist the aim of the artillery.

(4) If no target is found during the sweep round, it is repeated at a different elevation, and so on up to the maximum range of the light. Between successive sweeps the light can be obscured for a period less than the enemy would take to get through the illuminated zone.

In the Colonies, good high positions are seldom available, and elevated bases must be constructed of wood or iron to overcome this difficulty.

Finally, care must be taken that the auxiliary defences and obstacles

to the enemy's advance are not lit up.

At the proper moment, however, the small searchlight beams are thrown on to these points, while the large ones are directed towards the enemy's rear so as to show up the depth of his formation.

## PROCEDURE OF THE ATTACKER UNDER THE RAYS OF THE SEARCHLIGHTS.

If the attacker expects to be exposed to the searchlights of the defence he covers up all objects that reflect light, such as trumpets, drums, helmets, etc.

The infantry, when at a distance of three kilometres, is in column of companies at convenient intervals, a formation which enables them to take advantage of the shadows.

Roads and zones without cover, or slopes descending towards the enemy, are avoided if possible; if impossible to avoid these, the attackers advance at greater speed and in open formation while crossing

If they find themselves subjected to the luminous rays of the defensive searchlights, they throw themselves on the ground and take cover in the shadows caused by the inequalities of the ground, and they should endeavour to do this before the whole column is discovered.

When there is no cover, some officers advise taking leafy branches

and making use of their shadows as cover when lying down.

The officers are all on foot, as horses are liable to stampede and give away the column. If horses are employed they should be turned away from the lights directly they are caught by the rays.

The attackers profit by the moments when the lights are obscured,

or turned away from them, to make a rapid advance.

When arrived at rifle range the troops proceed as in the daytime.

## VULNERABILITY OF SEARCHLIGHTS.

Direct firing at searchlights is impossible on account of the blinding effect of the rays, and the estimation of range becomes inaccurate, for the opening and closing of the shutters and consequent flickering of the light, causes large errors in the enemy's aim.

However, artillery can fire if the observers and commanders are not themselves in the luminous beam. Percussion fire gives better results than shrapnel fire. Rifle fire is only effective at close range.

Russia has the best organization of searchlight units in the world.

The war with Japan made Russia understand the importance of this service, and after much experiment and study she has assigned to each army corps of two divisions, twelve searchlight units organized as follows:—

.........

(a) One unit of 90 cm., on motor carriage, for each army corps. (b) One unit of 75 cm., in parts, carried on four-wheeled and

two-wheeled carriages for each army corps. (c) Two units of 60 cm., one for each division, carried as in (b).

(d) Eight units of 40 cm., on two-wheeled carriages, very mobile, one for each regiment of infantry.

There are also special units of 40-cm. lights for mountain troops and mounted troops.

## LUMINOUS PROJECTILES.

The luminous source of these projectiles is obtained by means of Bengal lights with parachutes or by the bursting of the projectile into stars.

Germany, Russia, Japan, and Austria use the parachute type of projectile which appears to be preferable to the star shells employed by England and France.

In order to obtain less residual velocity at the point of culmination, and to increase by a very curved trajectory the duration of the light, luminous projectiles are fired from howitzers or mortars.

The only importance of obtaining greater duration of light is the economical question and the facility of re-munitioning and loading; with proper regulation of the intervals between successive shots the light can be made continuous.

Luminous projectiles are employed thus:-

- (1) For continuing by night a bombardment regulated during the day.
- (2) To discover particulars of enemy objectives hidden by lights or fires which have been reported towards the front.

They are not used for long-distance exploration like searchlights, because their number is limited.

They have the advantage of giving zenithal light without shadows, and of not disclosing the position of the guns which fire them. However, the intensity of illumination is not sufficient for observation from the battery, and the observers must go well to the front and ascend in order to see anything.

Dirigibles and aeroplanes are well suited for the use of observers

and can drop luminous shells themselves.

In Germany, in the 1910 manageuvres luminous projectiles fired from special pistols were tried, which illuminated the country around within a radius of 200 metres for a period of twenty seconds.

Those fired from special rifles had a duration of forty seconds.

These special luminous shells are used:-

- (1) To show up the line of march by night.
- (2) Suddenly to light up particular zones on the field of battle.
- (3) As a means of signalling.

# THE WAR.

## ITS NAVAL SIDE.

#### AFTER TWO YEARS.

In the last issue of the Journal, the naval events of the war occurring in April, May, and June were recorded, and the chronicle is here continued to the

second week in October.

On August 4th, the First Lord of the Admiralty published in the Press a brief survey of the naval situation after two years of war. Mr. Balfour said that it would be an error to suppose that the naval victory of May 31st-June 1st changed the situation. What it did was to confirm it. "Before Jutland, as after it, the German Fleet was imprisoned. The battle was an attempt to break the bars and burst the confining gates. It failed, and with its failure the High Sea Fleet sunk again into impotence." Mr. Balfour also referred to the voyage of the "Deutschland" as an operation which presented no naval difficulty, and the commercial results of which were infinitesimal. In its way, it was a tribute to the adequacy of the British blockade. In connection with the admonition of the German Press to the German public "to study the map and take heart," the First Lord pointed out that even the map of Europe shows an ever-shrinking battle-line. "But," he asked, "why look only at Europe?" If a map of the world was chosen, it would show that at the beginning of August, 1914, Germany possessed colonies in the China Seas, in the Malay Archipelago, in the Pacific Ocean, in West Africa, in South-West Africa, and in East Africa. "All have gone except the last, and the last, whilst I write, seems slipping from her grasp." Mr. Balfour also mentioned "the judicial murder of Captain Fryatt," for "doing his duty as a man of courage and of honour." Neutrals are constantly assured by German advocates that the Central Powers are fighting for "the freedom of the seas." This phrase, said Mr. Balfour, has different meanings in different mouths, but of what it means to Germany there have been ample opportunities for judging. "It means that the German Navy is to behave at sea as the German Army behaves on land. It means that neither enemy civilians nor neutrals are to possess\*rights against militant Germany; that those who do not resist will be drowned, and those who do will be shot."

Since the battle off Jutland on May 31st, the only naval incident of importance was a partial engagement between the fleets which was reported to have occurred in the North Sea on August 19th. Several events in July at sea, and the manner in which they were announced in the Berlin communiqués, made manifest a desire on the part of the German authorities to create a belief that the High Sea Fleet was again ready for battle, and was making promenades in the North Sea, "seeking for the British Navy." On August 19th, a portion of the High Sea Fleet left port, numbering, according to the Dutch fishermen, as many as sixty vessels, which, if correct, would appear to indicate that in the intervening eleven weeks some of the ships damaged in the Jutland battle had been repaired. The Kaiser has, indeed, specially thanked the dockyard officials at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven for the promptitude with which the repairs were effected. On this occasion, as soon as the German light cruisers reported the presence of the British in considerable force, the main body of the enemy returned to harbour. The Germans were said to have had two or more airships scouting for them, and that when the Battle Fleet retired the submarine flotillas remained behind. Apparently

an attempt was made to draw the British force into an area where the hostile underwater craft were lurking. Two light cruisers, the "Falmouth" and "Nottingham," were torpedoed, and other claims were made and denied. Neither as an attempt to support their assertion of victory, nor as a snare for the British

Battle Fleet, was this adventure of August 19th successful.

Supplementary despatches from Sir John Jellicoe, giving the names of the officers, petty officers, seamen and marines recommended by him for recognition in connection with the battle off Jutland Bank were published in the London Gazette on September 15th and October 25th. The King has conferred upon Sir John Jellicoe the Order of Merit, and this is the first occasion upon which this decoration has been awarded for services in face of the enemy at sea. Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commanding the Battle-cruiser Fleet, received the Grand Cross of the Bath; and Rear-Admirals Hugh Evan-Thomas and William C. Pakenham, Commanding respectively the Fifth Battle Squadron and the Second Battle-cruiser Squadron, were made Knights Commanders of the same Order. Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Second-in-Command of the Grand Fleet, received the Grand Cross of the Order of St. Michael and St. George; Vice-Admirals Sir Martyn Jerram and Sir Doveton Sturdee, commanding squadrons of the Battle Fleet, with Sir Charles Madden. Chief of the Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, were made Knights Commanders of this Order. Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock, Commanding the First Battle-cruiser Squadron, and Captain A. E. M. Chatfield, Sir David Beatty's Flag-Captain, were given the C.M.G. Three Victoria Crosses were given for conspicuously gallant conduct. Commander the Hon. E. B. S. Bingham, at present a prisoner of war in Germany, was awarded the Cross for the manner in which he led his destroyer division into action in an attack upon the enemy's big ships. The others were posthumous awards, one to Major F. J. W. Harvey, R.M.L.I., who, when mortally wounded, used his last breath to issue orders to flood the magazine, thereby saving the ship; and to John Travers Cornwell, boy, first class, for his example of fortitude and devotion to duty in the "Chester. A large number of names of other officers and men who were selected for decoration, special promotion, or for commendation in connection with the battle appeared in the Gazette.

#### NORTH SEA.

Belgian Coast Movements.—Towards the end of June, there was evidence of increased activity on the part of the Germans at Zeebrugge and off the Belgian coast, which may have been the result of a desire to foster a belief at home that their Fleet was free to cruise in the North Sea. When the steamer "Lestris" was captured on July 5th, as announced in last quarter's Notes, the incident was magnified into an achievement by the main Fleet, the vessel being represented as having been "taken as a prize not far from the English coast by part of our High Sea Forces." Efforts to repeat this little coup were unsuccessful, until the "Colchester" was seized and taken to Zeebrugge on the night of September 21st. A further example of German methods in misleading neutrals, and heartening people at home, was indicated by reports, based on the authority of the crew of a trawler from Ymuiden, that a large German Fleet had been seen "steaming to the north-west of the Frisian Islands." The correspondent of The Times at Amsterdam 12de careful inquiries into the origin of this report, and as a result was able to say that it was an entire fabrication.

MINE-SWEEPER TORPEDOED.—On July 4th, a German communiqué stated that one of their submarines had on that day sunk "an enemy submarine-destroyer in the southern part of the North Sea." In reference to this incident, however, the Admiralty announced that it was a mine-sweeping vessel which was hit by

a torpedo fired from an enemy submarine. She was slightly damaged, but returned safely into harbour.

Submarine Coast Raid.—At 10.30 p.m. on July 11th, a German submarine appeared off the small undefended port of Seaham Harbour. She approached within a few hundred yards of the town, and then opened fire. Some thirty rounds of shrapnel were fired from a 3-inch gun. Twenty of them fell in the direction of Dalton-le-dale, and a dozen rounds fell in and about Seaham Colliery. A woman who was walking through the colliery yard (added the official statement from the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief Home Forces) was seriously injured, and died next morning. One house was struck by a shell. No other casualties or damage occurred. Seaham is a coal-exporting town, with a population of about 12,000, on the Durham coast, seven miles south of Sunderland and ten miles north of the Hartlepools. The raider's commander was no more successful than his predecessor, who, eleven months earlier, bombarded Whitehaven and other Cumberland towns from a submarine. At the inquest on the one victim at Seaham, it was stated that the shelling lasted about five minutes. When firing, the submarine was well out of the water, and men could be seen moving about on the deck.

PATROL INCIDENTS.—On July 14th, a Dutch report from their frontier stated that off the Belgian coast a German patrol ship had struck a mine and sank in the previous week. The greater part of her crew were saved and taken to Zeebrugge by other patrol vessels. About this time, the arrival of new craft in the harbour at Zeebrugge was reported. Following the visit of two new submarines, for which two truck-loads of benzine had been conveyed to the pier. a strange vessel, painted grey, and resembling a merchantman, but thought probably to be an armed cruiser, was said to have been seen. Next two torpedo boats of large type were stated to have arrived at Zeebrugge from Borkum, travelling without lights. On July 17th, passengers arriving at Flushing by the mail steamer announced that they had sighted a British squadron in pursuit of a flotilla of German torpedo craft which had evidently come out from the Belgian ports with the intention of seizing other prizes like the "Brussels" and "Lestris." On July 14th, the neutrals on board the last-named vessel, after seven days in prison, were released by the Germans. There was no news as to the situation of the ten British subjects on board the steamer.

ARMED TRAWLERS SUNK.—On July 15th, the German Admiralty Staff issued a statement to the effect that on the 11th "one of our submarines in the North Sea sank a British auxiliary cruiser of about 7,000 tons. On the same day, off the English east coast, three armed English guardships were sunk by submarine attacks. The crews of these guardships were taken prisoners. One gun was captured." The British Admiralty, referring to this incident, said that there was no truth in the report of the sinking of an auxiliary cruiser, and that the "guardships" were armed trawlers. From information in the Dutch Press, gathered from fishermen who were stated to have witnessed the encounter, it took place off the Scottish coast. The submarines were armed with heavy guns, which overpowered those in the trawlers. One of the latter was soon observed to be on fire and to founder, whereupon the two others turned and made for the coast, pursued by the submarines. The trawlers were the "Onward," "Era," and "Nellie Nutton," and the crew of the first-named were all reported lost, the "Nellie Nutton" also having three killed. The submarines were said to have concentrated their fire first on one boat, then on the others.

BELGIAN COAST SKIRMISH.—On July 22nd, there was a brief encounter between the British and German light craft in the southern part of the North Sea. The official announcement said:—"At midnight on Saturday, near the North Hinder Light Vessel, some of our light forces sighted three enemy destroyers, who retired

before damage could be inflicted on them. Subsequently off the Schouwen Bank six of the enemy destroyers were engaged, and a running fight ensued, during which the enemy were repeatedly hit, but succeeded in reaching the Belgian coast. One of our vessels was hit once, and one officer and one man were slightly wounded. There was no other damage or casualty." The Schouwen Bank is, of course, the outermost of a series of sands and shallows, alternating with deeper channels for a distance of about fifteen miles from the south Dutch coast, opposite the islands of Schouwen and Walcheren and the eastern estuary of the Scheldt. The North Hinder light is off these sandbanks, nearly half-way across to Harwich. In the German report of the affair on the 22nd, the British destroyers were said to have been accompanied by "several small British cruisers of the 'Aurora' class," It was also asserted that the German vessels "undertook a raid which brought them close to the mouth of the Thames without sighting hostile naval forces there." In presenting to men from the destroyers and trawlers twentynine distinguished service medals, etc., on September 20th, Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, Commanding the Dover Patrol, said that the men of the latter had at all times and under all conditions carried out their duties well. record of the Patrol during the year had been a good one.

AUXILIARY SHIP ATTACKED.—On July 26th, a Berlin official message announced, with the usual exaggerations, that "on July 20th, off the British naval base at Scapa Flow (Orkneys), one of our submarines attacked a large British line of battleship and obtained two hits." In correcting this, the Admiralty made the following statement:—"The actual facts are that a small auxiliary off the north of Scotland was attacked by an enemy submarine on the date mentioned. She was not hit."

AEROPLANE RAIDS.—German aircraft, both Zeppelins and aeroplanes, have continued their visits to and attacks upon the eastern coast and counties during the period under review. On July 9th, a hostile seaplane came over the Isle of Thanet at 10.45 a.m. No bombs were dropped, and the raider made off, pursued by British naval aircraft. He was also fired at by anti-aircraft guns, but without effect. A second raid, over south-east Kent, was made on the night of the same day, at 11.55 p.m., when a hostile aircraft dropped seven explosive bombs, but effected no damage beyond breaking several windows. He made good his escape. In neither of these raids were there any casualties.

ZEPPELIN RAIDS .- A resumption of raids by Zeppelin airships took place on the last three days of July. On the early morning of July 29th, three airships came over the east coast between midnight and 1.30 a.m. Thirty-two bombs were dropped in Lincolnshire and Norfolk, but no material damage and no casualties were caused. Many other bombs are reported to have fallen in the sea. At one place anti-aircraft guns were in action and succeeded in driving off the aircraft from their objective. The raiders appear to have been greatly hampered by fog. On the night of July 31st, between the hours of 10 p.m. and midnight, the Eastern and South-Eastern Counties were attacked by several hostile airships. The raiders flew at a great height, said the official communiqué. Owing to this fact and to patches of mist the airships' movements gave rise to much uncertainty, and their number was difficult to determine. At least six ships could be reckoned by independent observers, and it is probable that one more flew over the country without dropping bombs. The number of bombs was at first greatly exaggerated owing to the majority of them falling in thinly-inhabited districts and having been heard at great distances. The actual number found was about sixty. One raider was engaged by aircraft and anti-aircraft guns. She was seen to drop to a low altitude and disappeared in the mist. A later official message on

August 1st said:—"The reports received to-day show that no casualties of any sort were caused by last night's air raid."

NAVAL AEROPLANE FEATS.—On July 31st, the Admiralty issued for publication details of an experience which happened to a British airman in connection with an abortive Zeppelin raid early that morning. The airman pursued in one of the naval aeroplanes a Zeppelin for thirty miles off the east coast, and attacked her. He had fired over two trays of ammunition at the airship when he was temporarily incapacitated by a portion of his machine-gun flying off and stunning him. The Zeppelin was nowhere to be seen when the pilot regained consciousness He was, therefore, forced to return to his station. On July 29th, there was issued by the Air Board an extract from a report of the Royal Naval Air Service, showing that on July 15th a Nieuport aeroplane from Dunkirk patrolled ten miles out to sea, and when approaching Ostend, at about 12,000 feet, encountered a German seaplane, a single-engine tractor type, 500 feet below. The enemy manœuvred for a position behind and below the Nieuport, both machines meanwhile executing a steep glide. The British pilot thereupon looped over the enemy, who passed underneath him. He thus gained the desired position behind, and opened fire into the seaplane at a range of 100 yards. The German pilot, who was evidently hit, made a vertical nose-dive. The machine was last seen in flames falling headlong downwards.

East Coast Raids.—On August 2nd, a further Zeppelin raid took place, about six airships raiding the counties of Norfolk, Suffolk, and Essex, and one of them was hit by anti-aircraft fire. Except at one point the Zeppelins did not penetrate far inland. On October 25th, the Distinguished Service Cross was conferred upon Flight-Lieut. C. T. Freeman for a gallant attack on a Zeppelin at sea on August 2nd. In the early hours of August 9th, there was another raid by airships officially estimated to number between seven and ten. The raiders did not penetrate far inland, except in the extreme north, but dropped a number of bombs in various localities near the coast. "At several places," said an official communique, "the airships were engaged by anti-aircraft guns and driven off from their objective," and no damage of military importance was reported.

DOVER RAIDED.—On August 12th, two hostile seaplanes appeared over Dover between 12.25 and 12.30 p.m. Four bombs were dropped, but no material damage was done beyond the breaking of a few windows. Anti-aircraft guns came into action, and aeroplanes went up in pursuit of the raiders, who made off seaward at about 12.35 p.m. The casualties were one officer and six men slightly injured.

Mulheim Raided.—On July 30th, in conjunction with the French, an attack was made by British naval aeroplanes on the benzine stores and barracks at Mulheim. This was the first occasion upon which naval aircraft had been mentioned in this quarter. The machines were officially stated to have met with a very heavy anti-aircraft fire in making their attack on the 30th, but they succeeded in gaining their objective, and carried out a successful bombardment, afterwards returning safely.

RAIDS IN BELGIUM.—On August 2nd, successful attacks by a naval aeroplane squadron of bombing and fighting machines were carried out on the enemy's aerodrome at St. Denis Westrem and on his ammunition sheds at Meirelbeke. About two tons of bombs were dropped on these objectives, and considerable damage was done. One of the fighting machines, piloted by Flight-Lieutenant R. G. A. Baudry, was afterwards missing, and was believed to have been shot down. This airman became a Flight-Sub-Lieutenant on March 18th, 1915, and Flight-Lieutenant on January 1st, 1916. In the Admiralty list of casualties published on September 11th, he was presumed to have been killed. Both the

places raided on August 2nd are near Ghent, Meirelbeke being two and a-half miles south of the town, and St. Denis Westrem five miles south of it.

ZEPPELIN SHED BOMBED.—At daybreak on the morning of August 9th, an attack was made upon the German airship shed at Evere, near Brussels. It was carried out by naval machines under a heavy fire, but the objective was successfully bombarded from a height of 200 feet, and eight bombs were observed to hit the shed. Heavy columns of white smoke were seen to issue. The machines returned safely. A previous naval raid upon the Evere shed took place on June 7th, 1915, and was made by Flight Lieutenants J. P. Wilson and J. S. Mills, the shed being observed to be in flames. It was subsequently reported that Zeppelin "LZ, 38" was inside at the time and was destroyed.

NAVAL AIR WORK.—At noon on August 18th, machines of the Royal Naval Air Service made an attack upon enemy ammunition dumps at Lichtervelde, some ten miles south-west of Bruges. The attack was successful, forty-eight bombs being dropped from a height of about 3,000 feet, and large fires were afterwards observed. All the machines returned safely. On August 19th there was issued a series of brief reports from the Air Board, extracted from recent despatches of the Royal Naval Air Service. In addition to describing operations off the Belgian coast, these accounts stated that the naval aircraft had maintained a steady offensive in Southern Bulgaria, and also a regular patrol of the Dardanelles, where they had attacked with bombs and machine-gun fire all enemy movements.

RAID ON LONDON.—On the night of August 23rd a Zeppelin crossed the east coast and dropped bombs without doing any damage or causing any casualties. On the following night, five or six enemy airships made a raid, dropping about 100 bombs, over the east and south-east coasts of England. The official communiqués showed that two or three of the raiders came in over the Eastern Counties, and dropped over thirty bombs without causing any casualties or damage. Another raider attempted to approach a seaport town, but being heavily fired on by anti-aircraft guns was driven off to the eastward after dropping 19 bombs in the sea without reaching her objective. Another airship which visited the south-east coast also came under heavy fire from the anti-aircraft defences, and was compelled to unload her cargo of bombs in the sea without doing any damage to life or property. Another raider succeeded in reaching the outskirts of London, when explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped, killing three men, three women, and two children, and injuring seven men, eleven women, and three children. In addition, one soldier was seriously and fourteen were slightly injured by broken glass. Most of the 40 bombs dropped by this vessel fell either on small properties or in the open, but an electric power station was slightly damaged, and engineering works were somewhat damaged by fire. Several small fires which occurred were promptly extinguished by the London Fire Brigade. Airmen went up in pursuit, and one of them succeeded in firing at a raider at close range.

ZEPPELIN SHEDS BOMBED.—On the morning of August 25th, an attack was made by machines of the Royal Naval Air Service upon one of the Zeppelin bases. The Admiralty stated that the airship sheds near Namur were successfully bombarded, and two of them were hit, but owing to low-lying clouds it was not possible to observe the amount of damage done. One of the British machines failed to return after carrying out the raid. A fortnight earlier, on August 11th, the airship sheds at Namur were reported by Sir Douglas Haig to have been bombed by the Royal Flying Corps.

GERMAN AIRSHIP BROUGHT DOWN.—On the night of September 2nd, the most formidable attack on England from the air attempted up to that time by the

Germans was made. It was carried out by thirteen airships, which dropped a number of bombs in the East Anglian and South-Eastern Counties. Three of the airships approached the outskirts of London. The official report said that one of them appeared over the northern districts at about 2.15 a.m., where she was at once picked up by searchlights and heavily engaged by anti-aircraft guns and aeroplanes. After a few minutes the airship was seen to burst into flame and to fall rapidly towards the earth. The ship was destroyed; the wreckage, engines, and the half-burned bodies of the crew being found at Cuffley, near Enfield. The other two ships were driven off without being able to approach the centre of the City. The number of casualties reported were one man and one woman killed, eleven men and women and two children injured. No military damage of any sort was caused. An important part of one of the enemy's airships which raided England on September 2nd-3rd was picked up in the Eastern Counties, and there was no doubt but that the ship suffered severe damage from gunfire. The airship which fell near London, and which was said to be commanded by Captain Wilhelm Schramm, passed through heavy and accurate gunfire, but it was established beyond doubt that the main factor in its destruction was the attack of an aeroplane of the Royal Flying Corps, piloted by Lieutenant William Leefe Robinson, Worcester Regiment and R.F.C., who was on September 5th awarded the Victoria Cross for his gallantry and judgment in attacking the airship-a military vessel -under circumstances of great difficulty and danger, and after he had been in the air for more than two hours.

British Naval Raids.—On the afternoon of September 7th, an attack was made by naval aeroplanes on the enemy aerodrome at St. Denis Westrem, which had been raided on August 2nd. A large number of bombs were dropped with good effect. One of the machines failed to return. During the course of the same afternoon, added the official communiqué, a naval aeroplane successfully attacked and brought down in flames a hostile kite balloon near Ostend. The attack was carried out under anti-aircraft fire of the heaviest description, but the pilot returned safely. He was Flight-Lieut. C. R. Mackenzie, R.N.A.S., and on October 25th was awarded the D.S.O. On the morning of September 9th, an attack was carried out by naval aeroplanes on the enemy's aerodromes at Ghistelles and Handzaeme. A large number of bombs were dropped with satisfactory results, and all the machines returned safely. An attack was also made by naval aeroplanes during the afternoon of the same day on the railway siding and ammunition dump at Lichtervelde, from which the machines also returned safely.

HOBOKEN YARD BOMBED .- On the afternoon of September 2nd, the shipbuilding yards of Hoboken, near Antwerp, were successfully bombed by naval aeroplanes. These yards had previously been raided by the machines of the Royal Naval Air Service, the first time being apparently on March 24th, 1915. Describing his share in the raid on that date, the late Flight Lieutenant H. Rosher (a collection of whose letters has been published by Messrs. Chatto and Windus) said that the course of the airmen was right up the coast, past Zeebrugge, and then to cut in across the land. At the mouth of the Scheldt, Rosher got clear of the clouds and followed his leader over them, but above Antwerp there were no clouds, and the machines were heavily fired upon. He proceeded: "As the wind was dead against me, I decided to come round in a semi-circle to cross the yards with the wind, so as to attain a greater speed. I was only 5,500 feet up, and they opened fire on me with shrapnel as soon as I got within range. I passed over the yards at about 1,000 feet only, and loosed all my bombs over the place. The whole way down I was under fire, two anti-aircraft in the yard, guns from the forts on either side, rifle fire, mitrailleuse or machine guns, and, most weird of all, great bunches (15 to 20) of what looked like green rockets.

but I think they were flaming bullets. The excitement of the moment was terrific. I have never travelled so fast before in my life." He estimated the speed of his descent as he vol-planed on sighting the yards at well over a hundred miles an hour. Following the raid on Hoboken on September 2nd, the enemy aerodrome at Ghistelles was also bombarded with effect by a large squadron of naval machines on September 3rd. On both days all the machines returned safely.

AIR RAIDS IN BELGIUM.—The attacks on enemy positions in Belgium by the British naval airmen were continued throughout September. In the early hours of the 15th, a squadron of aeroplanes bombarded the enemy's heavy batteries near Østend, and returned safely. On the afternoon of the 17th, a squadron of aeroplanes carried out a further attack on the enemy aerodrome at St. Denis Westrem. A large number of bombs were dropped with successful results. One machine, said the official announcement, was obliged to make a forced landing in Holland, and the pilot was interned. It was stated in the Dutch Press that this was Flight-Lieutenant Donald Ernest Larkness, who came down at West Kapelle, with a damaged motor, having been heavily fired at from Zeebrugge. He was slightly wounded in the leg by shrapnel, and his machine was so injured that he had to choose between falling into the sea or landing on Dutch soil. He dropped numerous bombs on Zeebrugge. On September 22nd, naval aeroplanes made another attack on the aerodrome at St. Denis Westrem, with results which were officially stated to be highly satisfactory. "Reliable reports now to hand," added the notice, "show that very considerable damage and many casualties have been caused by the previous bombardment of this objective." In the early hours of the 23rd, the enemy aerodromes at Ghistelles and Handzaeme were heavily bombarded by the naval machines, all of which returned safely. On September 27th, attacks were carried out on the enemy airship sheds at Evere; Berchem St. Agathe; and Etterbeck, near Brussels; all by naval aeroplanes. Bombs were observed to straddle the sheds, which were apparently hit. Bombs dropped at Evere struck buildings, presumably ammunition stores, in close Heavy explosions and large volumes of smoke were proximity to the sheds. observed. All the machines returned safely. On October 2nd, the airship sheds near Brussels were attacked, and one of the British airmen failed to return. The Germans claimed that their naval aeroplanes from Zeebrugge attacked the British machines, and shot one of them down.

ZEPPELINS DESTROYED.—On September 22nd there opened another Zeppelin raiding season. On that afternoon, a German seaplane appeared near Dover, and dropped three bombs, which caused no casualties, and made off at once in a north-easterly direction when aeroplanes went up in pursuit. This proved, as on previous occasions, to be the fore-runner of Zeppelin raids. One by twelve airships was made on the following night, the 23rd, over various parts of England, including the London district. Two Zeppelins were brought down in Essex, one being completely burnt out and the crew killed, and the other being compelled to land owing to loss of gas after damage by gunfire. These vessels, both comparatively new and of large naval type, were identified as "L.32" and "L.33." The first airship was finally destroyed by an aeroplane after passing through effective gunfire; the second was hit by gunfire from the London defences, but came down near the Essex coast. The destroyed vessel was commanded by Commander Brödruck, who with other members of the crew of "L.32" was buried on the 27th. On October 4th, it was officially announced that the D.S.O. had been conferred upon Second Lieutenants Frederick Sowrey and Alfred de Bath Brandon, M.C., both of the Royal Flying Corps, "in recognition of their gallantry and distinguished services in connection with the successful attacks on enemy airships." On September 25th, there was a further Zeppelin raid by seven airships,

aimed principally against the industrial centres of the Midlands, but as on the 23rd, no military damage was caused. On the two nights, 74 people were killed and 152 injured. On October 1st, ten hostile airships again crossed the east coast. One approached the north of London, but was driven off by gunfire and aeroplanes. Attempting to return from the north-west, she was again attacked, and brought to earth in flames in the neighbourhood of Potter's Bar. A second airship attempted to attack London, but was driven off, and the remaining vessels wandered aimlessly over the Eastern Counties and Lincolnshire. The airship destroyed was of the latest type, and on a tablet worn by the commander was the inscription "Mathy, 'L.31." This name appeared on the commander's On October 6th, however, it was reported from German sources. coffin-plate. that the commander was named Bernhard Schreib-Müller, who before entering the Army was an officer of the Lake Constance Navigation Company. As the "L.31" was a naval vessel, however, this may have referred to the commander of the vessel brought down on September 2nd. Four hostile airships were thus brought down in England within a month. On October 13th, Second Lieutenant Wulstan John Tempest, R.F.C., was awarded the D.S.O., in recognition of his conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty in connection with the destruction of the airship at Potter's Bar.

"Lassoo" Sunk.—On August 13th, the torpedo-boat destroyer "Lassoo" sunk off the Dutch coast after being torpedoed or mined. Six of her crew were reported missing, including Sub-Lieutenant H. O'B. Thornhill, R.N.; Surgeon-Probationer G. S. Freeman, R.N.V.R.; and Gunner (T) H. Godbehere, R.N. Engineer-Lieutenant-Commander Arthur R. Rice, R.N., and an engine-room artificer were wounded. Two Dutch torpedo boats were reported to have brought into Ymuiden on the same night some wreckage from the "Lassoo," including two boats. In the German version of the loss, it was asserted that the destroyer was torpedoed by a submarine "in the English Channel," although as a matter of fact the boat was sunk only a few miles from the coast of Holland, and was therefore a long distance from the English Channel. The "Lassoo," under the command of Lieutenant-Commander V. S. Butler, was the vessel which, after the naval air raid on Tondern, in Schleswig, on March 25th, 1916, rescued without loss the entire ship's company of the "Medusa," when that vessel had been seriously damaged in collision. (See No. 442, May, 1916, p. 424.)

GERMAN FLEET MOVEMENT .- Early on the morning of Monday, August 21st. the Admiralty issued a statement showing that the German High Sea Fleet had again put in an appearance in the North Sea-eleven weeks after it had been driven back into its ports by the Grand Fleet after the battle off the Jutland coast. The Admiralty announced that "reports from our look-out squadrons and other units showed that there was considerable activity on the part of the enemy in the North Sea on Saturday, the 19th inst. The German High Sea Fleet came out, but learning from their scouts that the British forces were in considerable strength the enemy avoided engaging and returned to port. In searching for the enemy we lost two light cruisers by submarine attack-H.M.S. ' Nottingham' (Captain C. B. Miller, R.N.), and H.M.S. 'Falmouth' (Captain J. D. Edwards, R.N.). All the officers of the former were saved, but there are 38 men of the crew missing; all officers and men of the 'Falmouth' were saved, but one, Leading Stoker Norman Fry, died of injuries. One enemy submarine has been destroyed. Another has been rammed, and possibly sunk. There is no truth in the German statements that a British destroyer was sunk and a British battleship damaged."

OTHER VERSIONS.—An official telegram from Berlin on the 20th thus referred to the foregoing encounter: "Our submarines, on the 19th, sank, in the waters

of the English East Coast, one hostile small cruiser and one destroyer, Another small cruiser and one battleship were badly damaged by torpedoes." This exaggeration of the success achieved by their submarines indicated the political object which the cruise was probably intended to serve. As regards the direction of the German advance, the crews of some Dutch trawlers returning to Ymuiden on the following day stated that on the morning of the 19th, when in 54.6 north latitude, and 4.55 east longitude, they sighted two Zeppelins and a squadron of either 14 or 16 German warships, including some large cruisers, one light cruiser, and a number of torpedo boats, all of which were proceeding west-north-westwards. On August 26th, a Berlin official communiqué stated that all the submarines which participated in the "enterprise of August 19th" had returned. The British Admiralty's statement that one of the German submarines was rammed, and slightly damaged, by a destroyer, after having torpedoed and sunk a light cruiser which was being towed, but the "U"-boat returned safely to port.

GERMAN STORY.—On August 22nd, an official German telegram said that about five o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th one of their submarines sighted five small British cruisers on a south-eastern course, accompanied by two destroyer flotillas. Behind these, six battle-cruisers were stationed, protected by a strong destroyer flotilla. "The submarine succeeded in firing a shot against one of these protecting destroyers, which had four funnels, and apparently belonged to the 'Mohawk' class. Shortly after being hit the destroyer sank, with its stern high above the water." (This part of the report, said the Secretary of the Admiralty, was without foundation; "no torpedo boat destroyer was touched.") The German account proceeded:-" When immediately afterwards, the whole British unit turned about, the submarine attacked a small British cruiser of the 'Chatham' class, which was now in the rear, and steaming at twenty-five knots. Two hits were observed, one in the bows and the other near the engine-room. The ship at once listed heavily and stopped. Owing to the enemy's strong patrols it was not until two and a-half hours later that the submarine succeeded in repeating the attack on the cruiser when the latter was being towed. . . . Soon afterwards, the crew heard a big explosion. The enemy destroyers pursued the submarine until darkness fell. . . . A small cruiser was later destroyed by another of our submarines."

THE LOST CRUISERS.—Both the "Nottingham" and "Falmouth" took part in the battle off the Jutland Bank on May 31st. In his report, Sir David Beatty spoke of the destroyer "Landrail" sighting an enemy submarine, and he went on to say: "the 'Nottingham' (Captain C. B. Miller) also reported a submarine on the starboard beam." In describing later a torpedo attack on the Third Light Cruiser Squadron, to which the "Falmouth" belonged, he said: "the 'Falmouth' (Captain J. D. Edwards) and 'Yarmouth' (Captain T. D. Pratt) both fired torpedoes at the leading enemy battle-cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo hit, as a heavy under-water explosion was observed." The "Nottingham" was of 5,440 tons, completed in 1914, and the "Falmouth" of 5,250 tons, completed in 1911. The massive silver plate presented by the people of Nottinghamshire to the former vessel was not on board, as was originally supposed, when she was sunk, but was deposited at Nottingham. Captain C. B. Miller had the honour of being received by King George at Windsor on August 24th.

GERMAN BATTLESHIP TORPEDOED.—On August 22nd, the British Admiralty announced that submarine "E.23," Lieutenant-Commander Robert R. Turner, R.N., which had returned that day from the North Sea, reported that on the morning of the 19th she had made a successful torpedo attack upon a German

battleship of the "Nassau" class. The commanding officer reported that while the German ship was being escorted by five destroyers back to harbour in a damaged condition he attacked again, and struck her with a second torpedo, and believes that she was sunk. In a semi-official telegram from Berlin on the 23rd, it was admitted that the battleship "Westfalen," of the "Nassau" class, was hit and slightly damaged by a British torpedo, but the vessel, it was claimed, proceeded under her own steam back to port, and would shortly be repaired. The second English torpedo, it was said, missed its mark. Submarine "E.23" had a great reception on returning to her East Coast base. The news of her exploit was already known, and when she came in sight the men assembled on the decks of other vessels in port gave her a rousing welcome. Lieutenant-Commander R. R. Turner, was in command of an older submarine, "D.3," during the first part of the war. On October 25th, he was awarded the D.S.O.

Boarding Steamer Lost.—On August 26th, the Admiralty stated that the armed boarding steamer "Duke of Albany," Commander George N. Ramage, R.N.R., had been torpedoed and sunk in the North Sea on August 24th by an enemy submarine. Commander Ramage and Engineer-Lieutenant A. G. G. Maskell, with 22 men, were lost; whilst 11 officers and 76 ratings were saved. The "Duke of Albany," a twin-screw steamer of 1,997 tons, was built in 1907 by Messrs. John Brown & Co., and was formerly in the Fleetwood-Belfast railway steamer service of the Lancashire and Yorkshire and North-Western Companies.

FALSE GERMAN REPORT.—On August 28th, the British Admiralty made the following announcement: "In the German wireless issued on Saturday night, and repeated to-day, the Vossische Zeitung is quoted as reporting from Amsterdam that Dutch sailors had stated that a British destroyer was seen in a sinking condition east of the Dogger Bank, having been abandoned by her crew. There has been no engagement of any sort, and no British destroyer is missing. There is, consequently, no shadow of truth in this fabricated statement."

Shooting of Captain Fryatt.—A sequel to the capture of the British steamer "Brussels" on June 24th (see August notes, page 676) was the shooting of her master, Captain Charles Fryatt. The following is the full text of the German official telegram, dated July 28th, which announced the execution:—

"On Thursday, at Bruges, before the Court Martial of the Marine Corps, the trial took place of Captain Charles Fryatt, of the British steamer 'Brussels,' which was brought in as a prize. The accused was condemned to death because, although he was not a member of a combatant force, he made an attempt on the afternoon of March 28th, 1915, to ram the German submarine 'U.33' near the Maas Lightship. The accused, as well as the first officer and the chief engineer of the steamer, received at the time from the British Admiralty a gold watch as a reward for his brave conduct on that occasion, and his action was mentioned with praise in the House of Commons. On the occasion in question, disregarding the U boat's signal to stop and show his national flag, he turned at a critical moment at high speed on the submarine, which escaped the steamer by a few metres only by immediately diving. He confessed that in so doing he had acted in accordance with the instructions of the Admiralty. sentence was confirmed yesterday (Thursday) afternoon and carried out by shooting. One of the many nefarious franc-tireur proceedings of the British merchant marine against our war vessels has thus found a belated but merited expiation."

In the House of Commons on July 31st, Mr. Asquith stated that His Majesty's Government desired to repeat emphatically that they were resolved that such crimes as the murder of Captain Fryatt should not, if they could help it, go unpunished. "When the time arrives," he added, "they are determined to bring to justice the criminals, whoever they may be, and whatever their station. In such cases as this, the man who authorizes the system under which such crimes are committed may well be the most guilty of all. The question of what immediate action should be taken is engaging the earnest consideration of the Government." In the House of Lords, the Marquis of Crewe said that the killing of Captain Fryatt was a judicial murder, and a cold-blooded murder, too. "Captain Fryatt was absolutely within his right, according to the rules of warfare, in attempting to defend himself and his ship."

A NARROW ESCAPE.—Early in September, according to the Haagsche Courant, the skipper of the Dutch trawler "Geertruda" narrowly escaped the fate of Captain Fryatt. After his vessel had been sunk by a German submarine, he was taken a prisoner to Germany, where he was put on trial. He was accused of carrying a gun in his trawler, and of attempting to ram a submarine. A court martial found him guilty, and he was sentenced to death, but on appeal was able to convince the authorities of his innocence, when he was released.

ATTEMPTED ESCAPE.—In the first week of September, two of the crew of the German auxiliary cruiser "Berlin," interned at Trondhjem, made a desperate effort to escape. They swam from the ship and reached the beach; but one was greatly exhausted, and gave himself up at dawn, and the other was caught.

ADMIRATTY DENIAL.—It was reported in the German Press that the British Government had informed Holland that from the middle of August all British mercantile vessels would be armed. This statement was categorically denied by the British Admiralty. The statement was, no doubt, said the British announcement, published in the German Press in order to provide material on which to base fresh illegal acts of barbarity against British merchant ships.

Unfounded German Claim.—On September 18th according to a German official communiqué, aeroplanes raided an Allied naval force of two gunboats, sixteen destroyers, and one "hydroplane ship" off the Flemish coast, the "hydroplane ship" being hit. An aeroplane of the squadron, which ascended to meet the raiders, was compelled to descend in Holland, added the Germans. In regard to the first claim, the Secretary of the Admiralty announced that none of His Majesty's ships was hit or damaged in any way. The descent of an airman in Holland may have reference to the British naval air raid on St. Denis Westrem on September 17th, referred to elsewhere.

DOVER PATROL.—A despatch from Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon on the work of the Dover Patrol from December 3rd, 1915, to May 29th, 1916, was issued in the London Gazette on July 25th, 1916. In these six months, over 21,000 merchant ships, apart from men-of-war and auxiliaries, passed through the Patrol. Of these, 21 were lost, or seriously damaged by the enemy, a proportion, therefore, of less than one per thousand. To effect this considerable security, over 4 per cent. of the patrol vessels had been sunk, and 77 officers and men had sacrificed their lives. In regard to the work of the Patrol in assisting in the protection of the flank of all the sea transport to and from the Army in France, Admiral Bacon said that this vast transport of troops had been so thoroughly safeguarded that not one single life had been lost during the sea passage.

BELGIAN COAST OPERATIONS.—Another attack on the Belgian coast positions from the sea was reported on Sunday, September 24th. The British squadron

taking part was said to be composed of monitors and destroyers, and sounds of firing were audible nearly all day.

Steamers Seized.—On the night of September 21st, the British steamer "Colchester" was seized by German small craft while on her way from Holland to England, and taken to Zeebrugge. The "Colchester" was in the Great Eastern Railway service, like the "Brussels," whose master, Captain Fryatt, was shot. On September 23rd, the Zeeland Company's steamer "Prins Hendrik," bound from Flushing to Gravesend, was detained in the North Sea by German vessels, which took some fifty-seven prisoners out of her and allowed her to proceed. After her release, the "Prins Hendrik" was detained a second time, about fifty miles out, and while being searched on this occasion an Allied aeroplane appeared overhead and endeavoured to drive off the German torpedo boats by dropping bombs. A second Dutch steamer, the "Batavier II.," was held up on the 24th by a submarine of an old type, "U.6," off the Maas Lightship. The steamer was taken to Zeebrugge, and when nearing the port some shells from the British bombarding squadron passed right over her.

SUBMARINE WARFARE.—The submarine war on merchantmen gave evidence of another period of fitful activity during September. Attacks on neutral ships were especially frequent. In the first week of the month, the "Kelvinia," a vessel of 5,039 tons, belonging to the Glasgow Steam Shipping Company, was sunk. She had several American passengers on board, and when these returned to the United States on September 18th they filed affidavits that the steamer was torpedoed without any warning. After receiving them, it was reported that officials of the State Department had declared that immediate action would be taken in the matter. About this time, several Spanish, Dutch, and Norwegian vessels were torpedoed or otherwise destroyed by the German submarines. Three Spanish steamers were sunk in two days, and protests were made by shipowners in Spain at these attacks. On September 25th, Count Romanones received a committee of shipowners who declared that they would suspend traffic if the Government did not obtain from the Central Empires a formal promise that their ships would be respected. The Spanish Committee in Paris, said Reuter, also demanded that for each Spanish boat sunk a German boat of equal tonnage interned in Spain should be seized. Similar protests were made in Holland. As regards the Norwegian losses, it was stated in The Times that, either by accident or design, Norwegian shipping had suffered more severely than that of any other neutral country, its losses amounting to well over 100,000 tons. In the four days September 8th-11th eight ships of the Norwegian merchant fleet, of an aggregate tonnage of 19,733, were sunk by German submarines. Norwegians were consequently asking why they should submit to such depredations, especially as, while Germany's warships attacked their merchantmen, the German merchant fleet, in increasing numbers, relying on England respecting the territorial waters convention, was creeping up the coast and enjoying the hospitality of Norwegian harbours.

SUBMARINES OFF ARCHANGEL.—About the end of September, "U" boats were reported in the White Sea. Among the ships which they attacked and sunk was the Norwegian steamer "Raon," with loss of life. Eleven men of the vessel returned to Christiania on October 9th, and reported that four others of the crew had perished from exhaustion, while another lifeboat with five men in it was lost.

Wireless Station Shelled.—A Norwegian journal, the Finmarkens Amtstidende, published at Vadsoe, reported that on October 7th three German submarines bombarded the wireless station at Jepnovalok, on the coast of the Murman Peninsula. One of the masts was destroyed, and some persons killed. A Russian destroyer then came up, and a fierce fight ensued, which ended in the sinking of two of the submarines.

TREATMENT OF SUBMARINES.—On October 4th, there was published in the Press the text of a memorandum, dated "August," from the Allied Governments to certain neutral maritime States, urging them "to take effective measures, if they have not already done so, with a view to preventing belligerent submarine vessels, whatever the purpose to which they are put, from making use of neutral waters, roadsteads and ports." The application to submarines of the principles of the law of nations was said to be affected by special and novel conditions; first, by the fact that these vessels could navigate and remain at sea submerged, and could thus escape all control and observation; and second, by the fact that it was impossible to identify them and to establish their national character, whether neutral or belligerent, combatant or non-combatant, and to remove the capacity for harm inherent in the nature of such vessels. It was therefore asked that "any belligerent submarine entering a neutral port should be detained there."

AMERICAN AND NORWEGIAN REPLIES .- On October 12th, it was revealed by Reuter that the United States had replied a month before to the Allied note. The reply, therefore, was despatched before the visit of "U.53" to Newport, Rhode Island, on October 7th. It declared that the Allied Powers had set forth no circumstances concerning the use of war or merchant submarines which would render the existing rules inapplicable to them. As regards the treatment of either war or merchant submarines in American waters, the United States reserved its liberty of action, and announced that it held it "to be the duty of belligerent Powers to distinguish between submarines of neutral and belligerent nationality, and that the responsibility for any conflict between belligerent warships and neutral submarines on account of the neglect of a belligerent so to distinguish between these classes of submarines must rest entirely upon the negligent Power." Norway's reply was of a different character. A Royal Letter on October 13th forbade from October 20th submarines belonging to belligerent navies travelling in Norwegian territorial waters. In case of infringement, a submarine risks attack without warning, it was declared; "In hard weather, a submarine, to save life, may seek refuge in Norwegian waters, but must then keep above water, flying the national flag, and leave immediately the reason for entering no longer exists." According to a Reuter telegram from Christiania, this permission also applies to mercantile submarines. The Royal Letter also warned submarines other than those mentioned not to travel in Norwegian waters, on account of the difficulty in distinguishing the different types. The Government repudiated responsibility for any damage inflicted owing to a mistake as to the submarine's

THE FIRST LORD.-In the list of honours conferred on the occasion of the King's Birthday, and published on June 3rd, Mr. A. J. Balfour was gazetted to the Order of Merit. On August 4th, the First Lord issued a message on the occasion of the second anniversary of the British declaration of war, which, he said, provided a fitting opportunity for a brief survey of the present naval situation. A week later, replying to an address presented to him as chairman of the British branch of the Empire Parliamentary Association, by the representatives of the Dominion Parliaments then concluding their visit to Great Britain, Mr. Balfour said: "There is not a man in this room who has been in this delegation who has not seen a great deal more than any Minister of the Crown. I have been First Lord of the Admiralty for over fourteen months, and I have not visited Rosyth since I have occupied that position. I have never seen munition works. I have not been over the Tyne or the Clyde under war conditions, and I have not, since I have been in office, been at the front." On September 4th and 5th, Mr. Balfour made a tour of shipbuilding and engineering works on the Clyde, when he addressed representatives of trade unions. He said that "the increase in the number of our

smaller craft, inevitably consequent upon the changed condition of warfare, had thrown upon our yards a strain wholly unexpected before the commencement of war. The scale of repairing had also inevitably increased." Mr. Balfour also had a conference with the masters of works which are producing war materials. On October 7th, it was announced that as a result of negotiations between representatives of the Admiralty, Ministry of Munitions, and the Board of Trade, and the local district committees of the shipyard trade unions, an important agreement had been made with the Liverpool district committees of the Liverpool Shipwrights' Trade and Friendly Association and of the Ship Constructors' and Shipwrights' Association. On this occasion, Mr. Balfour sent a telegram to Mr. Lynden Macassey, who organized the scheme, in which he said: "The decision of the Liverpool district committees to adopt dilution in the Mersey shipbuilding and ship-repairing trade is of the greatest national value and importance, and is in the best interests of the Royal Navy and the country."

CRADOCK MEMORIAL.-On June 16th, Mr. Balfour delivered an address on the occasion of the unveiling by the Marquis of Zetland of a mural monument to the late Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, who went down with his flagship, the "Good Hope," in the battle off Coronel on November 1st, 1914. The First Lord said that Cradock's name deserved to be enrolled among those who in this tremendous struggle had held high the honour of their country. Cradock's action in attacking a force obviously greatly superior to his own showed not only the highest courage, but the greatest unselfishness. The bust is the work of Mr. F. W. Pomeroy, A.R.A., and is inscribed: "To the glory of God and in memory of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, who, gallantly upholding the high tradition of the British Navy, led his squadron against an overwhelming force of the enemy off Coronel, on the coast of Chile, and fell gloriously in action on All Saints' Day, 1914. 'God forbid that I should do this thing, to flee away from them; if our time be come, let us die manfully for our brethren and let us not stain our honour.'-- Maccabees ix., 10. This monument is erected by his grateful countrymen."

"UC.5," on VIEW.—The German mine-laying submarine "UC.5," which was captured off the east coast in April, 1916, as announced by the Admiralty on the 28th of that month, was brought to London and moored alongside the Temple Pier, where the boat was exhibited to the public from July 26th to August 15th. A small charge was made for admission to the pier, and the proceeds devoted to naval charities. The total number of people who passed through the turnstile was 302,960, and the total receipts £3,650 15s. 7d. The boat was under the command of a warrant officer, and during the passage up the Thames was manned by a crew of four seamen from the submarine depôtship "Dolphin." A number of journalists had a private view of the vessel at Sheerness on July 20th. Replying to a question as to whether the "UC.5" could not be put to some military use, Dr. Macnamara announced on August 17th that this was being considered.

JUTLAND BANK MEDAL.—On August 1st, it was announced that Admiral H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenberg had designed a medal to commemorate the battle off the Jutland Bank on May 31st. It was the first of a series which Prince Louis intends to bring out at short intervals, the profits of the sale of them to be devoted to the naval orphanages. This first medal was struck in two sizes, one having a diameter of 1\frac{1}{4} inches, in white metal at 5s., in solid silver at 15s., and in 18-carat gold at £11 10s. The smaller size was \frac{1}{4}ths of an inch in diameter, fitted with loop and ring for wearing on a bracelet or watchchain, and was struck in solid silver at 3s. 6d., and in 18-carat gold at 35s. On August 22nd.

it was announced that over 10,000 of the medals had already been sold, most of the purchasers being relatives and friends of the men lost in the fight.

GERMAN FLEET REPAIRS.—On September 24th, the Kölnische Volksgeitung published, from Krupp's "Notes for Publication," a decree by the Kaiser commending the work of the dockyards in restoring the damaged German ships to an efficient condition. "In an astonishingly short time," said the All-Highest, "the armouring has been made good, new ships have been put in hand, and all the apparatus and instruments so important for warfare have been supplied, so that last week the Fleet could already again have executed a searching attack on the enemy." The decree was signed by the Kaiser at the Great Headquarters on September 10th, and addressed to the Imperial Chancellor, who was commanded to bring it to the knowledge of the docks and works concerned, and to cause it to be posted on the notice boards. The Wilhelmshaven papers stated about the same time that it was the intention of the Kaiser to inspect the Fleet early in October. This was generally considered to be the prelude of a naval move. The Fleet was said to be anxious for battle, as the German ships were in a much better condition than they were at the time of the battle off Jutland, and the officers and men were confident that in the next encounter they would defeat the British Fleet.

NAVAL HISTORY LECTURES .- On October 4th, Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg presided at King's College over the Laughton Lecture, which was delivered by Mr. Julian Corbett on "The Revival of Naval History." This lecture is given in memory of the late Professor Sir John Knox Laughton, and during the afternoon Prince Louis inaugurated "The Laughton Library," the nucleus of which was formed by Sir John Laughton during the twenty-five years in which he was associated with King's College. Prince Louis announced that the Admiralty, within two or three days of the declaration of war, succeeded in obtaining the valuable services of Mr. Julian Corbett as the official historian of the Navy, and he had been working there ever since. On October 9th, at a lecture presided over by the Hon. J. W. Fortescue, Mr. Corbett said that "writing modern history was writing with all the interesting part left out. An effort was being made to arrange the enormous mass of documents for historical purposes without prejudice to the old arrangement of the Record Office, and the future historian would, he hoped, be relieved from an enormous mass of barren material. An effort had been made to keep a record of telephone messages." On October 6th, the first of a series of ten lectures, arranged by the London County Council for teachers, on "Sea Power: Its Meaning and Functions" was given by Mr. Gerard Fiennes at King's College. Lord Burnham, who presided, said that most of the military experts had proved to be false prophets, "but the naval prophets had been singularly justified by events." He did not think there was one who did not understand and who did not try to make the public understand what sea power meant. The great war had unfolded the meaning of sea power even more clearly and more cogently than anyone would have thought possible, and as the decision on land was postponed the meaning of sea power became clearer in our eyes.

PRIZE BOUNTY.—A number of claims for prize bounty have been settled by Sir Samuel Evans in the Prize Court during the past few months. The first case of the kind since the outbreak of the present war was heard on March 27th last, when the award for the sinking of the German auxiliary cruiser "Cap Trafalgar" by the British auxiliary cruiser "Carmania" was decided. Since then, a number of other claims have been dealt with, of which the principal have been for the victory off the Falklands, heard on August 22nd, when £12,160 was awarded to the British crews; the sinking of the "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse"

by the "Highflyer," heard on July 3rd, when £2,580 was awarded; the destruction of the "Emden" by the "Sydney," heard on August 22nd, for which £1,985 was awarded; the torpedoing of the Turkish battleship "Messudieh" by submarine "B.11," heard on July 24th, for which £3,500 was awarded to Lieutenant Holbrook and his crew; and the destruction of enemy vessels in the Sea of Marmora by submarine "E.11," heard on July 28th, when Captain Nasmith and his crew received a grant of £3,250 for the sinking of the battleship "Hairedin Barbarossa," £655 for the torpedo gunboat "Pelenk-i-Deria," and £425 for the destroyer "Yar Hissar." This award worked out, according to the revised scale instituted in February, 1916, at £80 for each A.B., and up to £500 for the commander, with proportionate sums for other officers.

#### ATLANTIC.

VOYAGE OF THE "DEUTSCHLAND."-On the morning of July 9th, a German submarine, the "Deutschland," arrived at Norfolk, Virginia, after a voyage across the Atlantic with a cargo reported to consist of dyestuffs and medicines. She was commanded by Captain Paul König, and was said to have left Heligoland on June 23rd. According to the commander's story, the voyage was one of 4,100 miles, of which distance 1,800 miles was travelled under water, largely in the North Sea area, to avoid the Allied warships. The submarine encountered one week of rough weather, and was compelled to submerge to avoid the storm. The shifting of cargo when under water troubled her on one occasion, when she was delayed for three hours, but on her arrival in America she was reported to be in good condition. According to statements contained in her bill of health, issued at Bremen, and dated June 13th, which was inspected by the Health Officer at Baltimore immediately after the submarine came to her moorings, her gross tonnage was 701, and her net tonnage 414. The document described her as engaged in freight carrying trade between "Bremen, Boston, and other West Atlantic ports." The vessel left Bremen on June 14th and stopped for nine days at Heligoland before beginning the trans-Atlantic journey.

Submarine's Status.—On July 12th, the British and French Embassies were reported to have made representations to the American State Department that the "Deutschland" was potentially a warship, even though she might have been designed and used as a merchant vessel. The view of the Allied Governments was that the very form and structure of such ships, which enabled them to avoid the examination ordinary merchantmen had to undergo, removed them from the mercantile class of vessels. Being obviously constructed in avoidance of the requirements of international law, they must be regarded as outside that law, and, as enemy warships, subject to destruction at sight. It was stated that the Department considered this view in conjunction with a report obtained from Captain Hughes, who, with other American naval officers, made an examination of the "Deutschland." On July 14th, the Advisory Board reported to the State Department that the submarine should receive the same treatment as an ordinary merchant ship, as she was an unarmed freight carrier which could not be converted for the purposes of offence without extensive structural changes.

ATLANTIC SUBMARINE VOYAGES.—On July 10th, a representative of the Press Association was granted an interview by a high official at the British Admiralty, who informed him that as a feat of seamanship or navigation the exploit of the German submarine need not attract any particular attention "since ten British submarines constructed in Canada crossed the Atlantic last summer." The official also declared that the "Deutschland" was not the first "trader submarine" to cross the Atlantic, inasmuch as it was known that she was merely an ordinary

"U" boat with her fighting equipment removed. Nor was a new era opened for the submarine as a trader, since the small amount of cargo carried, compared with the cost of the voyage, made it not a commercial proposition. On the other hand, it was reported from Berlin that in the autumn of 1915 an organization known as the "Ocean Company, Limited," was formed with a nominal capital of £100,000, and registered at Bremen to engage in traffic by means of commercial submarines. The North-German Lloyd and the Deutsche Bank were concerned in the undertaking, and the new firm was established by Herr Alfred Lohmann, who became chairman. It was also stated that the "Deutschland" was specially built for this new company and launched at Kiel in March, 1916.

RETURN JOURNEY.—After nearly three weeks in America, the "Deutschland" was granted her clearance papers on the afternoon of July 26th. It was not until 5.40 p.m. on the afternoon of August 1st, however, that the boat left Baltimore. On July 30th, it was announced that the American Navy Department had refused a request from Captain König for a special escort for the "Deutschland" in American territorial waters, designed to protect her from interference by British cruisers. The Department saw no reason to anticipate any such interference within the three-mile limit, and considered that it would create an impossible precedent if naval ships were to be detailed to guard foreign "merchantmen" out of port. It was intimated, however, that the armoured cruiser "North Carolina" and two torpedo-boat destroyers had been assigned to neutrality duty outside the Virginia Capes. On July 18th, Mr. Lansing, the United States Secretary of State, was reported to have refused a request from Captain König to be allowed to send wireless messages to Berlin from the Tuckerton station.

Arrival in Germany .- On August 23rd, the "Deutschland" arrived off the mouth of the Weser, and reported all well on board. She was said to have returned with a cargo of rubber and nickel worth £50,000, and also three bags of mails from Count Bernstorff. There was an outburst of rejoicing in Germany over the event, the Kaiser receiving Captain König and decorating all the crew. and Count Zeppelin, Herr von Krupp, and Admiral Scheer visiting the submarine. In the early morning of August 25th, the vessel steamed up to Bremen, preceded by the Bremen Government steamer and escorted on both sides by tugs, while behind followed a large fleet of various steamers. In a message from Bremen, it was stated that when the submarine left America, no fewer than eight British war vessels were on the alert, surrounded by a number of chartered American steam trawlers for the purpose of laying nets and keeping the enemy informed. Nevertheless, the submarine managed to get away. Her voyage across the Atlantic was at first stormy, but later the sea was calmer. The ship proved a good sea boat and her engines worked faultlessly, 100 miles being covered under water without any trouble. The total voyage measured 4,200 miles. On September 14th, it was reported that, in conjunction with "a literary expert from the Foreign Office," Captain König was to write a book on the trip to America and back.

CASE OF THE "BREMEN."—It was reported at the time the "Deutschland" reached Baltimore that a second vessel of the kind would follow her within a few days, the name of this ship being the "Bremen." Up to October 25th, however, this vessel failed to put in an appearance. She was stated to be under the command of Captain Schwartzkopf, of Lubeck, and when her expected arrival did not take place in July or August it was suggested that she was being kept back in Germany until the return of the "Deutschland." There were many and conflicting reports concerning her fate, and more than one circumstantial account of her capture by the Allies appeared in the Press. On August 29th, the Wireless Press issued a message from Bremen to the effect that Herr Lohmann had stated

that the second submarine liner from that port was then at sea on her way to Baltimore with a cargo of dyes.

PORTUGUESE GUNBOAT ATTACKED.—On the night of August 28th, the Portuguese gunboat "Ibo" was attacked by a German submarine, said to be "U.20," about sixty miles off the Tagus bar. The torpedo missed its mark, and the submarine submerged as soon as the gunboat opened fire.

SPAIN AND SUBMARINES.—" U.35," the German submarine which, as recorded last quarter, visited Cartagena in June, was stated in an official communiqué from Berlin on July 6th to have returned home after successfully executing her task of carrying an autograph letter from the Emperor to the King of Spain and medical supplies for interned Germans. "In the course of this journey," added the statement, "it sank inter alia the armed French steamer 'Herault,' capturing one gun." Following the protests and expostulations called forth by the vessel's visit to Cartagena, it was announced in September that the German Government had given assurances to the Spanish Government that no war or merchant submarine would anchor off the coast or enter Spanish ports.

FATE OF THE "KARLSRUHE."—In September, it became known that Captain Aust, who was said to have been second-in-command of the German cruiser "Karlsruhe," which attained some success as a commerce raider in the Atlantic in 1914, had been permitted by the authorities to publish his diary under the title of "Exploits of the 'Karlsruhe' in the War." He gives the following explanation of the mystery which attached to the disappearance of this vessel: On November 4th, 1914, the cruiser was in latitude 10 deg. 7 min. North, and 55 deg. 25 min. West, when she was struck by a torpedo from some invisible craft—probably a submarine. The ship broke in two and sank immediately, with many of the crew and the commander. The "Karlsruhe" was accompanied in her adventures by two tenders, the "Indrani" and "Rio Negro." These rescued many of her crew. Subsequently the "Indrani" managed to get into Norwegian waters, and on December 4th, 1914, Aust reached Germany. The "Rio Negro" arrived home some time later. This version varies a little from that formerly accepted (see Naval Notes, Vol. LX., p. 232).

"Deutschland" Captain's Book.—On October 14th, it was reported that Captain König, of the "Deutschland," had written a book on the voyage to America and back of his vessel. He described life on board the vessel as "Hell," and gave vivid descriptions of the discomforts and sufferings of the crew.

British Visit to Lisbon.—Some units of the British Fleet, it was officially stated on September 7th, visited Lisbon recently, and were very cordially received by the President and Ministers and high naval and military officials, as well as by the public generally. A guard of honour from the flagships paraded before the Palace and gave cheers for the President, after which the seamen marched through the town. The Minister for Foreign Affairs gave a banquet to the officers of the Fleet, large numbers of men were entertained at the theatre, and a picnic to Cintra was organized. The Admiral in Command reported that the greeting and welcome received by the Fleet was most cordial.

"U-53" IN AMERICA.—On October 7th, the "U.53," flying the Imperial German flag, unexpectedly appeared at Newport, Rhode Island. She was under the command of Captain Hans Roze, a tall man of dark complexion, about thirty-eight years old, who was stated to have informed Rear-Admiral A. M. Knight, commanding the United States Naval Station at Newport, that he had put into that port for liquid fuel and provisions, but that the real purpose of his voyage was to discharge certain official documents destined for the German Ambassador. The commander reported that the journey from Wilhelmshaven occupied seventeen

days, three out of which were spent submerged. It was conjectured that in sending "U.53" Germany was making her first effort to enlist American sympathy in sounding the Allies upon peace negotiations, but subsequent incidents failed to support this view. The submarine stayed three hours at Newport, leaving at 5.17 p.m., it was thought either to return to Germany or go into hiding until return messages were ready.

COMMERCE RAIDING.—It was announced that the French and British Ambassadors at Washington lodged a protest against the use made of a neutral port by "U.53," holding that the vessel was liable to internment until after the war. Press reports stated that the submarine, which was known to have at least eight torpedoes on board, obtained at Newport a complete list of steamers bound in and out of Atlantic ports. In any case, she made at once for the vicinity of the Nantucket Lightship, which lies in one of the important steamship lanes between Europe and America, and there on Sunday, the 8th, she destroyed six vessels, four British, one Dutch, and one Norwegian. The most serious case was that of the "Stephano," which had ninety passengers on board, including thirty Americans, many of them belonging to the Red Cross. In this and other cases, only the promptitude of the American naval authorities prevented loss of life, Rear-Admiral Gleaves sending from Newport a flotilla of destroyers. On October 13th, it was reported that Mr. Lansing had opened an investigation into the loss of the "Stephano," which was torpedoed without any warning. Among the legal questions raised was one referred to as follows by the Washington correspondent of the Daily Telegraph: -" The British and neutral vessels were sunk close to the American coast because, in deference to the urgent representations by Washington, British cruisers and patrols were recalled from the trade lanes approximate to American waters and to the great ports of the United States."

#### BALTIC

THE RUSSIAN FLEET.-In the Daily Mail on June 14th and 15th, an account was given of a visit made to the Russian Baltic Fleet by Mr. Hamilton Fyfe. Referring to the regret in the Fleet at the death of Admiral Essen, he said it was the latter who re-created the Russian Navy after the disasters of the war with Japan, and the results of his efforts were beginning to appear when this "Every month increased the Navy's strength. The pace of war broke out. shipbuilding was quickened. The programme settled before the war was carried out with a rapidity which for Russia was unexampled. Essen's foresight and wise preparation received every day readier recognition." The correspondent was granted an interview with Admiral Kanin, who said that the Russians were in a quite different position from that of a year ago. "We are," he said, "to begin with, very much stronger in ships. I have, in addition to the four new Dreadnoughts, a large number of other ships put in commission during the last twelve months. In torpedo boats and submarines we are now especially strong. Our mine-layers and mine-sweepers are numerous and devoted. Very likely it is the increase of our strength which keeps the enemy away. Our scouts never see any German ships." Referring to the enemy's failure at Riga in the summer of 1915, the Admiral said: "We kept them off then, and I am confident we shall be able to keep them off now that we are so much better equipped."

NEUTRAL SHIPPING.—During July, increased activity on the part of German patrol boats in the Baltic and its approaches was manifested, directed chiefly against the neutral merchant shipping in those waters. On July 18th, a Copenhagen report mentioned that there had been seized, on the previous day alone, off the south coast of Sweden, one Danish steamer, three Swedish, and one large

American four-masted schooner. In several cases, vessels seized in this way were released after examination, but a message on July 24th stated that some ships captured in the previous month were still held up, chiefly at Swinemünde. 'It was stated that the Germans examined systematically every ship passing the southern Sound. On July 28th, a Berlin telegram announced that two British cargo steamers had been seized by German torpedo boats in international waters off Landskona.

CASE OF THE "ADAMS."—On July 16th, the British steamer "Adams," of 2,223 tons, was reported captured by a German torpedo boat off Aarhus. The vessel had last been reported from Cronstadt, and it appeared that she was making an attempt to leave the Baltic, as a number of British ships—200 was mentioned in one estimate—had done since the battle off the Jutland Bank. The "Adams," however, was seized in Swedish territorial waters. This was admitted by the German captain who took her to Swinemunde, and who said that his motive was to retaliate for the alleged actions of the Russians in torpedoing German vessels in Swedish waters off the Gulf of Bothnia. On July 20th, it was announced by the Swedish Minister in Berlin that the "Adams" had been released. She was escorted on that day back to the place at which she was captured. The German Minister in Stockholm expressed his regret at the occurrence, which he said was unauthorized by the Berlin naval authorities.

AIR RAIDS.—Cross-raiding by aircraft continues to be a feature of the Baltic On July 17th, the German official communiqué said that three Russian aeroplanes had attacked their light naval forces at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga, and unsuccessfully dropped bombs. One of the machines was stated to have been brought down by anti-aircraft fire, which also compelled the others to retreat. A counter-stroke was made by the Germans early on the morning of the 18th, when their seaplanes dropped bombs on some enemy cruisers, torpedo boats, and submarines, and the military establishments at the naval port of Reval. The German account claimed that "numerous undeniable hits were obtained on the enemy's forces." Four bombs were said to have been dropped on a submarine, and great fires were observed in the docks. Although heavily fired upon, the seaplanes returned in safety to the warships waiting for them off the Gulf of Finland. The German account concluded :- "Though owing to the clearness of the weather our naval forces could be observed from the shore very early, and their whereabouts were ascertained by an enemy aerial reconnaissance, no enemy naval forces were sighted." On July 25th, a "Zeppelin" dropped about fifteen bombs in the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and on the outskirts of the town of Abo, in the Aland Islands, without, however, causing any damage to the ships or on shore. The attack was made at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Being fired at by the Russian batteries, the "Zeppelin" withdrew in a southerly direction. On the same day, eight German seaplanes attacked the seaplane station in the islands, dropping about 100 bombs. Two Russian seaplanes which engaged the enemy succeeded in hitting one machine, which caught fire. The German version of the Zeppelin raid said that the airship "executed an attack on the main base of the Russian and British submarines at Mariehamn, in the Aland Islands, successfully dropping on the harbour works there nearly 14 cwt. of explosive bombs."

Submarine Mining.—Towards the end of August it was reported that German submarines, which had been driven out of the Gulf of Bothnia by Russian warships, had spread hundreds of floating mines, so that navigation had become very difficult in those waters.

ARENSBURG RAIDED.—On August 2nd, in the early morning, a raid by German seaplanes was made upon the Russian air station at Arensburg, on Oesel Island, at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga. Russian aeroplanes, said the official German account, ascended to repulse the attack, but the raiders returned safely.

GERMAN SUBMARINE ATTACKS.—On August 3rd, it was reported from Scandinavia that the Swedish steamer "Hudiksvall," bound for Raumo, Finland, had been torpedoed on the previous night, also that the Swedish steamers "Bror Oscar" and "Vermland" had been torpedoed the same day. A fourth victim was the Finnish steamer "Stanto," from Stockholm to Raumo.

AIR RAIDS.—On the night of August 12th, a squadron of Russian seaplanes made a successful raid on the enemy aerodromes near Lake Angern, north-west of Riga, dropping several bombs with good effect. A shed was destroyed by fire, and a number of other fires were started all over the aerodrome. On the night of the 15th, it was the turn of the German airmen. Their seaplanes attacked with explosive and incendiary bombs the aerodrome of Papenholm, on the island of Oesel, at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga, and upon Russian aeroplanes on the shore of the island of Runö, also in the Gulf of Riga. Despite heavy anti-aircraft fire, and a subsequent air fight, the German machines returned safely.

COURLAND COAST SHELLED.—Early in September, the Germans officially reported that Russian vessels had bombarded the north coast of Courland without success. It was officially stated in Petrograd about this time that mines were to be laid round the Aland Islands as far as the limits of Swedish territorial waters.

LAKE ANGERN RAIDED.—On September 14th, a Reuter telegram from Petrograd announced that a squadron of four Russian aeroplanes of the Slyr-Murometz type bombarded the German seaplane station on Lake Angern, in the Gulf of Riga. The Russians dropped 73 bombs, of a total weight of 62 poods (about one ton). Eight enemy seaplanes attacked the Russian squadron, but were speedily put to flight by machine-gun fire. Eight enemy machines were reported destroyed or put out of action in the raid. On a previous occasion, one aeroplane of the Slyr-Murometz type and another of the Ilya-Murometz type, were reported to have fought and routed seven attacking German seaplanes.

TRAWLERS OFF RIGA.—The Petrograd official communiqué on September 13th, in which it was noticed that "in the region of Riga and on the Dvina the enemy's activity has considerably increased," also contained the following:—"In the Baltic Sea on Saturday (September 9th) our Fleet successfully shelled some hostile trawlers in the Irben Straits (Gulf of Riga). Some of the trawlers were compelled to run aground.

AIR STATION RAIDED.—On September 26th, a raid was made by two Russian seaplanes upon the naval air station on Lake Angern, west of the Gulf of Riga. According to the German account, one of the seaplanes was shot down and the other damaged by anti-aircraft fire. The Russians, however, only mentioned the loss of one seaplane. "Our machines," said their communiqué, "were subjected to the fire of the enemy batteries, and were engaged in combat with twenty enemy machines. During this unequal contest Lieutenant Arseni Gorkovenko unfortunately perished and his aeroplane was lost."

New Commander-in-Chief.—On October 13th, the appointment was reported from Petrograd of Vice-Admiral Nepenin to be Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Fleet in the Baltic, in succession to Admiral Kanin, who was appointed a member of the Council of the Empire. Vice-Admiral Nepenin formerly commanded the torpedo craft division in the Baltic. He received the Order of St. George for his

work in the torpedo boat defence of Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War. He attained the grade of first-class captain at the age of forty-five, and subsequently that of vice-admiral during the present war.

#### ADRIATIC.

PARENZO RAIDED.—On July 11th, a further raid by Italian naval forces was made upon Parenzo. The attack took place at daybreak, and according to a semi-official account issued at Rome, the Italian units effectively bombarded the enemy seaplane base at Parenzo—which is on the Istrian coast, mid-way between Trieste and Pola. The raid was met by heavy fire from the new defence batteries. Four enemy units which arrived from the south avoided contact, and withdrew in the direction from which they had come. The Italian vessels all returned safely.

British Drifters Sunk.—On July 9th, two British drifters on patrol duty were sunk by the Austrians. The British Admiral in the Adriatic reported that the Austrian cruiser "Novara" came upon a group of drifters, of which the "Astrum Spei" and "Clavis" were sunk, and the "Frigate Brid" and "Ben Bui" damaged, but not sufficiently to prevent them returning to port. The crew of the "Astrum Spei" were taken prisoners, and among the remainder of the boats there were ten killed and eight wounded. The incident was grossly exaggerated in the following wireless message of the enemy:—"Our cruiser 'Novara' met in the Otranto Straits with a group of four, or—according to statements made unanimously by prisoners who were taken—five, armed English patrol ships, and destroyed them all with cannon fire. All the steamers sank in flames, and three of them after an explosion of the boilers. The 'Novara' was only able to save nine men of their crews."

"IMPETUOSO" SUNK.—On July 10th, the Italian torpedo-boat destroyer "Impetuoso" was torpedoed and sunk by an enemy submarine in the Lower Adriatic—according to the Austrian report it was in the Otranto Straits. Nearly all the crew were saved. The "Impetuoso" was a 680-ton vessel of 30 knots, armed with one 4.7-in. and four 12-pr. guns, and two tubes, and was completed by Messrs. Pattison, of Naples, in 1913.

"Magnet" Sunk.—On August 2nd, the Austrian torpedo gunboat "Magnet" was torpedoed in the Upper Adriatic by an Italian submarine. The Austrians, however, claimed that the vessel was able to reach harbour. She was damaged about the stern, and two men were killed on board her and four wounded, besides seven who were afterwards found to be missing.

ITALIAN SUBMARINES LOST.—On August 3rd, it was officially announced from Rome that two Italian submarines, which left on a mission to the enemy coasts some time before, had not returned to their bases, and consequently they were given up as lost. It was stated from enemy official sources that one of the boats was the "Giacinto Pullino," and that she had been captured in the Northern Adriatic and brought to Pola almost undamaged. The entire crew of three officers and eighteen men, it was added, were captured unwounded. The "Pullino" was launched at Spezia in 1913, and was of 344 tons (394 tons submerged), with a surface speed of fifteen and a submerged speed of nine knots. She had four torpedo tubes.

TORPEDO CRAFT ACTION.—On August 2nd, according to an official Vienna telegram, a flotilla of Austrian torpedo boats bombarded military establishments at Molfetta. An airship shed was claimed to have been wrecked, a factory set on fire, and another damaged. On the return journey, the Austrian vessels,

which included the light cruiser "Aspern," were encountered by an Allied squadron consisting of one cruiser and six destroyers. A brief running fight ensued. "After our ships had scored some hits," said the Austrian account, "the enemy vessels made off to the southward and disappeared," when the raiders returned undamaged to their ports.

DURAZZO RAIDED.—Early on the morning of August 2nd, five Allied aeroplanes dropped bombs on Durazzo. The enemy report said that no damage was caused. One of the machines was brought down some miles south of Durazzo by an Austrian seaplane, and captured in an only slightly damaged condition. The two occupants of the machine were reported to have fled, but later one of them, an officer, was captured by Austrian troops.

WHITEHEAD WORKS RAIDED.—On August 8th, the famous Whitehead torpedo works at Fiume were attacked from the air. An Italian official communiqué of the following day said that as enemy aircraft on July 27th had raided Italian open towns on the Lower Adriatic without any military object, one of the Italian strong Caproni squadrons bombed the Whitehead torpedo and submarine works. In spite of the heavy fire of the anti-aircraft artillery, and the attacks of enemy aeroplanes, the airmen succeeded in dropping four tons of high explosive, which did much damage to the works and set them on fire. During the air fight, one enemy aeroplane was brought down above Muggia. One of the Caproni machines was observed landing near Volosca, but the others returned safely.

ITALIAN PATROL BOAT SUNK.—On August 26th, there was an attack by three Austrian seaplanes upon a group of enemy patrol steamers in the Ionian Sea. It was claimed that as a result of the bombs dropped on the latter one of them was sunk. The machines, although violently bombarded by the patrol vessels, returned undamaged.

RAID ON TRIESTE.—On September 13th, in unfavourable atmospheric conditions, a squadron of twenty-two of the Italian Caproni battle-planes, escorted by Nieuport chasers, made a raid on Lloyd's arsenal and the seaplane sheds near Trieste. One hundred and seventy-two bombs, equivalent to five tons of high explosives, were dropped on the railway establishments and the ships under construction, and large fires were observed. The aeroplanes were attacked by the enemy's anti-aircraft artillery, and by seaplanes, but all returned to their sheds.

FALL OF GORIZIA.—The capture by the Italian troops on Wednesday, August 9th, of the town of Gorizia, should be noted for its possible naval bearing. This stronghold, which fell to the Italian Army as a result of the general offensive undertaken by General Cadorna, has been called the key of Trieste. Its capture brought nearer the complete isolation of the Istrian peninsula, and on or adjoining this peninsula are the three main bases of the Austro-Hungarian Navy—Trieste, Pola, and Fiume. It was also a stepping-stone to Laibach, the principal military headquarters on the railway which supplies the peninsula, and the cutting of which railroad would place the Austrian Fleet at Pola in a precarious position.

GORIZIA AND VENICE RAIDED.—On the night of September 3rd, hostile aircraft dropped bombs on several places, among which was Gorizia; and on the following night, a seaplane dropped about twenty bombs on Venice, without, however, doing any real damage.

ITALIAN BATTLESHIP LOST.—On September 11th, the Italian authorities revealed the sinking of the Dreadnought battleship "Leonardo da Vinci" in Taranto Harbour, which took place on the night of August 2nd. The warship was moored in a position sheltering her from all possibility of hostile attack, when fire broke out near the aft magazine, and although the flooding of the magazine prevented

the entire destruction of the ship a series of explosions occurred, and the hull sank 45 minutes later in 35 feet of water. It was thoroughly established that the accident was not due to spontaneous combustion of powder or shells. A strong committee was appointed to investigate all the circumstances, and another to consider the best means of raising the battleship and making her fit again for service. Out of the 34 officers and 1,156 men on board, 21 officers and 227 men fell victims to their duty. Their conduct was admirable. The captain and second-in-command both died from burns and wounds. The former was hurled overboard, but had himself hoisted back on board again, and died later in hospital after suffering considerably from burns.

AUSTRIAN BATTLESHIP'S FATÉ.—It was reported from Rome, by an Exchange message on October 8th, that a large Austrian battleship had blown up in Pola Harbour. On the 12th, a message from Paris to the Wireless Press stated that the vessel destroyed was a new Dreadnought. She blew up with her crew on board, the explosion damaging ships in the vicinity.

Durazzo Raided.—On September 28th, it was announced by the Austrians that the Italians had made an air raid upon Durazzo with five aeroplanes. Two seaplanes ascended to meet them, and one forced an Italian aeroplane down to the water, where it was rescued by an Italian destroyer. A second machine was pursued towards Brindisi, and there shot down forty miles off the coast, the observer, an Italian naval officer, being killed, and the pilot severely wounded. The latter was rescued and brought to Durazzo. The Italian version of the raid said that over half a ton of high explosives were dropped on Durazzo Harbour. The loss of the machine near Brindisi was not admitted.

#### MEDITERRANEAN.

SUEZ CANAL ATTACKED.—On the morning of August 4th, a large force of Turks began an attack upon the British positions at Romani, east of the Suez Canal. The attack was an entire failure, and the results were disastrous for the enemy. In the task of repelling this onslaught, assistance was rendered by men-of-war in the Bay of Tina. The Turkish communiqué spoke of three vessels being engaged. The General Officer Commanding in Egypt, in one of his despatches, referred to these vessels as monitors.

"ZAIDA" SUNK.—On August 25th, the Admiralty announced that the armed yacht "Zaida," which was on detached service in the Gulf of Alexandretta, where she had been destroying petrol stores, etc., had been reported as being considerably overdue. A recent German communiqué had stated that a patrol boat had been sunk in those waters. There was no doubt, said the Admiralty, that this information referred to the "Zaida," as news had been received through Turkish sources that four officers and nineteen men of her crew had been taken prisoners, but there was no information as to the fate of the remainder of the crew, two officers and eight men, and it was therefore assumed that they were lost. The "Zaida" appeared in Lloyd's Register of Yachts as a twin-screw steel boat of 106.78 tons, built at Cowes in 1900, and owned by Lord Rosebery.

KAVALA OCCUPIED BY BULGARIA.—On August 25th, in spite of promises to Greece, the forts of the Ægean port of Kavala were occupied by the Bulgarians. It was officially announced from Paris that "on August 25th two British monitors and a cruiser bombarded the forts at Kavala, which had been occupied, with one exception, by the Bulgarians." In a further French official report from Salonika, dated August 28th, it was announced that "the Bulgarians have occupied different localities abandoned by the Greeks west of Kavala. British monitors

bombarded enemy forces the presence of which was reported at the mouth of the Struma."

ALLIED FLEET OFF ATHENS.—On September 1st, an Allied Fleet, which was reported to consist of twenty-three warships, arrived off the Piræus, under the command of the French Commander-in-Chief, Admiral du Fournet. About a week later, it was reported that the wireless telegraphic services in the Greek warships and naval establishments had been taken control of by the Allies. On September 22nd, it was rumoured that the armoured cruiser "Georgius Averoff," lying off Salamis arsenal, was preparing to join the national movement and to go to Salonika, three-quarters of the crew being said to favour the project, but an official denial of any outbreak was issued next day. Early on the morning of September 25th, M. Venizelos, accompanied by a number of his former colleagues, including Admirals Condouriotis and Miaulis, left the Piræus for Crete, where a Provisional Government was proclaimed on the 28th. Various secessions of portions of the Fleet to the new movement were reported.

GREEK FLEET SEIZED.—On October 11th, Admiral Dartige du Fournet presented an ultimatum to the Greek Government, demanding, as a precautionary measure, in view of the security of the Allied Fleet, the handing over of the entire Greek Fleet, except the "Georgius Averoff," the "Lemnos," and the "Kilkis," by 1 o'clock the same afternoon. The control of the Piræus-Larissa railway was also demanded. The demands were met, and the Fleet handed over, the Athens Government adding a protest to its notification of acceptance. A detachment of French marines also occupied on October 11th the two islands of Leros and Kyra, in the Gulf of Salamis, which served as munition depôts for the Greek Fleet.

KAVALA DISTRICT RAIDED .- On September 15th, the Admiralty issued particulars of a series of attacks carried out upon the Bulgarian lines of communication beyond Kavala from August 25th to 31st by naval aircraft. On the 25th the railway station and bridge at Buk [about twenty-two miles north-north-east of Kavala] were successfully bombed. On the 26th a similar attack upon the railway station at Drama [twenty-two miles north-west of Kavala] resulted in the burning of a large petrol store and considerable destruction among the rolling stock in the sidings. Bombs were also dropped on the billets of the enemy's troops at Doksat [fourteen miles north-west of Kavala]. On the 27th Okgilar [twenty-five miles north-north-east of Kavala] railway station, where the headquarters of the 10th Division were situated, was successfully attacked. The station buildings were set on fire and considerable damage was done to the permanent way. On the 28th Drama station was again bombed. The station buildings were considerably damaged. On the same day Kavala forts were attacked with excellent results. On the 29th a large body of infantry and transport concentrated at Porna were attacked. Considerable havoc was caused in the village and among the troops. A large fire was started among the stores in the transport park. The moral as well as the material effect of this bombardment seems to have been considerable, as a reconnaissance made on the following day showed that all troops, camps, and transport had been removed from this district. On the 31st an attack was made on Angista railway station [twenty-five miles west-north-west of Kavala]. Direct hits were made and extensive damage was caused.

SEAPLANE RAIDS IN PALESTINE.—On September 16th, the Admiralty announced that between August 25th and 20th a series of attacks and reconnaissances upon the enemy railway communications in Palestine were carried out by a British seaplane squadron. These flights were made under somewhat hazardous conditions, due to the fact that the railway runs, for the most part, behind a range of

mountains difficult for seaplanes to surmount. Bombs were dropped on Afuleh Junction, where considerable damage was done to the rolling stock, permanent way, and to stores in the vicinity. A railway engine and fourteen carriages were also set on fire and destroyed. The railway stations at Tulkeram and Ardana and an enemy camp four miles north-west of Remleh [thirteen miles from Jaffa] were successfully bombarded and severely damaged. On August 26th a seaplane bombarded the railway station at Homs [about eighty miles north of Damascus]. This flight, carried out at a distance of forty-five miles inland under extremely adverse conditions and through clouds low down on the mountains, was a singularly fine performance for a seaplane.

KAVALA BOMBARDED.—On September 15th, a Bulgarian official communiqué stated that "the enemy Fleet continues to cruise along the Ægean coast before Kavala and Electheran, in the Gulf of Orfano." Another Bulgarian report issued on the 17th said that "Yesterday the enemy Fleet shelled the port of Kavala and the outer districts of the town. The barracks in the western part of the town were set on fire, but there was no loss of life." On September 20th Reuter telegraphed from Athens that it was semi-officially announced that the Admiral commanding the Allied Fleet had notified the existence of a blockade between the mouth of the Nestos and the village of Chaiaghizi. This included, of course, the Gulf of Kavala. On September 22nd the General Officer Commanding at Salonika reported:—"On our Struma front ships of the Royal Navy shelled the enemy in the neighbourhood of Neohori (at the mouth of the river) with satisfactory results." Next day the co-operation of naval aircraft was referred to in the military report. "Our naval aircraft," it was said, "dropped bombs on enemy transport near Drama with apparently good results."

"Franconia" Sunk.—On October 5th, the Admiralty announced that the Cunard steamship "Franconia," employed on transport duty, was sunk in the Mediterranean on the previous day by an enemy submarine. She was carrying no troops at the time. Twelve of her crew were missing, and 302 were saved.

"GALLIA" SUNK.—On October 9th, it was announced that the French auxiliary cruiser and troopship "Gallia" was torpedoed in the Mediterranean by an enemy submarine on the 4th—the same day as the "Franconia." One of the magazines exploded, destroying the wireless installation and rendering a call for aid impossible. Nearly all the ship's officers were lost, but of the 2,000 French and Serbian troops on board 1,374 took to the rafts and were picked up next day by a French cruiser.

"RIGEL" SUNK.—On October 13th, the German Admiralty staff announced that one of their submarines operating in the Mediterranean sank on October 2nd the small French cruiser "Rigel," built as a submarine-destroyer, sending her to the bottom with two torpedoes,

#### BLACK SEA.

Russian Operations.—On July 11th, Russian torpedo boats operating in the western part of the Black Sea captured the Turkish steamship "Itschibad," with a cargo of petrol and barley, and brought her without incident to one of their ports. On July 12th, some torpedo boats also destroyed a steamship accompanied by two tugs in the Melen estuary, east of Ergheli.

"GOEBEN" AT SEA.—On July 4th, at 4 p.m., the "Goeben" bombarded the town and port of Tuapse, below Novorosisk, on the north-eastern shore of the Black Sea. She also sank the passenger steamer "Knias Obolensky." At the same time, the "Breslau," flying the Russian flag of St. Andrew, approached,

and, having hoisted Turkish colours, bombarded Scotchi, a place below Tuapse-About 6 p.m. both vessels disappeared in a southerly direction.

Hospital Ship Sunk.—On July 9th, the sinking of another hospital ship in the Black Sea was officially announced. An enemy submarine, without warning, torpedoed and sunk the "Vperiode," which bore all the usual distinctive marks. Seven men were drowned, but the rest were saved. The vessel was on her way from Batoum, unescorted, to take wounded on board, having taken the place of the hospital ship "Portugal," torpedoed on March 30th.

NEW COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.—Early in August, it was announced that Vice-Admiral A. V. Kolchak had been appointed to the command of the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea in succession to Admiral A. E. Eberhard, who was placed on the retired list. The new Commander-in-Chief, aged forty-two, is the youngest Admiral in the Russian Navy.

# THE WAR.

## ITS MILITARY SIDE by J. D. F.

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### SECTION XLVIII.

The Battle of the Marne, from September 4th to 12th, 1914.

#### I.—REMARKS.

The action generally known as the "Battle of the Marne" took place over a very large area, stretching from Paris to Verdun, with subsidiary fighting from Verdun to Belfort, along the eastern French frontier. The retirement of the Allies had been in progress for some days, and it was only on reaching this previously selected position, with its strong flanking points at Paris and Verdun, that the French Commander-in-Chief decided to attack the enemy.

#### II.-THE GERMAN FORCES.

These were as follows:-

First Army (Von Kluck)—IInd Corps, IIIrd Corps, IVth Corps, VIIth Corps, IVth Corps (reserve), and 2nd and 4th Divisions of Cavalry. The VIIth Corps (reserve) was at Maubeuge.

Second Army (Von Bulow).—IXth Corps, Xth Corps, Guard Corps, and Xth Corps (reserve), and two divisions of cavalry.

Third Army, Saxons (Von Haussen)—XIIth Corps, XIXth Corps, XIIth Corps (reserve), and XIXth Corps (reserve), and one division of cavalry.

Fourth Army (Duke of Würtemberg)—VIth Corps, VIIIth Corps, XVIIIth Corps, VIIIth Corps (reserve), XVIIIth Corps (reserve), and two divisions of cavalry.

Fifth Army (Crown Prince of Prussia); west of the River Meuse and Verdun—XIIIth Corps, VIth Corps (reserve), XVIth Corps (reserve); north and east of Verdun—Vth Corps, Vth Corps (reserve), XIIth Corps, XVIth Corps, with several (?) divisions of cavalry.

Sixth Army (Crown Prince of Bavaria)-five corps.

Seventh Army (Von Hoeringen)-?

Excluding the Sixth and Seventh Armies and the corps of the Fifth Army north and east of Verdun, which did not, strictly speaking, take part in the battle, the total German strength was about 22 corps=880,000 men, with (say) ten cavalry divisions=80,000 men. Allowing ten per cent. for miscellaneous services, the grand total force would be 1,056,000.

#### III .- THE FORCES OF THE ALLIES.

These were as follows:-

First Army (Dubail)—VIIIth Corps, XIIIth Corps, XIVth Corps, with ? reserve divisions and the garrison of Belfort.

Second Army (de Castelnau)-two corps and 59th, 68th, 70th Divisions.

Third Army (Sarrail)—IVth Corps, Vth Corps, VIth Corps, XVth Corps, with reserve divisions and the mobile defence troops of Verdun. The IVth Corps and half the VIth Corps went to other armies during the battle.

Fourth Army (Langle de Cary)—IInd Corps, XIIth Corps, XVIIth Corps, XXIst Corps (originally with First Army), and one Colonial division.

Seventh Army (Foch)—IXth Corps, XIth Corps, a mixed corps and two reserve divisions.

Fifth Army (Franchet d'Espérey)-three corps, with two reserve divisions.

British Army (F.M. Lord French)-three corps.

Sixth Army (Maunoury)—VIIth Corps, a reserve corps, with three territorial divisions.

Excluding the First and Second Armies, the Verdun garrison and two corps of the Third Army, which did not, strictly speaking, take part in the battle, the total Allied strength was about 22 corps=880,000 men, with (say) eight cavalry divisions =64,000 men. Allowing ten per cent. for miscellaneous service, the grand total force would be 1,038,000.

#### IV .- THE GERMAN PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

This was based upon the following considerations:-

(a) The general situation.

(b) The strength of the opposing forces.(c) The condition of the Allied forces.

(a) General Situation (Marne area only).

Germans: South of Senlis—south of Soissons—towards Rheims—south of Vouziers—Montfaucon—Dun.

Allies: Verdun—Sermaise—south of Vitry-le-François—Sompuis—Mailly le Camp—south of Sézanne—south of Esternay—Rozoy-en-Brie—south of Coulommiers—Crecy-en-Brie—Villiers-sur-Marne—Tremblay-les-Gonesse—Louvres.

The German forces were marching in a southerly direction, while the Allies had nearly reached the selected position south of the River Marne. It is probable that the Germans expected a halt to be made when the Paris—Verdun position was reached.

- (b) Strength of the Opposing Forces.—As stated above there were about 1,056,000 Germans to 1,038,000 of the Allies in the Marne area. Probably the Germans underestimated the strength of the Allies, but it is more likely that they thought the new "Masses de Manœuvre" (the Sixth and Seventh Armies of Maunoury and Foch) could not be brought into their positions quickly enough and that consequently the odds as regards strength would be in their favour.
- (c) Condition of the Allied Forces.—The Germans no doubt thought that the Allied troops, after their long retreat, would (especially the British and Fifth French Armies) be much exhausted and unable to make a vigorous counter-attack. It is probable that this idea considerably influenced the Germans in their new line of action.

#### The Plan of Operations.

It was decided to carry out the following movements forthwith:-

First: Hold the line of the River Ourcq as a flanking position against Maunoury's force, with part of the First Army. After this, to turn Maunoury's left and either drive him back on Paris or surround him.

Second: Use the remainder of the First Army and part of the Second Army to drive a wedge between the British and Fifth French Army, and either drive the former back on Paris or force it into the area of the Sixth Army.

Third: Break the Allied line about La Fère-Champenoise and drive back the Fourth and Third French Armies on Verdun and country to the south.

Fourth: Capture Verdun and break through to the south towards Nancy. At the same time use the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Armies to capture the French Fourth, Third, and Second Armies.

[This latter movement was not strictly a part of the Battle of the Marne, but is quoted to show how it was proposed to deal finally with the French Fourth and Third Armies.]

#### V .- THE ALLIED PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

On September 5th, 1914, the Allied Supreme Command considered that the time had come for the Allied forces to take the offensive, as the proposed line of resistance on the River Marne had been reached,

The following operations were therefore ordered to take place, so that the attack could commence on September 6th, 1914:—

First: The general front to be formed by the evening of September 5th from Verdun to Paris as follows:—

Third Army: Verdun—Revigny.
Fourth Army: Revigny—Sommesons.
Seventh Army: Sommesons—Esternay.

Fifth Army: Esternay—south-east of Coulommiers. British Army: South-east of Coulommiers—Meaux.

Sixth Army: Meaux-Nanteuil.

[The Sixth and Seventh Armies were the newly formed reserves, which comprised the "Masses de Manœuvre."]

Second: The general attack to commence early on September 6th, 1914.

(a) Sixth Army to move against the German right and outflank the River Ourcq position.

(b) The remaining armies to attack the enemy in front of them, and drive them back.

#### VI.—GENERAL DIARY OF THE OPERATIONS.

SEPT. 4TH.—Area of the River Ourcq.—The French Sixth Army was disposed as follows:—

VIIth Corps: Louvres—Tremblay-les-Gonesse. Reserve Corps: Tremblay-les-Gonesse—Claye.

Morocco Brigade: Claye.

Territorial Divisions (two): about Pontoise from Amiens.

Cavalry Division (connecting with British Army): Villiers-sur-Marne.

During the day the German First Army descended the River Ourcq on both banks; the cavalry reached Senlis and villages to the south and west. In the evening the IVth German Reserve Corps took up position on the River Ourcq as a flank guard.

Area West of Coulommiers.—British Army was some twelve miles south of the line Lagny—Rozoy. There was some fighting near the Grand-Morin.

Area La Ferté-Gaucher.—The Fifth French Army reached its position and prepared for attack.

Area Fère-Champenoise.—Seventh French Army reached its position and prepared for attack. General line was Charleville—south of Mondemont—south of St. Gond Marshes—Sommesons.

Area Vitry-le-François.-Fourth French Army prepared for attack.

Area South-west of Verdun.—Third French Army prepared for attack.

The Commander of the Allied forces issued an order, of which the following is a summary, on the evening of this day:—

#### ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 4TH, 1914.

1.—It is desirable to take advantage of the doubtful position of the German First Army, and to concentrate against it the Allied forces on the extreme left.

2.—During September 5th the following movements will take place, preparatory for a general attack on September 6th, 1914:—

(a) All available troops of Sixth Army to cross the River Ourcq between Lizy-sur-Ourcq and May-en-Multien, and attack in the direction of Château-Thierry. Available squadrons of Ist Cavalry Corps are placed at the disposal of G.O.C. Sixth Army. (b) British Army, when established on the line Changis—Coulommiers, to face east, and advance on Montmirail.

(c) Fifth Army to take up the front Courtacon—Esternay—Sézanne and attack in a north and south direction; IInd Cavalry Corps to act between 5th and British Armies.

(d) VIIth Corps (Foch) to cover the right of the Fifth Army by holding the southern exits of the marshes of St. Gond, and parts of the plateau north of Sézanne.

(e) The attack will commence in the morning of September 6th, 1914.

(Sd.) J. JOFFRE.

SEPT. 5TH.—Area of the River Ourcq.—Sixth Army was heavily engaged from mid-day, the most severe fighting being on the right and centre. By the evening a slight advance had been made all along the line. The German IInd Corps was withdrawn and sent to assist the IVth Reserve Corps.

Area West of Coulommiers.—The British Army had some fighting with the advanced troops of First German Army. The British Commander was fully informed by the French Commander of the proposed new movements at a conference held this day.

Area La Ferté-Gaucher.—The Fifth French Army had some engagements with the enemy.

Area Fère-Champenoise.—There was some local fighting between the Seventh French Army and the Second and Saxon Armies all along the line.

Area Vitry-le-François.—The town was evacuated and a position taken up on the heights in rear by mid-day from Humbauville, by Vauclerc to Sermaize.

Area South-west of Verdun .- As before.

The Commander of the Allied forces issued the order (summarized) given below:—

7 p.m., September 5th, 1914.

Fourth Army.—To-morrow, September 6th, our armies of the left will attack in front and flank the First and Second German Armies. The Fourth Army will arrest its movement to the south, face the enemy, and assist the IIIrd Army which is moving from the north of Revigny, and take the offensive.

Third Army.—The Third Army, covering itself to the north-east, will march to the west and attack the flank of the enemy's forces marching west of the Argonne. It will conform its movements to those of the Fourth Army, which has been ordered to attack the enemy.

(Sd.) J. JOFFRE.

Sept. 6th.—Area of the River Ourcq.—The Sixth Army attacked at daybreak. The VIIth Corps occupied Etavigny, Arcy-en-Multien, Vincy, and Puisieux without serious fighting. The reserve corps had some fighting about Barcy, Chambry, and Penchard, all of which were eventually occupied. As these movements threatened the German lines, the IVth Reserve Corps began to retire parallel to the River Ourcq, on Betz and Marreuil-sur-Ourcq and entrenched itself in a position facing Rozoy-en-Multien and Etavigny. Late in the afternoon the French IVth Corps from Lorraine commenced to arrive, and by the evening part of it had reached a point a little to the south-west of Claye. The 45th Division from Paris also came up and took post between the VIIth and reserve corps.

Area West of Coulommiers.—The British Army had very severe fighting throughout the morning, the First German Army attempting to drive it out of the Great-Morin, especially to the south of Coulommiers. At 2 p.m. it was noticed

that the German attack was weakening; this was due to the fact that the IInd: German Corps was moving to the assistance of the IVth Reserve Corps on the River Ourcq. Later the Germans began to retreat slowly; by the evening the British had occupied Dagny, Coulommiers and Maisoncelles.

Area of La Ferté-Gaucher.—As in the case of the British Army, the Fifth French Army had very severe fighting throughout the morning. About 3 p.m. similar signs of retiring were noticed at Ferté-Gaucher, due to the fact that the VIIth German Corps had moved to assist the IVth Reserve Corps on the River Ourcq. Eventually the Germans were driven out of Montceaux-les-Provins, Courgivaux, and Villeneuve-les-Charlesville.

Fighting continued all night; by the early morning the Fifth French Army was fairly well in possession of the line Jouy-sur-Morin-Villeneuve-les-Charlesville.

Area Fère-Champenoise.—The Seventh Army, part of which was on the line Charleville—south of Mondemont—south of St. Gond Marshes—Sommesons, attacked at daybreak, and after very severe fighting made some progress about Mondemont, north of Sézanne. By the evening, however, the right and centre had been slightly forced back.

Area Vitry-le-François.—The Fourth Army was heavily engaged throughout the day.

Area South-west of Verdun.—There was a good deal of fighting, but the Third' Army repulsed all attacks.

SEPT. 7TH.—Area of the River Ourcq.—There was heavy fighting all along the line. The German IVth Corps, which had been withdrawn from the River Marne, now came up about Betz and attacked Etavigny vigorously, threatening the extreme left of the Sixth Army. At dusk the two Territorial divisions at Pontoise commenced to move up, and the 7th Division of the French IVth Corpsarrived from Paris in taxi-cabs.

By the evening the general battle line was Nanteuil-Etavigny-Le Plessy-

Area West of Coulommiers.—The British advance continued, the German rearguards being slowly forced back.

Area La Ferté-Gaucher.—The Fifth Army advanced steadily, and after severe fighting occupied the line Jouy-sur-Morin—Esternay definitely. During the day there was great pressure on the left of the Seventh Army, and the Ist Corps on the right was directed to give all assistance possible to its left flank.

Area of Fère-Champenoise.—There was very heavy fighting all day, especially about Lenharreé and Haussemont.

By the evening the right had retired a little towards the line Salon-Gourgançon Connantre-Allemant.

Area Vitry-le-François.—Very heavy fighting all along the line, especially about the centre and left.

Area South-west of Verdun.—Considerable fighting all along the line, especially about Sommeilles, Laheycourt, Villers-aux-Vents and Revigny.

SEPT. 8TH.—Area of the River Ourcq.—There was very heavy fighting throughout the day. The IVth German Corps was now in position towards Nanteuil, and succeeded in forcing back the French left on Bouillancy and Villers-St.-Geneste. The French centre and right, however, held out with much difficulty. By the evening the position was very serious and help was greatly needed.

Area West of Coulommiers.—The Germans continued their retreat, and the British Army steadily advanced. The 1st Corps had severe fighting north of Rebais, and the IInd and IIIrd Corps were also heavily engaged from time to time. By the evening the whole force was well towards the River Marne.

Area La Ferté-Gaucher.—After severe fighting throughout the day the Fifth French Army reached the Petit Morin, and Montmirail was occupied during the evening. The Fifth French Army and the British Army were now in line.

The general battle line of the Fifth French Army in the evening was VVIIIth Corps (Marchis), HIrd Corps (Montmirail), Xth Corps (?), Ist Corps (towards

Baunay).

Area of Fère-Champenoise.—Very heavy fighting all along the line. On the left the French occupied St. Prix and the southern edge of the St. Gond Marshes, but on the right and centre they were forced back from the line north of La Fère-Champenoise—Sommesons to the position Connantre—Corroy—Gourgançon—Semoine.

It should be noted that a gap began to appear in the German line opposite the IXth French Corps, in the centre of the German Guard Corps, the right of which still held the ground to the north of the St. Gond Marshes, while the left had joined the Saxons in forcing back the French centre and left.

In the evening the general battle line was St. Prix-south of St. Gond Marshes

-south of Bannes-Connantre-Corroy-Gourgançon-Semoine.

Area Vitry-le-François.—Very heavy fighting throughout the day, especially about Vitry, Sompuis, Pargny, Maurupt-le-Montoy, Sermaize-les-Bains, and Etrepy. The general French line was well held.

Area South-west of Verdun.—The French Third Army held its position; a great deal of heavy fighting.

SEPT. 9TH.—Area of the River Ourcq.—The Sixth French Army had very severe fighting all day and was in a distinctly dangerous position, as the flanking movement of the German forces about Nanteuil developed considerably. The French Commander-in-Chief, however, gave orders for the ground to be held at all costs, and this was successfully done. The fighting was particularly severe about Marville, Arcy-en-Multien, and Vincy. Late in the afternoon further German reinforcements were noted moving south from Compiègne, but some 20,000 men of the Paris garrison were hurriedly brought up in taxi-cabs, and the general front was maintained. In the evening the artillery bombardment appeared to weaken, but fighting continued until a late hour. The general battle line was now south of Nanteuil—Arcy-en-Multien—Varreddes. The 8th Division of the IVth French Corps was now about Trilport, acting as connection between the Sixth French and British Armies.

Area West and North of Coulommiers.—The British advance continued, and the German rearguards were forced across the River Marne. There was heavy fighting at Varreddes, Ferté-sous-Jouarre, le Château de Condé, Charly and Château-Thierry. By the evening the German Cavalry Corps was retiring north from a line Lizy-sur-Ourcq—Charly, while the Third German Army was moving north towards Neuilly-St.-Front.

Area of La Ferté-Gaucher.—The Fifth French Army continued its advance, pressing back the German Second Army (left) to the north. The fighting all along the line was severe. By the evening the general battle line was Château-Thierry—Condé—Fromentières—St. Prix.

Area of La Fère-Champenoise.—At daybreak the German left and centre began a vigorous offensive against the French centre and right, and succeeded in bending the latter back to Salon. At the same time the Guards on the German right began to retire slowly, being forced back by the extreme left of the French. As a consequence the gap between the two portions of the Guards began to increase, and the French Commander, realizing the state of affairs, ordered the 42nd Division (which had some hours previously been withdrawn from the French

left) to advance through the gap, west of La Fère-Champenoise, and take the east portion of the German Guards in flank. At 6 p.m. the division advanced, struck the enemy's right flank, causing great confusion, and a vigorous attack by the French centre (IXth Corps) caused the enemy to retire.

By the evening the Seventh French Army was in possession of La Fère-Champenoise, Mondement on the left, and Lenharrée on the right.

Area Vitry-le-François.—The Fourth French Army maintained its line throughout the day. Its left was in some danger when the right was driven back from Sermaise, but the ground was held, and an attempt by German cavalry corps to turn its left was beaten off by the transfer of a division from the right.

Area South-west of Verdun.—There was heavy fighting all along the line, especially about Revigny, but the general front was held.

SEPT. 10TH.—Area of the River Ourcq.—At daybreak the VIth French Corps discovered that the First German Army was retiring north—in fact that a general retirement of the German forces, the Fifth Army being used as a pivot, was taking place. An advance was at once made, and by the evening the front was Betz—Villers Cotterets.

Area West of Coulommiers—Soissons.—The British Army continued to follow up the retiring Second German Army, and there was a good deal of fighting throughout the day. By the evening the British were on the line of the River Ourcq, with centre towards Neuilly-St.-Front.

Area La Ferté-Gaucher.—The Fifth French Army continued its advance, driving the enemy before it. By the evening it was on the River Ourcq, left connecting with British right, centre about Fère-en-Tardenois.

Area Fère-Champenoise.—The Seventh Army continued its advance, moving on the line Epernay—Chalons. A part of its force was sent towards Mailly to assist the Fourth French Army, as the Fourth German Army on that side was retiring very slowly.

Area Vitry-le-François.—There was considerable fighting in the area of the Fourth French Army. Some advance was made, but the enemy retired slowly.

Area South-west of Verdun,—The Third French Army had some severe fighting about Revigny, Vaubécourt, and Triaucourt.

SEPT. 11TH.—Area of the River Ourcq.—The Sixth French Army continued its advance towards the line Compiègne—Soissons.

Area West of Coulommiers—Soissons.—The British Army continued its advance, crossing the upper part of the River Ourcq and moving towards the line Soissons—Bourg.

Area La Ferté-Gaucher.—The Fifth French Army continued its march towards the line Bourg—Bery-au-Bac.

Area Fère-Champenoise.—The Seventh French Army entered Chalons and moved towards the line Bery-au-Bac-Mourmelon.

Area Vitry-le-François.—The Fourth French Army had heavy fighting about Sompuis. The enemy retreated, and the army moved on the line Mourmelon—west of Varennes.

Area South-west of Verdun.—The Third French Army pushed forward its left, conforming to the movements of the Fourth French Army.

SEPT. 12TH.—The German retirement now concluded. In the evening the general battle line was north of Compiègne—south of Soissons—north of Rheims—Varennes—north of Verdun. The Battle of the Marne is considered to have concluded this day.

and the enemy's were the NVX XVII. APPENDIX XVII. Despatch from the General Officer Commanding the British Forces in France.

General Headquarters, May 19th, 1916.

I have the honour to report the operations of the British forces serving in France and Belgium since December 19th, 1915, on which date, in accordance with the orders of His Majesty's Government, I assumed the Chief Command.

During this period the only offensive effort made by the enemy on a great scale was directed against our French Allies near Verdun. The fighting in that area has been prolonged and severe. The results have been worthy of the high traditions of the French Army and of great service to the cause of the Allies. The efforts made by the enemy have cost him heavy losses both in men and in prestige, and he has made these sacrifices without gaining any advantage to counter-balance them.

During this struggle my troops have been in readiness to co-operate as they might be needed, but the only assistance asked for by our Allies was of an indirect nature-viz., the relief of the French troops on a portion of their defensive front. This relief I was glad to be able to afford.

Its execution on a considerable front, everywhere in close touch with the enemy, was a somewhat delicate operation, but it was carried out with complete success, thanks to the cordial co-operation and goodwill of all ranks concerned and to the lack of enterprise shown by the enemy during the relief.

On the British front no action on a great scale, such as that of Verdun, has been fought during the past five months, nevertheless our troops have been far from idle or inactive. Although the struggle, in a general sense, has not been intense, it has been everywhere continuous, and there have been many sharp local actions.

The maintenance and repair of our defences alone, especially in winter, entail constant heavy work. Bad weather and the enemy combine to flood and destroy trenches, dug-outs, and communications; all such damages must be repaired

promptly, under fire, and almost entirely by night.

Artillery and snipers are practically never silent, patrols are out in front of the lines every night, and heavy bombardments by the artillery of one or both sides take place daily in various parts of the line. Below ground there are continual mining and counter-mining, which, by the ever-present threat of sudden explosion and the uncertainty as to when and where it will take place, causes perhaps a more constant strain than any other form of warfare. In the air there is seldom a day, however bad the weather, when aircraft are not busy reconnoitring, photographing, and observing fire. All this is taking place constantly at any hour of the day or night, and in any part of the line.

In short, although there has been no great incident of historic importance to record on the British front during the period under review, a steady and continuous fight has gone on, day and night, above ground and below it. The comparative monotony of this struggle has been relieved at short intervals by sharp local actions, some of which, although individually almost insignificant in a war on such an immense scale, would have been thought worthy of a separate despatch under different conditions, while their cumulative effect, though difficult to appraise at its true value now, will doubtless prove hereafter to have been considerable.

One form of minor activity deserves special mention, namely, the raids or "cutting out parties" which are made at least twice or three times a week against the enemy's line. They consist of a brief attack, with some special object, on a section of the opposing trenches, usually carried out at night by a small body of men. The character of these operations—the preparation of a road through our own and the enemy's wire—the crossing of the open ground unscen—the penetration of the enemy's trenches—the hand-to-hand fighting in the darkness and the uncertainty as to the strength of the opposing force—give peculiar scope to the gallantry, dash and quickness of decision of the troops engaged; and much skill and daring are frequently displayed in these operations.

The initiative in these minor operations was taken, and on the whole has been held, by us; but the Germans have recently attempted some bold and well-conceived raids against our lines, many of which have been driven back, although some have succeeded in penetrating, as has been reported by me from time to time.

Of the numerous local actions alluded to, the total number, omitting the more minor raids, amounts to over sixty since December 19th, of which the most

important have been:-

The operations at The Bluff, the Hohenzollern Redoubt, and at St. Eloi; the mining operations and crater fighting in the Loos salient and on the Vimy Ridge; and the hostile gas attacks north of Ypres in December, and opposite Hulloch and Messines in April.

The most recent local operations worthy of mention are the capture of some 500 yards of our trenches by the Germans at the Kink, on May 11th, and the capture by us of 250 yards of their trenches near Cabaret Rouge, on the night of May 15th-16th.

As an illustration of the nature of these local operations, it will suffice to

describe two or three of the most important.

During the period February 8th to 19th the enemy displayed increased activity in the Ypres salient, and carried out a series of infantry attacks, preceded, as a rule, by intense bombardment, and by the explosion of mines. These attacks may, no doubt, be regarded as a subsidiary operation, designed partly to secure local points of vantage, but probably also to distract attention from the impending operations near Verdun, which began on February 21st.

After several days' heavy shelling over the whole of our line in this area, the first attack took place on February 12th at the extreme left of our line to the north of Ypres. A bombing attack was launched by the Germans in the early morning, and they succeeded in capturing our trenches. Our counter-attack, however, which was immediately organized, enabled us to clear our trenches of the enemy, and to pursue him to his own. After a period of further bombardment on both sides, the German fire again increased in intensity against our trenches and the French line beyond them; and in the evening a second attempt was made to rush our extreme left-this time entirely without success. Smaller attempts against other trenches in the neighbourhood were made at the same time, but were imme-Throughout the operations our diately repulsed by rifle and machine-gun fire. position in this part of the line remained intact, except that two isolated trenches of no tactical importance were captured by the enemy a day or two later; they were subsequently obliterated by our artillery fire. Throughout this fighting the French on our immediate left rendered us the prompt and valuable assistance which we have at all times received from them.

Another series of German attacks was launched about the same time in the neighbourhood of Hooge to the east of Ypres. The enemy had pushed out several saps in front of his trenches, and connected them up into a firing line some 150 yards from our lines. During the whole of February 12th he heavily bombarded our front-line trenches in this neighbourhood, and completely destroyed them. On the following afternoon an intense bombardment of our line began, and the enemy exploded a series of mines in front of our trenches, simultaneously launching infantry attacks against Hooge and the northern and southern ends of Sanctuary Wood. Each of these attacks was repulsed by artillery, machine-gun, and rifle fire.

Further to the south, however, the enemy was more successful. On the northern bank of the Ypres-Comines canal there is a narrow ridge, 30ft. to 40ft. high, covered with trees-probably the heap formed by excavation when the canal was dug-which forms a feature of the flat wooded country at the southern bend of the Ypres salient. It runs outward through our territory almost into the German area, so that our trenches pass over the eastern point of it, which is known as The Bluff. Here also our trenches were almost obliterated by the bombardment on the afternoon of the 14th, following which a sudden rush of hostile infantry was successful in capturing these and other front-line trenches immediately north of The Bluff-some 600 yards in all. Two of these trenches were at once regained, but the others were held by the enemy, in the face of several counter-attacks. On the night of the 15th-16th we made an unsuccessful counter-attack, with the object of regaining the lost trenches. An advance was begun across the open on the north side of the canal, combined with grenade attacks along the communication trenches immediately north of The Bluff. The night was very dark and heavy rain had turned the ground into a quagmire, so that progress was difficult for the attacking force, which was unable to consolidate its position in the face of heavy machine-gun and rifle fire. After the failure of this attack it was decided to adopt slower and more methodical methods of recapturing the lost trenches, and nothing of special importance occurred in the Ypres salient during the rest of the month, although both sides displayed rather more than the usual activity.

The recapture of The Bluff took place after the enemy had held it for seventeen days. After several days' preliminary bombardment by our artillery the assault was carried out at 4.29 a.m. on March 2nd. Measures taken to deceive the enemy were successful, and our infantry effected a complete surprise, finding the enemy with their bayonets unfixed, and many of them without rifles or equipment. About fifty Germans took refuge in a crater at the eastern end of The Bluff, and these put up a brief resistance before taking refuge in the tunnels they had constructed, in which they were captured at leisure. Otherwise our right-hand attacking party, whose objective was The Bluff, met with little opposition.

The front line of the centre attack, reaching its assigned objective without much opposition, swept on past it and seized the German third line at the eastern side of the salient. This line was not suitable to hold permanently, but it proved useful as a temporary covering position while the captured trenches in rear were being consolidated, and at nightfall the covering party was withdrawn unmolested. The later waves of our centre attack met and captured, after some fighting, several Germans coming out of their dug-outs.

The left attacking party, at the first attempt, failed to reach the German trenches, but those who had penetrated to the German line on the right realized the situation and brought a Lewis gun to bear on the enemy's line of resistance, completely enfilleding his trenches, and thus enabling the left company to reach its

goal.

Thus our objective, which included a part of the German line, as well as the whole of the front lost by us on February 14th, was captured, and is still held by us. Several counter-attacks were destroyed by our fire. The enemy's trenches were found full of dead as a result of our bombardment, and five officers and 251 other ranks were captured.

The support of the heavy and field artillery and a number of trench mortars

contributed largely to the success of the operation.

On March 27th our troops made an attack with the object of straightening out the line at St. Eloi, and cutting away the small German salient which encroached on the semi-circle of our line in the Ypres salient to a depth of about 100 yards over a front of some 600 yards. The operation was begun by the firing of six

very large mines; the charge was so heavy that the explosion was felt in towns several miles behind the lines, and large numbers of the enemy were killed. Half a minute after the explosion our infantry attack was launched, aiming at the German second line. The right attack met with little opposition and captured its assigned objective; but the left attack was not so successful, and a gap was left in possession of the Germans, through which they entered one of the craters. The following days were spent by both sides in heavy bombardment and in unsuccessful attacks, intended on our part to capture the remaining trenches and on the part of the Germans to drive us from the positions we had occupied. In the very early morning of April 3rd we succeeded in recapturing the crater and the trenches still held by the enemy, thereby securing the whole of our original objective. We had, moreover, captured five officers and 195 men in the first attack on March 27th, and five officers and 80 men in the attack on April 3rd. The work of consolidating our new position, however, proved extremely difficult. owing to the wet soil, heavy shelling, and mine explosions; though pumps were brought up and efforts at draining were instituted, the result achieved was comparatively small. By dint of much heavy work the brigade holding these trenches succeeded in reducing the water in the trenches by two feet by the morning of the 5th. This state of affairs could not, even so, be regarded as satisfactory; and during the 5th the enemy's bombardment increased in intensity, and the new trenches practically ceased to exist. On the morning of the 6th the enemy attacked with one battalion supported by another; he penetrated our new line, and gained the two westernmost craters. It is difficult to follow in detail the fighting of the next three weeks, which consisted in repeated attacks by both sides on more or less isolated mine craters, the trench lines having been destroyed by shell fire. Great efforts were made to maintain communication with the garrisons of these advanced posts, and with considerable success. But there were periods of uncertainty, and some misconception as to the state of affairs arose. On the 11th it was reported to me that we had recaptured all that remained of the position won by us on March 27th and April 3rd. This report, probably due to old craters having been mistaken for new ones, was subsequently found to be incorrect. The new craters, being exposed to the enemy's view and to the full weight of his artillery fire, have proved untenable, and at the present time our troops are occupying trenches roughly in the general line which was held by them before the 27th.

On the night of April 29th-30th the enemy carried out a gas attack on a considerable scale near Wulverghem, on a front of 3,500 yards. The operation was opened by heavy rifle and machine-gun fire under cover of which the gas was released. Immediately afterwards a heavy "barrage," or curtain of artillery fire, was placed on three parts of this area, and eight infantry attacks were launched. Of these attacks only two penetrated our trenches; one was immediately repelled, while the other was driven out by a counter-attack after about forty minutes' occupation. The enemy's object would appear to have been the destruction of mine shafts, as a charge of gun-cotton was found unexploded in a disused shaft, to which the enemy had penetrated. But if this was his object he was completely unsuccessful.

Similar attacks were made by the Germans in front of Vermelles, to the south of La Bassée, on April 27th and 29th, the discharge of a highly concentrated gas being accompanied by bombardment with lachrymatory and other shells and the explosion of a mine. On the first occasion two minor infantry attacks penetrated our trenches, but were driven out almost immediately; on the second occasion a small attack was repulsed, but the more serious advance which appears to have been intended was probably rendered impossible by the fact that a part

of the enemy's gas broke back over his own lines, to the visible confusion of his troops, who were massing for the attack.

The activity described above has its counterpart in rear of our lines in the training which is carried out continuously. During the periods of relief all formations, and especially the newly created ones, are instructed and practised in all classes of the present and other phases of warfare. A large number of schools also exist for the instruction of individuals especially in the use and theory of the less familiar weapons, such as bombs and grenades.

There are schools for young staff officers and regimental officers, for candidates for commissions, etc. In short, every effort is made to take advantage of the closer contact with actual warfare, and to put the finishing touches, often after actual experience in the trenches, to the training received at home.

During the period under review the forces under my command have been considerably augmented by the arrival of new formations from home, and the transfer of others released from service in the Near East. This increase has made possible the relief of a French army, to which I have already referred, at the time of the Battle of Verdun. Among the newly arrived force is the "Anzac" Corps. With them, the Canadians, and a portion of the South African Overseas Force which has also arrived, the Dominions now furnish a valuable part of the Imperial Forces in France.

Since the date of the last despatch, but before I assumed command, the Indian Army Corps left this country for service in the East. They had given a year's valuable and gallant service under conditions of warfare which they had not dreamt of, and in a climate peculiarly difficult for them to endure. I regret their departure, but I do not doubt that they will continue to render gallant and effective service elsewhere, as they have already done in this country.

I take this opportunity to bring to notice the admirable work which the Royal Flying Corps has continued to perform, in spite of much unfavourable weather, in carrying out reconnaissance duties, in taking photographs—an important aid to reconnaissance which has been brought to a high pitch of perfection-and in assisting the work of our artillery by registering targets and locating hostile batteries. In the performance of this work they have flown in weather when no hostile aeroplane ventured out, and they have not hesitated to fly low, under fire of the enemy's guns, when their duties made it necessary to do so. also carried out a series of hombing raids on hostile aerodromes and points of military importance. A feature of the period under review has been the increased activity of the enemy's aircraft, in suitable weather. But the enemy's activity has been mainly on his own side of the line, and has aimed chiefly at interrupting the work carried out by our machines. In order to carry on the work in spite of this opposition, which was for a time rendered more effective by the appearance in December of a new and more powerful type of enemy machine, it has been necessary to provide an escort to accompany our reconnaissance aeroplanes, and fighting in the air, which was formerly exceptional, has now become an everyday

The observers, no less than the pilots, have done excellent service, and many fine feats have been performed by both. Developments on the technical side of the air service have been no less remarkable and satisfactory than the progress made on the purely military side. Much inventive genius has been displayed; and our equipment for photography, wireless telegraphy, bomb-dropping and offensive action generally has been immensely improved, while great skill has been shown in keeping the flying machines themselves in good flying condition.

The continuance of siege warfare has entailed for the Royal Engineers work of a particularly arduous and important kind extending from the front trenches to

the base ports. In the performance of this work the officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the field companies and other units of the Corps have continued to exhibit a very high standard of skill, courage, and devotion to duty.

The work of the Tunnelling Companies calls for special mention. Increased mining activity on the part of the enemy has invariably been answered with enterprise combined with untiring energy on the part of our miners, who in carrying out duties always full of danger have shown that they possess in the highest degree the qualities of courage, perseverance, and self-sacrifice. Their importance in the present phase of warfare is very great.

The excellent work done by the corps of military police is worthy of mention. This corps is inspired by a high sense of duty, and in the performance of its share

in the maintenance of discipline it has shown both zeal and discretion.

All branches of the medical services deserve the highest commendation for the successful work done by them, both at the front and on the lines of communication. The sick rate has been consistently low; there has been no serious epidemic, and enteric fever, the bane of armies in the past, has almost completely disappeared owing to preventive measures energetically carried out. The results of exposure incidental to trench warfare during the winter months were to a very great extent kept in check by careful application of the precautions recommended and taught by regimental medical officers. The wounded have been promptly and efficiently dealt with, and their evacuation to the base has been rapidly accomplished. The close co-operation which has existed between the officers of the regular medical service of the Army and those members of the civil medical profession who have patriotically given their valuable services to the Army has largely contributed to the prevention of disease and to the successful treatment and comfort of the sick and wounded. As part of the medical services, the Canadian Army Medical Corps has displayed marked efficiency and devotion to duty.

The Commission of Graves Registration and Enquiries has, since it first undertook this work eighteen months ago, registered and marked over 50,000 graves. Without its labours many would have remained unidentified. It has answered several thousand inquiries from relatives and supplied them with photographs. Flowers and shrubs have been planted in most of the cemeteries which are sufficiently far removed from the firing line, and all cemeteries which it is possible to work in during the daytime are now being looked after by non-commissioned officers and men of this unit.

The valuable nature of the work performed by the officers of the Central Laboratory and the Chemical Advisers with the armies in investigations into the nature of the gases and other new substances used in hostile attacks, and in devising and perfecting means of protecting our troops against them, is deserving of recognition. The efforts of these officers materially contributed to the failure of the Germans in their attack of December 19th, 1915, as well as in the various gas attacks since made.

The stream of additional personnel and material arriving from England and the move of complete formations to and from the East during the period under review have thrown a great dea! of work on our base ports and on the advanced base. The staff and personnel of these stations have coped most ably with the work of forwarding and equipping the various units passing through their hands, and I desire to bring their good work to notice.

The large increases made to our forces have necessitated a great expansion in the resources of our lines of communication, and I have been greatly struck by the forethought shown by the administrative services in anticipating the requirements of the armies in the field and in the provision made to satisfy these

requirements.

The base ports have been developed to the utmost possible extent, advanced depôts have been provided, and communications have been improved to ensure punctual distribution to the troops.

Labour has been organized in order to develop local resources, especially in the matter of timber for defences and hutting, and stone for road maintenance, whereby considerable reductions have been made possible in the shipments from over sea.

Economy has attended the good methods adopted, and the greatest credit is due to all concerned for the results obtained.

I desire to acknowledge here the valuable assistance rendered by the naval transport officers on the lines of communication. They have worked with and for the Army most untiringly, efficiently, and with the utmost harmony. I also desire to acknowledge the indebtedness of the Army to the Royal Navy for their unceasing and uniformly successful care in securing the safety of our transport service on the seas.

I wish to acknowledge the work done in the reproduction of maps by the Ordnance Survey Department. Over 90 per cent. of the maps used in this country are reproduced and printed in England by the Ordnance Survey, and the satisfactory supply is largely due to the foresight and initiative displayed by this department. I can now count on obtaining an issue of as many as 10,000 copies of any map within one week of sending it home for reproduction.

I have forwarded under a separate letter the names of the officers, noncommissioned officers, and men whom I wish to bring to notice for gallant and distinguished service.

#### APPENDIX XVIII.

#### Despatch from the General Officer Commanding the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

A supplement to the London Gazette contained a highly important despatch from General Sir C. C. Monro, dated from Headquarters, First Army, France, March 6th, giving a brief account of the operations in the Eastern Mediterranean from October 28th, 1915, on which day he assumed command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, until January 9th, 1916, when he handed over charge at Cairo to Lieut.-General Sir Archibald Murray. In the first portion of his despatch General Monro explains his reasons for advising the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula. That portion of the despatch is reproduced below:-

On October 20th in London I received your lordship's instructions to proceed as soon as possible to the Near East and take over the command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. My duty on arrival was in broad outline:-

- (a) To report on the military situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula.(b) To express an opinion whether on purely military grounds the Peninsula should be evacuated, or another attempt made to carry it.
- (c) The number of troops that would be required, (1) to carry the Peninsula, (2) to keep the Straits open, and (3) to take Constantinople.

Two days after my arrival at Imbros, where the headquarters of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was established, I proceeded to the Peninsula to investigate the military situation. The impressions I gathered are summarized very shortly as follows:-

The positions occupied by our troops presented a military situation unique in history. The mere fringe of the coast line had been secured. The beaches and piers upon which they depended for all requirements in personnel and material were exposed to registered and observed artillery fire. Our entrenchments were dominated almost throughout by the Turks. The possible artillery positions were insufficient and defective. The force, in short, held a line possessing every possible military defect. The position was without depth, the communications were insecure and dependent on the weather. No means existed for the concealment and deployment of fresh troops destined for the offensive—whilst the Turks enjoyed full powers of observation, abundant artillery positions, and they had been given the time to supplement the natural advantages which the position presented by all the devices at the disposal of the Field Engineer.

Another material factor came prominently before me. The troops on the Peninsula had suffered much from various causes:

(a) It was not, in the first place, possible to withdraw them from the shell-swept area as is done when necessary in France, for every corner on the Peninsula is exposed to hostile fire.

(b) They were much enervated from the diseases which are endemic in that part of Europe in the summer.

(c) In consequence of the losses which they had suffered in earlier battles, there was a very grave dearth of officers competent to take command of men.

(d) In order to maintain the numbers needed to hold the front, the Territorial Divisions had been augmented by the attachment of Yeomanry and mounted brigades. Makeshifts of this nature very obviously did not tend to create efficiency.

Other arguments, irrefutable in their conclusions, convinced me that a complete evacuation was the only wise course to pursue.

(a) It was obvious that the Turks could hold us in front with a small force and prosecute their designs on Baghdad or Egypt, or both.

(b) An advance from the positions we held could not be regarded as a reasonable military operation to expect.

(c) Even had we been able to make an advance in the Peninsula, our position would not have been ameliorated to any marked degree, and an advance on Constantinople was quite out of the question.

(d) Since we could not hope to achieve any purpose by remaining on the Peninsula, the appalling cost to the nation involved in consequence of embarking on an overseas expedition with no base available for the rapid transit of stores, supplies and personnel, made it urgent that we should divert the troops locked up on the Peninsula to a more useful theatre.

Since, therefore, I could see no military advantage in our continued occupation of positions on the Peninsula, I telegraphed to your Lordship that in my opinion the evacution of the Peninsula should be taken in hand.

Below is published the text to the despatch issued in a Supplement to the London Gazette from General Sir C. C. Monro to Lord Kitchener, giving an account of the operations in the Eastern Mediterranean from October 28th, 1915, on which date he assumed command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, until January 9th, 1916, when in compliance with Lord Kitchener's directions he handed over charge at Cairo to Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray. The first portion, which sets forth the reasons which actuated General Monro in advising the evacuation of Gallipoli, is reproduced textually above. Describing the course of events after his visit to Imbros, and his decision that evacuation was necessary, General Monro proceeds:—

Subsequently I proceeded to Egypt to confer with Colonel Sir H. McMahon, the High Commissioner, and Lieutenant-General Sir J. Maxwell, Commanding the Forces in Egypt, over the situation which might be created in Egypt and the Araba

world by the evacuation of the Peninsula. Whilst in Egypt I was ordered by a telegram from the War Office to take command of the troops at Salonika. The purport of this telegram was subsequently cancelled by your Lordship on your arrival at Mudros, and I was then ordered to assume Command of the Forces in the Mediterranean, east of Malta, and exclusive of Egypt.

Consequent on these instructions, I received approval that the two forces in the Mediterranean should be designated as follows:-

(a) The original Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, which comprised the forces operating on the Gallipoli Peninsula and those employed at Mudros and Imbros, as the "Dardanelles Army," under Lieut.-General Sir W. Birdwood, with headquarters at Imbros.

(b) The troops destined for Salonika as the "Salonika Army," under Lieut.-General Sir B. Mahon, with headquarters at Salonika.

The staff of the original Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was left in part to form the Dardanelles Army, and the remainder were taken to make a General Headquarter Staff for the increased responsibilities now assumed. Other officers doing duty in this theatre with the necessary qualifications were selected, and with no difficulty or demands on home resources, a thoroughly efficient and adequate Staff was created.

Mudros was selected as being the most suitable site for the establishment of headquarters, as affording an opportunity, in addition to other advantages, of daily consultation with the Inspector-General, Line of Communications. working of the services of the line of communications presented difficulties of an unique character, mainly owing to

(a) the absence of pier and wharfage accommodation at Mudros and the necessity of transferring all ordnance and engineer stores from one ship to another;

(b) the submarine danger;

(c) the delay caused by rough weather.

Close association with General Altham was therefore most imperative, and by this means many important changes were made which conduced to greater efficiency and more prompt response to the demands of fighting units.

A narrative of the events which occurred in each of the two Armies is now

recorded separately for facility of perusal and reference.

Early in October the 10th Division, under Lieutenant-General Sir B. Mahon, was transferred from Suvla to Salonika, and fully concentrated there. The dislocation of units caused by the landing on the Peninsula and the subsequent heavy fighting which occurred prevented this division being despatched intact. The organization of the infantry and the Royal Engineers was not disturbed, but the other services had to be improvised from other divisions as found most accessible.

The arrival of the 10th Division had been preceded by two French divisions under General Sarrail, whose force was subsequently augmented by another division. These three divisions were then moved into Serbia under the understanding arranged between the Allies' Governments, which was to the effect that the French forces were to protect the railway between Krivolak and Veles, and to ensure communication with the Serbian Army, whilst the British were to maintain the position from Salonika to Krivolak, and to support the French right. If communication with the Serbian Army could not be opened and maintained, the Allied forces were to be withdrawn. With this object, two battalions of the 10th Division were moved from Salonika on October 27th, and took over the French front from Rosturino to Lake Doiran. The remainder of the division was sent to Serbia on November 12th and following days, and took over the French front eastwards from Kosturino.

The task of moving troops into Serbia and maintaining them there presented many difficulties. No road exists from Salonika to Doiran, a few miles of road then obtains, which is followed within a few miles by a track only suitable for pack transport. Sir B. Mahon had therefore to readjust his transport to a pack scale, and was dependent on a railway of uncertain carrying power to convey back his guns and all wheeled traffic in case of a withdrawal, and to supply his troops whilst in Serbia. Very soon afterwards reinforcements commenced to arrive. The disembarkation of these new divisions was an operation which taxed the powers of organization and resources of the staff at Salonika to the highest degree possible, and it speaks highly for their capacity that they were able to shelter and feed the troops as they arrived. During November and the early part of December the 10th Division was holding its position in Serbia, and the disembarkation of other divisions was proceeding with difficulty.

In order to gain time for the landing of the troops, and their deployment on the positions selected, I represented to General Sarrail and Sir B. Mahon the urgent need of the divisions withdrawing from Serbia being utilized as a covering force, and retaining their ground as such until the forces disembarking were

thoroughly in a position to hold their front.

It had been evident for some time that the power of resistance of the Serbian Armies was broken, and that the Allied Forces could afford them no material assistance. It was also clear from all information received that the position of our troops was becoming daily more precarious owing to a large German-Bulgarian concentration in the Strumniza Valley. I, therefore, again pressed General Sarrail to proceed with his withdrawal from the positions he was holding. The British Division operating as it was, as the pivot upon which the withdrawal was effected, was compelled to hold its ground until the French left was brought back. Before our withdrawal was completed the 10th Division was heavily attacked on the 6th, 7th, and 8th December, by superior Bulgarian forces. The troops had suffered considerably from the cold in the highlands of Macedonia, and in the circumstances conducted themselves very creditably in being able to extricate themselves from a difficult position with no great losses. The account of this action was reported by wire to you by General Mahon on December 11th; no further reference is therefore necessary to this incident. As soon as I was informed that the 10th Division was being heavily pressed I directed Sir B. Mahon to send a brigade up the railway line in support, and to hold another brigade ready to proceed at short notice. The withdrawal was, however, conducted into Greek territory without further opposition from the Bulgarians. Meanwhile the operation of disembarkation at Salonika was being carried out with all possible speed, and the Greek authorities, through their representative from Athens, Colonel Pallis, were informed by me that we intended to proceed to the defensive line selected. This intimation was received in good part by the Greek Generals. They commenced to withdraw their troops further to the east, where they did not hamper our plans, and they showed a disposition to meet our demands in a reasonable and friendly spirit.

Whilst dealing with the events above enumerated, I desire to give special prominence to the difficulties to which General Sir B. Mahon was exposed from the time of his landing at Salonika, and the ability which he displayed in overcoming them. The subjoined instances, selected from many which could be given, will illustrate my contention and the high standard of administrative capacity displayed by the General Officer Commanding and his Staff:—

(a) From the date on which the 10th Division first proceeded into Serbia until the date of its withdrawal across the Greek frontier, personnel, guns, supplies and material of all kinds had to be sent up by rail to Doiran, and onwards by

march, motor lorries, limbered wagons, and pack animals. This railway, moreover, was merely a single track, and had to serve the demands of the local population as well as our needs. The evacuation of the wounded and sick had to be arranged on similar lines, yet the requirements of the troops were fully satisfied.

(b) The majority of the divisions were sent without trains to Salonika, most units without first line transport; in spite of this, part of the force was converted

into a mobile condition with very little delay.

(c) The complications presented by the distribution and checking of stores, supplies, ammunition, etc., discharged from ships on to quays, with insufficient accommodation or storehouses, and with crude means of ingress and egress therefrom, and served by a single road which was divided between the French and ourselves, constituted a problem which could only be solved by officers of high administrative powers. I trust, therefore, that full recognition may be given tomy recommendation of the officers who rendered such fine service under such arduous conditions.

On my arrival in the Mediterranean theatre a gratifying decline in the high rate of sickness which had prevailed in the force during the summer months had become apparent. The wastage due to this cause still, however, remained very high. The Corps Commanders were urged to take all advantage of the improved weather conditions to strengthen their positions by all available means, and to reduce to the last degree possible all animals not actually required for the maintenance of the troops, in order to relieve the strain imposed on the Naval Transport Service. During the month of November, beyond the execution of very clever and successful minor enterprises carried out by Corps Commanders with a view to maintaining an offensive spirit in their commands, there remains little to record—except that an increased activity of the Turkish artillery against our front became a noticeable factor.

On November 21st the Peninsula was visited by a storm said to be nearly unprecedented for the time of the year. The storm was accompanied by torrential rain, which lasted for twenty-four hours. This was followed by hard frost and a heavy blizzard. In the areas of the 8th Corps and the Anzac Corps the effects were not felt to a very marked degree owing to the protection offered by the surrounding hills. The 9th Corps were less favourably situated; the watercourses in this area became converted into surging rivers, which carried all before them. The water rose in many places to the height of the parapets and all means of communication were prevented. The men, drenched as they were by the rain, suffered from the subsequent blizzard most severely. Large numbers collapsed from exposure and exhaustion, and in spite of untiring efforts that were made to mitigate the suffering, I regret to announce that there were 200 deaths from exposure and over 10,000 sick evacuated during the first few days of December. From reports given by deserters it is probable that the Turks suffered even to a greater degree.

In this period our flimsy piers, breakwaters, and light shipping became damaged by the storm to a degree which might have involved most serious consequences, and was a very potent indication of the dangers attached to the maintenance and supply of an army operating on a coast line with no harbour, and devoid of all the accessories, such as wharves, piers, cranes, and derricks, for the

discharge and distribution of stores, etc.

Towards the latter end of the month, having in view the possibility of an evacuation of the Peninsula being ordered, I directed Lieutenant-General Sir W. Birdwood, Commanding the Dardanelles Army, to prepare a scheme to this end, in order that all the details should be ready in case of sanction being given to this operation. I had in broad outline contemplated soon after my arrival on the

Peninsula that an evacuation could best be conducted by a sub-division into three stages:—

The first during which all troops, animals, and supplies not required for a long campaign should be withdrawn.

The second to comprise the evacuation of all men, guns, animals, and stores not required for defence during a period when the conditions of weather might retard the evacuation, or in fact seriously alter the programme contemplated.

The third or final stage, in which the troops on shore should be embarked with all possible speed, leaving behind such guns, animals and stores needed for military reasons at this period.

This problem with which we were confronted was the withdrawal of an army of a considerable size from positions in no cases more than 300 yards from the enemy's trenches, and its embarkation on open beaches, every part of which were within effective range of Turkish guns, and from which in winds from the south or south-west the withdrawal of troops was not possible.

The attitude which we should adopt from a naval and military point of view in case of withdrawal from the Peninsula being ordered had given me much anxious thought. According to text-book principles and the lessons to be gathered from history it seemed essential that this operation of evacuation should be immediately preceded by a combined naval and military feint in the vicinity of the Peninsula, with a view to distracting the attention of the Turks from our intention. When endeavouring to work out into concrete fact how such principles could be applied to the situation of our forces, I came to the conclusion that our chances of success were infinitely more probable if we made no departure of any kind from the normal life which we were following both on sea and on land. A feint which did not fully fulfil its purpose would have been worse than useless, and there was the obvious danger that the suspicion of the Turks would be aroused by our adoption of a course the real purport of which could not have been long disguised.

On December 8th, consequent on your Lordship's orders, I directed the General Officer Commanding Dardanelles Army to proceed with the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac at once. Rapidity of action was imperative, having in view the unsettled weather which might be expected in the Ægean. The success of our operations was entirely dependent on weather conditions. Even a mild wind from the south or south-west was found to raise such a ground swell as to greatly impede communication with the beaches, while anything in the nature of a gale from this direction could not fail to break up the piers, wreck the small craft, and thus definitely prevent any steps being taken towards withdrawal. We had, moreover, during the gale of November 21st, learnt how entirely we were at the mercy of the elements with the slender and inadequate means at our disposal by which we had endeavoured to improvise harbours and piers. On that day the harbour at Kephalos was completely wrecked, one of the ships which had been sunk to form a breakwater was broken up, and the whole of the small craft sheltered inside the breakwater were washed ashore. Similar damage was done to our piers, lighters, and small craft at Suvla and Anzac.

Lieutenant-General Birdwood proceeded on receipt of his orders with the skill and promptitude which is characteristic of all that he undertakes, and after consultation with Rear-Admiral Wemyss, it was decided, provided the weather was propitious, to complete the evacuation on the night of December 19th-20th. Throughout the period December 10th to 18th, the withdrawal proceeded under the most auspicious conditions, and the morning of December 18th found the positions both at Anzac and Suvla reduced to the numbers determined, while the evacuation of guns, animals, stores and supplies had continued most satisfactorily.

The arrangements for the final withdrawal made by corps commanders were as follows:--

It was imperative, of course, that the front line trenches should be held, however lightly, until the very last moment and that the withdrawal from these trenches should be simultaneous throughout the line. To ensure this being done. Lieut.-General Sir W. Birdwood arranged that the withdrawal of the inner flanks of corps should be conducted to a common embarking area under the orders of the General Officer Commanding IXth Corps. In the rear of the front line trenches at Suvla the General Officer Commanding IXth Corps broke up his area into two sections divided roughly by the Salt Lake. In the southern section a defensive line had been prepared from the Salt Lake to the sea and Lala Baba had been prepared for defence, on the left the second line ran from Kara Kol Dagh through Hill 10 to the Salt Lake. These lines were only to be held in case of emergency—the principle governing the withdrawal being that the troops should proceed direct from the trenches to the distributing centres near the beach, and that no intermediate positions should be occupied except in case of necessity. At Anzac, owing to the proximity of the trenches to the beach, no second position was prepared except at Anzac Cove, where a small keep was arranged to cover the withdrawal of the rearmost parties in case of necessity."

The good fortune which had attended the evacuation continued during the night of the 19th-20th. The night was perfectly calm with a slight haze over the moon, an additional stroke of good luck, as there was a full moon on that night. Soon after dark the covering ships were all in position, and the final withdrawal began. At 1.30 a.m. the withdrawal of the rear parties commenced from the front trenches at Suvla and the left of Anzac. Those on the right of Anzac who were nearer the beach remained in position until 2 a.m. By 5.30 a.m.

the last man had quitted the trenches.

At Anzac four 18-pounder guns, two 5-inch howitzers, one 4.7 naval gun, one anti-aircraft, and two 3-pounder Hotchkiss guns were left, but they were destroyed before the troops finally embarked. In addition fifty-six mules, a certain number of carts, mostly stripped of their wheels, and some supplies which were set on fire, were also abandoned.

At Suvla every gun, vehicle, and animal was embarked, and all that remained

was a small stock of supplies which were burnt.

Early in December orders had been issued for the withdrawal of the French troops on Helles, other than their artillery, and a portion of the line held by French Creoles had already been taken over by the Royal Naval Division on December 12th. On December 21st, having strengthened the VIIIth Corps with the 86th Brigade, the number of the French garrison doing duty on the Peninsula was reduced to 4,000 men. These it was hoped to relieve early in January, but before doing so it was necessary to give some respite from trench work to the 42nd Division, which was badly in need of a rest. My intention, therefore, was first to relieve the 42nd Division by the 88th Brigade, then to bring up the 13th Division, which was resting at Imbros since the evacuation of Suvla, in place of the 29th Division, and finally to bring up the 11th Division in relief of the French Helles would then be held by the 52nd, 11th, and 13th Divisions, with the Royal Naval Division and the 42nd Division in reserve on adjacent islands.

On December 24th General Sir W. Birdwood was directed to make all preliminary preparations for immediate evacuation, in the event of orders to this effect

being received.

On December 28th your Lordship's telegram ordering the evacuation of Helles was received, whereupon, in view of the possibility of bad weather intervening, I instructed the General Officer Commanding Dardanelles Army to complete the operation as rapidly as possible. He was reminded that every effort conditional

on not exposing the personnel to undue risk should be made to save all 60-pounder and 18-pounder guns, 6-inch and 4.5 howitzers, with their ammunition and other accessories, such as mules and A.T. carts, limbered waggons, etc. In addition I expressed my wish that the final evacuation should be completed in one night, and that the troops should withdraw direct from the front trenches to the beaches. and not occupy any intermediate position unless seriously molested. At a meeting which was attended by the Vice-Admiral and the General Officer Commanding Dardanelles Army, I explained the course which I thought we should adopt to again deceive the Turks as to our intentions. The situation on the Peninsula had not materially changed owing to our withdrawal from Suvla and Anzac, except that there was a marked increased activity in aerial reconnaissance over our positions, and the islands of Mudros and Imbros, and that hostile patrolling of our trenches was more frequent and daring. The most apparent factor was that the number of heavy guns on the European and Asiatic shores had been considerably augmented, and that these guns were more liberally supplied with German ammunition, the result of which was that our beaches were continuously shelled, especially from the Asiatic shore. I gave it as my opinion that in my judgment I did not regard a feint as an operation offering any prospect of success. Time, the uncertainty of weather conditions in the Ægean, the absence of a suitable locality, and the withdrawal of small craft from the main issue for such an operation were some of the reasons which influenced me in the decision at which I arrived. With the concurrence of the Vice-Admiral, therefore, it was decided the Navy should do their utmost to pursue a course of retaliation against the Turkish batteries, but to refrain from any unusually aggressive attitude should the Turkish guns remain quiescent.

General Sir W. Birdwood had, in anticipation of being ordered to evacuate Helles, made such complete and far-seeing arrangements that he was able to proceed without delay to the issue of the comprehensive orders which the consumation of such a delicate operation in war requires. He primarily arranged with General Brulard, who commanded the French forces on the Peninsula, that in order to escape the disadvantages of divided command in the final stage, the French infantry should be relieved as early as possible, but that their artillery should pass under the orders of the General Officer Commanding VIIIth Corps, and be withdrawn concurrently with the British guns at the opportune moment.

On December 30th, in consequence of the instructions I had received from the Chief of the General Staff to hand over my command at Alexandria to Lieut-General Sir A. Murray, who, it was stated, was to leave England on December 28th, I broke up my headquarters at Mudros and proceeded with a small staff, comprising representatives of the General Staff, the Quartermaster-General and Adjutant-General branches, on H.M.S. "Cornwallis" to Alexandria. The rest of the Staff were sent on in front so as to have offices in working order when my successor should arrive.

In the meantime the evacuation, following the same system as was practised at Suvla and Anzac, proceeded without delay. The French infantry remaining on the Peninsula were relieved on the night of January 1st-2nd, and were embarked by the French Navy on the following nights. Progress, however, was slower than had been hoped, owing to delays caused by accident and the weather. One of our largest horse ships was sunk by a French battleship, whereby the withdrawal was considerably retarded, and, at the same time strong winds sprang up which interfered materially with work on the beaches. The character of the weather now setting in offered so little hope of a calm period of any duration, that General Sir W. Birdwood arranged with Admiral Sir J. de Robeck for the assistance of some destroyers in order to accelerate the progress of re-embarkation.

They then determined to fix the final stage of the evacuation for January 8th, or for the first fine night after that date.

Meanwhile the VIIIth Corps had maintained the offensive spirit in bombing and minor operations with which they had established the moral superiority they enjoyed over the enemy. On December 29th the 52nd Division completed the excellent work which they had been carrying out for so long by capturing a considerable portion of the Turkish trenches, and by successfully holding these in the face of repeated counter-attacks. The shelling of our trenches and beaches, however, increased in frequency and intensity, and the average daily casualties continued to increase.

The method of evacuation adopted by Lieut.-General Sir F. J. Davies, K.C.B., Commanding VIIIth Corps, followed in general outline that which had proved successful in the northern zone. As the removal of the whole of the heavy guns capable of replying to the enemy's artillery would have indicated our intentions to the enemy, it was decided to retain, but eventually destroy, one 6-inch British gun and six French heavy guns of old pattern, which it would be impossible to remove on the last night. General Brulard himself suggested the destruction of these French guns. The first step taken as regards the withdrawal of the troops was the formation of a strong Embarkation Staff and the preparation of positions covering the landings, in which small garrisons could maintain themselves against attack for a short time should the enemy become aware of our intention and follow up the movement. Major-General the Hon. H. A. Lawrence, Commanding the 52nd Division, was selected to take charge of all embarkation operations At the same time the services of various staff officers were placed at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding VIIIth Corps, and they rendered very valuable assistance.

The General Officer Commanding 13th Division, selected and prepared a position covering Gully Beach. Other lines were selected and entrenched, covering the remainder of the beaches from the sea north of Sedd-el-Bahr to "X" Beach inclusive. Garrisons were detailed for these defences, those at Gully Beach being under the General Officer Commanding 13th Division, and those covering the remainder of the beaches being under the command of a selected officer, whose headquarters were established at an early date, together with those of the General Officer Commanding Embarkation, at Corps Headquarters. As the withdrawing troops passed within the line of these defences they came under the orders of the General Officer Commanding Embarkation, which were conveyed to them by his staff officers at each beach. In addition to these beach defences four lines of defence were arranged, three being already in existence and strongly wired. The fourth was a line of posts extending from De Tott's battery on the east to the position covering Gully Beach on the west.

The time fixed for the last parties to leave the front trenches was 11.45 p.m., in order to permit the majority of the troops being already embarked before the front line was vacated. It was calculated that it would take between two and three hours for them to reach the beaches, at the conclusion of which time the craft to embark them would be ready.

The naval arrangements for embarkation were placed in the hands of Captain C. M. Staveley, R.N., assisted by a staff of naval officers at each place of embarkation.

On January 7th the enemy developed heavy artillery fire on the trenches held by the 13th Division, while the Asiatic guns shelled those occupied by the Royal Naval Division. The bombardment, which was reported to be the heaviest experienced since we landed in April, lasted from noon until 5 p.m., and was intensive between 3 p.m. and 3.30. Considerable damage was done to our parapets and communication trenches, and telephone communications were interrupted. At 3.30 p.m. two Turkish mines were sprung near Fusilier Bluff, and the Turkish trenches were seen to be full of men whom their officers appeared to be urging to the assault. No attack, however, was developed except against Fusilier Bluff, where a half-hearted assault was quickly repulsed. Our shortage of artillery at this time was amply compensated for by the support received from the fire of the supporting squadron under Captain D. L. Dent, R.N. Our casualties amounted to two officers and 56 other ranks killed, and four officers and 102 other ranks wounded.

January 8th was a bright, calm day, with a light breeze from the south. There was every indication of the continuance of favourable conditions, and, in the opinion of the Meteorological Officer, no important change was to be expected for at least twenty-four hours. The Turkish artillery were unusually inactive. All preparations for the execution of the final stage were complete. The embarkation was fixed at such an hour that the troops detailed for the first trip might be able to leave their positions after dark. The second trip was timed so that at least a greater portion of the troops for this trip would, if all went well, be embarked before the final parties had left the front trenches. The numbers to be embarked at the first trip were fixed by the maximum that could be carried by the craft available, those of the second trip being reduced in order to provide for the possibility of casualties occurring amongst the craft required to carry them. The numbers for the third trip consisted only of the parties left to hold front trenches to the last, together with the garrisons of the beach defences, the naval and military beach personnel and such R.E. personnel as might be required to effect the necessary repairs to any piers or harbour works that might be damaged.

About 7 p.m. the breeze freshened considerably from the south-west, the most unfavourable quarter, but the first trip, timed for 8 p.m., was despatched without difficulty. The wind, however, continued to rise until, by 11 p.m., the connecting pier between the hulks and the shore at "W" Beach was washed away by heavy seas, and further embarkation into destroyers from these hulks became impracticable. In spite of these difficulties the second trips, which commenced at 11.30 p.m., were carried out well up to time, and the embarkation of guns continued uninterruptedly. Early in the evening reports had been received from the right flank that a hostile submarine was believed to be moving down the Straits, and about midnight H.M.S. "Prince George," which had embarked 2,000 men, and was sailing for Mudros, reported she was struck by a torpedo which failed to explode. The indications of the presence of a submarine added considerably to the anxiety for the safety of the troop carriers, and made it necessary for the Vice-Admiral to modify the arrangements made for the subsequent bombardment

of the evacuated positions.

At 1.50 a.m., Gully Beach reported that the embarkation at that beach was complete, and that the lighters were about to push off, but at 2.10 a.m. a telephone message was received that one of the lighters was aground and could not be refloated. The N.T.O. at once took all possible steps to have another lighter sent in to Gully Beach, and this was, as a matter of fact, done within an hour, but in the meantime at 2.30 a.m. it was decided to move the 160 men, who had been relanded from the grounded lighter, to "W" Beach and embark them there. From 2.40 a.m. the steadily increasing swell caused the N.T.O. the greatest anxiety as to the possibility of embarking the remainder of the troops if their arrival was much deferred. At 3.30 a.m. the evacuation was complete, and abandoned heaps of stores and supplies were successfully set on fire by time fuzes after the last man had embarked. Two magazines of ammunition and explosives were also successfully blown up at 4 a.m. These conflagrations were apparently the first intimation received by the Turks that we had withdrawn. Red lights were immediately discharged from the enemy's trenches, and heavy

artillery fire opened on our trenches and beaches. This shelling was maintained until about 6.30 a.m.

Apart from four unserviceable 15-pounders which had been destroyed earlier in the month, ten worn-out 15-pounders, one 6-inch Mark VII. gun, and six old heavy French guns, all of which were previously blown up, were left on the Peninsula. In addition to the above, 508 animals, most of which were destroyed, and a number of vehicles and considerable quantities of stores, material, and supplies, all of which were destroyed by burning, had to be abandoned. It would have been possible, of course, by extending the period during which the process of evacuation proceeded to have reduced the quantity of stores and material that was left behind on the Peninsula, but not to the degree that may seem apparent at first sight. Our chances of enjoying a continuity of fine weather in the Ægean were very slender in the month of January; it was indeed a contin-

for a fortnight or perhaps for even longer. Supplies, ammunition, and material to a certain degree had therefore to be left to the last moment for fear of the isolation of the garrison at any moment when the evacuation might be in progress. I decided therefore that our aim should be primarily the withdrawal of the bulk of the personnel, artillery, and ammunition in the intermediate period, and that

no risks should be taken in prolonging the withdrawal of personnel at the final

gency that had to be reckoned with that we might very probably be visited by a spell of bad weather which would cut us off completely from the Peninsula

stage with a view to reducing the quantity of stores left.

Before concluding this inadequate account of the events which happened during my tenure of command of the forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, I desire to give a brief explanation of the work which was carried out on the line of communications, and to place on record my appreciation of the admirable work rendered by the officers responsible for this important service. On the Dardanelles Peninsula it may be said that the whole of the machinery by which the text-books contemplate the maintenance and supply of an army was non-existent. The zone commanded by the enemy's guns extended not only to the landing places on the Peninsula, but even over the sea in the vicinity. The beaches were the advanced depôts and refilling points at which the services of supply had to be carried out The landing of stores as well as of troops was only possible under artillery fire. under cover of darkness. The sea, ships, lighters, and tugs took, in fact, the place of railways and roads, with their railway trains, mechanical transport, etc., but with this difference, that the use of the latter is subject only to the intervention of the enemy, while that of the former was dependent on the weather. Between the beaches and the base at Alexandria, 800 miles to the south, the line of communications had but two harbours, Kephalos Bay on the island of Imbros, fifteen miles roughly from the beaches, and Mudros Bay, at a distance of sixty miles. In neither were there any piers, breakwaters, wharves, or storehouses of any description before the advent of the troops. On the shores of these two bays there were no roads of any military value, or buildings fit for military usage. The water supply at these islands was, until developed, totally inadequate for our needs.

The Peninsula landing places were open beaches. Kephalos Bay is without protection from the north, and swept by a high sea in northerly gales. In Mudros Harbour, trans-shipments and disembarkations were often seriously impeded with a wind from the north or south. These difficulties were accentuated by the advent of submarines in the Ægean Sea, on account of which the Vice-Admiral deemed it necessary to prohibit any transport or store ship exceeding 1,500 tons proceeding north of Mudros, and although this rule was relaxed in the case of supply ships proceeding within the netted area of Suvla, it necessitated the trans-shipment of practically all reinforcements, stores, and supplies—other

than those for Suvla—into small ships in Mudros Harbour. At Suvla and Anzac, disembarkation could only be effected by lighters and tugs, thus for all personnel and material there was at least one trans-shipment, and for the greater portion of both two trans-shipments,

Yet notwithstanding the difficulties which have been set forth above, the Army was well maintained in equipment and ammunition. It was well fed, it received its full supply of winter clothing at the beginning of December. The evacuation of the sick and wounded was carried out with the minimum of inconvenience, and the provision of hospital accommodation for them on the Dardanelles line of communication and elsewhere in the Mediterranean met all requirements. The above is a very brief exposition of the extreme difficulties with which the officers responsible were confronted in dealing with a problem of peculiar complexity. They were fortunate in being associated in their onerous and anxious task with a most competent and highly trained naval staff. The members of the two staffs worked throughout in perfect harmony and cordiality, and it was cwing to their joint efforts that the requirements of the troops were so well responded to.

With reference to the evacuation of Suvla Bay by the British troops under General Sir Julian Byng, it is interesting to recall what the enemy thought as recorded in the *Vossische Zeitung* of January 21st, in which it is observed:— "The English had in all probability realized the hopelessness of the struggle before the last weeks of November, and about the middle of December they had prepared for their retreat in an absolutely admirable manner—for this praise must be accorded to them. As long as wars exist their evacuation of the Ari Burnu and Anafarta fronts will stand before the eyes of all strategists of retreat as a hitherto unattained masterpiece."

#### APPENDIX XIX.

Despatch from the General Officer Commanding the East African Force.

A despatch from Lieut.-General the Hon. J. C. Smuts, Commander-in-Chief, East African Force, describing the operations in East Africa from February 12th, when he assumed command, until March 21st, was published in a supplement to the London Gazette. The chief portions of the despatch, which bears date April 30th, are given below.

General Smuts sailed from South Africa on February 12th, and arrived at Mombasa on February 19th. There he was met by Major-General Tighe, who explained the situation in East Africa and the steps he had taken to push forward all preparations for an operation in the Kilimanjaro area before the rains. After a reconnaissance of the two proposed lines of advance he cabled from Nairobi on February 21st that he was prepared to carry out the occupation of the Kilimanjaro area before the rainy season, and received the approval of the Secretary for War. General Smuts recapitulates the outstanding features of the military situation in East Africa, and also the steps recently taken by General Tighe towards the development of the advance into German territory which was made possible by the arrival of the reinforcements from South Africa.

At the commencement of 1916 the German forces in German East Africa were estimated at some 16,000 men, of whom 2,000 were white, with 60 guns and 80 machine-guns. They were organized in companies varying from 150 to 200 strong, with ten per cent. of whites and an average of two machine-guns per company. The enemy occupied a considerable tract of British territory. At Taveta they had established a large entrenched camp, with an advanced position at Salaita (El Oldorobo), an entrenched camp at Serengeti, and an outpost at Mbuyuni, the latter places thirteen and seventeen miles respectively east of Taveta. At Kasigau

they maintained a garrison of 500-600 rifles with the object of delaying our concentration by blowing up the Uganda railway and the Voi-Maktau railway. Their numerous attempts to accomplish this end were uniformly futile. In the coastal area they maintained a considerable garrison on the Umba River, and actively patrolled thence to the vicinity of the Uganda railway, Mwele Mdogo and Gazi. At numerous points throughout the 600 miles of land frontier the opposing troops were in touch, and the result was that General Tighe had to disseminate widely his small force, and was unable to keep any large reserve in hand to meet a sudden call. In spite of the fact that he had to be constantly on the watch for the next move of his active and enterprising foe, General Tighe kept steadily before him the necessity of doing all in his power to prepare the way for the eventual offensive movement. With this end in view he organized such of his infantry as could be spared for active operations into the 1st and 2nd East African Brigades, acting on the Taveta and Longido lines respectively, and proceeded to develop the organization of the whole force into two divisions and line of commu-

nication troops

On January 15th the 1st Division, under Major-General Stewart, was ordered to occupy Longido and to develop the lines of communication between that place and Kajiado, on the Magadi railway. On January 22nd the 2nd Division, under Brigadier-General Malleson, advanced from Maktau to Mbuyuni, meeting with slight opposition, and on the 24th occupied Serengeti camp. This advance had the immediate effect of making the enemy evacuate Kasigau. The railway was advanced from Maktau to Njoro drift, three miles east of Salaita, and arrangements made for the concentration of a large force at and near Mbuyuni. The greatest difficulty in the way of this concentration was the lack of water, the Serengeti plains being by nature a waterless desert. A 2½-inch pipe was laid from Bura, but this did not suffice, over 100,000 gallons being required daily, and the pipe yielding only 40,000. balance had to be made good by railway and storage tanks. The whole of the watering arrangements were so carefully worked out that not a single hitch occurred when the main concentration eventually took place, in spite of the fact that an enemy raiding party succeeded in damaging the Bura headworks. this great credit is due to Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Collins, R.E., who was General Tighe's C.R.E. I cannot speak too highly of all the preliminary work done by General Tighe in the direction of organization and preparation for offensive measures. This left me free on arrival to devote my whole energies to active operations, and I take this opportunity of placing on record my appreciation of the fact that the success of those operations is in a large measure due to General Tighe's foresight and energy in paving the way for the expected reinforcements.

Early in February the 2nd South African Infantry Brigade arrived, and on the 12th of that month General Tighe directed the 2nd Division to make a reconnaissance in force of Salaita, and if possible to occupy that position. General Malleson carried out this operation with three battalions 2nd South African Brigade and three battalions 1st East African Brigade, supported by eighteen guns and howitzers. The Salaita position is one of considerable natural strength and had been carefully entrenched. The enemy was found to be in force and counter-attacked vigorously. General Malleson was compelled to withdraw to Serengeti, but much useful information had been gained, and the South African Infantry had learned some invaluable lessons in bush fighting, and also had opportunity to estimate the fighting qualities of their enemy. This brings the operations up to the date on which I arrived in East Africa, and decided, as mentioned above, that the occupation of the Kilimanjaro area before

the rainy season was a feasible operation.

The original plan devised by General Tighe had been to occupy the Kilimanjaro area by making a converging advance from Longido and Mbuyuni with the 1st and 2nd Divisions respectively, with Kahe as the point towards which movement was to be directed. To this main plan I adhered, but I decided that some alteration of dispositions was necessary in order to avoid frontal attacks against entrenched positions of the enemy in the dense bush, and to secure the rapidity of advance which appeared to me essential to the success of the operation in the short time at our disposal before the commencement of the rains, which might be expected towards the end of March.

Accordingly I issued orders that the 1st South African Mounted Brigade, under the command of Brigadier-General Van Deventer should be transferred from the 1st Division to Mbuyuni and act from there directly under my orders in a turning movement to the north of Taveta and Salaita. This transfer was carried out by rail most expeditiously, and by March 4th all minor concentrations were complete, the 3rd South African Brigade had arrived in the country, and my force was disposed as follows:—

1st Division (less 1st South African Mounted Brigade), Longido.

and Division (less detachments), Mbuyuni and Serengeti.

1st South African Mounted Brigade, Mbuyuni.

Army Artillery, Mbuyuni and Serengeti.

The 2nd South African Infantry Brigade, one field and one howitzer battery, were retained by me as Force Reserve.

The task of the 1st Division was to cross the thirty-five miles of waterless bush which lay between Longido and the Engare Nanjuki River, occupy the latter, and then advance between Meru and Kilimanjaro to Boma Jangombe. My intention was thereafter to direct this division on Kahe, and cut the enemy's line of communication by the Usambara Railway. The task of the 1st South African Mounted Brigade and of the 2nd Division was to advance through the gap between Kilimanjaro and the Pare Hills against the enemy's main force, which was reported to be concentrated in the neighbourhood of Taveta, with strong detachments at the head of Lake Jipe, in the bush east of the River Lumi and at Salaita. The total force with which the enemy could oppose our advance into the Kilimanjaro area was estimated at 6,000 rifles, with 37 machine-guns, and 16 guns.

The manner in which I proposed to initiate the operation was as follows:-

(a) 1st Division to commence its forward movement on March 5th, and be allowed two clear days' start before the advance against Taveta should begin.

(b) 1st South African Brigade and 3rd South African Infantry Brigade, both under command of General Van Deventer, to leave Mbuyuni and Serengeti on the evening of March 7th, and make a night march to the River Lumi east of Lake Chala. On the 8th to seize the high ground round Lake Chala and develop a turning movement by the west against Taveta. The object of this turning movement was partly to surprise the enemy and partly to avoid a frontal attack through the thick bush which lay between Salaita and Taveta.

(c) 2nd Division to advance against Salaita Hill on the morning of March 8th, entrench a line facing the hill, and make preparations for an attack, supported

by the Army artillery.

(d) Force Reserve to follow General Van Deventer's column during the night of March 7th-8th and take up a central position astride the Lumi, whence it could be used to reinforce either Van Deventer or the 2nd Division, as required.

It will be readily seen that these movements demanded the greatest energy and decision on the part of the commanders concerned. In order to be in close touch with the main operations round Taveta I decided to accompany the Force Reserve to the Lumi, leaving part of my General Staff at Mbuyuni to control operations elsewhere.

The initial movements were carried out successfully and with very slight opposition on the part of the enemy, who was undoubtedly taken by surprise. The 1st Division succeeded in crossing the waterless belt safely, and by the afternoon of March 6th had its advanced troops established on the small hill Nagasseni just east of the River Engare Nanjuki. By 2 p.m. on the 7th the whole division was concentrated at this point, and on the 8th moved to Geraragua.

On the evening of March 7th General Van Deventer's column started on its march across the Serengeti plains for Chala. The 1st South African Mounted Brigade from Mbuyuni and the 3rd South African Infantry Brigade from Serengeti Camp. The Force Reserve, under General Beves, followed in rear of the 3rd South African Infantry Brigade. At 6 a.m. on March 8th the 1st South African Mounted Brigade reached the Lumi River near the southern end of the Ziwani swamp, and the 3rd South African Infantry Brigade simultaneously arrived on the river east of Lake Chala. General Van Deventer at once proceeded to make good the high ground lying between Lake Chala and Rombo Mission. He then made a converging movement on the Chala position from the east and northwest, sending the brigade scouts to threaten the enemy's line of retreat to the south. Chala was only lightly held by the enemy, and these dispositions soon caused him to withdraw on Taveta. General Van Deventer occupied Chala and pursued towards Taveta, a portion of which position was occupied by the 2nd South African Horse. As, however, the enemy in Taveta were in considerable strength, General Van Deventer considered it wise to concentrate on the Chala position before dark. Meanwhile the 3rd South African Infantry Brigade and the Force Reserve halted astride the Lumi to guard the crossing. During the afternoon an enemy force estimated at from 300 to 500, which had been cut off from the main body by our unexpected movement to Chala, advanced from the north along the line of the river in thick bush, and made more than one attack on the outposts of the infantry in bivouacs.

These attacks were easily repulsed with loss to the enemy, but also caused most of the losses we sustained that day. While the bulk of my forces were engaged in making good the Chala position and the Lumi crossing, the 2nd Division, under Major-General Tighe, carried out, on March 8th, an artillery bombardment of Salaita, and the infantry of the 1st East African Brigade advanced and dug themselves in, in readiness for an attack on the 9th.

At dawn on the 9th General Van Deventer sent his mounted troops to get astride the Moschi road west of Taveta, which place the enemy evacuated in the course of the day. He also sent the 12th South African Infantry to make good Ndui Ya Warombo Hill and the Lumi bridge east of Taveta. The 2nd Division continued to bombard Salaita, and at 2 p.m. the infantry advanced to the attack, only to find that the bombardment, coupled with the turning movement via Chala, had compelled the enemy to evacuate, just in time to avoid two squadrons of the 4th South African Horse sent to intercept their retreat.

Early on the 10th a regiment of South African Horse, despatched from Chala to make good Taveta, were able to seize the position before a large body of the enemy, who had obviously been sent back to reoccupy it. After a brief fight the enemy withdrew towards the Latema-Reata nek, hotly pursued by mounted troops and field artillery. The enemy fought a stubborn rearguard action, and eventually was left in position on the nek. On the same date the 2nd Division advanced to Taveta, detaching garrisons at Serengeti and Salaita. The Lumi crossing was found impassable for motor lorries and heavy guns, and the bulk of the transport did not cross until the bridge had been improved about mid-day on the 11th.

On the morning of the 11th General Van Deventer on the right advanced via Spitze Hill and Kile on Mamba Mission and the line of the Himo. In the centre the 4th South African Horse, supported by the 12th South African Infantry, made good East Kitowo Hill after a brisk skirmish. On the left the mounted troops of the 2nd Division reconnoitred the Latema-Reata nek, which was found to be held in some strength. The Force Reserve was ordered to move from Chala to Taveta. It was now clear that the enemy had withdrawn from Taveta in two directions, along the Taveta-Moschi road towards the west and along the Taveta-Kahe road between Reata and Latema Hills towards the south-west, but the exact line of retirement of his main forces was uncertain. The 4th South African Horse were in touch with what appeared to be merely a rearguard on the Moschi road, and an enemy force of unknown strength was in position on the Latema-Reata nek. It was essential to determine whether this was only a covering force, or whether the enemy was in such strength as to threaten a counter-attack towards Taveta. In either case it was necessary to drive him from the nek before I could advance beyond Taveta.

The 2nd Division had in Taveta only three weak battalions of the 1st East African Brigade, eight 12-pounder guns, and a howitzer battery. With these I determined to clear up the situation, and, if possible, make good the nek. This operation was entrusted to Brigadier-General Malleson, commanding the 1st East African Brigade, who had at his disposal Belfield's Scouts, Mounted Infantry Company, Nos. 6 and 8 Field Batteries, No. 134 Howitzer Battery, 2nd Rhodesian Regiment, 130th Baluchis, 3rd King's African Rifles, Machine Gun Battery Loyal

North Lancs., Volunteer Machine Gun Company.

General Malleson selected as his objective the spur of Latema, which commands the nek from the north, and at 11.45 a.m. advanced to the attack. The 130th Baluchis on the right and 3rd King's African Rifles on the left formed the firing line, 2nd Rhodesian Regiment the general reserve. The mounted troops watched both flanks, and the artillery supported the attack at a range of about 3,500 yards. As they approached the bush-clad slopes of Latema the firing line came under a heavy rifle and machine-gun fire. The enemy also had at least two guns and several pom-poms in action, and our infantry could make little headway. At 4 p.m. the Force Reserve began to arrive in Taveta, and I reinforced the 2nd Division with the 5th South African Battalion. At the same time General Malleson, who was seriously indisposed, asked to be relieved of his command, and I directed General Tighe to assume command of the operation personally.

On the arrival of the 5th South African Infantry General Tighe ordered the Rhodesians to advance, and to carry the King's African Rifles forward with them in an assault on the Latema ridge, the 130th Baluchis co-operating vigorously on the right. All ground gained was to be at once made good. The 5th Field Battery and 5th South African Field Battery, as they arrived in Taveta, were brought into action in support of the attack. This assault was gallantly pressed home, especially by the Rhodesians, but failed to make good the ridge. The 3rd King's African Rifles, who had been hotly engaged since the outset, had the misfortune to lose their gallant leader, Lieutenant-Colonel B. R. Graham, and several other officers. General Tighe found it necessary to support the Baluchis with half the 5th South African Infantry, and I further reinforced the 2nd Division

with the 7th South African Infantry.

This latter battalion reached General Tighe about 8 p.m., and shortly afterwards he decided that the best chance of quickly dislodging the enemy from their position on the nek was to send in the two South African battalions with the bayonet by night. The operation was no doubt fraught with considerable risk, as there was no opportunity of adequately reconnoitring the ground over which the attack must be made, nor was it by any means certain that the enemy was not present in large numbers. On the other hand, the moon was in the first

quarter, and so facilitated movement up to midnight; the bush along the line of the road to the nek did not appear to be very dense; and, moreover, the volume of fire developed by the enemy did not seem to indicate that he had a large force actually in his first line, though he had, as usual, a large proportion of machine guns in action.

The night advance of the two South African battalions was ably organized and gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel Byron, commanding the 5th South African Infantry. The 7th South African Infantry formed the first line, with the 5th in support. They advanced with great dash through the bush, which proved to be much thicker than was anticipated, driving the enemy before them till the latter was on the crest, where he checked our advance. A certain amount of disintegration was inevitable in a night advance through the dense thorn bush in the face of stubborn opposition. Groups of men and individuals who got separated from their leaders had no course but to fall back to the position where the 1st East African Brigade was formed up in general reserve, about 1,500 yards east of the nek. Colonel Byron had issued instructions that, on reaching the crest, Lieutenant-Colonel Freeth, commanding the 7th South African Infantry, and Major Thompson, of the same battalion, should wheel outwards and make good the heights north and south of the nek respectively, while Colonel Byron himself secured the actual nek. These two gallant officers most ably carried out their task. Colonel Freeth fought his way up the steep spurs of Latema till he found that the party with him had dwindled to eighteen men. He was joined by a few of the Rhodesians and King's African Rifles, who had clung on to the crest of the ridge after the assault in the evening, and the small party held on till daylight. Major Thompson wheeled towards Reata with 170 men and dug himself in in an advantageous position. About midnight Colonel Byron reached the nek within thirty yards of the enemy's main position. The opposition here was very stubborn. At one point Major Mainprise, R.E., Brigade Major, and twenty-two men, were killed by the concentrated fire of three machine guns, and Colonel Byron, who was himself slightly wounded, reached the nek with only twenty men. The enemy was still in a position which commanded the ground he had won, and, finding it impossible either to advance or to hold his ground, he was reluctantly compelled to withdraw.

Meanwhile General Tighe found it extremely difficult to keep touch with the progress of the fight, of which he could only judge by the firing and the reports of officers and others sent back from the ridge, who naturally were only cognisant of events in their own immediate vicinity. About 1 a.m. several requests for reinforcements reached him, and he ordered forward the 130th Baluchis. These advanced at 1.20 a.m., and shortly met Colonel Byron, who reported that he had ordered his small party to retire. General Tighe accordingly re-formed his force and dug in astride the road to await daylight. Attempts to gain touch with Colonel Freeth and Major Thompson failed.

Judging by General Tighe's reports, I considered that it was inadvisable to press the direct attack on the Latema-Reata nek further, and preferred to await the effect of the turning movement of the mounted troops, which was ordered for the next morning, and calculated to cause a speedy withdrawal of the enemy from this position. I accordingly, at 4.30 a.m., directed General Tighe to withdraw his whole force before daybreak to a line further back from the nek. This withdrawal was in progress when patrols sent to gain touch with the flank detachments on Reata and Latema found the latter in occupation of both hills and the enemy in full retreat from the nek. I at once despatched the 8th South African Infantry to make good the ridge, and some artillery to shell the retiring enemy, who was now estimated to be between 1,500 and 2,000 in number. Effective

pursuit through the dense tropical forest, which stretched from Kitowo to Kahe, was out of the question.

Our casualties in the engagement were about 270, which cannot be considered excessive in view of the important results gained. We captured, besides rifles and ammunition, a 6-cm. gun and three machine guns. Some forty to fifty enemy dead were found on the position, and, as they are always most careful to remove their dead and wounded, there can be no doubt that their casualties were severe. While this action was in progress on the Taveta—Kahe road, the 4th South African Horse and 12th South African Infantry kept up a brisk engagement with the enemy on the Taveta—Moschi road, where the enemy was found to be in strong force on the northern slopes of Latema and on North Kitowo Hill. At one point twenty of the enemy dead were found after the engagement.

With the end of this action the first phase of the battle for Kilimanjaro came to a conclusion. On March 12th General Van Deventer continued his advance up to Mamba Mission and the Himo Bridge on the Taveta—Moschi road, in the face of slight opposition. The enemy in his retirement during the night and the early morning had destroyed all bridges on the road, and great difficulty was experienced in rationing Van Deventer's force. On the 13th he advanced and occupied Moschi unopposed, the enemy having withdrawn the previous night towards Kahe. The 2nd and 3rd South African Brigades were thereupon concentrated at the Himo Bridge, the remainder of the 2nd Division at Taveta.

It is necessary now to refer to the movements of the 1st Division, which had arrived at Geraragua on the 8th, having encountered only slight opposition. On the 9th General Stewart halted to reconnoitre and let his supplies catch up. The direct road from Geraragua to Boma-Ja-Ngombe was reported impassable for wheels, all bridges having been destroyed by the enemy. As a result of this and of the exhausted state of his ox transport, General Stewart considered it necessary to halt on the morning of the 10th and reconnoitre for a road further to the west. A difficult but passable track was found, and the march was resumed at midday. The mounted troops left Geraragua at sixteen hours on the 10th, on which date they encountered some opposition, sustaining thirteen casualties. The Division and the mounted troops eventually joined hands on the Sanja River on the night of the 12th-12th, and on the 13th advanced to Boma-Ja-Ngombe. On the 14th, when the main force of the enemy had already retired to the Ruwu and Kahe positions, the 1st Division joined hands with General Van Deventer in New Moschi, through which place the six companies of the enemy who had been opposing General Stewart had already passed on the night of the 12th March, as previously stated.

The next few days, from the 13th to the 18th March, were spent in improving the road from Taveta to Moschi, reorganizing transport, bringing up supplies, etc., and in reconnoitring towards Kahe and the Ruwu River. The whole of the country bordering that river on the north is dense tropical forest, and the enemy took advantage of this to display some boldness in firing into our camps by

night.

On the night of the 17th-18th Belfield's Scouts were sent from Himo Bridge to occupy Unterer Himo, and at dawn were driven off by a superior force of the enemy. A position on the Ruwu River appeared to me from patrols, intelligence reports, and somewhat incomplete air reconnaissance, to be the next which the enemy might hold, and it was of vital importance for purposes of railway extension and future advance that the enemy should be driven south of this river before the rains commenced.

I therefore, on the 18th, issued orders for a general advance towards the Ruwu. On the extreme right the East African Mounted Rifles and a squadron of the 17th Cavalry advanced from Mue via Masai Kraal. The 3rd South African

Brigade moved from Himo Bridge on Euphorbien Hill, and the 2nd South African Brigade from the same point on Unterer Himo, to which place the 1st East African Brigade of the 2nd Division sent forward two battalions from Latema. The advance was supported by field and mountain artillery. The infantry occupied the line Euphorbien Hill—Unterer Himo without difficulty, while the East African Mounted Rifles encountered three enemy companies at Masai Kraal. During the day I ordered the 2nd East African Brigade of the 1st Division from New Moschi to Mue to support the mounted troops on the Kahe road.

On the 19th the general advance continued, but the 1st East African, 2nd and 3rd South African Brigades could make little progress through the well-nigh impenetrable bush which surrounded the enemy's position on the Himo about Rasthaus. The 3rd Brigade, ably supported by the 28th Mountain Battery, had a sharp engagement with the enemy at dusk while occupying its line for the night, and sustained thirty to forty casualties. The fresh graves of twenty-seven of the enemy's askaris were afterwards found in the vicinity of the action. and East African Brigade and the mounted troops of the 1st Division under General Sheppard pushed the enemy back to Store, four miles south of Masai Kraal, and bivouacked there for the night. On the 20th I withdrew the 2nd South African Brigade from Unterer Himo, and sent three battalions to reinforce General Sheppard on the Mue-Kabe road, where I anticipated the strongest opposition. At 2 p.m. on the 20th General Van Deventer, with the 1st South African Mounted Brigade, the 4th South African Horse, and two field batteries, left Moschi with instructions to cross the Pangani, and get in rear of the enemy's position at Kahe Station. That night General Sheppard's camp at Store was heavily attacked from 9.30 p.m. to midnight. These attacks were repulsed with loss to the enemy. The enemy force actually engaged was estimated by prisoners at 500 men, with another 500 in reserve. Their casualties were estimated at 70 to 100, ours were 20.

At daylight on the 21st Van Deventer was approaching the Pangani from the west at a point south-west of Kahe Hill. He experienced some difficulty in crossing the river, but by midday had occupied in succession Kahe Hill, Bauman Hill, and Kahe Station with slight opposition. The enemy had already earlier in the day blown up the main railway bridge over the Ruwu (or Pangani).

After the loss of Kahe Hill the enemy realized its importance as the key to the Ruwu position, and made several determined efforts to recover it, which were, however, beaten back with loss. A mounted party which moved forward from Kahe Hill to cut off the retreat of the enemy by the waggon road south of the Ruwu found the enemy in force, and had to retire. Van Deventer therefore waited for the following day to develop the turning movement, after his whole brigade should have been brought across the Pangani. During the whole day the enemy had two 4.1-inch naval guns in action, one on a railway truck and the other from a concealed fixed position south of the Ruwu.

On the 21st General Sheppard had the following troops under his command:—
2nd East African Brigade.—25th Battalion Royal Fusiliers, 29th Punjabis.
129th Baluchis.

2nd South African Brigade.—5th South African Battalion, 6th South African Battalion, 8th South African Battalion.

Divisional Troops.—East African Mounted Rifles, one squadron 17th Cavalry, 1st and 3rd South African Field Artillery Batteries, 27th Mountain Battery, No. 12 Howitzer Battery, 1st King's African Rifles, two Royal Naval armoured cores.

As soon as I heard that General Van Deventer was nearing Kahe I ordered General Sheppard to advance. This he did at 11.30 a.m., with the 2nd South African Brigade on his right, and the 2nd East African Brigade on his left, the

dividing line being the Masai Kraal-Kahe road. By 12.30 p.m. the enemy had been driven back on to his main position on the south edge of a clearing in the dense bush, with his east and west flanks protected respectively by the Soko Nassai and the Defu Rivers, both of which were considerable obstacles to the movements of the infantry. General Sheppard's intention was to attack the enemy frontally, and, with or without the aid of the 3rd South African Brigade, to envelop his Unfortunately, the advance of the 3rd Brigade from right (eastern) flank. Euphorbien Hill was so impeded by the dense bush that it was unable to exercise any influence on the fight, and without its aid the task proved to be beyond the powers of the force at General Sheppard's disposal. His infantry tried to cross the clearing, which varied in width from 600 to 1,200 yards, but the enemy's dispositions were so skilfully made that these attempts were met and repulsed by rifle and machine-gun fire, both from front and flank. The double companies of the 129th Baluchis crossed the Soko Nassai, and endeavoured to turn the enemy's right, but here, too, they were held up. Our guns were well handled, the 27th Mountain Battery being in action in the actual firing line, but definite targets were difficult to obtain owing to the density of the bush. The whole force, in fact, was ably handled by General Sheppard, and the men fought like heroes, but they were unable to turn the enemy from his strong position. General Sheppard did not know that Van Deventer was already at Kahe Station, some miles in advance of his right flank, and no contact could be established through the intervening thick bush. He accordingly gave orders to dig in on the ground won, with a view to renewing the attack on the 22nd.

At dawn on the 22nd patrols found the enemy gone. He had waited only for the cover of night to retire across the Ruwu River and proceed down the main road towards Lembeni, abandoning his stationary 4.1-inch gun, which had been blown up.

Our casualties at the Soko Nassai action were 288. It is not easy to estimate those of the enemy, but a large pile of used field-dressings found south of the Ruwu told a significant tale. As far as can be ascertained, the enemy forces employed on the 22nd were fourteen or fifteen companies, distributed along the Himo and Ruwu from Rasthaus to Kahe. Besides the two 4.1-inch naval guns, the enemy employed several field guns and pom-poms.

The result of these operations from March 18th to 21st was to drive the enemy out of the country north of and along the Ruwu River. Aruscha had meanwhile been occupied by our mounted scouts, who drove off an enemy company in a southerly direction, and thus the conquest of the Kilimanjaro—Meru area, probably the richest and most desirable district of German East Africa, was satisfactorily completed. I accordingly established my headquarters at Moschi, placed a chain of outposts along the line of the Ruwu, and set to work to reorganize my force for the next move, meanwhile concentrating the troops as far as possible in healthy localities to give the men a rest after the hardships they had endured.

#### APPENDIX XX.

Despatch from the Commander-in-Chief in India, covering Military Operations in the Indian Empire since the Outbreak of the War.

A supplement to the London Gazette contained a despatch, dated March 9th last, from General Sir Beauchamp Duff, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief in India, covering the military operations in the Indian Empire since the outbreak of war. It dealt with operations of a minor character in Aden, Gulf of Oman, Sistan, Baluchistan, North-West Frontier, Burma, and Madras.

The following extracts from the report deal with the chief incidents recorded:—
On the outbreak of war with Turkey, on October 31st, 1914, reports indicated that the Turks were in some strength in the Shaikh Sa'id Peninsula, and that they were preparing to despatch troops to act against the Aden Protectorate. Consequently, on November 3rd, orders were issued to Brigadier-General H. V. Cox, C.B., C.S.I., Commanding 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, then on the voyage to Suez, to capture Shaikh Sa'id and destroy the Turkish works, armaments, and wells at that place. Three battalions from the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade and the 23rd Sikh Pioneers were detailed for this operation, in which H.M.S. "Duke of Edinburgh" co-operated.

On November 10th the transports conveying the force arrived off the coast of the Shaikh Sa'id Peninsula, but adverse weather conditions prevented a landing at the point first selected. While the transports were moving to an alternative landing place H.M.S. "Duke of Edinburgh" engaged the Turkish defences with satisfactory results. Covered by the fire of the naval guns, a landing was effected, all opposition encountered was overcome, and the enemy were driven inland, abandoning their field guns. On November 11th Turbah Fort and other Turkish works in the vicinity were destroyed by the troops and a naval demolition party, and the force, having effected its object, re-emberked.

In forwarding his report on these operations, General Cox brings to notice the valuable assistance received by him in the disembarkation and re-embarkation of his force from Captain H. Blackett, R.N., H.M.S. "Duke of Edinburgh," and all under his command.

Shaikh Sa'id was again occupied by the enemy, and on the night of June 14th-15th, 1915, he endeavoured to effect a landing on the north coast of the Island of Perim. This attack was successfully driven off by the detachment, 23rd Sikh Pioneers, which formed the garrison of the island, under the command of Captain A. G. C. Hutchinson. During May, 1915, the enemy was reported to be becoming more active, and during the latter half of June reports indicated a possible Turkish advance on Lahej from Mawiyah. On definite information being received that such an advance was about to be made, Major-General D. G. L. Shaw, Commanding Aden Brigade, ordered the Aden Movable Column, under Lieut.-Colonel H. F. A. Pearson, 23rd Sikh Pioneers, to move out of Shaikh 'Othman on the evening of July 3rd.

Early the following morning the advance was continued to Lahej, to which place the Aden Troop had previously been despatched. The intense heat, sand, and shortage of water rendered the march and the subsequent operations most trying, but nevertheless the advanced guard reached their objective, and engaged the Turks just beyond Lahej on the evening of July 4th. But the desertion of the hired camels and the severe climatic conditions so delayed and distressed the main body as to necessitate a withdrawal from Lahej to Khor Maksar on July 5th.

In recording this, Major-General Shaw pays a tribute to the devotion to duty of the men of the Royal Artillery, who effected the withdrawal of their guns under the most trying conditions.

On the withdrawal of the Aden Movable Column to the Khor Maksar line the Turks occupied Shaikh 'Othman, and it was decided to increase temporarily the Aden garrison. On July 20th, the 28th (Frontier Force) Brigade, with a battery Royal Horse Artillery and a detachment of Sappers and Miners, afterwards reinforced by another battery and the Aden Troop, the whole under the command of Lieut.-Colonel A. M. S. Elsmie, 56th Punjabi Rifles (Frontier Force), moved out of Aden to attack the enemy next morning. The Turks, completely surprised, were expelled from Shaikh 'Othman. Their casualties were some fifty-sixty, in addition to several hundred prisoners, mostly Arabs.

In September reports indicated that the Turks were preparing to retire from Lahej; a column under Lieut.-Colonel A. M. S. Elsmie, 56th Punjabi Rifles (Frontier Force), was therefore directed to ascertain the situation at Waht. On September 25th this column surprised the enemy, estimated at 700 Turks with eight guns and 1,000 Arabs, and seized and occupied Waht.

Major-General Sir G. J. Younghusband, K.C.I.E., C.B., who was commanding the Aden Brigade during a portion of the period when these operations took place, brings to notice the great assistance he received on all occasions both by sea and land from Captain Hall Thompson, R.N., his Majesty's ship "Philomel."

Arab unrest, which had been growing in 'Oman for some time past, culminated on the night of January 10th-11th, 1915, in an attack by some 3,000 Arab rebels against our outpost line covering Masqat and Matrah. In the early morning of January 11th, the whole available British force, under the command of Colonel S. M. Edwardes, D.S.O., 10211d King Edward's Own Grenadiers, took the offensive, and defeated and drove back the rebels, who fled into the interior, having suffered losses estimated at over 300 killed and wounded.

Colonel Edwardes brings to notice the very valuable assistance rendered by

Lieut.-Colonel R. A. E. Benn, Political Agent, Masqat.

Towards the end of 1914 information was received of anti-British preaching by certain mullahs in the Mohmand country. On April 13th, 1915, reports were received that the Mohmands were collecting with a view to raiding Shabkadar. Reconnaissances on April 16th and 17th located no hostile gatherings, but on April 18th the tribesmen attempted to advance, and were met by the troops under Major-General Young, near Hafiz Kor. In the action which ensued the hostile lashkar rapidly increased to some 2,400 men, but its advance was repulsed with loss, and it was forced back into the hills. Darkness prevented any pursuit.

In reporting these operations Major-General Blomfield records his gratitude for the benefit he received from the experience, knowledge, and helpfulness of the Honourable Sir George Roos-Keppel, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Chief Commissioner,

North-West Frontier Province.

Gatherings in Buner during July had been reported, but the tribesmen remained quiet until August 15th, when information was received that a certain mullah, known as the Haji Sahib of Turangzai, was in the Ambela Pass with several thousand men, preparing to invade British territory. His gathering included a number of the Hindustani Fanatics, a sect inhabiting the Buner border country.

A small column from Mardan was at once moved to Rustam, on the Buner border. On August 17th a hostile gathering of some three to four thousand tribesmen debouched from the Ambela Pass and moved towards Rustam, while a further force was reported to be in the neighbouring hills to the north-west. Brigadier-General S. F. Crocker at once attacked the Ambela Pass gathering, and routed it with loss. The o1st Battery Royal Field Artillery, which came up during the course of the action after a forced march, did great execution.

Major-General F. Campbell, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding 1st Peshawar Division, now concentrated a brigade, under the command of Brigadier-General N. G. Woodyatt, at Rustam. Between August 21st and 31st this brigade took the offensive against the tribesmen whenever they appeared, and during this period Brigadier-General Woodyatt was engaged with the enemy on three occasions, on all of which he was successful in driving them back into the hills with loss.

and destroying the villages in which they had harboured.

Meanwhile, during August, there had been some talk of jihad on the Mohmand border, where various religious leaders had been active, and large tribal gatherings led by these fanatical mullahs were reported to have collected on August 28th. On September 3rd large bodies of tribesmen were observed moving in the foothills and preparing sangars in the vicinity of Hafiz Kor, but no steps

were taken to prevent them collecting, as it was desired to entice them out into the plain. By the evening of September 4th it was calculated that the hostile force had reached its maximum strength (it was then about 10,000), and Major-General F. Campbell, C.B., D.S.O., commanding 1st Peshawar Division, decided to attack. The action was fought on the following day; the enemy resisted stoutly, and displayed great bravery, tenaciously holding on to their sangars, but were defeated with heavy loss and driven from their position. An opportunity occurred for cavalry action, and a successful charge was made against the tribesmen.

Between September 20th and 24th further hostile gatherings were reported on this border, and the mullahs made great efforts to stir up their followers to invade British territory. No lashkar, however, crossed the border until early in October, when lashkars, numbering some 9,000 men, again collected in the neighbourhood of Hafiz Kor. Major-General Campbell, who had strengthened his force by another brigade under Brigadier-General N. G. Woodyatt, took the offensive against this gathering on October 8th from Shabkadar. The enemy offered strong opposition, especially on our right flank, where the Mobile Column from Abazai was cooperating, but were defeated and forced back into the hills. A detachment of the Khaibar Rifles from Fort Michni took part in the fight.

In this operation armoured cars were used for the first time in action in India and proved of great value. These successful operations brought the unrest

among the Mohmands to an end.

Although further gatherings were reported in Swat, there was no actual outbreak until October, when the tribesmen again became active. Lieutenant-Colonel C. C. Luard, 1st Battalion Durham Light Infantry, temporarily commanding the Malakand Movable Column, at once decided to attack; and, on moving out from Chakdara Camp on October 27th, he engaged, routed, and pursued the enemy, who were severely handled and lost a standard. As the result of this action, there has been no further gathering on this border.

Mechanical transport was used for the first time on the Indian frontier, and proved to be invaluable; as, without it, the maintenance of the forces in the field

could not have been effectively accomplished.

Major-General Campbell cordially acknowledges the ready assistance afforded to him by the Hon. Sir George Roos-Keppel, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, who kept him informed, frequently by personal interview, of the changes in the political situation and other matters, enabling him to make the necessary dispositions in time to meet each situation as it arose. Sir George Roos-Keppel was present throughout the action at Hafiz Kor on September 5th.

General Campbell also gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance given to military commanders throughout the operations by the following political officers in their respective areas:—

H. N. Bolton, Esq., I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar. Major W. J. Keen, I.A., Political Agent, Dir, Swat, and Chitral. Captain J. A. Brett, I.A., Assistant Commissioner, Mardan.

Captain R. E. H. Griffith, I.A., Assistant Political Agent, Mohmand.

In conclusion, General Campbell records his thanks to Mr. R. C. Boyle, Commandant, Frontier Constabulary, and Mr. E. C. Handyside, District Officer, Frontier Constabulary, who, with their officers and corps, at all times closely and usefully associated themselves with the military throughout the operations.

I wish to bring Major-General Campbell's own services to notice.

In August, 1915, owing to the activity of Germans in the Far East, certain preventive measures were instituted to safeguard the Indian coasts and to prevent the smuggling into the country of arms and ammunition.

#### APPENDIX XXI.

An account of the fighting round Loos, prepared in the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

#### PART I.

The great attack launched on September 25th, 1915, by the British Army against the German lines from Loos to the La Bassée Canal, marked the resumption of the Allied offensive which more than three months earlier had been brought to a standstill. The fighting of the early summer had made it clear that under the conditions of trench warfare an attack must be supported by an expenditure of ammunition on a scale never contemplated hitherto. The accumulation by the Allies of the necessary reserve of munitions had been the chief work of the summer months, but at the same time the British forces in France had been steadily augmented by dispatch overseas of division after division of the "New Armies." Sir John French had thus not only been provided with considerable reserves, but had been able to take over more line and so free many French divisions for employment elsewhere.

During this period the inactivity had been only relative. Trench warfare in all its phases had never ceased; at times there had been severe fighting, such as the struggles in July and August for the ruins of Hooge, which in any other war would have ranked as important battles, but no general effort to break down the deadlock had been attempted by the Allies. The Germans, too, had done nothing to disturb seriously the equilibrium in the West. Their main efforts had been directed eastward, and with such marked success that, quite apart from the local situation in the West, a diversion was urgently needed to help the hard-pressed Russians. Just as in the early stages of the war the Russians had advanced into East Prussia with the object of relieving the tension in the West, so now it was the turn of the French and British armies to draw off the German pressure from the East.

The plan adopted was that the French should make their principal effort in Champagne, while their northern armies, under General Foch, were at the same time to take the offensive in Artois in close co-operation with the British on their left. Opposite the point of junction between the French Tenth Army and our First Army under Sir Douglas Haig lay Lens, a great manufacturing and mining centre presenting peculiar difficulties to an attack. To launch troops against such a tangle of narrow streets, mine buildings, pit-heads, and slag-heaps would inevitably lead to loss of cohesion and control, and it was accordingly decided that the town itself should merely be masked, the Allies pushing past it on either flank, hoping to form a junction well to the east and to cut off its garrison from reinforcements or retreat.

The British attack, then, was no isolated effort, nor is it only by their direct results, important as they were, that the operations of our troops are to be measured. In a sense, they were subsidiary to the attacks of the French. Great as was the force we sent into action, the French were employing nearly twice as many divisions on our right, and an even larger force in the main effort in Champagne. At every stage, therefore, in our operations the immediate consideration was not so much the situation on our immediate front as the progress of the Allied forces as a whole.

The frontage on which the main attack of the British forces was to be delivered was that between the Bethune—La Bassée Canal and the joint just south of Grenay where the right of the First Army joined the left of the French armies under General Foch. Two of Sir Douglas Haig's corps, the Ist, under Lieut.

General Hubert Gough, and the IVth, under Lieut.-General Sir Henry Rawlinson, were to be employed in the principal operation, but at the same time subsidiary operations were to be undertaken by the First Army, at Givenchy, just north of the canal, against the salient in the German line west of the Moulin du Pietre near Neuve Chapelle, and against the trenches at Bridoux at the foot of the Aubers Ridge. Simultaneously, in the area of the Second Army, General Allenby's Vth Corps was to put in the 14th and 3rd Divisions against the strong German positions on the Bellewaarde Ridge, the theatre of fierce fighting in June, July, and August.

It had been decided to employ smoke and gas, and it was therefore necessary to fix the hour for the attack at a time when meteorological conditions would be favourable for the use of these accessories. The French were not using gas, and, wishing to carry out the final stages of their bombardment at a time when the light would be favourable to observation, settled on 12.25 p.m. as the hour for their attack. As the time finally fixed upon for the assault by the British infantry was 6.30 a.m., it followed that provision had to be made in the plan of battle for the fact that in the early stages the British would be unsupported on their right.

The corps on the left of the main attack, south of the La Bassée Canal, was the 1st, commanded by Lieut.-General Hubert Gough. From its right, which connected with the 1Vth Corps at the Vermelles—Hulloch road, the line it occupied curved back north-west to the Bethune—La Bassée Canal, and, crossing that, took in the much-fought-for village of Givenchy. Its left was thus somewhat further west than, and in rear of, its right, and the configuration of the line helped to make it easy for the machine-guns of the defence to bring enfilade fire to bear on the attack.

In the corresponding section of the hostile front the outstanding feature was the formidable Hohenzollern Redoubt, which protruded in a south-westerly direction several hundred yards from the main German line in front of the slag-heap and buildings round Fosse 8 de Bethune. Direct communication between the Redoubt and the main line, here known as Dump Trench and Fosse Trench, was provided by two communication trenches, North Face and South Face, running from north-east to south-west. These were in turn covered by two more trenches, known to our troops as Big Willie and Little Willie, running respectively east and north so as to protect the flanks of the Hohenzollern Redoubt. Further north, near the canal, the German defences were both complicated and strong, a specially important point being a redoubt on the railway embankment, which commanded the approaches from the direction of Guinchy. About a mile in rear of the front system of trenches was a scarcely less formidable second line, in which the strongly fortified villages of Cité St. Elie, Haisnes, and Auchy-lez-La Bassée, were points of special importance. Between these two main positions there were intermediate lines serving as communication trenches, but quite defensible.

Of General Gough's three divisions, the 2nd was on the left, with one brigade north of the canal and two south, extending on their right to the Vermelles—Auchy road. Next came the 9th Division, the Scottish unit of the "First Hundred Thousand," to which was entrusted the difficult task of assaulting the Hohenzollern and Fosse 8. The right of the line was held by General Capper's 7th Division, which had landed in Belgium nearly a year earlier to play so splendid a part in foiling the great German effort to break through at Ypres. Its objective, after capturing the formidable defences immediately to its front, was to push on over the slight ridge in rear of them and attack the second line between Hulloch and Cité St. Elie.

At the appointed hour, 5.50, the discharge of gas and smoke began, and continued during the last forty minutes of the bombardment. Unfortunately, in the section attacked by the 2nd Division, the angle of the line proved in the prevailing wind unfavourable for the success of the gas, which moved so slowly as to retard the advance, and tended to drift northward along our lines. A good many men

were thus put out of action, and the attack started at a disadvantage.

Moreover, though the wire had for the most part been cut the German trenches in this quarter proved to have been but little damaged by the bombardment, and were strongly manned, so that directly the assault started a tremendous fire was poured into the advancing lines. On the left the 2nd South Staffordshires suffered particularly heavily from flanking fire from the Embankment Redoubt, and though such was the vigour and determination which they put into their attack that one company effected a lodgment in the German lines, it was held up by enfilade fire, and had in the end to fall back when our bombardment was On the right of the South Staffords the 1st King's advanced with equal dash and no better success. Similar misfortune attended the efforts of the 1st Middlesex and the 2nd Argyll and Sutherlands further to the right; they reached the wire only to be shot down in trying to force their way through. One platoon of the old 93rd did manage to win through into the German trenches, but not a man of them came back, and a gallant attempt of the supporting battalion, the 2nd Royal Welch Fusiliers, to retrieve the check to the advanced lines met with no success and heavy losses. The Middlesex hung on stubbornly for some time, taking cover in shell craters close to the German lines, but though the bombardment was renewed, and the German trenches heavily shelled, no second attack was attempted, and in the course of the afternoon three battalions of the divisional reserve were moved off to the assistance of the 7th Division.

Meanwhile the 9th Division had delivered its attack. Its left brigade, the 28th, attacking the Madagascar Trench just to the east of the railway to Vermelles, had found the wire not very well cut; a concealed trench staked and full of barbed-wire had checked the 6th King's Own Scottish Borderers; the 10th Highland Light Infantry had come under a deadly enfilade machine-gun fire from a small projection known as Mad Point. Despite this some of the Borderers won their way into the German lines and held on some time. The reserve battalions, the 9th Scottish Rifles and 11th Highland Light Infantry, came up after a short bombardment and renewed the attack, but their gallant efforts were little more successful than those of their predecessors. Some of the Highland Light Infantry got into the northern end of Little Willie and maintained themselves there until the small hours of the morning of the 26th, when they retired, bringing with them some prisoners, but the rest of the brigade could do no more than hold on its original trenches, digging a sap to connect these with Little Willie.

More fortunate than the troops on their left, the 26th Brigade had found their wire well cut, and the 7th Seaforths and 6th Camerons carried the Hohenzollern Redoubt and Little Willie, although their flanks came under heavy enfilade fire as they pushed across the open. The Camerons suffered especially heavy losses, but their reserves came up, pushed on to the Fosse Trench, and then fought their way through the rows of cottages behind it, only halting on the northern edge of the Corons de Pekin, where they found the 7th Seaforths already in position. This battalion had been splendidly successful, had forced its way up the communication trenches from the Hohenzollern to the Dump Trench, and carried that obstacle and pushed on to Fosse 8 and the Three Cabarets north of the mine. At this point the Seaforths and Camerons came to a standstill; they were under heavy fire from the cemetery some 600 yards further on; their losses had been heavy, and they had plenty to do in maintaining themselves at the point they had done so well to reach. Moreover, as the 2nd Division had been checked,

it was necessary that a defensive flank should be formed to cover the eastward

advance of the rest of the corps.

The supporting battalions of the 26th Brigade had followed hard on the heels of the leaders. On the left the 8th Black Watch had, like the Camerons, come under a nasty enfilade fire from the machine-guns near Mad Point, and they had had some sharp fighting at the Dump Trench, where they took a large number of prisoners. The bulk of the battalion made their way through the Corons and joined up with the Camerons and Seaforths beyond the houses, but one company went on eastward with the 8th Gordons. This battalion had reached the Hohenzollern after the Seaforths had rushed on and over it to find many Germans emerging from dug-outs; after disposing of these men the Gordons pressed on towards Haisnes, carrying and passing over Fosse Alley and reaching the Pekin Trench, a few hundred yards short of Haisnes itself, soon after 8 o'clock. Beyond this their victorious progress could go no further. They had got right ahead of all support, except for a small party of the Black Watch who had joined them. Not until nearly 11 o'clock was the 27th Brigade able to get up to them, and by that time the capture of Haisnes, which three hours earlier would have been an easy task for fresh troops, was no longer practicable, German reinforcements having come up.

The 27th Brigade had found it no easy thing to thread its way up through communication trenches already congested with a stream of wounded and German prisoners on their way to the rear, and it was nearly 9 o'clock before its leading battalions crossed the main German trenches south of the Dump and followed the Gordons towards Haisnes. Moving forward over the crest of the ridge, the 11th and 12th Royal Scots came under heavy fire, but pressed on nevertheless, and were not checked till they reached the Pekin Trench. Some men indeed penetrated into the outskirts of Haisnes, but enfilade fire from Cité St. Elie caught them in flank, and the advanced position could not be maintained; the two battalions therefore held on in the Pekin Trench south-west of Haisnes, having the Gordons on the left and some of the 7th Division on their right. Following them, the 10th Argyll and Sutherlands had reached Fosse Alley and established themselves there, pushing up one company to protect the left of the troops in front. Further the 9th Division could not advance: there was now only one battalion in hand, the 6th Scots Fusiliers, and without large reinforcements or a strong artillery support it was hopeless to press the attack on Haisnes. Some guns were pushed forward and came into action south-west of the Dump, doing splendid work in helping the 26th Brigade to hold on, but once the German reinforcements had time to come up, only a really heavy bombardment could have enabled progress to have been made against the second defensive line.

Like the 9th Division, the 7th had employed two brigades in its attack, holding back one in reserve. On the left the 2nd Royal Warwicks and 1st South Staffords met with a very heavy fire, and were in places checked by uncut wire, But the 1st Royal Welch Fusiliers came up in support, losing most severely. and after a stubborn fight the German front lines were stormed. Parties of Germans held out some time longer, especially at a point called the Pope's Nose, but the advance of the 20th Brigade past their flank and an enfilade attack by some bombers of the Border Regiment resulted before long in the surrender of these detachments. Even before this the 2nd Queen's, the reserve battalion of the 22nd Brigade, had pushed on, carrying with them the remnants of the leading regiments, had cleared the Quarries half-way between the front line and Cité St. Elie, capturing more prisoners there, and had penetrated to Cité St. Elie itself. But, like the 27th Brigade, the 22nd could not maintain itself at the most advanced point it had reached. The Warwicks and South Staffords had been greatly reduced in numbers, and the attack in its last stages lacked weight. However, a position was taken up in a German trench north-west of Cité St. Elie, more or less in touch with the advanced troops of the 9th Division further north, and here, despite heavy shelling and frequent counter-attacks, the brigade held on

till evening.

Meantime, on the right, the 20th Brigade had carried the German front trenches within half an hour of the attack starting. Its leading battalions were the 2nd Gordons-the old 92nd Highlanders-and the 8th Devons, one of the two service battalions which had taken the place of the Guards battalions formerly in the brigade. Despite the loss of most of their officers, these two units pressed on vigorously; they had some sharp fighting at the support trenches, and encountered several scattered parties of Germans in dug-outs in the rear, while a little farther on they came across a line of gun emplacements, which they rushed, capturing eight field guns and more prisoners; they were only checked when they reached the point where the Hulloch-Vermelles road crosses that from Lens to La Bassée. Here, well ahead of the troops on either flank, and reduced to a mere handful, they came to a standstill. In support of them came up the 6th Gordons, a Territorial battalion from Banff and Donside, and some of the 9th Devons and 2nd Borders. The bulk of the 9th Devons and Borders halted at the gun positions, where they dug in, linking up the emplacements into a continuous trench, hereafter known as Gun Trench. To this point two battalions of the 21st Brigade, the 2nd Bedfords, and 2nd Wiltshires, made their way a little later.

By midday, then, the 1st Corps, though checked on the left, had secured the whole of the German front from the Hohenzollern Redoubt south, had captured nine field guns (eight in Gun Trench and one taken by the 9th Division at Fosse 8) and many prisoners, and had pushed forward to the second line at three points. But it had used up all its reserves; for the 2nd Yorkshires and 4th Cameron Highlanders of the 21st Brigade had moved up to the Ouarries in support of the 22nd, and the 2nd Scots Fusiliers were the only battalion of the 7th Division left in hand. Some of the battalions had been terribly reduced. The loss in officers had been especially heavy; all but three officers of the 8th Devons fell before the front line was taken, and several other units had been little less fortunate. Moreover, the different brigades which had reached the German second line were not effectually linked up. Advancing from a central position, they had diverged outwards as they advanced, and were all alike held up by formidable defences and lack of support. But, under the conditions of modern warfare, there is nothing more difficult than to give speedy and effective support to troops which have pushed on well ahead. To move supports across the open is to expose them to heavy fire; the Bedfords and Wiitshires had 200 casualties apiece from shell fire as they moved to Gun Trench after it had been token; to move up communication trenches is safer, but, as the 27th Brigade had found, very tedious; while the difficulties of establishing communication between the advanced troops and the headquarters of their brigades and divisions are easier to realize than to overcome.

While the Ist Corps had been hotly engaged on the left of the main attack, the IVth on its right had attacked with no less dash and had gained equally striking successes. Of its three divisions one was from the old original Expeditionary Force of 1914, one consisted of Territorials, one of the "New Army." On the right, south-west of Loos, the 47th (London) Division connected with the French; in the centre, west-north-west of Loos, was the 15th Division, the Scottish regiments of the "Second Hundred Thousand"; north again came the 1st Division, whose left rested on the Vermelles—Hulloch road, the boundary between the Ist and IVth Corps. Each division had two of its brigades told off for the assault, and kept the third in reserve; the attacking brigades had two or three battalions

in front, with the rest in close support. The German trenches, which it was their first task to assault and carry, ran along a ridge which rises in a south-westerly direction from the Vermelles—Hulloch road. East of this ridge the ground slopes down gradually into a shallow valley, through which runs the road from Loos to Hulloch, beyond which it rises gradually to an almost parallel ridge ending in Hill 70, south-east of Loos.

The 47th Division's instructions were, after carrying the German positions in front of them, to wheel to the right and form a defensive flank, facing south, so as to cover the advance of the 15th Division, who were to push through Loos against Hill 70 and over it to Cité St. Auguste, while the 1st Division had as its objective the line from Puits 14bis, more than half a mile north of the

highest part of Hill 70, to the southern end of Hulloch.

Here also, as farther north, gas and smoke were let loose from 5.50 onwards, and very soon the German front line was completely blotted out from the view of the British, though in places the distance between the two lines was only 300 yards. Our artillery at the same time increased the intensity of the bombardment, to which the German guns replied vigorously, though their rifle and machine-gun fire was wild and high, and gradually diminished in volume. On the whole, the gas worked well, but the wind was light and fitful, and in one or two places the cloud drifted back on our lines, causing some casualties and a little confusion. It was then that at a point where the gas was hanging thickest Piper Laidlaw, of the 7th K.O.S.B.'s, jumped out of his trench and moved up and down, playing the regimental march, and his example at once steadied the men.

Punctually at 6.30 the leading lines of our infantry went over our parapet and dashed forward against the German lines. A storm of shrapnel met them, and from rifles and machine-guns a tremendous fire was poured into them; many officers and men went down, but the advance was never checked; line after line of supports followed, and in a very few minutes the Scots and Londoners of the 15th and 47th Divisions were in and over the German front line.

On the extreme right of the 47th two battalions of the 142nd Brigade remained in our trenches, covering the flank of our advance. The battalion on the right of our attack, the 7th City of London, had before it the northern end of the Double Crassier, a long, double slag-heap lying south-west of Loos. This the 7th carried after stubborn fighting, and then proceeded to consolidate the position. On their left the 6th London pushed forward in face of a heavy machine-gun fire, carried the front trenches, taking over 200 unwounded prisoners, and then swept on to the second line, which was in turn carried and made good. Less than an hour and a half from the moment of advance these two battalions were in the positions they had been detailed to seize, and here, with some aid from the 8th London (Post Office Rifles), they maintained themselves successfully.

North of the 6th and 7th the London Irish (18th London) had been equally successful. Their objective was the second line from the Bethune—Lens road to the Loos cemetery, and this they reached, captured, and consolidated in face of heavy fire and stubborn opposition. Behind them followed two more battalions. On the right the 20th (Blackheath and Woolwich), pushing through the 18th, secured in succession an enclosure south of Loos, known as the Garden City, and then a chalk pit near the southern end of the Loos slag-head, in which they captured a couple of field guns. On the left the 10th Battalion (St. Pancras) made their way through the southern outskirts of Loos, capturing another field gun, and established themselves on the south-eastern edge of the town, their left flung back to connect with the 15th Division, their right in touch with the Blackheath Battalion at the chalk pit. Later in the day the 17th Battalion (Poplar and Stepney) were brought up to assist in holding the position, which

was subjected to heavy shelling and several counter-attacks. Despite these the positions were securely held, and through all the fluctuations of the subsequent fighting the 47th Division maintained their ground unflinchingly: the defensive flank they had been detailed to secure was never a source of anxiety, indeed on September 27th they were able to improve their position. The 23rd London, aided by bombers from the 17th, 19th, and 20th, made a dashing attack and cleared the Germans out of a copse from which their snipers had been giving trouble. Finally, between September 29th and October 1st, the division was relieved by the French, and withdrawn for a well-earned rest.

Meanwhile on the right of the 15th Division the 44th Brigade had successfully stormed the German front line due west of Loos, although suffering terrible losses from machine-guns, whose gunners stuck to their pieces to the last. At the second line there was another sharp fight, but it too was carried.

Soon after 7 o'clock the 9th Black Watch and 8th Seaforths, closely supported by the 7th Camerons, were forcing their way through Loos. There was much stubborn fighting in the streets, in the houses, and in the cellars, where individual Germans sold their lives desperately. In this hand-to-hand work it was only natural that units became mixed up, so that when the Highlanders emerged victorious on the eastward edge of Loos all cohesion had been lost. But the dash of their attack had not been exhausted, and long before all resistance in Loos had ceased a mixed mass of all three regiments was pushing up on the slopes of Hill 70. Unfortunately the losses among the officers had been extremely heavy and, being deprived of the landmark of the famous Loos "Tower Bridge." hitherto visible as a mark to steer by in the thickest of the smoke, the men lost direction and swung too much to the right, so that instead of making for Cité St. Auguste they made more to the south-east in the direction of Cité St. Laurent, the fortified suburb north of Lens. In a way the very success of the charge and the speed with which the Highlanders had pressed on was their undoing. The confused mass of men, now reinforced by two companies of the 10th Gordons, did not halt on the crest of the hill to consolidate the ground so brilliantly won, but went on over Hill 70 with an impetuous rush which was only brought to a standstill before the machine-guns and uncut wire of Cité St. Laurent. Here on the far slope of the hill the 44th Brigade held stubbornly on for some hours in the face of heavy fire, which increased in volume as the German reinforcements

The left brigade had not been less brilliantly successful, though it, too, had lost heavily in storming the German line. The left column, two companies of the 12th Highland Light Infantry, came under heavy enfilade fire from the north, and had to face that flank, and so could not press on with the centre and right. These columns, the 7th King's Own Scottish Borderers and 10th Scottish Rifles, cleared the Germans out of their support trenches and then moved rapidly east across the valley north of Loos, making for Puits 14bis and Hill 70, where they arrived about 9 a.m. They, too, like the 44th Brigade, were carried away by the very success of their attack.

With the Germans on the run in front of them there was no stopping the men, and on they went over the hill only to be checked, as the 44th Brigade were, by rifle and machine-gun fire from the fortified houses and railway embankment on the far side. Between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. then the leading troops of the 15th Division after a splendid success had been brought to a standstill and were in need of reinforcements if the advance was to be carried farther. But supports and reserves had been to some extent absorbed in the fighting in Loos, which went on long after the first troops got through, and in clearing up from dug-outs and the advanced German trenches small parties of their defenders whom

the rapid advance of the leading lines had left behind. Moreover, as already mentioned, enfilade fire from their left had held up the 12th Highland Light Infantry, and the grenadiers of the 6th Camerons of the 45th Brigade had to be sent up from the divisional reserve to help them to dispose of the enemy, who at this point had not been dislodged from the German front line. Thus it was some time before assistance could reach the advanced troops, and in the meantime the left of the 46th Brigade was absolutely in the air.

Soon after the leading line had got checked on the farther side of Hill 70 a senior officer arrived on the hill, the commanding officer of the 7th Camerons, who had brought with him a couple of companies of the 7th Scots Fusiliers of the 45th Brigade. The only other troops at his disposal were detachments of all units of the 44th Brigade, men who had fought their way through Loos and collected on the rear slope of the hill. Realizing that as things stood the forward position over the crest of the hill was untenable, he at once set to work to organize a defensive line some 200 to 300 yards back on the western slope, and on this line the remnants of the men who had gone on against Cité St. Laurent were rallied when at last they fell back. For a time the situation was critical. The Germans were following up the retreat of the exhausted survivors of the advanced troops; the hill was under heavy fire; the units except for the Scots Fusiliers were all mixed up, and there were very few officers left. But the German counterattacks were checked on the crest of the hill, and though a redoubt on the crest unfortunately passed into their keeping again, the position just below the crest was maintained against all attacks.

A prominent part in this crisis was played by the Headquarter flag carried by the 7th Camerons, on which a couple of pieces of Cameron tartan had been sewn. Round this the men rallied and though more than once the line shook before the German counter-attacks every time the flag went forward the men followed it up the hill, and before long the remnants of the 44th Brigade had settled down, had checked the counter-attacks, and were holding on confidently. To their left the fight had followed a very similar course. The advanced troops, after holding on gallantly for some time, had been forced back over the crest of the hill, had been rallied on the western slopes, and were maintaining a position there. About 1 p.m., just in time to check a strong German counter-attack, the 6th Camerons arrived, and took up a position on the left near Puits 14bis, while this flank was further secured by parties of the 12th Highland Light Infantry, of the 8th King's Own Scottish Borderers, the reserve unit of the 46th Brigade and of the Divisional Pioneer Battalion the 9th Gordons, two companies of which were putting Loos into a state of defence.

By the evening, then, the 15th Division were holding a line 2long the western side of Hill 70 from the south-east end of the Loos Crassier to Puits 14bis. Units were very much mixed up, casualties had been very heavy, and there was difficulty about getting up rations, ammunition, and entrenching tools. However, there were two battalions of the 45th Brigade available in Loos, the 13th Royal Scots and 11th Argyll and Sutherlands, and their arrival allowed the exhausted remnant of the 44th Brigade to be withdrawn. Portions of the 21st Divison also came up during the night, while the exposed left flank of the 46th Brigade had been secured in the late afternoon by the arrival of some of the 1st Division at the chalk-pit and Bois Hugo.

Moving forward at the same time as the 15th and 47th Divisions, the 1st had had a more chequered career. Of the four battalions in its front line, the 8th Royal Berkshires on the left had been the most successful, though they had lost heavily in forcing their way through the German wire, and storming the first line trenches. From there they pushed on, carried two more lines of trenches,

captured a field gun, and penetrated to within a short distance of Hulloch. On their right the 10th Gloucesters had found the German wire a considerable obstacle, and it was at a heavy price that they had won their way through and evercome the stubborn resistance which they met in the support and reserve trenches. But their assault was pressed home, and with support from the 1st Camerons the German second line was carried. The Camerons went on, stormed a third line, captured two guns and three machine-guns, and made their way to Hulloch, some men even entering the village itself. But both Camerons and Berkshires had suffered severely: their splendid advance had carried them far ahead of their supports, and without assistance they could not maintain their advanced positions. There was nothing for it but to fall back about 500 yards west of the Lens—La Bassée road, where they held stubbornly on, though it was not until some hours later that the Welsh and South Wales Borderers of the 3rd Brigade came up to their help.

The long delay in the arrival of these supports was due to the same cause which had checked the 12th Highland Light Infantry on the left of the 15th Division. Before the 2nd Brigade advanced against the German trenches near Lone Tree, an unlucky shift of the wind brought the gas back into our own lines, and both the 6oth Rifles and the 1st Loyal North Lancashires had many men disabled before they started to attack. When, moreover, they did deliver their assault it was only to find the wire practically uncut. At this point the wire was hard to see, being low and broad, and the ground just short of the entanglement seemed to have received the bulk of the shells. The two battallons fell back, rallied, and advanced again in face of heavy rifle and machine gun fire. The 2nd Royal Sussex, coming up promptly in support, could achieve no more. Many of them reached the wire only to be shot down, and equal ill-success attended the 1st Northamptons, when they in turn attempted the impossible.

Thus the whole 2nd Brigade was checked and remained held up for several hours before some 1,200 yards of untaken trenches. Not only this, but a detachment known as "Green's Force," composed of two Territorial battalions attached to the 1st and 2nd Brigades, the London Scottish and the 9th Kings, which had been intended to move forward between the 1st and 2nd Brigades, keeping them in touch, had to be utilized to overcome the resistance of the Germans at Lone Tree. The 1st Black Watch also, the reserve unit of the 1st Brigade, was drawn into the fight at this point, and the Divisional Reserve, the 3rd Brigade, had to be called upon to assist. The Welsh pushed across the lines carried by the 1st Brigade and wheeled to their right, the 1st Gloucesters, crossing much farther south, faced to their left in support of the 12th Highland Light Infantry and 6th Camerons. Thus, when at last finding themselves under heavy fire from the front and outflanked both on north and south the defenders of the Lone Tree trenches put up their hands, they had done their work. stubborn resistance had upset the whole advance of the 1st Division. hundreds of prisoners were taken, but the losses of the 2nd Brigade and supporting units had been very heavy, and though the remaining battalions of the 3rd Brigade were pushed forward to assist the Camerons and Berkshires, they got up too late to renew the attack on Hulloch that evening, while the 2nd Brigade only reached Bois Hugo and the Chalk Pit about 6 p.m., and in much diminished strength. Thus, the capture of the Lone Tree trenches had absorbed the reserves so urgently needed to improve the success so brilliantly won farther south. But for the 2nd Brigade's misfortune in finding the wire uncut the whole division might well have been across the Lens-La Bassée road when the 15th Division reached Hill 70, and in that case Hulloch would not have been the farthest east of the 1st Brigade.

#### APPENDIX XXII.

An account of the fighting round Loos, prepared in the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

#### PART II.

Whilst the Ist and IVth Corps had been winning great successes south of the La Bassée Canal there had been some very gallant work at the other points in the line where subsidiary attacks were being undertaken. The main object of these attacks was not so much to capture and retain the points assailed as to distract the attention of the enemy and to cause him to divert to these quarters reserves which he otherwise would have been free to throw into the scale against Generals Gough and Rawlinson. In the end the troops engaged in these holding attacks were everywhere thrust back to their original positions, but they had played their part to the complete satisfaction of the Commander-in-Chief, and their determined and gallant efforts had contributed not a little to the success of the general scheme. Had larger reserves and a more ample supply of ammunition been available, the opportunities opened by the initial successes of the Vth, IIIrd, and Indian Corps, might have been turned to immediate and local advantage. But as these attacks were merely subsidiary in aim, and as it was all-important that the guns engaged in the main battle should not want for ammunition, it was impossible to give carte blanche to the artillery supporting the holding attacks or to provide an unlimited supply of bombs at those points. Thus the Germans, by throwing into the fight large reserves of men and munitions, were able to win back the trenches carried earlier in the day, though not without hard fighting and heavy casualties.

The better to carry out their task of misleading and distracting the enemy the holding attacks were all launched some time before the main advance started. The attack of the 5th Brigade on the German trenches opposite Givenchy was timed for 6 o'clock, and was carried out by three battalions-the 1st Queens, the 2nd Oxford and Bucks. Light Infantry, and 2nd Highland Light Infantrya fourth battalion, the Glasgow Highlanders (9th Highland Light Infantry) being told off to attack the trenches immediately north of the canal at the same time as the main attack on the south of it. The attack of the three battalions was delivered with great dash, and at first fared very well. The Queen's and Highland Light Infantry rushed the German front line with complete success and little loss, and pushed on at once towards the second line, getting more than half-way before they were checked by machine-gun fire from communication trenches on their left flanks. They held on some time as long as their bombs lasted, but were then forced back to our own lines by strong counter-attacks. The right company of the Oxfordshires had likewise won its way into the German front line, though the left of their line was checked by enfilade fire. attempted to consolidate their positions, but were unable to hold out against the strong counter-attacks which the enemy pushed forward. About 9.30 the remainder of the assaulting companies were back in the British lines.

On the left of the 5th Brigade two battalions of the 19th Division, the 9th Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the 9th Welsh, had pushed forward at 6.30, making for the German trenches in front of Chapelle St. Roch. Unfortunately, the check to the left column of the 5th Brigade had left the Germans in possession of a strong salient near the Sunken Road trench just north-east of Givenchy, and the enfilade fire from this point stopped the Welsh after they had made about 200 yards. The Fusiliers were in like manner held up, and after maintaining

their ground for some time, both battalions had to retire to our trenches. But, despite the losses incurred in these attacks, they had achieved their purpose by occupying the attention of considerable forces, the Germans showing themselves in strength at both points.

The fate of the 8th Division's attack had been very similar. Attacking with three battalions-the 2nd Lincolnshires, the 2nd Royal Berkshires, and the 2nd Rifle Brigade-against the frontage between two strong points in the German line known as Corner Fort and Bridoux Fort, it had carried the position at its first rush, despite a stubborn resistance on the part of the enemy, 120 of whom, belonging to the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, were taken. At one point only, on the left of the Rifle Brigade and right of the Berkshires, was the attack unsuccessful, while on the left the Lincolnshires pushed on and took a good length of the second line. Then, while the artillery endeavoured to keep the German counter-attacks at bay, the work of consolidation was started, being made none the easier by the fact that the back of the German trenches was very strongly revetted. But the ammunition supply was not unlimited, and gradually the arrival of strong reinforcements, including many bombers, enabled the Germans to win back the trenches they had lost. About 1 o'clock the Lincolnshires were forced back from the Bridoux Fort, and the Berkshires, with both flanks in the air, were soon forced to follow suit. At Corner Fort the Rifle Brigade held on some time longer, and beat off several counter-attacks, but it was felt that the retention of their position would hardly be worth the losses it would entail, especially as economy of ammunition was necessary, and accordingly about 4 p.m. the Rifle Brigade was very skilfully withdrawn, but with slight losses. Advantage had been taken of this attack to start a new trench across the re-entrant in the British lines at this point, and this was completed during the night, by which means the frontage to be held was considerably reduced and a weak point in the line abolished.

The first object of the two brigades which were attacking on the front held by the Indian Corps was the strong salient in the German lines just west of the Moulin du Pietre, but it was hoped to be able to push on further against the higher ground in rear if things went well; and at first it seemed as if these hopes might be realized. On the right, where the Gahrwal Brigade attacked, uncut or mended wire checked the 3rd Gurkhas and the 2nd Leicesters, only the left battalion, the 8th Gurkhas, succeeding in their attack. But the 2nd and 4th Black Watch and 69th Punjabis of the Bareilly Brigade were brilliantly successful, storming the first line of trenches, getting into the defenders with the bayonet, and taking over 200 unwounded prisoners, nearly all from the 13th Infantry Regiment of the Seventh (Westphalian) Corps, old opponents of our Indian Corps. Still they pressed on, chasing the Germans back before them to the second set of trenches, half a mile in rear. Nor did this check them. Reinforced by the 58th Rifles and the 33rd Punjabis, who pressed forward in fine style, they carried the second line and began attacking the Moulin.

The effect of this impetuous advance was that the flanks of the wedge it had driven into the German positions were dangerously exposed. Parties had been told off to block the captured trenches leading to the north, and on the right the 4th Black Watch flung back their flank and connected up with the portion of the 8th Gurkhas who had pushed forward, but the flanks to be secured were dangerously long for the force available. Unfortunately, too, the supporting battalions, in their zeal to press home the advantages gained, had pushed forward too soon, leaving the Brigadier with no reserve in hand, and had carried with them most of the parties left behind to consolidate the first position won. Orders were issued for the Dehra Dun Brigade to come up and carry on the advance,

but rain had made the communication trenches deep in mud, and this, with the congestion due to prisoners and wounded, so delayed their move that they could not get into position in time to help the Bareilly Brigade.

For some time the advanced troops held their ground well, but before long strong German reinforcements came up, bombers began to press in on both flanks, even getting between the advanced troops and their supports. The 12th Rifle Brigade of the 20th Division, who had come up on the left, made a gallant attempt to cover the left flank, holding the ground very successfully until their supply of bombs ran out. When this happened, however, they could no longer maintain their ground, and, despite a gallant effort of the Shropshire Light Infantry to come to their help, they were driven back. But before this the Germans had driven in the advanced troops. They began by getting in rear of the little party of the 8th Gurkhas, who had lost very heavily, and were only some 150 strong, and this enabled them to turn the right of the two Punjabi regiments. 58th Rifles and 4th Black Watch hung on a little longer, but they too were outflanked, and forced back; finally, the 2nd Black Watch, in danger of being completely cut off, had also to retire. They faced about frequently with great steadiness, but at each stand their flanks were again turned. Eventually, after a most gallant struggle, the last parties of the Bareilly Brigade were forced to evacuate the trenches they had stormed so brilliantly. On this it was decided not to utilize the Dehra Dun Brigade in a renewal of the attack. No counterstroke was attempted by the Germans, who had been severely punished; plenty of evidence of the damage and casualties caused by our artillery had been seen in their lines, one whole company having evidently been caught by our guns when in close formation; moreover, they had had to put in strong reinforcements to regain the lost ground, so that as a diversion the attack of the Indian Corps had achieved its purpose.

The most important of the holding attacks was that undertaken by the Vth Corps against the German trenches east of Hooge. Here the frontage attacks stretched from the Ypres-Roulers railway on the north, along the Bellewaarde Ridge, past the ruins of the Château at Hooge to a point several hundred yards south of the Menin road. On our left three battalions of the 14th Division, the 9th Rifle Brigade, 5th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, and 5th Shropshire Light Infantry made lodgments in the German trenches at three different points, but unluckily were not able to carry the Bellewaarde Farm itself or to connect up with each other. The Germans at once delivered a powerful counter-attack, bearing hardest on the Rifle Brigade near the Railway Wood, and though the 9th King's Royal Rifle Corps came up in support the Rifle Brigade was forced back to its own trenches, only retaining possession of the crater of a mine which had been successfully sprung just before the attack. The enemy then pressed hard on the portions of the other two battalions who had established themselves further south, and ultimately after a hard struggle succeeded in ousting them, having subjected them to an extremely heavy cannonade. In the centre the efforts of the 2nd South Lancashires and the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles of the 3rd Division to force their way into the extremely strong position held by the enemy at the south-west corner of the Bellewaarde Lake had been unsuccessful, uncut wire and numerous machine-guns defeating all their attacks.

But more to the south the 8th Brigade, aided by the 1st Scots Fusiliers of the 9th, had done very well. Here, too, a mine was exploded with great success, the whole of one company of the 172nd Infantry Regiment being reported by prisoners to have been destroyed, and the 2nd Royal Scots pushing forward made good their footing in the German lines. On the right the Scots Fusiliers stormed trenches and consolidated a flanking position, while on the left the 4th Gordons

(T.F.) stormed a fort, getting into it so soon after the bombardment stopped that the garrison had hardly time to emerge from their dug-outs, and were taken completely at a disadvantage. Many prisoners were taken here, and one field gun, which, unfortunately, could not be got away to our lines.

The 1st Gordons attacking along the Ypres—Menin road were, like the South Lancashires and Irish Rifles, checked by wire, and made little progress, but the rest of the brigade succeeded in establishing itself fairly solidly in the captured trenches. However, in the afternoon, the enemy concentrated against the defenders of the Fort, where the 4th Middlesex had now reinforced the Gordons, a most tremendous force of artillery, and thus compelled them to evacuate the ruins of their position. This success the Germans followed up by pressing on the flank of the Royal Scots, and driving them out. The Fusiliers, however, managed to hold on longer, but were withdrawn later when it was decided, in view of the need to economise ammunition, that no further attack should be attempted.

Thus the attack at Hooge, like the other subsidiary efforts, had ended with our troops back in their original trenches. But despite this and despite the severe losses incurred the subsidiary attacks had served their purpose well. Against all four the Germans had been forced to put in considerable reinforcements, who were thus diverted from the more important scene of action, while everywhere, except possibly at Givenchy, their casualties had been severe. The tombardment which had preceded the attack was reported by prisoners to have done great execution, and it had only been after severe fighting that the Germans had won back their trenches, while in making their counter-attacks they had had to expose themselves in the open. The inevitable difficulties of promptly pushing up supports and ammunition to the advanced troops were partly responsible for our failure to retain the ground we had won. Nor must it be forgotten that the task of consolidating under heavy shell fire captured trenches, battered to pieces by the bombardment, is far from simple, and that until the new positions have been consolidated their defence, especially against troops far more familiar with them than their captors can be, is peculiarly difficult. But though it was disappointing that such gallant efforts as had been made at Hooge, at Bridoux, and Moulin du Pietre and at Givenchy should have left the local situation unchanged, they had not been thrown away; elsewhere advantage had been taken of the diversion they afforded.

Through the afternoon of September 25th the position of the Ist Corps The different parties of advanced troops maintained remained little changed. their positions stubbornly, doing all they could to consolidate them. But they lacked tools and were heavily shelled and constantly sniped, and had to beat off several counter-attacks. The 73rd Brigade of the 24th Division, which had been placed at the disposal of the oth Division, arrived at the Divisional Headquarters about 1 o'clock, but its battalions were much delayed by the congestion in the trenches. In the course of the evening the advanced troops of the 27th Brigade, having both flanks in the air, and being attacked by bombers on the right, fell back on Fosse Alley. Here a stand was made for a time, but again the right was turned, the Germans having got in between the 9th and 7th Divisions, and finally, in the small hours of the 26th, the defenders of Fosse Alley fell back to our old trenches to rest and reorganize. By this time, however, the 73rd Brigade had arrived and taken over the defence of Fosse 8 from the 26th Brigade. Just as the relief was completed a German counter-attack was momentarily successful in effecting a lodgment at the Three Cabarets, north of the Fosse, but the Seaforths and Black Watch came back and cleared the assailants out with the bayonet, the Germans losing heavily, so that the position at Fosse 8 was made secure.

Exactly what had happened at the junction between the 9th and 7th Divisions it is not easy to ascertain. The position at the Quarries had seemed sufficiently satisfactory to allow of two battalions of the 21st Brigade being withdrawn about II p.m. to reinforce the right of the 7th Division in preparation for an advance on Hulloch, but as the Yorkshires were being relieved by the South Staffords the Germans suddenly appeared in the Quarries in force. After some confused fighting in the darkness the whole of the 22nd Brigade was forced back to the German support and front trenches, where they established themselves from the Pope's Nose northwards, linking up on their left with the 73rd Brigade south of the Hohenzollern. About the time of the loss of the Quarries the advanced troops of the 20th Brigade at the cross roads had been outflanked by a German force. There was nothing to be done but to fall back to Gun Trench. This they did, closely pressed by the Germans, who came charging into Gun Trench, and were only thrust back by the Borders, Devons, and Bedfords after a savage struggle. At daybreak, then, on the 26th, the line of the 7th and 9th Divisions, though pushed back in places, was continuously held, and the German counterattacks had been checked.

Formidable as had been the task of the Ist Corps when attacking on the 25th, that of maintaining the positions it had won was in some ways more There was no question now of surprising the enemy by a sudden offensive; the problem was to convert the hostile trenches, badly damaged by the bombardment, into a solid defensive position. All difficulties notwithstanding, the line held by the 1st Corps was successfully maintained throughout the 26th, although subjected to a heavy bombardment. Two attempts were made to recapture the Ouarries, and so straighten out our line; the first, made early in the morning by the 9th Norfolks of the 71st Brigade, achieved nothing; the second, in the afternoon, by Colonel Carter's force from the 2nd Division, met with more success, and the 2nd Worcesters, the 1st Worcesters and the 1st King's Royal Rifles established themselves on a line about 200 yards from the southwest face of the Quarries. It was during this latter attack that the 7th Division had the misfortune to lose its commander, General Capper, who was mertally Subsequently the line thus gained was connected up with Breslau wounded. Avenue and St. Elie Avenue.

Farther north the 73rd Brigade had been subjected to a severe trial, getting their first experience of shell-fire in the shape of a heavy bombardment. They were, moreover, short of water and food, but they managed to retain their ground round Fosse 8 and beat off several counter-attacks. In the course of the afternoon the 27th Brigade moved up into the old German lines southeast of the Hohenzollern, and later the 6th Scots Fusiliers and the 10th Argyll and Sutherlands reoccupied the northern end of Fosse Alley with the idea of bombing down it and connecting up with the 7th Division, whose bombers were to work north from their position opposite the Quarries.

However, early on the 27th the Germans renewed their attacks in great force. They could make no headway against the 27th Brigade in Fosse Alley, nor against the 7th Division farther south, though a vigorous attack from the Quarries on the 4th Camerons in Breslau Avenue at one time looked dangerous. The 2nd Wiltshires, who were in support trenches some distance in the rear, promptly made a most dashing charge across the open to the weak spot in the line, secured it, and helped to drive back the attack. In Gun Trench the remnants of the 20th Division were relieved by the 2nd Scots Fusiliers, and in the course of the day the position here was made much stronger, the captured guns being safely removed, and touch obtained with the IVth Corps farther south.

But it was on the 73rd Brigade that the Germans pressed hardest. After more than one repulse and hard fighting they broke in between the 7th Northamptons and the 12th Royal Fusiliers on the west and north of the Fosse, and also made a lodgment in the north-east corner held by the 9th Royal Sussex. The Northamptons were driven out of their trenches, but rallied among the rows of miners' cottages and made several attempts to recover the lost ground. Gradually, however, the whole brigade was thrust back, and about I p.m. the whole Fosse had passed into German hands, and the Germans were pressing on against the Hohenzollern Redoubt. This placed the Argyll and Sutherlands in Fosse Alley in a most precarious position. They had been holding their own quite easily, despite several German advances, though the Scots Fusiliers were being pressed by bombing parties working round their exposed flank. But when their left also was turned by the retreat of the 73rd Brigade the Argylls' position was also untenable, and about 3 p.m. the garrison of Fosse Alley had to fall back to the Dump Trench. The retirement was steadily conducted, the men facing about repeatedly to fire on their pursuers, who pushed on to the Dump Trench, only to be beaten off with loss by the mixture of units, chiefly Royal Scots and 73rd Brigade, who were holding that line.

Just before this, the remnants of the 26th Brigade had made a most gallant effort to restore the situation at the Hohenzollern, where things had become critical. General Thesiger, the commander of the 9th Division, had been killed, and the 73rd Brigade seemed likely to be driven from the redoubt. Though reduced to less than the strength of one battalion, the 26th made a splendid charge, and if they did not manage to recover the Fosse and Dump Trenches, their timely help, moral and material, to the hard-pressed 73rd Brigade stayed the further advance of the Germans, and prevented the loss of the Hohenzollern. About 8 p.m. a brigade of the 28th Division arrived, and it became possible to withdraw the 73rd Brigade and most of the 9th Division. The 9th had suffered severely; the casualties among its infantry averaged over 500 per battalion, but both in its successful advance and even more in withdrawing it, had taken a heavy toll of the Germans. It withdrew from the trenches with its ranks depleted, but with its reputation solidly established.

The 28th Division took over the defence of the Hohenzollern under great difficulties. As a result of so much heavy fighting there was great confusion and mixture of units in the redoubt, the topography of which was wholly unfamiliar to the newcomers, and it was hopeless to attempt a counter-stroke for the recovery of Fosse 8 until things had been put straight. But this delay, though unavoidable, gave the Germans time to consolidate their position. About 2.30 a.m. on the 28th the 1st Royal Berkshires of Carter's force made a fine attack on the Dump. Some of the men got right on to the slag heap and a brilliant piece of bombing by one of its subalterns, Lieutenant Turner, won back 150 yards of trench and earned him a V.C. But the task was too much for one battalion, and the gallant effort ended in failure.

The attack by the 85th Brigade was made about 9:30 a.m., after half an hour's bombardment by the artillery. The 2nd Buffs reached the edge of the Dump and got into the Germans in Slag Alley with the bayonet, but could not maintain their ground. Nearly all their officers fell, and the attackers were forced back to the Dump Trench, which the 3rd Royal Fusiliers had secured before the attack started. At the southern end of Little Willie some ground had been gained by the bombers of the 2nd East Surrey, but during the afternoon the Germans managed to get into the Dump Trench near its junction with South Face, and though the 85th Brigade retained possession of the main redoubt with Big Willie and parts of Little Willie, Dump Trench and North Face and

South Face, the position was never very solidly established. Through the 29th hard fighting continued, with varying results. The 1st York and Lancasters and 2nd East Yorkshires of the 83rd Brigade came up to the help of the 85th, and several German attacks were repulsed, but South Face was lost about 4 p.m., and Big Willie wrested from us about 5 o'clock, though it was quickly recovered by the East Yorkshires and 1st King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. On the left the East Surreys held on stoutly, and of the redoubt itself the 3rd Royal Fusiliers retained possession. Next day (September 30th) the situation remained unchanged, though stubborn fighting went on all day, chiefly bombing encounters in the communication trenches between the redoubt and Fosse 8.

Elsewhere along the line held by the Ist Corps there had been continual fighting. On both sides the guns were busy, and our men were hard at work improving their position, gaining a few yards by bombing here and there, repulsing attacks at other points. On the 30th the Germans managed to make a lodgment of about 150 yards in Gun Trench by working up an old communication trench and getting in between the Bedfords and the Scots Fusiliers. Their further progress was stopped, but they clung on to this piece of trench most tenaciously for a fortnight, repulsing four different efforts to turn them out, and being only ousted at last by a very fine attack of the 7th East Surreys, of the 12th Division. But it was at the Hohenzollern that the struggle raged fiercest. During the night of September 30th-October 1st the 85th Brigade were withdrawn, being relieved by the 84th, while the remaining brigade of the 28th Division, the 83rd, was now holding the trenches south-east of the Hohenzollern as far as the Quarries, having relieved some of the 7th Division.

The 84th Brigade had a very heavy trial. The continual fighting, the repeated bombardments and bombing, had done great damage to the Hohenzollern; in places the trenches had been completely destroyed. They had to meet repeated attacks, and though on October 1st the 1st Welsh won back a large portion of Little Willie, capturing some prisoners and inflicting heavy loss on the Germans, they could not manage to get touch with the troops in the redoubt, and, having both flanks exposed, were bombed out next afternoon after a stubborn defence. That night the 1st Suffolks tried without success to retake Little Willie, and early on October 3rd the Germans made a tremendous effort against the whole line from the junction of Big Willie with the Quarry Trench to the western end of the Hohenzollern. Outnumbered and outbombed, the 84th Brigade were unable to withstand their onslaught, and by midday the Germans were once again in possession of the Hohenzollern—or, rather, of its ruins. The eastern end of Big Willie, however, they failed to carry, the 2nd King's Own holding on in the face of every attack.

#### APPENDIX XXIII.

An account of the fighting round Loos, prepared in the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

#### PART III.

While this fierce fighting had been raging round the shattered Hohenzollern, the situation along the rest of the line had been but little altered, though several changes had taken place in the dispositions of our troops. The taking over of Loos and Hill 70 by the French had allowed the 47th Division to be completely withdrawn into reserve by the evening of October 1st. On the previous day the 12th Division, another unit of the "First Hundred Thousand," had relieved the

Guards in the trenches from Chalk Pit Wood to a point opposite Hulloch. In the course of October 1st the 2nd Division took over the right portion of the line of the 1st Corps from the 7th Division and also relieved the 83rd Brigade in Quarry Trench. But during these changes there was but little infantry fighting; intermittent bombardments went on, varying in intensity, in the course of which the 12th Division had the misfortune to lose its commander, General Wing, killed. The chief change took place on the front held by the 12th Division, where steady progress was made in pushing forward the trenches between Chalk Pit Wood and the point where the 1st Division had established itself opposite Hulloch. By October 5th, when the 1st Division returned to the front and took over from the 12th, the British line had been brought nearly parallel to and within a little distance of the Lens—La Bassée road.

The relief of the 12th Division by the 1st set the former free to take over the trenches north of the Vermelles—Hulloch road as far as the Quarries. Here the Guards had replaced the 2nd Division on the night of October 3rd, just after the 1st King's Royal Rifles and the 1st King's had taken a leading part in the repulse of a strong German attack north of the Quarries. The move of the 12th allowed the Guards to shift more to their left and relieve the 83rd Brigade in Big Willie and opposite the Hohenzollern on the night of October 5th, thus completing the relief of the 28th Division. On their left the Guards found the 7th Division, the 2nd being now in corps reserve. It had been decided to make another effort to retake the Hohenzollern, but time was needed to complete all the necessary preparations for this and for the attacks to be undertaken at the same time on the Quarries, on the German lodgment in Gun Trench, and on Hulloch.

On the southern portion of the battlefield the position remained substantially unchanged throughout the night of September 25th-26th. On the right the London Division continued its task of consolidating the defensive flank south and south-east of Loos. On Hill 70 the 45th and 46th Brigades of the 15th Division were endeavouring to improve their position and prepare for a renewal of the offensive in the morning, but units were somewhat mixed up, especially those of the 46th Brigade in the left centre, and as the hill was subjected to constant shelling and rifle fire all night, and several counter-attacks had to be repulsed, it proved very difficult to organize the attack. During the evening of the 25th the 62nd Brigade of the 21st Division had arrived at Loos and taken post in support, one battalion on the right at the south-east end of the Loos slag-heap, two behind the 45th Brigade, one in rear of the 46th. The exposed left flank of the 15th Division had been secured by the arrival of the 2nd Brigade late in the afternoon, but, though every effort was made to establish a strong position, the men were exhausted, and having only their small entrenching tools had not been able to do much digging in the stiff chalk round Bois Hugo and Puits 14bis.

In the early hours of September 26th the 2nd Brigade was relieved by the 63rd Brigade of the 21st Division. These troops had had the very trying experience of advancing in the dark across the complicated system of German defences and a battlefield strewn with débris. And they had hardly taken up their position before German artillery and snipers opened upon them. Moreover, an awkward feature in the tactical situation was that the Bois Hugo, extending some way eastward more or less at right angles to the main road from Lens to La Bassée, drove as it were a wedge into the line and afforded a covered approach to Puits 14bis.

The lett of the brigade was also in the air, for the leading battalions of the 24th Division, which had started to advance on the left of the 21st, had halted at the German front trenches, and were nearly a mile in rear of the 63rd Brigade,

though on their left they were in touch with the 1st Division. Here the 1st and 2nd Brigades, after their hard day's fighting, had spent the night in intermediate German trenches between the Lone Tree lines and Hulloch; the South Wales Borderers, who were nearest to Hulloch, had been sharply engaged all night with the German bombers near the Lens—La Bassée road, and had repulsed one particularly vigorous attack with heavy loss.

The plan for the day's operations was that after an hour's bombardment the troops on the western slopes of Hill 72 were to advance at 9 a.m., and to assault the German defences on the crest and back slope of the hill. This would secure the right flank of the 21st Division, who, with the 24th on their left, were to advance against the back system of German defences, which ran from Hulloch to Cité St. Auguste. On the left of the 24th the 1st Division were to renew their attack on Hulloch. The main advance, which was to be preceded by an

artillery bombardment, was to start at 11 a.m.

At 8 a.m. the bombardment of Hill 70 began, the fire, despite a thick mist, being extremely accurate, and at q a.m. the assault was delivered. On the right three battalions of the 45th Brigade advanced astride the road over the top of the hill, with two of the 62nd Brigade in support; on the left the 6th Camerons, of the 45th Brigade, and 13th Northumberland Fusiliers, of the 62nd, carried out the attack, the battalions of the 46th Brigade, all much reduced in number, remaining in the British trenches as a reserve. But though the assault was delivered with the greatest gallantry, the bombardment had not been very successful in cutting the German wire, and the redoubt on the top of the hill which we had failed to hold on the previous day proved a tactical asset of the greatest importance to the Germans. Unfortunately, too, on the left the artillery failed to lift sufficiently as the troops pressed forward-one account says that the smokehelmets which our men were wearing made it hard to identify them-and this checked the assault. But here the splendid example and leadership of Colonel Douglas Hamilton, of the 6th Camerons, did much to rally and reform the men, and they advanced again, though with little better success.

For some time the crest of the hill was stubbornly contested, but the machineguns in the redoubt did great execution, and in the end the attackers were pushed back to their trenches lower down the slope. Here a confused struggle went on, with varying success; several times our line gave way before the German counterattacks, only to be rallied and to go forward again. The exact sequence of events in such a fight is most difficult to determine, but the available evidence goes to show that, while on the right and centre of the hill the troops managed to maintain themselves till well after midday, on the extreme left, where, as one account says, "gas came on with a favourable wind," the Germans attacking in force were able, soon after 10 o'clock, to thrust our men down off the hill and press them back towards Loos, though the stubborn resistance of the 6th Camerons checked the advancing Germans, preventing them from following up

the retirement.

About the same time the 63rd Brigade, attacked from Bois Hugo in front, threatened by an outflanking movement against their left, and exposed to a heavy fire, had been driven back from their advanced positions and were rallying west of the Loos—Hulloch road on the 64th Brigade, who were now advancing to their support. But the whole position was not lost. The example and exertions of the officer in command of two companies of the 8th Somerset Light Infantry at the Chalk Pit were successful in keeping his men firm, and his party held up the German advance, and thus gave time for the rest to rally. As the 63rd Brigade, supported by two battalions of the 64th, came forward again, the troops of the 24th Division began their advance, the 72nd Brigade in the two leading lines, two battalions of the 71st in reserve. Farther north, again, the

South Wales Borderers, the Black Watch, and 2nd Welsh, of the 1st Division, were moving forward against Hulloch. Of these three battalions, the two on the left came under very heavy machine-gun fire and could make little headway, but the Welsh push on far, driving the advanced German troops back before them and

getting quite close to the southern end of the village.

But the Germans made good use of their occupation of Bois Hugo. They had brought up machine-guns and were able to pour a damaging enfilade fire into the right flank of the 72nd Brigade, inflicting heavy casualties. In the same way, though the 63rd got within a very short distance of its original position, machine-guns from Puits 14bis checked it and drove it back. The men rallied, however, and made another advance, supported by another battalion of the 64th Brigade, but this attempt lacked cohesion and weight, and, coming under heavy fire from the northern end of Hill 70, where the Germans were now established, collapsed like its predecessor. But this time the attack of the 24th Division had been repulsed. Its leading battalions, the 8th Royal West Kent on the left and the 9th East Surrey on the right, had advanced steadily and successfully, despite heavy enfilade fire from Hulloch and Bois Hugo. Well supported by the 8th Queen's and the 8th Buffs, they pushed forward across the Lens-La Bassée road, and made their way up to the wire in front of the German trenches, but only to find it practically intact. Unable to get through the 'wire, and with nearly all their officers down, the 72nd had to fall back, suffering terribly from artillery fire. At the Lens-La Bassée road a stand was made which enabled a good many of the wounded to be got in, but the supporting battalions of the 71st Brigade had come under very heavy fire, the enemy using gas shells freely, so that their attempt to renew the attack broke down.

Meanwhile, the Welsh, left in the air by the retreat of the 72nd Brigade, had had to fall back from their exposed position near Hulloch. By about 2 p.m. the 24th Division had retired to the trenches from which they had originally advanced. Here the troops were reformed and held on in touch with the 21st Division, who, after some further abortive attempts to get forward in face of the German shell-fire and machine-guns, had gone back to the road from Loos to Haisnes. After their second retirement, about 1 p.m., the gallant defenders of the Chalk Pit, left isolated by the retreat of the troops on their flanks, had been obliged

to evacuate the position they had so tenaciously maintained.

But while the Germans had managed to repulse the British attacks they made no attempt to follow up their advantage, though the loss of the line from the Chalk Pit to the northern end of Hill 70 had left Loos exposed to an attack from the north-east, and the only troops on that side of the town were two companies of the 9th Gordons, who were endeavouring to put some houses into

a state of defence.

Early in the afternoon the exposure of their left made the advanced position of the defenders of Hill 70 untenable, and, after repulsing several counter-attacks, they were forced down its slopes, though a gallant remnant hung on steadily east of Loos. But a brigade of the 3rd Cavalry Division had been placed at the disposal of General McCracken, who hurried it up to Loos to support his hard-pressed division, and between 4 and 5 o'clock the Royals and 3rd Dragoon Guards arrived at the village. About this time the last remnants of the infantry from Hill 70 began retiring upon Loos, an order to retreat having apparently been passed along the line, but on the arrival of the cavalry this rearward movement was stopped, and detachments of nearly every battalion in the division, including strong bodies of the 9th Gordons and 11th Argyll and Sutherlands, remained in position east of Loos until, about midnight, the arrival of the 8th Cavalry Brigade made it possible for them to be relieved. On the 27th the whole Fifteenth Division was withdrawn for a richly-merited and much-needed rest. Its

year-old battalions had won their spurs and shown themselves worthy of their parent regiments. Heavy as their losses had been, they had hit the Germans hard and had achieved a solid success, even if the full measure of what their dashing advance had at one moment seemed about to gain had not been attained.

While the 3rd Cavalry Division were taking over and consolidating the defences of Loos, other troops were relieving the 21st and 24th Divisions in the captured trenches north of Loos. These were the Guards, about to make their début as a division. The task assigned to them was the recovery of the line Hill 70-Puits 14bis-Chalk Pit, on which the Germans were by now well established. It was impossible, therefore, to attack until the afternoon, as a heavy bombardment had to be carried out as a preliminary. Not till 4 o'clock on September 27th did the Guards advance, the 2nd Brigade opening the attack by sending in the and Irish Guards to attack Chalk Pit Wood; the 1st Coldstreams followed in support, while the 1st Scots, echeloned on the right rear of the Irish, were to move past the south end of Chalk Pit Wood against Puits 14bis. On their left the 1st Guards Brigade and the troops of the 1st Division, who were holding on to their advanced positions close to Hulloch, were to assist the advance by letting off smoke-bombs and making other demonstrations as if about to assault Hulloch, while on the right the 3rd Guards Brigade was to move through Loos to attack Hill 70.

At first the attack of the 2nd Guards Brigade went very well. The Irish cleared Chalk Pit Wood, the Scots advanced close up to Puits 14bis, before a tremendous fire from machine-guns in Bois Hugo swept them down. Even so, a gallant handful pushed on, reached, and took the Puits. But they were only a handful, and two companies of the 3rd Grenadiers who were sent up to their help suffered so terribly from the machine-guns that only about a platoon reached the Puits. Meanwhile the Irish Guards, advancing beyond Chalk Pit Wood, had been checked and driven back some way, but rallied and came forward again with two companies of the 1st Coldstreams. But the little party at Puits 14bis was not strong enough to maintain itself there, and in the end its survivors, after a splendid struggle, were forced back to the line just south of Chalk Pit Wood, where the Scots and Grenadiers were digging themselves in. The Chalk Pit, however, was made good, and during the night the right battalion of the 1st Guards Brigade began digging a new trench to connect up their position with the left of the 2nd, north of the wood.

While the 2nd Guards Brigade was hotly engaged round Puits 14bis and Chalk Pit Wood, the 3rd advanced steadily through Loos under a storm of shells, many officers and men being put out of action by asphyxiating gases. About 5.30 p.m. it launched its attack on Hill 70. The 4th Grenadiers, who led the brigade, had lost so heavily from the gas shells that the Welsh Guards, the supporting battalion, had to be put in at once. Pushing forward steadily, these two battalions, both of them in action for the first time, won their way nearly to the crest of the hill, and though the redoubt on the top checked them as it had checked the 15th Division on the previous morning, they established and maintained a line just below the crest of the ridge, more or less where the Highlanders had rallied round the Cameron tartan two days before. During the night the 2nd Scots Guards came up and relieved the Welsh battalion.

The gallant attack of the Guards had not achieved all it had set out to do, but it had resulted in the definite establishment of the British front along a line running roughly northward from the south-eastern end of Loos and parallel to the Lens—La Bassée road. Another effort was made to gain Puits 14bis, but the fine advance which the 1st Coldstreamers made on the afternoon of September 28th was no more fortunate than the effort of the Scots and Grenadiers. As before, a small party reached the Puits, but could not be adequately supported

owing to enfilade machine-gun fire and a very heavy bombardment; in the end the survivors had to fall back.

After this matters settled down on the southern section of the front. The British line at this point was already in advance of that held by the French farther south, although the attacks of the French Tenth Army, assisted not a little by the diversion of the German reserves to stay the British advance, has resulted in appreciable gains in the direction of Souchez, the La Folie Wood, and Thelus, and the capture of some thousands of prisoners. Moreover, until the situation on our left, round Fosse 8 and the Quarries, was somewhat more cleared up, a further advance on the front from Loos to Hulloch did not offer any great advantages; to hold and consolidate the substantial gains already secured was the immediate task, and to this all efforts were directed. During the next few days the Guards were relieved by the 12th Division, and the French took over Loos from the 47th, the 12th being in their turn relieved on October 5th by the 1st Division.

After the loss of the Hohenzollern Redoubt on October 3rd there was a few days' lull in the fighting, though on both sides there was intermittent artillery activity, constant work on the trenches, and occasional bombing encounters. The British were busy preparing for a renewed attack, but it was from the Germans that the first big effort came. In the course of October 8th reports were received from the French on our right that the enemy was making gaps in his wire opposite Loos, and that other indications pointed to the likelihood of an attack. The troops now holding the British front were the 1st Division from the Chalk Pit to the advanced trenches opposite Hulloch, the 12th Division thence to the Quarries, the Guards on their left in the eastern end of Big Willie and the trenches opposite the Hohenzollern, the 7th Division continuing the line northwards. Along the whole of this line the German fire increased in intensity as the day wore on, the trenches being subjected to an extremely severe bombard-

ment, which reached its maximum in the early afternoon.

Between 3 and 4 o'clock the expected assault was delivered. The Germans came streaming over the crest of Hill 70 in masses, while opposite the Chalk Pit Wood and the trenches just north of it dense lines advanced in succession, offering a target of which our artillery and infantry were prompt to take advantage. The Germans pressed on with magnificent courage, but were mowed down almost to a man by the rifle fire of the 2nd Munsters in Chalk Pit Wood, of the 1st Gloucesters in the Chalk Pit itself, and of the 9th King's just north. Some, very few, of them got within fifty yards of the Chalk Pit, but fifteen minutes after the attack had been launched the rapid fire and the machine-guns of the defence had broken it utterly, and of the two German regiments which had started to the assault of our line, the greater number had been shot down before they got within 200 yards. A similar fate had befallen the regiments that had advanced against the French; they had suffered terribly from the "75's," and a small lodgment on the Double Crassier was all they had to show for their very heavy casualties. Our reserves had moved forward to assist repulse the attack, but had arrived to find all was over.

Further north the Germans attacked the Guards in great force. The line of the 1st Guards Brigade from St. Elie Avenue to the junction of Big Willie and the Quarry Trench was held by the 2nd and 3rd Coldstreamers, the 3rd Grenadiers of the 2nd Guards Brigade being on their left in Big Willie. The attacking force here was drawn from the VIIth (Westphalian) Corps, till then north of the canal. The 3rd Coldstreamers were attacked by three battalions, who, advancing with great resolution, made a lodgment in a sap and were only ejected after sharp fighting; against the 2nd Coldstreamers on the right the assailants came quite close up, but were beaten off with heavy loss. Against

Big Willie, where bombers worked up communication trenches, and took the left company in flank from the Hohenzollern, they at first had more success. The companies of the 3rd Grenadiers were forced out of their trenches, but the second line was maintained, and a counter-attack promptly launched. In this the bombers of the 3rd Coldstreamers played a prominent part. Working along Big Willie from the east, and at the same time pushing north along the Dump Trench, they did fine work, and, with the aid of two companies of the Scots Guards, Big Willie was cleared, and the German attack completely foiled. The only point along the line where things had not gone well was at that part of Gun Trench where the Germans had established themselves on September 30th. Here the 6th Royal West Kents of the 12th Division made a very fine attack, but after gaining ground at first were in the end ousted by bombers and driven back

to their original position.

During the next few days there was again something of a lull in the fighting, though on the 9th the Guards beat off determined bombing attacks on the St. Elie Avenue, and next day the bembers of the 2nd Grenadiers made 100 yards by bombing northward up the Dump Trench. This roused the Germans to counterattacks, but neither on the 10th nor on the 12th were they able to shake the hold which the Grenadiers had gained. Meanwhile the preparations for the renewal of the attack had been pushed on, and by the 13th all was ready. On the right the 1st Brigade, supported by the 2nd Royal Sussex and 1st Northamptons, were to attack the German trenches just west of Hulloch, the 3rd Brigade demonstrating on their right to cover their assault. In the centre the 12th Division were to renew the attack on Gun Trench and to assault the Quarries. On the left the 46th Division, Territorials from the North Midlands, were entrusted with the assault on the Hohenzollern; the 2nd Division, who had on the 10th-11th relieved the left of the Guards, and the right of the 7th Division, and were now holding our front opposite Little Willie, were to co-operate by the discharge of gas and smoke, and, by pushing bombing parties up a communication trench which had been dug almost to Little Willie, to assist in the attack on that bone of contention.

Of these three efforts, that of the 1st Division was the least successful. It was pushed gallantly forward, and the London Scottish, 8th Berkshires, 8th Black Watch, and 1oth Gloucesters all managed to reach the German trenches along the Lens—La Bassée road. But the wire proved for the most part uncut, and all the devoted efforts of the wire-cutting parties failed to make a way through. A few of the 8th Berkshires got into the enemy's trenches, and some of the London Scottish reached but could not cross the road, but the net result of the attack was only a small gain of ground on the right, where the advanced party

of the London Scottish had dug in.

The 12th Division was more fortunate. The 7th East Surreys accomplished the task which had foiled so many gallant efforts, and their fine attack at last cleared Gun Trench of the Germans; several prisoners were taken, and the ground gained was consolidated despite vigorous counter-attacks. The 6th Queen's on their right lent effective assistance, and their machine-gun fire did much damage to the Germans bolting from the lost trench. Further to the left the 6th Buffs, attacking with great dash, were caught by enfilade machine-gun fire and checked, and, though the 7th Norfolks got into the main German trench south-west of the Quarries, they were finally bombed out. The 7th Suffolks, however, attacking on the north-west of the Quarries, were more successful, gaining valuable ground and making good their gains, the net result of the day's work being a substantial improvement in this part of the field.

But the most important episode of the 13th was the North Midland Division's attempt on the Hohenzollern. In this two brigades were employed. Against the

redoubt itself the Lincoln and Leicester Brigade were put in, with orders to push on straight for Fosse Trench and to secure that position, at the same time sending bombing parties up Little Willie, North Face, and South Face. On their right the Staffordshire Brigade were to assault Dump Trench and Fosse 8. The attackwas, of course, preceded by a heavy bombardment, and careful preparations were made for a curtain fire in rear of the position during the actual assault so as to prevent the arrival of reinforcements. But when the attack started the volume of fire which the Germans poured in showed that the bombardment had been less successful than had been hoped for. From the slag-heap the machine-guns poured in a deadly fire, and the enemy's trenches were everywhere strongly manned.

However, the 5th Lincolns and the 4th Leicesters carried the Hohenzollern with a rush, turned the Germans out of the trench which had been dug across the shord of the redoubt, and were only stopped a little distance from the Fosse-Trench by machine-gun fire from front and flank. Desperate bombing encounters took place in Little Willie and the other communication trenches, the 5th Leicesters. gaining a good deal of ground, but being forced back when bombs ran short, while some of the 5th Lincolns worked up North Face to within fifty yards of the Fosse Trench. On the right the Staffordshire Brigade had had rather more ground to cover than the Lincolns and Leicesters, for it had been found necessary to launch the attack from the old British trenches, as there was not room enoughfor the assembly of the assaulting force in the part of Big Willie which we held. Coming at once under a tremendous fire, the 5th North Staffordshires lost half their numbers in getting across the open, and the 5th South Staffordshires advancing from Big Willie against South Face were also heavily punished. The reserve battalions, the 6th South Staffords and the 6th North Staffords, took upthe attack, but after their leading companies had suffered nearly as severely as the first lines, the rear companies were held back from advancing, as the prospects of their achieving anything were not enough to warrant their being put in.

For some hours desperate bombing work went on in Big Willie and in the saps and communication trenches round, while the 1st Monmouthshires, the pioneer battalion of the division, were putting the redoubt into a defensible con-Not much ground could be gained, though useful help was given by some detachments sent up by the Notts and Derby Brigade, and, shortly before 4 p.m., the advanced troops of the Lincolns and Leicesters fell back on the redoubt. They rallied there, however, on the support of the 5th Leicesters and Monmouthshires, and the German counter-attack was checked. Meanwhile, some of the 7th Sherwood Foresters had come up with the bombers of the 8th, and these parties played a leading part in the bombing encounters which went on all night. About 4 a.m. on the 14th a fine effort by the 8th Sherwood Foresters dislodged from the eastern corner of the redoubt a party of Germans who had established themselves there. This success was more timely, as at the moment the Germans were pressing hard, advancing across the open and bombing up the communication trenches, but the situation was re-established, and a little later the Notts and Derby Brigade took over the defence of the redoubt from the Lincolns and Leicesters, holding it without much difficulty until the night of October 15th-16th, when they were relieved by the 2nd Guards Brigade. By this time the redoubt had been wired by the 1st North Midland Field Company, R.E., and the position made fairly secure. In the middle of the relief the enemy made another counter-attack in force, their last serious effort as it turned out, but though they reached the wire the steady fire of the 5th and 6th Sherwood Foresters was too much for them, and the attack was repulsed with heavy loss.

The recovery of the Hohenzollern may be taken as the final act in the great battle which had begun on September 25th. For another week considerable activity continued round the redoubt and near the Quarries, but neither side

attempted anything beyond minor operations. Some useful gains of such a character were made by the 2nd Irish Guards and by the bombers of the 3rd Guards Brigade, by which the position was strengthened. Similarly, the 7th Suffolks were able to improve their position in the "Hairpin Trench" at the north-west corner of the Quarries, the 9th Essex, who relieved them on the night of the 14th, continuing the work and repulsing a strong German counter-attack on October 19th; but sharp as all this fighting was, it produced no considerable change in the general situation. Neither side made any serious attempt to disturbthe state of things which had been reached.

The German counter-attacks had met a reception which did not encourage repetition, our position in the captured trenches was growing stronger every day, arrangements for artillery support were being completely co-ordinated, and by this time it was clear that the Germans had had to abandon hope of wresting from us the positions so brilliantly captured on September 25th, and so stubbornly

defended in the subsequent contests.

It is, of course, impossible to say what the Germans had been planning when they found themselves called upon to meet the sudden Allied offensive, but undoubtedly they had had to rush up reserves from all quarters to an extent that must have dislocated completely their arrangements for relief, while their losses had, undoubtedly, been extremely severe. Many of their units, such as the division which had been holding Loos and the battalions engaged in the counter-attack of October 8th, had been almost annihilated, many more had been reduced to a condition in which they were incapable of a vigorous offensive.

On the Allied side, the objects of the offensive had been in large measure obtained. Quite apart from the marked improvement which had taken place in Russia since the attack had started, direct results of considerable importance had been achieved. Opposite the British the enemy's front system of defences had been carried over a length of nearly four miles, our troops had penetrated into the hostile positions in places as much as 3,000 yards, and had consolidated and made good their capture of the greater part of the ground covered by their advance. Twenty-six field guns, many more machine-guns, much material, and over 3,000 prisoners had been taken. In Champagne the French had made substantial gains, and had inflicted very heavy losses on their opponents. In Artois useful, if less considerable, advantages had been secured, even if the French line in that quarter had not been brought level with the salient to which the British line had been pushed forward between Loos and Hulloch. But both in Artois and in Champagne the French advance had come to a standstill, and once that had happened, and once a sufficiently defensible line had been established along the British front by the attack of October 13th, no local gain, not even the recovery of Fosse 8 or of the Quarries, would have been worth the inevitable casualties.

#### PRINCIPAL ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY.

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The Story of the King's (Liverpool) Regiment. By T. R. Threlfall. 8vo. 6s. (Presented by the Proprietors, Country Life). (Country Life). London, 1916.

From Sail to Steam—Naval Recollections, 1878—1905. By Admiral C. C. Penrose Fitzgerald. 8vo. 12s. 6d. (Presented by the Publishers). (Edward Arnold). London, 1916.

A VOYAGE FROM ENGLAND TO INDIA IN THE YEAR MDCCLIV, AND AN HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE SQUADRON AND ARMY IN INDIA, UNDER THE COMMAND OF VICE ADMIRAL WATSON AND COLONEL CLIVE, IN THE YEARS 1755, 1756, AND 1757; INCLUDING A CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE ADMIRAL AND THE NABOB SERAJAH DOWLAH. By Edward Ives. 4to. (Presented by Colonel H. C. Wylly, C.B.). (Edward and Charles Dilly). London, 1773.

SELECTIONS FROM THE STATE PAPERS OF THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL OF INDIA—WARREN HASTINGS. Edited by G. W. Forrest. 2 Vols. 8vo. 8s. 6d. (Second-hand).

(Constable & Co., Ltd.). London, 1910.

#### NOTICES OF BOOKS.

King Edward VII., the Peacemaker. By Colonel Sir James Gildea, K.C.V.O., C.B.: Eyre & Spottiswoode, Ltd.

This very handsome volume may be regarded as the first instalment of a work, the preparation of which was entrusted to Sir James Gildea some five years ago by Her Most Gracious Majesty Queen Alexandra. To Sir James the Queen Mother confided the task of collecting for future publication details and reproductions of all those many memorials which had been set up to the memory of a greatly-loved Sovereign. The number of these memorials is necessarily very large and their collection takes much time, for they are to be found not only in this country and in all parts, however distant, of the British Empire, but very many memorials are also in existence in those foreign cities and other places of continental resort where his late Majesty was most frequently seen, where he was best known and appreciated, and where the charm of his personality had deeply impressed itself upon those who were not his subjects. The work as originally designed cannot of course be completed until full particulars of all memorials are to hand, and consequently in this volume we have presentments of the memorials erected in commemoration of King Edward's coronation and other matters, prefaced by a very detailed account of the chief events in the late King's life, from his birth in November, 1841, until his deeply lamented death in May, 1910.

The compiler of this record reminds us that this book is in no way intended to be a Life of King Edward VII., or an authoritative record of his late Majesty's reign, rather is it to be accepted as evidence of how strenuously His Majesty devoted himself to the good of his people and the Empire from his earliest days; and this opening portion enables us to realize how full and busy was the life which our late King led, how occupied were all his days with the ceremonies connected with useful and enduring works of all kinds, how he never spared himself, and how "pleasant" were all his ways. This volume is divided into three parts; in the first are included genealogies of the Royal Family and the summary of the events of the late King's life; the second contains reproductions, beautifully executed, of portraits, statues, busts, medals, and medallions; while in the third will be found reproductions of many of the Coronation and other memorials erected in the United Kingdom, in India, the Colonies, and abroad; the book is further supplied with two copious indices, and the whole itself provides an additional memorial to him in remembrance of whom it has been compiled.

All profits arising from the sale of this work are to be devoted to the Royal Homes for Officers' Widows and Daughters at Wimbledon, in the maintenance of which Her Majesty Queen Alexandra takes, as is well known, so deep an interest; and copies can be obtained from the Officers' Branch of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association at 23, Queen Anne's Gate, Westminster, at prices ranging from two and a-half to four guineas, so that every purchaser of this unique and beautiful book will assist the object to which the profits will be devoted, and on account of which no appeal has been made during the present war.

From Sail to Steam. By Admiral C. C. Penrose FitzGerald: Edward Arnold.

This book is an amplification of a work previously published and by the same author, called "Memories of the Sea," and contains many more reminiscences of a life at sea, during which if Admiral Penrose FitzGerald was not fortunate enough, as in these pages he more than once deplores, to see something of active service, he lived at any rate a very full life, was rarely unemployed, visited many quarters of the globe, and had his full share of the good and bad times which

the sailor's calling has to offer-sometimes in unequal proportion-to those who follow it. The author's first independent command was that of the old "Rapid," a ship which appears to have been singularly mis-named, since she was the slowest ship in the Mediterranean, too slow to keep up with the rest of the Fleet or to carry mails or despatches, so that she was usually detached to some obscure port where her commander was his own master and enjoyed all the sport his soul loved. He tells us many capital stories of the good shooting, which in the days of which he writes was to be found on many parts of the shore of the Eastern Mediterranean. Thereafter, as Flag-Captain to Admiral Lord Clanwilliam, he made a two-years' cruise round the world in a very mixed little fleet of five ships, of which the "Bacchante," with the two young Princes, Prince Edward and our present King, was one-a voyage which, in certain aspects, does not appear to have been an unqualified success. This was followed by a spell on shore as Captain of the Royal Naval College at Greenwich, another term of active employment as Flag-Captain to his former chief on the North American Station, on shore again for two years as Superintendent of Pembroke Dockyard, and then, finally, employment as Rear-Admiral Second-in-Command on the China Station. In so varied a service the Admiral saw many things and people; he has remembered all he saw, and has a number of good stories to tell; and at the present time those he narrates about a visit to Hamburg and Berlin in 1896, and about what he saw of Prince Henry of Prussia, are of very real interest. Admiral FitzGerald deals with many Service questions, about which he seems, at all times and seasons, to have had the courage of his opinions; he has much to say about politicians which is not always flattering; but his book is eminently readable, and in these much-muzzled days, through which we are slowly passing, to meet with a writer who so boldly speaks his mind refreshes a reviewer almost like sea-bathing.

Notes on the Military Value of Roads. By Major-General Sir J. R. L. Macdonald, K.C.I.E., C.B.: Mackay & Co., Ltd.

This very valuable book has apparently been reprinted in book form from the professional papers published in the first instance at, and issued by, the Royal Engineers' Institute at Chatham, and it is the fruit of very much study of a subject which from all times has caused grave anxiety and many searchings of heart to general and staff officers, who have been concerned with plans for the timely concentration of troops, and whose most careful calculations are liable to be thrown out by the fact that their troops may have to march under unfavourable conditions or upon inferior roads. General Macdonald claims, and with much apparent justification, to have succeeded in evolving a method for calculating the rate of marching upon all classes of roads under almost every possible condition which can arise; and from the close agreement he quotes as shown between marching rates calculated in this way with those actually observed, it would appear that his method may be accepted as sound. He shows us how to determine the Road Factor, as he calls it, and its average value, and then proceeds to deal, under the head of Rates of Marching, with the rates at the head and rear of a column, homogeneous or mixed, marching across country, and marching by night. Other sections discuss length of march and conditions affecting the length; the march of a division and of two divisions on the one road; also combined marching and forced marching. Part II. discusses "Communications" and all their kindred matters-convoys, stages, and all the various expedients for increasing power; and both these papers here combined under the one heading of "The Military Value of Roads." should prove of very real assistance to commanders, staff, and regimental officers in the more complete study of matters which exert so great an influence upon the failure or success of the conduct of all military operations.

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